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is special issue brings 18 papers on applied policymodeling
where the complex nature of the systems (and intervention
techniques) plays a signiﬁcant role. e issue covers a range
of applications from crime, ﬁnance and trade, infrastructure,
and engineering to health policies. In order to tackle these
multifaceted problems, a plethora of methodologies is used:
extended econometric approaches, large-scale simulations,
and theoretical models for which some results can be derived
analytically. is highlights the diﬃculty of the tasks and
the lack of standardized approaches, which also may be seen
in a good light as it pinpoints the wide background of the
scholars that are approaching these problems. We argue that
the current issue gives a good overview of the challenges to
be addressed and how the state-of-the-art deals with them.
As a ﬁnal remark, it is worth noticing that the following
list of papers is sorted only based on topics—without any
underlying judgment.
e special issue opens up with the work by the Guest
Editors: “Policy Modeling and Applications: State-of-the-Art
and Perspectives.”is review focuses onmethodologies that
are, arguably, at the core of the complex systems science:
agent-based modeling, network models, dynamical systems,
data mining, and evolutionary game theory. e view of
all the chosen methodologies is presented having in mind
public policy applications. ey illustrate speciﬁc experiences
of large applied projects in macroeconomics, urban systems,
and infrastructure planning.
Two expected results of public policies are fostering
economic development and show adaptive capacity in case
of disruptions. e latter is linked to the concept of resilience.
In the research paper by G. Castan˜eda and O. A. Guerrero,
“the Resilience of Public Policies in Economic Development,”
the authors analyze how the adaptive capacity of the policy-
making process generates resilience in the face of disruptions.
Further, they develop a computational model, which takes
into account diﬀerent social mechanisms (coevolutionary
learning and complex interaction networks) to compute a
resilience score against simulated disruptions to the expected
evolution. Interestingly, they show that certain policy issues
are resilient and others fragile, depending on the context of
application.
is special issue also brings two papers that focus explic-
itly on applied policy from a complex systems perspective.
e ﬁrst—“Infrastructure as a Complex Adaptive System”
—by E. J. Oughton et al. advocates the need to coordi-
nate govern planning considering interdependencies among
infrastructure sectors. e second paper—“A Case Study
of Complex Policy Design”—by Buzuku et al. reinforces
the need to integrate policy analysis. e authors of the
latter propose methodological steps that should guarantee
a systematic analysis that covers the space of possibilities
paving optimal paths for policymakers.
e paper by E. J. Oughton et al. makes a case that
infrastructure sectors are increasingly becoming more inte-
grated in tandem with advances in digital and technological
Hindawi
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enhancements. Further, the authors describe the pervasive
eﬀects of the lack of intertwined infrastructure planning over
social and economic issues. is description is in tune with
the concepts of complex adaptive systems (CAS), mainly,
its multitude of decentralized decision-making agents, its
emergent phenomena characteristics, and its networked,
dynamic connections. e paper then details each feature
of systems locking together properties of CAS and infras-
tructure. Finally, E. J. Oughton et al. illustrate the analysis
of the applied version of their system-of-systems to a case
study of the United Kingdom.ey identify the key decision-
makers across government bodies and list four necessary
metrics to consider about each sector to foster integration.
A family of models under the NISMOD umbrella functions
as the coordinator of the systems aiming speciﬁcally at
long-term planning, risk, and vulnerability analysis and the
prevention of cascading failures within extreme events. e
paper concludes with a critical review of its contributions and
the limitations of the proposal.
e paper by S. Buzuku et al., in turn, advocates sys-
tems integrated analysis via creative and analytical methods
applied in sequence. e authors claim that so-called wicked
problems demand a prior phase of complex understanding
before applying optimal analytics. Hence, when the space
of possibilities is intractable, systemic methods may con-
tribute to problem-solving. S. Buzuku et al. proposed method
combines General Morphological Analysis (GMA) to Design
Structure Matrix (DSM) along with an embedded sensitivity
analysis and a cross-consistency assessment to enhance goal-
oriented policy design. e paper applies the proposed
method to a case study of a large industrial wastewater
treatment plant in Brazil. e authors claim that the tool
systematically served the purpose of guiding and facilitating
the process of decision-making among stakeholders and
experts. Limitations included the diﬃcult iterative learning
process experienced by theme experts and the lack of priority
for cluster of resulting policies suggested at the outcomeof the
process.
e special issue also depicts two agent-based models
(ABM) that evaluate details of policy performance features.
Both papers try to illuminate and anticipate the response
societal groups are more likely to display factoring in internal
social mechanisms.
A. Sze´kely et al. present “Countering Protection Rackets
Using Legal and Social Approaches: AnAgent-Based Test,” in
which they balance beneﬁts of strong legal measures against
coordinated social approaches but also a combination of
both. In fact, the authors claim to consider and integrate
inﬂuence from Homo Sociologicus and Homo Economicus
alike. In the model, the notion of the ‘salience of a norm’
and its measurement along with a calibration process help
make it more theoretically and empirically grounded. In
short, the agents of the model are the State (implementing
legislation) and the NGO (fostering social norms) acting
upon the core, complex-behavior duet of entrepreneur and
consumers within the Maﬁa inﬂuence. Validation is achieved
via participatory modeling but also through comparative his-
torical data analysis. Although not deﬁnitive, results suggest
that a combination of legal and social approaches is socially
preferable.
H. I. Brugger et al. also investigate features of alterna-
tive policy scenarios within (income) groups in “Equity of
Incentives: Agent-Based Explorations of How Social Net-
works Inﬂuence the Eﬃcacy of Programs to Promote Solar
Adoption.” Rather than observing overall increase in solar
photovoltaic (PV) adoption, the paper emphasizes unequal
distribution of adopters given by segregated network eﬀects.
emodel theoretically tests diﬀerent structures of inﬂuence
on the next adopter. us, four alternatives of incentives
are tested against extreme levels (low and high) of network
segregation. Feed-in tariﬀ keeps ﬁxed rates for energy that
is fed into the grid; leasing equipment comes from third
parties; and seeding supports initial adopters in given neigh-
borhoods. Alternatively, there is also a comparison with zero
incentives. Among the tested cases, feed-in tariﬀs were the
one found to produce larger inequalities among consumers,
whereas leasing is in pair with the scenario with no incen-
tive. e author strengthens the argument that underlying
network structures may be relevant when designing policy.
e work by R. Azghandi et al., “Minimization of Drug
Shortages in Pharmaceutical Supply Chains: A Simulation-
Based Analysis of Drug Recall Patterns and Inventory Poli-
cies,” studies, using a mathematical model, the pharma-
ceutical supply chain in order to understand the behavior
of the drug shortages under diﬀerent disruption patterns.
is problem is of relevance to public policy as it must, in
principle, ensure that any drug is available to patients at
healthcare centers. is is a problem that oﬃcial healthcare
administrators and other stakeholders of supply chains con-
tinue to face. e authors use a mix of simulation modeling
and data envelopment analysis approaches.
From a policy and regulatory point of view, under-
standing the characteristics and instabilities brought by the
ﬁnancial interrelations between variegated actors is funda-
mental. ese interrelations can be represented in terms of a
financial network. Contrary to stylized models in the former
literature, such networks exhibit a nontrivial topology. eir
characterization is fundamental, as it is the study of eco-
nomic processes over them. In Y. Tang et al., “Complexities
in Financial Network Topological Dynamics: Modeling of
Emerging and Developed Stock Markets,” the authors study
the interplay between the topological structure of the price
correlation network and the emergent market behavior. In
their paper, they analyze the stock markets of the two largest
world economies (China and USA), unveiling fundamentally
diﬀerent properties in the two stockmarkets, as also revealed
by price movements. While the paper discusses portfolio
applications, the authors call for the interpretation from the
policy-making point of view.
In this special issue, another agent-based model is intro-
duced to study a speciﬁc ﬁnancial network: that of the
interbank exposures. In this setup S. Davidovic et al., in
“Liquidity Hoarding in Financial Networks: e Role of
Structural Uncertainty,” study the dynamics of conﬁdence
in the presence of diﬀerent kinds of shocks. e model
is microfounded including the balance sheet of the bank.
Interestingly, the authors study the spreading of local impacts
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in conﬁdence in cases such as sudden shocks, leading to
the system breakdown. With respect to policy-making, the
results suggest the importance of rapid bailouts and the need
for regulation designed to improve overall transparency in
the ﬁnancial system.
In a similar direction, the problem of fund investment is
tackled by X. Yue and X. Sue, in “A Novel Decision-Making
Approach to Fund Investments Based on Multigranulation
Rough Set.” In this paper, a multigranulation rough set
decision method is used to construct the fund investment
decision information system; then, the fund investment deci-
sion information system is reduced at diﬀerent thresholds,
the decision rules are extracted by reduction and the rules are
analyzed, and ﬁnally the decision rules are given using fund
investment.
In a somewhat diﬀerent venue of research, G.-Y. Shi et
al. analyze the stable marriage problem (SMP) and propose
a theoretical generalized form for SMP, along with average
happiness achieved. Indeed, the paper “Instability in Stable
Marriage Problem: Matching Unequally Numbered Men and
Women” focuses on the application of GSMP for unequal
sized matching groups. e GSMP could be applied to
any matching problems such as clients and servers, peers
in a P2P network or, more generally, allocation of limited
resources across interested users. eir results suggest that
the advantages of the active side are typically observed on
the Gale-Shapley algorithm reverses on the GSMP when
the active side has a higher number of individuals. Further,
GSMP suggests that results are highly sensitive to group size.
In a related research line, Y.-X. Kong et al. in “Com-
petition May Increase Social Utility in Bipartite Matching
Problem” study again the stable marriage problem and in the
context of competition (instead of random matching, as in
the original Gale-Shapley formulation). In this context, they
introduce a global measure for the social utility. Interestingly,
they ﬁnd that, under this condition, competition increases the
overall social utility. ey also show imbalances in the size of
the two groups can change dramatically with respect to the
symmetric case.
In “Congenital and Blood Transfusion Transmission of
Chagas Disease: A Framework Using Mathematical Model-
ing” E. Ramalho et al. study the dynamics of Chagas disease
in cases where there is no vector. e importance of this
case can be understood in the mobility from places with
such vectors, for example, Latin America, to places like
Europe. e authors use a ODE-model in order to evaluate
the epidemiological eﬀect of control measures. It was applied
to demographic data from Spain and sensitivity analysis
was performed on model parameters associated with control
strategies.
N. M. R. Ahmad et al., in “Analyzing Policymaking for
Tuberculosis Control in Nigeria,” study one of the major
causes of death by an infectious disease worldwide. e
authors focus on the tuberculosis control in Nigeria. Using
a sophisticated mathematical model they aim to analyze
eﬀective strategies that could be used in policy-making to
eﬀectively reduce Tuberculosis.
M. Jovanovic et al. in “SOSerbia: Android-Based So-
ware Platform for Sending Emergency Messages” present a
platformused in smartphone devices to be used in emergency
situation. is platform is experimentally used as a part of
the emergency response center at the Ministry of Interior
of the Republic of Serbia. In their work they empirically
demonstrate how the treatment of complex information in
coordination with public forces can be of use in order to be
more eﬀective when applying public policy.
K. Yoo and S. Blumsack analyze “the Political Complexity
of Regional Electricity Policy Formation.” e authors focus
on a very important aspect of energy supply: any technolog-
ical change in electric power systems required from one part
physical systems adapts to integrate new technologies and
market players but also policies and rules adapt to support
that technological integration.
e products produced, imported, and exported by a
given country determine its proﬁle. Diﬀerent representations
are possible of this world trade network. It found in the last
decade that such proﬁle largely determines the development
of nations. Conversely, the set of nations that produce,
import, or export speciﬁc products are indicators of the
complexity involved in its production. In the last years, a
wealth of studies has delved into this research direction. In
policy-making, prediction is helpful as it can help practi-
tioners to solve practical problems and advise meaningful
strategies for the future. In the special issue, H. Liao et al.
“Enhancing Countries’ Fitness with Recommender Systems
on the International Trade Network” analyze the export
data of countries within the World trade. ey introduce a
methodology akin to recommender systems to identify prod-
ucts that correspond to the production capacity of countries,
which are however overlooked by them. By a minimalistic
modeling they simulate the evolution of country’s ﬁtness if
changes in the product proﬁle of the country are changed,
following the policy recommendation. Interestingly, the rec-
ommendation seems to capture the countries’ technological
evolution by making correct out-of-sample predictions of
diﬀerent economic indicators.
In a related line of research, M.-Y. Zhou et al., in “Quan-
tifying the Robustness of Countries’ Competitiveness by
Network-Based Methods,” deal with quantifying the robust-
ness of countries to ﬂuctuating economic conditions. e
long-term aim is to provide policy-makers with indicators
of fragility that allow for construction of eﬃcient policies
to overcome it. Speciﬁcally, the authors develop indicators
to characterize the robustness (or stability, as they frame
it) of countries against unexpected economic recessions.
ey resort to diﬀerent approaches (the celebrated Fitness-
Complexity approach and a method of reﬂections). Inter-
estingly, they ﬁnd that the characterization through Fitness-
Complexity yields countries which have strong robustness
against economic crises.
We—as Editors—are glad to have been able to put
together a relevant number of papers, from a wide spec-
trum of disciplines—from economics to sociology and from
physics to medicine and engineering—and traditions to a
united core of applied policy modeling environment. Clearly,
network, agent-based modeling, and mathematical simula-
tions come to fore as preferable tools of the cra. Much is
yet to be discussed, mainly, from our perspective, validation,
4 Complexity
replication, and comparative studies. We hope you enjoy the
diverse contents and methods that are represented in the
following collection.
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Agent-based models are used to explore how social networks influence the effectiveness of governmental programs to promote
the adoption of solar photovoltaics (solar PV) by residential households. This paper examines how a common characteristic of
social networks, known as network segregation, can dampen the indirect benefits of solar incentive programs that arise from peer
effects. Peer effects cause an agent to be more likely to adopt a technology if they are socially connected to other adopters. Due to
network segregation, programs that target relatively affluent agents can generate rapid increases in overall adoption levels but at
the cost of increasing disparities in access to solar technology between rich and poor communities. These dynamics are explored
through theoretical agent-basedmodels of solar adoptionwithin hypothetical social systems.The effectiveness of three types of solar
incentive programs, the feed-in tariff, leasing programs, and seeding programs, is explored. Even though these programs promote
rapid adoption in the short term, results demonstrate that network segregation can create serious distributional justice problems in
the long term for some programs.The distributional justice effects are particularly severe with the feed-in tariff. Overall, this paper
provides an illustration of how agent-based models may be used to evaluate and experiment with policy interventions in a virtual
space, which enhances the scientific basis of policymaking.
1. Introduction
This paper uses agent-based models (ABM) to evaluate the
effectiveness of public policies to promote the adoption of
alternative energy technologies by residential households. Of
particular interest is the adoption of rooftop solar photo-
voltaics (PV), or solar panels, which convert sunlight falling
on one’s rooftop into electricity. Solar PV is one example of
a decentralized energy technology with great potential for
reducing a given region’s dependence on fossil fuels and can
therefore contribute positively to sustainability [1]. At the
same time, solar PV has a long way to go. Even in markets
where rooftop solar is prevalent, such as in Germany and
in California, USA, overall market penetration is relatively
small [2, 3]. For individuals, solar PV systems represent large
investments and carry with them risk and uncertainty. It is
in reducing these risks and up-front costs that incentives
to install residential solar systems can help promote more
widespread adoption and commensurate decarbonization of
energy systems.
These considerations underscore the need for public poli-
cies that incentivize more widespread interest and adoption
of solar PV. While incentive programs come in many shapes
and sizes, the essential logic of an incentive program is that
it will reduce barriers to adoption for direct recipients of a
program benefit, such as those agents that receive tax credits
or other subsidies for installing solar PV. Incentive programs
also create indirect benefits through peer effects—a phe-
nomenon whereby the adoption behavior of agents increases
the probability that other agents in the system will adopt
(see, e.g., the diffusion model by [4]). Peer effects work
through a variety of mechanisms, such as the exertion of
Hindawi
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social influence onnonadopters (e.g., [5, 6]) and the provision
of new information about the true costs and benefits of solar
through active communication with solar adopters (e.g., [7–
9]).
Thus beneficiaries of governmental incentive programs
can, through their adoption behavior, increase the probability
that other actors in the system will also adopt. At the
same time, however, peer effects are naturally limited to a
certain group of people around an adopter. Certain incentive
programs may perform well in terms of promoting greater
distributional energy justice through supporting PV adop-
tion specifically by low-income households, thus increasing
the number of social multipliers who put the peer effect
into action within this group. Other incentives systematically
target more affluent households and thus might increase
injustice by spurring a peer effect in a group with less need
for a given technology.
In this way, public policies meant to promote solar
adoption may create inequalities in the adoption of solar
between disparate social groups. These potential inequities
are ignored in most formal evaluation of energy policy,
which tends to focus on the overall penetration of solar
PV, that is, the aggregate number of people who have
adopted in a given region. And yet, understanding inequality
in access to renewable energy is a crucial research need
([10]; [11, 179]; [12, 435]). This is important in part because
solar PV technology carries more than just environmental
benefits. Solar PV can also create significant cost savings for
households, helping them to be less vulnerable to energy
rate increases and fluctuations in availability. Depending
on local policies, rooftop solar can even create a revenue
stream for households as they sell surplus electricity back
to the energy utility. However, these benefits accrue in the
long term and becoming a PV adopter generally requires
substantial capital investments and financial risk. This makes
it difficult for households with modest incomes to enjoy the
long-term benefits of solar, potentially creating inequities
where the solar PV is exclusively available to wealthy house
holds.
1.1. The Need for a Complexity Science Approach to Policy
Evaluation. In order to design better public policy for solar
PV, it is necessary to evaluate the efficacy of different
policy choices given the complex social systems in which
these policies unfold, particularly in terms of the degree
to which they avoid (or exacerbate) inequities in access to
a given technology. Classic tools of policy evaluation are
poorly suited for this task. Classic tools tend to extrapolate
future scenarios based on past behaviors, assume relatively
homogenous and rational agents, and focus on aggregate
trends. These approaches largely ignore the complexity that
arises through the interplay of individual decision-makers
and focus instead of the decisions of a hypothetical “central
planner” (see, e.g., [13]).
The use of a network science perspective allows us to
study complex system processes through the explicit repre-
sentation of relations between actors, such as pathways or
the interdependence of decision-making. In recent years, a
vast body of literature has emerged on diffusion processes in
complex networks [14, 15], such as the spread of epidemics
[16] or information [17]. We build on this research and
extend it to the evaluation of policies that aim to promote a
certain technology adoption behavior, explicitly taking into
account the interdependencies between decision-makers and
the complex social networks in which they are embedded.
The peer network influences studied here are nested within
the larger study of economic networks, which are themselves
an important approach for complex systems analysis (see
Emmert-Streib et al., 2018, for a comprehensive review).
For tractability, we focus on the purely social influences by
which potential adopters learn about the benefits and costs
of solar energy. Of course, potential adopters are embedded
in a complex economic network of organizations providing
adoption incentives and banks providing the capital for
necessary upfront investments.
Consequentially, this paper applies a complexity science
perspective by explicitly accounting for the diffusion of
adoption behavior in complex networks in the evaluation of
solar policies, particularly in terms of equity outcomes. One
useful tool in the complexity science toolkit is the agent-
based model (ABM), which is increasingly recognized as a
promising approach to evaluate the effectiveness of public
policies where costs and benefits accrue from complex social
behaviors. Theoretical ABMs can examine the nonlinear
dynamics of solar PV adoption which arise from the behav-
iors of interconnected, heterogeneous agents, as we see in
the real world where solar PV adoption decisions are made.
By focusing on the individual decision-maker rather than
aggregate trends, ABMs allow for an explicit representation
of agents’ adaptive capacity [18]. ABMs are increasingly used
to develop a more robust understanding of energy demand
and the ex-ante evaluation of renewable energy policies
[19].
1.2. Roadmap of This Paper. This paper uses a series of theo-
retical, computational ABMs to compare and evaluate three
distinct types of real-world solar incentive programs: the
feed-in tariff, leasing programs, and seeding of underserved
communities. Of particular interest is the effectiveness of
these incentive programs in terms of (i) the overall speed of
solar PV adoption in a social system and (ii) the access to
solar PV that is afforded to different groups, particularly high-
and low-income agents. This second evaluative criterion
is a crucial component of the distributional justice issues
discussed above. These inequities may be underestimated
if an analyst assumes that social networks allow for the
positive, indirect benefits of incentive programs to spill over
to less affluent communities that face high barriers to solar
adoption. In reality, social network structures may inhibit
these processes and dampen the indirect benefits of solar
incentive programs. In other words, program effectiveness
is likely conditional on how social networks are structured
within a given market.
Our model compares the effectiveness of incentive pro-
grams in terms of aggregate adoption as well as energy justice
as called for by Sovacool [10, 2] and illustrates the degree to
which the structure of actual social networks—particularly
the degree of segregation observed within networks—is likely
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to change the relative effectiveness of different policy instru-
ments. Understanding the mechanisms behind the interplay
of different network structures and policy instruments is
crucial for a transfer of policies from a context with a rather
integrated society (such as Germany or California) to a
context with a more segregated society (as might be the case
in developing countries).
This paper turns next to a discussion of the benefits
generated by solar incentive policies, with a particular focus
on the indirect benefits derived from peer effects. We discuss
how network segregation may create distributional justice
concerns in that certain segments of society will accrue dis-
proportionate benefits. We then turn to a focused discussion
of the particular types of incentive programs represented
in our ABM, as well as expectations based on network
theory regarding program effectiveness based on varying
degrees of network segregation. The structure of the ABM
is discussed afterwards—this is a theoretical model in which
agents in a hypothetical social system are randomly exposed
to incentive programs and make subsequent adoption deci-
sions. We conclude with an analysis and summary of the
results, as well as a discussion of policy implications of this
research.
2. Solar Adoption Incentives and the Role of
Social Networks
Solar PV adoption dynamics are ultimately the result of
decisions made by individuals and households. As with
other types of high-cost, emerging technologies, these are
not simple decisions [20, 21]. Many factors play into adop-
tion decisions, such as peoples’ financial means, peer-group
behavior, and attitudes towards green and new technologies
(e.g., [6, 173]).
Solar incentive programs seek to intervene in these indi-
vidual decision-making processes by reducing the various
barriers to adoption, whether this means making solar PV
more affordable, less uncertain, or more socially desirable.
Most programs focus on reducing financial barriers and
perceived risks associated with solar. Perceived risk can be
decreased through information provision—providing trust-
worthy information about the true costs and benefits of
adopting solar PV. Perceived risk can also be reduced by
guaranteeing a reasonable amortization period (e.g., through
guaranteed feed-in-tariffs as used, e.g., in Germany and
discussed in more detail below). Incentives may decrease
financial barriers in two ways: by decreasing the upfront
investment costs for purchase and installation of the PV
(e.g., through convenient loans or leasing contracts) and by
increasing the long-term profitability of a solar system [20, p.
74].
As noted above, these direct benefits of solar incentive
programs are complemented by the indirect benefit of mak-
ing solar PV a more viable or attractive option for poten-
tial adopters. It is these indirect benefits—realized through
several possible mechanisms—through which a bulk of the
benefit of solar incentive programs are likely realized. These
mechanisms include, for instance, lowering costs as more
individuals adopt. Increasing demand for solar PVs followed
bymore competitors on the supply side leads tomore efficient
ways of production and decreasing prices [23]. Of central
interest in this paper, however, is the peer effect, where the
adoption of solar by a substantial number of early adopters
makes itmore likely that agents in the (geographical or social)
neighborhood adopt solar PV. A number of mechanisms
underlie the peer effect, such as increased information provi-
sion through one’s social network, the creation of social pres-
sures to reduce one’s environmental impact, or the showing-
off of investments in new technologies. Solar adopters who
arewell integrated in the networkmay act as socialmultipliers
by distributing information and being positive role models.
For designing just and effective incentives, it is necessary to
consider the role that the peer effect and network structures
play within the diffusion process of environmental-friendly
technologies.
2.1. Networks and Indirect Benefits of Solar Incentive Programs.
The idea that social networks enhance the indirect benefits
of solar incentive programs is not new; indeed, there is
a growing body of research on the interdependencies of
environmental consumption decisions by individuals and
households. This has been studied in the literature alterna-
tively as peer effects [5, 9, 24], social influence [6, 7], and
diffusion of innovations [25–27], all of which underscore the
same fundamental lesson that the behavior of any particular
agent is determined in part by the behaviors of those they are
socially close to.
Varied notions of “closeness” matter for peer effects,
such as spatial proximity (e.g., one might tend to adopt the
behaviors that are prevalent in the community) or informal
social relations (e.g., one might adopt the behaviors of their
friends). Whatever the case may be, social closeness may
be represented in social systems using the concept of social
networks [28, 29]. A network is simply a generic representa-
tion of how agents in social systems—commonly referred to
as the nodes, which may represent individuals, households,
formal organizations, or any discrete decision-maker—are
related to one another through linkages, which represent
socially important relationships such as information sharing,
friendship, or proximity.
There is a vast literature in the emerging field of network
science that seeks to understand how individual behaviors
are correlated with one’s position in a network [30, 31]. Most
relevant to the idea of the peer effect are diffusion models
of networks. Generally speaking, these models examine how
network nodes adopt the attributes of their neighbors and
how certain structures influence the speed with which a
particular attribute spreads throughout the network (see [26]
for a current overview).Thesemodels are applicable to a wide
range of phenomena, such as the spread of disease over space
and time (see, e.g., [32, 33]), the reaching of a consensus
within groups [34, 35], or the adoption of environmental
technologies including rooftop solar [5, 36, 37].
The primary characteristic of a network that increases
diffusion speeds (and therefore the effectiveness of peer
effects) is the closeness of agents within the network [38].
“Closeness” refers to the average distance between any two
pairs of network nodes and is related to how many steps
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Figure 1: Illustrative network structures. Note: networks generated using ABMs of random network formation in R [22].
it takes to reach a given node by starting at any particular
node. Even relatively slight changes in network structure can
dramatically influence the closeness of nodes. For instance,
only a few random rewires of a lattice-type network can
dramatically increase the overall closeness of nodes and thus
increase potential diffusion speed [39, 40].
In this paper, we focus on two particular types of network
structures: “integrated” and “segregated” networks (Figure 1,
Panels (a) and (b), resp.). In these networks, network actors
have a group membership represented by the shading of the
nodes. Integrated networks are those where actors are as
likely to be connected to actors of their own type as to actors
of another type. For diffusion processes in an integrated
network, it should make no difference to which group the
first adopters belong. In a segregated network, however,
actors with the same attributes are much more likely to be
connected than actors with different attributes. For instance,
actors might be divided along economic characteristics or in
terms of attitudes towards new technologies. In the case of
segregated networks, diffusion is fastest among the group of
the early adopters. However, overcoming the gap between the
two groups—and thus achieving widespread adoption—will
be much more difficult. Again, the position of the early
adopters will be crucial: if the early adopters are brokers
between the two groups overcoming the gap will happen
much faster than if the early adopters are at the periphery of
the network.
The speed of diffusion processes in varying types
of network structures should be an important consid-
eration when designing policies to promote technology
adoption—otherwise one cannot realistically estimate peer
effects. In this paper, we explicitly model the process in
integrated and segregated networks and study how diffusion
processes differ with network structure and how the efficacy
of incentive programs is conditional on these structures.
3. Theoretical Expectations:
Distributional Equity and the Problem of
Network Segregation
Governmental goals are mostly set towards reaching certain
target percentages of, for instance, renewable energies relative
to overall energy production (for the German case, see [41])
or towards the achievement of absolute goals, such as the
100,000 Roof Program for solar PV or the recent example
of subsidies for hybrid and electric vehicles in Germany
[42]. This means that the success of incentive programs is
measured primarily according to their influence on overall
adoption rates [43–45]. However, in a world where large gaps
between affluent and poorer households are observed, one
could argue that an aimof public spending and public policies
should lie in minimizing this gap. Over the last decades,
public spending towards supporting renewable energies has
substantially increased worldwide and is expected to grow
further, from an estimated USD 214 billion in 2014 to USD
300 billion by 2020 ([46, p. 5]; [47]). Calls are getting louder
that this vast amount of public spending cannot be one-
dimensionally directed towards increasing, for example, the
share of renewable energies. Instead, “the distribution of the
costs and the benefits of these subsidies across socioeconomic
groups”—and thus the question of social equity in policy
design—must be taken into account ([46, p. 5]; [48, p. 263];
[49, 50]). Therefore, overall adoption rates should not be
the only evaluative criterion for policy investment incentives,
but the effect of the policy on social equity has to be taken
into account when deciding for suitable policies to support
renewable energies and other measures towards an energy
transition [48, p. 255].
As noted above, one’s choice to adopt solar PV is depen-
dent on a given actor’s position in a social network. Thus
the ability of a given agent to influence the decisions of
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Figure 2: Possible influence relations of an adopter.
others is likely dependent on the level of segregation in the
network. Figure 2 illustrates this schematically. In Figure 2(a),
a technology adopter (the shaded agent) is embedded in an
integrated network, in the sense that the adopter is connected
to similar agents (circles) about as often as to dissimilar agents
(triangles). Thus, the adopter influences both groups (circles
and triangles) equally through the peer effect. In many real-
world scenarios, however, we observe that adopters have
networks that are segregated in the sense that connections
exist primarily among agents with similar attributes [51–53].
Attributes that might be relevant in this context include the
level of education, the awareness of environmental problems,
the willingness to pay for sustainable technology, and overall
financial means [8, p. 344].This scenario of agents embedded
in segregated networks is depicted in Figure 2(b). In this
case, peer effects lead to an increased probability of adoption
within the group of the first adopters [48, p. 263], while
the probability of the members of the other group is not
affected at a large scale. In our application, types of actors
reflect an actor’s individual propensity to adopt solar PV.This
propensitymay be dependent upon characteristics such as the
affluence and environmental beliefs of an actor, among other
factors [6].
Figure 1(a) depicts an integrated social network in which
links between actors of the same type are as likely as
links between actors of different types. Diffusion can flow
unhindered fromone actor (type) to another. In an integrated
network, peer effects can counteract initial differences in
adoption propensities if a low-propensity actor is connected
to many high-propensity actors who already adopted PV;
this will drastically increase its own probability to adopt.
In a segregated network, on the other hand, links between
actors of the same type are much more likely than links
between actors of different types (see Figure 1(b)). Thus,
in a segregated network, peer effects cannot enhance the
diffusion of positive environmental consumption equally
throughout the whole network. Low-propensity actors are
mainly influenced by other low-propensity actors, which will
hinder diffusion among them. Without any incentives, we
thus expect adoption curves of low- and high-propensity
actors to be closer together in integrated than in segregated
networks–where adoption curves depict the percentage of
adopters within a given group over time.
In this way, network segregation can slow the diffusion
of positive behaviors in social systems. Segregation limits
peer effects between unlike actors, and therefore incentives
targeted to affluent actors will not benefit less affluent actors
in the long run because sufficient connections between the
two groups are missing. A careful evaluation of incentives
and their intended and unintended outcomes is needed
to set diffusion processes in motion which lead to more,
instead of less, energy justice. Our evaluation of equity
outcomes of renewable energy subsidies can bring us one step
further to answering one of the research questions proposed
by Sovacool [10, p. 22]: “Which energy [. . .] systems help
reduce poverty and meet development goals and which ones
exacerbate inequality and concentrate wealth?”
3.1. What Incentives Work and When? Various forms of
supporting PV installations through incentives are already
practiced in numerous contexts; incentives include the feed-
in-tariff (e.g., in Germany), leasing programs (e.g., in Califor-
nia) and pilot projects of seeding solar to poorer communities
(also in California). While the outcome of increasing overall
adoption rates can easily be measured, other effects of
incentive programs remain mostly unknown, for example,
the questions of who is benefitting from this kind of incentive
in the short and the long run. Modelling the processes of
solar adoption allows us to analyze the effect of the varying
incentives on the adoption dynamics, which include uptake
of installations as well as equity between different societal
groups. In the following, the three forms of incentives applied
in this work will be briefly summarized.
Feed-In Tariff. The feed-in tariff guarantees adopters a long-
term fixed rate for every kWh fed into the grid from
renewable energies, with solar PV systems being the most
feasible option for private households. Through this long-
term guarantee, the financial risk of adopting is substantially
reduced and the large investment will pay off much faster
than without the incentive. This incentive primarily targets
actors with the financial means tomake the initial investment
in solar. This is because the economic benefits of the feed-
in tariff are for long term, and the upfront investment is not
necessarily made any easier.
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The first country to implement a feed-in tariff was USA
with its Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in
1978. (Pub.L. 95–617, 92 Stat. 3117, enacted on November 9,
1978.) In 1991, a feed-in tariff was enacted in Germany, the
Act on the Sale of Electricity to the Grid [54]. This act had a
far-reaching impact on the development of PV installations
in Germany. Since then feed-in tariff policies have spread
worldwide and are by now world-leading instruments to
support renewable energies [55, p. 19]. In the year 2007, 46
jurisdictions worldwide have implemented a feed-in tariff.
Beside numerous western countries and jurisdictions such
as Switzerland (1991), Italy (1992), Denmark (1993), Spain,
and Greece (1994), also quite a number of countries from
the global south have implemented a feed-in tariff, such as
India (1993), Sri Lanka (1997), and Algeria and Indonesia
(2002) to name the first among them [56]. As multiple
studies have shown that the implementation of the feed-
in tariff in Germany led to a fast uptake of renewable
energies in general and solar energy in particular (see,
e.g., [57]), this in turn led to decreasing prices for the PV
technology making the technology more cost-efficient [58,
59]. By targeting the actors that are most likely to adopt
(high-probability agents), we expect that a faster overall
uptake of installations will be observable (as compared to no
incentives).
However, Welsch and Ku¨hling [6] show that in Germany
higher-income households are more likely to invest in solar.
This trend is consistent with the feed-in tariff, which makes
the adoption of solar a profitable investment for affluent
actors. Jenkins et al. [11, 176] thus argue that theGerman feed-
in tariff is an example of a program that promotes energy
injustice because it leads to higher energy prices in general
in order to refinance the promised fixed feed-in rate for
renewable energy producers ([48, p. 263]; [60]). People that
are interested in investing, but do not own their home or
do not have the initial money to invest, cannot participate
in the transition. However, in the long run, they have to
bear the burden of rising energy costs due to the guaranteed
feed-in, without having had the chance to participate in the
beginning ([61, p. 3882]; [11, p. 176]). This phenomenon of
feed-in tariffs on energy inequity was analyzed by researchers
in a wide variety of contexts, such as in Australia, California,
and UK [46], Denmark, Germany, Cyprus, and Spain [62],
and Thailand [63]. Based on these observations, we argue in
the following that the high and upper middle-income class
is disproportionally benefitting from the feed-in tariff, while
low-income households are unlikely to benefit from this
incentive. Because of missing links to social multipliers, we
expect this effect to be more critical in societies with a major
income gap and high segregation, having crucial implications
for the distributional energy justice of this incentive [11, p.
176]. To evaluate these distributional justice issues, we will
examine the adoption dynamics of high- and low-probability
actors separately. In integrated networks, we expect that the
difference between the dynamics of the two actor groups
will not increase significantly through the feed-in tariff
(as compared to no incentive in integrated networks). In
segregated networks, however, we expect that the difference
in adoption dynamics between high- and low-probability
actors increases significantly through the feed-in tariff (as
compared to no incentive in segregated networks).
Leasing.This formof incentivizing solar adoptions is based on
a third-party ownership. Third parties own and operate PV
on private households or small industrial buildings. Through
the leasing agreement, upfront costs for installing solar are
extremely reduced or even eliminated. Economic benefits
occur from the first month and not after a long amortization
period. Leasing programs are widely present in USA (see,
e.g., [37]) and are currently becomingmore visible in Europe.
Drury et al. [64] as well as Rai and Sigrin [36] are able to
show that leasing options are increasing the demand and
widening the range of potential adopters throughmaking PV
available for less wealthy agents as well. Leasing programs
are thus expected to lead to a faster overall uptake of
installations (as compared to no incentives).Wealthier agents
(particularly those who are risk-averse) will benefit from
this type of incentive as well. The leasing program thus
targets both high- and low-probability actors. Therefore,
we expect the differences in adoption dynamics between
high- and low-probability actors to stay stable with leasing
programs in integrated as well as in segregated networks (as
compared to no incentive in the respective network). These
expectations will be tested with the model introduced in
the next section. The same dynamic is expected to occur
with incentivizing solar adoption through low-interest loans
[63, p. 266].
Seeding Less Affluent Communities. Using this strategy, free
or low-cost PV systems are given out to a selected number of
qualified agents in low-income communities.This has a dou-
bled positive effect on adoption rates: first, strong financial
support is especially important for low-income households to
support their investment [20, p. 85]; second, it is increasing
the visibility of PVs, spurring peer effects within those
communities [8, p. 340] (see above on the importance of peer
effects in low-income communities). Currently, this form of
support is in pilot status only. For example, pilot projects have
been implemented in California under the Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Fund in collaboration with the Oakland-based
nonprofit organizationGrid Alternatives.The project is partly
financed by California’s cap and trade program and aims at
supporting low-income families through free PVs. The peer
effects of this project are not yet monitored. In an agent-
basedmodel, Zhang et al. [65] show extremely positive effects
of seeding for overall adoption rates. Therefore, seeding
programs are expected to lead to a faster overall uptake
of installations in our models as well (as compared to no
incentives). Since the seeding program is only targeting
low-income actors, it drastically increases the probability
that these agents will adopt solar. Especially in segregated
networks, it will be of major importance to spur peer effects
in currently underserved communities. We therefore expect
that seeding programs positively affect the adoption dynam-
ics in segregated networks by decreasing the differences
between high- and low-probability actors (as compared to
no incentive in segregated networks). In integrated networks,
however, the difference in adoption dynamics is not expected
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Figure 3: Model overview of one simulation run.
to change significantly with seeding programs (as compared
to no incentive in integrated networks).
These adoption dynamics—and the role of governmental
interventions in managing the tradeoff between speed and
equality of adoption across communities—are the focus of the
agent-based model described in the following section.
4. Model Overview
These theoretical expectations are explored through an agent-
basedmodel that examines adoption dynamics over time in a
hypothetical social system, given variation in the underlying
social network structures and incentive in place. This model
was coded in R and is an advancement of the model previ-
ously developed and explored by Henry and Brugger [66].
The predecessor model included many of the components
explained in detail below but laid its focus on the effect
that the strategies of firms (when targeting their potential
customers) would have on the adoption dynamics, by being
a gatekeeper to adoption possibilities without altering the
actual adoption decisions. Advancing the previous model,
the current version allows explicitly modelling the effect of
policy interventions (here through various incentives) on the
adoption probabilities of the different types of individual
agents and thereby on the overall adoption dynamics.
As noted above, we study peer effects by modelling
the social network connecting actors, and that enables and
constrains social influence. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show two
illustrative networks in which agents are visualized as circular
nodes, with their color representing the fact that they belong
to one of two groups, differentiated through socioeconomic
attributes that influence the probability of adoption.The links
between those nodes represent the relations between them,
such as information exchange or proximity, through which
peer effects and social influence can unfold.Therefore, agents
that are connected to other agents that have already adopted
solar are assumed to have a higher probability of adopting
solar themselves, compared to agents who are not connected
to adopters.
Figure 1(a) shows an integrated network, where links
between actors of different types are as likely as links between
actors of the same type. This represents a network where
actors build their relations entirely independent of their own
and of the other agents’ group membership. Contrasting
this network, Figure 1(b) visualizes a segregated network in
which the realization of a relation is highly dependent on
whether two agents belong to the same group. In this network
structure, agents within one group are much more likely to
be influenced by other agents within their own group. How
strong this effect is depends on the level of segregation, which
is governed by the segregation model parameter (see below).
As Henry and Brugger [66] note, this representation of the
network may capture various types of social closeness which
determine the ability of one agent to influence another, such
as spatial proximity, shared participation in social venues, or
friendships. Many such real-world networks exhibit segrega-
tion.
Figure 3 gives a graphical overview of a model run.
In the first step of every model run, a network of 100
agents is formed. The agents are randomly assigned to one
of two groups. Links between those agents are built based
on the network segregation parameter (S) and the density
(d). Following this network formation, in each time step,
one potential adopter is selected at random. This agent then
makes an adoption decision based on parameters, which
are fixed for the whole simulation run (the incentive quota
and the social influence parameter, SI) and on parameters
that are actor-specific (incentive, I, and propensity difference,
P) or even time-step-specific (number of adopters in the
neighborhood, N). After each time step, the number of
adopters in each group is reported. The random selection
of a potential adopter and the following adoption decision
is repeated until all agents are adopters. In the following
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Table 1: Model scenarios: overview over determining parameters.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8
Incentive No incentive Feed-In Leasing Seeding No incentive Feed-In Leasing Seeding
Segregation Low (S=0) Low (S=0) Low (S=0) Low (S=0) High (S=0.75) High (S=0.75) High (S=0.75) High (S=0.75)
Density 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Incentive quota 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Propensity difference 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Social influence 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
With these eight scenarios we can study the diffusion processes under the four possible incentive parameters (no incentive, feed-in, leasing, and seeding) in
highly segregated (segregation high, S=0.75) and in integrated (segregation low, S=0) networks. Keeping all other (bold font) parameters constant over all
simulations allows us to single out the effects of the different incentives and segregation on the diffusion processes.
section, the model parameters and the decision are explained
in greater detail.
4.1. Synopsis of Model Parameters. This model examines the
effect of various policy incentiveswithin networkswith differ-
ent structures. The different network structures are governed
by the network segregation parameter. Three additional key
characteristics are defined and controlled for in the model,
incentive quota, social influence, and propensity difference,
all of which are introduced in the following. All of these
characteristics stay constant within one model run but may
vary across runs.
Network segregation is captured by parameter S, reflecting
the degree to which linkages tend to exist among actors with a
similar propensity for technology adoption. For the purpose
of this study, the segregation parameter was chosen to be
either 0 or 0.75. A value of zero leads to an integrated network
(see Figure 1(a)), meaning that agents are as likely to form
linkswith those that arewithin the same group as to those that
are in the other group. In contrast, if S=0.75, the network is
highly segregated (see Figure 1(b)) andwithin-group links are
much more likely to be realized than links between agents of
different types. In the setup of this model, the link formation
is solely governed by this segregation parameter S and the
density d of the network. Links between actors of the same
type are assumed to occur with probability 𝑑 + (𝑆 ∗ 𝑑). On
the other hand, links between actors from different groups
are assumed to occur with probability 𝑑 − (𝑆 ∗ 𝑑). Therefore,
with a segregation parameter of 0.75, links between similar
agents are seven times as likely to be realized as links between
different types of agents (8.75% and 1.25%, resp., displayed
in Figure 1(b)). As discussed below, other values might be
reasonable as well; however, a clear distinction between the
two observed network structures is crucial.
Incentive quota is a model parameter regulating how
many incentives are given out. This variable ranges between
0 and 1, where 0 means that no incentives are given out and
1 means that all adoptions are supported by incentives. For
the analysis of this paper, we studied an incentive quota of
0.3, which means that adoption decisions are made under
the knowledge of the incentives until 30% of the agents
have adopted. This quota reflects the governmental course of
incentivizing the starting phase of the new technology rather
than aiming at supporting all agents to adopt.
Social influence is a parameter determining the strength
of the peer effect by which an agent’s adoption probability
increases as a function of the number of adopters they are
connected to. This parameter (SI) takes a value from 0 to
1, inclusive, where 0 indicates that agents are not at all
influenced by the adoption of other agents they are connected
to, but the strength of this influence increases as SI goes
towards 1. In the currentmodel, we simulate a constant strong
social influence of 𝑆𝐼 = 1.
Propensity difference is a model parameter (P) that allows
differentiating the baseline adoption probability of actors
that are part of two different groups. The baseline adoption
probability captures an agent’s probability to adopt when no
neighbors have adopted yet and no incentives are in place. In
the current model, we differentiate between two groups, the
“high” and “low” propensity agents. We assume a propensity
difference parameter of 𝑃 = 0.6, giving a baseline adoption
probability for low-propensity agents of 5% and a baseline
probability of 8.8% for high-propensity agents.
The model setup consists of three initial steps: (1) the
creation of 100 agents, (2) their assignment to one of two
groups (either with a high or a low baseline propensity to
adopt the technology), and (3) the formation of the network.
The segregation parameter and a fixed density of 0.05 govern
the network formation. A density of 0.05 means that 5% of all
possible relations are realized in the network. The density of
the network reflects the overall intensity of social interaction
within the network (e.g., how often do people speak about the
adoption of solar and how often do they observe that other
people have already adopted).
In order to compare a reasonable number of different
scenarios, identify only the effect of the parameters that are
of major interest within the context of this paper, only the
segregation parameter (high versus low), and the type of
incentives (no incentive, feed-in, seeding, and leasing) across
model runs, leading to eight distinct scenarios as summarized
in Table 1.
4.2. Model Dynamics. After the model is set up, an iterative
process is started, which consists of two stochastic processes:
first, one potential adopter (i.e., any agent that has not yet
adopted) is selected at random and, second, the chosen agent
makes his adoption decision. In the following, both processes
are explained in detail.
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Table 2: Incentive parameter values 𝐼(𝑟𝑖, 𝑧) by incentive program
and agent type
Poorer households
(𝑟𝑖 = 0)
Richer households
(𝑟𝑖 = 1)
Feed-In tariff (z =1) 𝐼0,1 = 1 𝐼1,1 = 1.5
Leasing (z = 2) 𝐼0,2 = 1.25 𝐼1,2 = 1.25
Seeding (z = 3) 𝐼0,3 = 1.5 𝐼1,3 = 1
Random Agent Selection. Each time step starts with the
selection of a potential adopter. Therefore, from all current
nonadopters, one agent is chosen uniformly at random. This
gives every nonadopter the same probability of being selected
as all other nonadopters. Mathematically, the probability
𝑃𝑟𝑅(𝑖, 𝑡) that the 𝑖th nonadopting agent is selected at time 𝑡
is therefore given by
𝑃𝑟𝑅 (𝑖, 𝑡) =
1
𝑄𝑡
, (1)
where 𝑄𝑡 represents the number of agents at time 𝑡 who
have still not adopted the technology. In each time step,
exactly one agent is chosen, who will then make an adoption
decision.
Agent Adoption Decisions. The agent that has been selected
makes a stochastic decision of whether or not they adopt
the technology. The probability hereby varies depending
on group membership, type of incentive, and importance
of social influence. The probability 𝐴(𝑖, 𝑡) of the potential
adopter 𝑖 to adopt at time step 𝑡 is therefore governed by the
following logistic function:
𝐴 (𝑖, 𝑡) =
𝐼𝑟𝑖 ,𝑠
1 + 𝑒−(−2.944+𝑃∗𝑟𝑖+𝑆𝐼∗𝑁𝑖,𝑡)
, (2)
where 𝑟𝑖 indicates the group membership of agent 𝑖 and is
coded as one if the agent is member of the high-propensity
group and zero if the agent is amember of the low-propensity
group. P and SI are the propensity difference and social
influence parameters described above, and𝑁𝑖,𝑡 represents the
number of adopters the 𝑖th agent is connected to at time 𝑡. (In
some few cases, this can lead to 𝐴(𝑖, 𝑡) > 1; in that case, the
probability is redefined to 𝐴(𝑖, 𝑡) = 1.)
Moreover 𝐼𝑟𝑖 ,𝑧 is introduced to model incentive pro-
grams. The incentive parameter 𝐼𝑟𝑖 ,z is contingent on the
group that the actor belongs to (𝑟𝑖) and the incentive (z) in
place. If the agent 𝑖 is profiting from the given incentive, it
will increase its probability to adopt (𝐼𝑟𝑖 ,𝑧 > 1). However,
if a policy incentive is not targeting the group that 𝑖 belongs
to, the probability function will stay the same as without any
incentive (𝐼𝑟𝑖 ,𝑧 = 1); Table 2 shows the respective values
for 𝐼𝑟𝑖 ,𝑧. Critical for the idea of the simulation are the relative
values of 𝐼𝑟𝑖 ,𝑧 for each incentive—the relationship between
the parameter 𝐼0,𝑧 for the low-propensity and 𝐼1,𝑧 for the
high-propensity agents—rather than their absolute values.
This approach is comparable to classical game theoretical
models—like the Prisoners Dilemma—in which not the
actual payout values matter but rather their relative structure
(see, e.g., [67, p. 4f].). However, actual values are necessary
for following the decision-makingwithin the game and in our
case for simulating decision-making processes.
The feed-in tariff (incentive: 𝑧 = 1), which is most
beneficial to the high-propensity group (as explained above),
does not alter the probability function of the members of
the low-propensity group (𝑟𝑖 = 0 󳨐⇒ 𝐼0,1 = 1) but
does have an impact on the probability function of the high-
propensity group (𝑟𝑖 = 1 󳨐⇒ 𝐼1,1 = 1.5). In this
way, the incentive parameter is chosen such that it increases
any given probability, which is dependent on propensity
difference and the social influence parameter as well as the
number of connected agents that have already adopted, for
high-propensity actors by 50%.
The seeding incentive (incentive: 𝑧 = 3) targets the
low-propensity group by giving out free PVs to poorer
households, thus increasing the probability function to adopt.
Again the incentive parameter increases any given proba-
bility, which is dependent on propensity difference and the
social influence parameter aswell as the number of connected
agents that have already adopted, by 50% (𝑟𝑖 = 0 󳨐⇒
𝐼0,3 = 1.5), while keeping the probability function of the
high-propensity group unaltered (𝑟𝑖 = 1 󳨐⇒ 𝐼1,3 = 1).
Under the possibility to lease PVs to private households
(incentive 𝑧 = 2), the members of the high- as well as
low-propensity groups can benefit, because it gives actors of
both groups the chance to avoid high upfront investments
and long-term benefits through the installation. However,
long-term benefits are not expected to be as high as with
the other two incentives (for the targeted group). Thus the
incentives through leasing options are expected to have a
positive influence on the adoption probability functions of
both groups but not as high as when targeted directly. This
is reflected in the applied incentive parameter (𝑟𝑖 = 0 󳨐⇒
𝐼0,2 = 1.25 & 𝑟𝑖 = 1 󳨐⇒ 𝐼1,2 = 1.25), which increases
any given adoption probability for actors of both groups by
25%.
Three additional points about the behavior of this adop-
tion probability function are needed. First, the constant coef-
ficient of -2.944 on the logistic function ensures a minimum
probability of adoption of 5% for all agents, no matter their
propensity or social connections. The minimum probability
that an agent 𝑖 will adopt is a situation where 𝑖 has low
propensity (i.e., 𝑟𝑖 = 0) and the agent is not linked to any
adopters (i.e.,𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 0). Thus, a constant coefficient of -2.944
fixes this minimum probability of adoption at approximately
0.05 or 5%. We conjecture that the value of this coefficient
will not alter adoption trends other than speeding up or
slowing down the overall process. Varying this constant will
only speed up or slow down the model and should not
fundamentally change the underlying dynamics.
Second, the propensity difference parameter P captures
the marginal difference in adoption probability between low-
and high-propensity agents. Since P may not be larger than
one, a high-propensity agent will be nomore than three times
as likely to adopt as a low-propensity agent, controlling for
other factors. Following the preceding point about minimum
adoption probabilities, this means that a low-propensity
agent will have a minimum adoption probability of 5%, and
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Table 3: Effect of incentive programs on speed of adoption: integrated versus segregated social networks.
DV = avg. wait time (smaller values signify faster adoption speeds)
Model 1: Integrated networks Model 2: Segregated networks
Program dummy variables
Feed-in tariffs used? -0.415 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.394 ∗ ∗ ∗
Leasing program used? -0.366 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.413 ∗ ∗ ∗
Seeding program used? -0.282 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.362 ∗ ∗ ∗
Constant coefficient 3.328 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.411 ∗ ∗ ∗
N 7,428 simulations 7,408 simulations
R2 0.029 0.030
Note: the table reports results of OLS regression models with average wait time as the dependent variable. For dummy variable effects, the simulation with no
incentive programs is the left-out category. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗ p < 0.05.
if P=1, then a high-propensity agent will have a minimum
adoption probability of 15%.
Third, this function assumes that the effect of being
connected to an adopter is largerwhen adoption probability is
low.Thus, the connections to adopters have a larger influence
on potential adoption for low-propensity agents than for
high-propensity agents. This difference increases with larger
values of P.This is an artifact of the logistic model being used
here and is in linewith current findings (see, e.g., [5, 14f.]) that
show that peer effects play amore important role for adoption
decisions in low-income households.
5. Results
The following results are drawn from running 3,500 simu-
lations with the three incentive programs described above.
Approximately 25% of these simulations were run assuming
no incentives to establish a baseline for comparison. In
another 25% of simulations, the feed-in tariff was modelled,
supporting the higher-propensity (wealthier) group, 25% of
simulations implemented leasing possibilities favoring both
groups equally, and the last 25% of simulations explore the
influence of the seeding program to poorer households on
the adoption dynamics.Themodels were not run for a certain
amount of time steps but rather until all agents have adopted
the technology (i.e., until complete saturation was reached).
Since the number of time steps necessary varied between the
various model runs, the results are analyzed dependent on
the percentage of adopters rather than on time steps.Through
this uniform exploration of the results, we are able to analyze
how adoption dynamics differ based on the various policy
incentives in place and based on the two analyzed network
structures.
5.1. Influence of Policy Incentives on Saturation Times. The
influence ofmodel parameters, including the existence of cer-
tain incentive programs, on adoption dynamics is explored
through two regressionmodels summarized in Table 3. Using
the individual simulation run as the unit of analysis, these
models predict two evaluative criteria—average wait times
(Model 1) and differences in average wait times (Model
2)—as a function of model parameters specified at model
setup. These evaluative criteria are measures of the speed of
adoption and the equity of adoption dynamics between low-
and high-propensity groups, respectively.
More specifically, average wait time is defined as the
number of time steps required for 100% of agents to adopt
divided by the number of agents in the system.This measures
the average number of time steps that one must wait before
any given agent in a system adopts. Average wait time is thus
a measure of the overall speed of adoption within a given
system but ignores who is adopting. Higher values indicate
slower adoption speeds (worse outcomes), whereas smaller
values indicate faster adoption speeds (better outcomes).
The variable difference in average wait time is defined as
the average wait time among low-propensity agents minus
the average wait time among high-propensity agents. In other
words, this is a measure of the degree to which one group lags
behind the other in terms of average adoption trends. Large
positive values of this variable mean that the high-propensity
group becomes saturated much more quickly than the low-
propensity group, thus indicating lower equity (i.e., a worse
outcome). Values close to zero indicate that high- and low-
propensity groups become saturated at approximately the
same rate.
These regression models allow us to distill the enormous
amount of data generated by our computational simulations
into a relatively small set of average trends that emerge across
simulations. By integrating the incentive program dummy
variables into the model, we are able to examine the degree
to which each program influences our evaluative criteria on
average, controlling for other stochasticmodel parameters. In
both models, the left-out categories are simulations without
any incentive program.
In both models, we see that all programs appear to have
a positive effect on overall speed of adoption. This is to be
expected because, as noted above, speed of adoption does not
account for the distribution of adoption behaviors over space
or within a network. In other words, any incentive program
yields significantly better outcomes than no incentive pro-
gram.
By comparing Models 1 and 2, however, we can see
that the effectiveness of programs depends on the degree
of segregation observed in the networks. While the feed-
in tariff seems to generate the fastest saturation times in
integrated networks (Model 1), leasing programs appear to
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Table 4: Effect of incentive programs on distributional equity: integrated versus segregated social networks.
DV = difference in avg. wait time (smaller values signify greater equity)
Model 1: Integrated networks Model 2: Segregated networks
Program dummy variables
Feed-in tariffs used? 0.008 ∗ 0.024 ∗ ∗ ∗
Leasing program used? 0.007 0.006
Seeding program used? 0.003 -0.011 ∗
Constant coefficient 0.037 0.056 ∗ ∗ ∗
N 7,428 simulations 7,408 simulations
R2 0.001 0.007
Note: the table reports results of OLS regression model with difference in average wait time (distributional equity) as the dependent variable. For dummy
variable effects, the simulation with no incentive programs is the left-out category. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.001; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗ p < 0.05.
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Figure 4: Graphical depiction of program outcomes, speed of adoption versus equity in segregated versus integrated networks.
support faster overall adoption speeds in segregated networks
(Model 2).
Evaluating these programs in terms of equity gives yet
another picture of program effectiveness. Table 4 summarizes
the potential differences in program outcomes in terms of
equity of adoption trends. Indeed, seeding programs appear
to be the only type of incentive that significantly increases
equity in terms of realizing a lower gap in the average number
of adopters within high- and low-propensity groups.
Figure 4 offers a graphical depiction of these results. The
program effect coefficients were reestimated using a measure
of equity and adoption speed that is (1) normalized to fall
in a range from 0 to 1, such that the effects of programs
are comparable across models and (2) adjusted such that
larger values indicate better outcomes and smaller values
indicate worse outcomes. Red bars indicate the estimated
effect of each program on adoption speeds, while yellow
bars indicate the effect on equity. Colored regions indicate a
90% confidence interval for each coefficient estimate, while
the outside bars delineate a 95% confidence interval. As
seen also in Table 4, only seeding programs have a positive
effect on both evaluative criteria when we assume segregated
networks. Leasing has a positive effect on adoption speeds
and no discernible effect on equity, whereas the feed-in tariff
appears to promote greater inequalities.
5.2. Characterizing Adoption Dynamics. While these regres-
sion models provide useful insights into average trends, they
also hidemuch of the richness of adoption dynamics—that is,
the process by which adoption behaviors spread throughout
the system over time. Figure 5 provides a descriptive illus-
tration of these dynamics. Each panel of this figure illustrates
trends realized across all simulation runs; bars in these figures
represent the distribution of the proportion of agents that
have adopted at different stages of the process, among high-
propensity agents (white bars) and low-propensity agents
(green bars). For any given simulation, the “stage” of process
is defined as the number of time steps that have elapsed as a
proportion of the overall saturation time. Thus, a simulation
that takes 1,000 time steps for all agents to adopt is at the 10%
mark at 100 time steps; however, a simulation that takes only
500 time steps for all agents to adopt is at the 20%mark at 100
time steps. Viewing adoption trends in this way allows us to
focus on the overall shape of adoption curves controlling for
the variation in overall saturation times (as seen in Table 3,
Model 1).
The trends seen in these figures support the results of
the models presented in Table 4. Feed-in tariffs produce
much larger inequalities between high- (white) and low-
(green) propensity groups, especially later in the process,
than we see in any other scenario. Seeding policies tend to
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Figure 5: Realized adoption dynamics under various incentive programs.
have very narrow gaps between groups over time, although
disparities to tend to increase later in the process as the
incentive programs are phased out ofmore of the simulations.
Finally, leasing programs do not appear to alter the shape
of adoption curves for either group over and above the no-
incentive scenario.
6. Conclusion
This agent-based model allows us to evaluate the effects
of various types of (simplified) incentives in a virtual
space, accounting for different societal structures.The results
demonstrate that underlying network structures of a society
have an important effect on the effectiveness of policy
incentives.
Our results suggest that policy incentives designed to
support primarily high-propensity agents might not be the
best or even correct way to induce diffusion throughout a
segregated network. In segregated networks, peer effects are
dampened by missing societal links between more and less
affluent actors. Thus, policy incentives that specifically target
actors that are more affluent may further increase energy
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inequality. This is an important finding for policy-makers
thinking about transferring existing incentives, for example,
best practices examples, from other contexts to their own.
An incentive that might have worked well in a relatively
integrated society can lead to extremely unjust outcomes
within segregated societies.
This underscores a need for more reliable measures of
the segregation of a society, so that policy programs can
be crafted accordingly to enhance peer effects in a way
that diffusion spreads throughout the whole social system.
Introducing programs that will properly seed underserved
communities could be one way to enhance distributional
justice. These findings are, of course, not limited to the
adoption of solar PV but within any policy domain where
governments try to foster diffusion processes through policy
interventions. Furthermore, these results can help to inform
more complex (agent-based) models, which try to map the
effect of policy incentives. They emphasize that peer effects
cannot be reduced to simple diffusionmodels but thatmodels
considering social effects need to take more realistic network
structures into account.
6.1. Limitations of this Work. The aim of this theoretical
model is to study the effect of network structures on diffusion
processes and the equity between two groups in this process.
Naturally, such a theoretical model comes with a number of
limitations. First, for simplification reasons, the model only
considers two different types of actors. Those types have to
be understood as a compilation of attributes, such as level of
income, level of education, or level of environmental concern
or geographical proximity, many of which are known to
correlate in real life. The important point is that actors with
similar attributes are either more likely to be connected to,
and thus to influence, each other (in a segregated network)
or equally likely to be connected to each other than to
actors with different attributes (in an integrated network).
Within the scope of this model, no explicit decomposition in
the different attributes and their influence on the diffusion
of the adoption of solar PV is modelled. Following this
level of abstraction, costs of solar PV are also not explicitly
modelled but are implicitly taken into account in the baseline
propensity to adopt.
Second, it may seem that the results of the model are
sensitive to the particular choice of incentive parameters. Two
parameters are chosen for each incentive, which determine
how the incentive affects the adoption behaviour of actors
in the high- and low-propensity group. The key issue is how
the assumed parameters influence the direction in which
a certain policy will influence the adoption probability in
each of the groups. While the magnitude of these parameters
influences the speed of adoption, it is not expected to change
the adoption patterns. Furthermore, conclusions are not
drawn based on findings that directly depend on the setting
of these parameters but are drawn from the comparison
between adoption dynamics in the two network structures,
given the same incentive parameters.Therefore, we donot test
the results for varying parameters.
Third, the two types of networks studied here have to
be understood as stylized network types, representing the
two extremes in which either no barriers or high barriers for
relations between two actor types exist. Future work should
expand this work by studying diffusion processes in larger
networks with underlying real-world network structures,
such as networks enxhibiting community structure.
Fourth, in order to reach an analysable number of model
parameter combinations, a very limited number of settings
for each model parameter had to be selected. Therefore,
exemplary settings were chosen, which allowed the contrast-
ing of the process with two distinct network structures while
keeping the other conditions (such as density and social
influence) constant.However, previouswork suggests that the
network density plays a crucial role in diffusion (e.g., [68]).
Therefore, it would be interesting to explore in future work,
whether changing densities and changing social influence
parameters have similar effects on the diffusion in integrated
and segregated networks.
6.2. Applied Implications ofThisWork. Despite the theoretical
focus of the model, its findings prove to be relevant in
actual policy design. Especially, but not only, in segregated
societies, public policy-makers are well advised to consider
equity effects of the policies they propose. Policies supporting
renewable energies can go a long way in empowering poorer
households and communities if they are targeted in the right
way. The findings in this work show that multiple incentives
are suited to realize the targeted outcome of increasing the
share of solar PV adopters but that not all incentives have
the additional effect of benefiting poorer households and
communities. It has to be taken into account that in some
contexts it will be most beneficial to aim for a fast diffusion,
for example, because this might drive the prices down and
would thus allow that a technology could also be adopted by
less affluent actors in the long run.However, this kind of long-
term positive effects is not always given. This work unveils
that equity effects can differ widely for different policies
and within different societal structures. It would thus be
fruitful if the assessment of how societal structures and social
influence could speed up or dampen the diffusion process
of the benefits of certain incentives would be part of policy
evaluation.
Data Availability
As these are computational simulations, interested readers
may run simulations on their own to replicate the findings.
All data used will be published at the author’s website, and all
codes will be made available for replication of models (run in
R).
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The range of application of methodologies of complexity science, interdisciplinary by nature, has spread even more broadly across
disciplines after the dawn of this century. Specifically, applications to public policy and corporate strategies have proliferated
in tandem. This paper reviews the most used complex systems methodologies with an emphasis on public policy. We briefly
present examples, pros, and cons of agent-based modeling, network models, dynamical systems, data mining, and evolutionary
game theory. Further, we illustrate some specific experiences of large applied projects in macroeconomics, urban systems, and
infrastructure planning.We argue that agent-basedmodeling has established itself as a strong tool within scientific realm. However,
adoption by policy-makers is still scarce. Considering the huge amount of exemplary, successful applications of complexity science
across the most varied disciplines, we believe policy is ready to become an actual field of detailed and useful applications.
1. Introduction
Generally speaking, complex systems are those in which the
sum of the parts is insufficient to describe the macroscopic
properties of systems’ behavior and evolution [1–3]. Inter-
actions among parts of the system, at different scales, in a
nonhierarchical [4], nonlinear, and self-organizing manner
[5] lead to emerging properties [6, 7] that fail to have a single,
certain unfolding in the future.
Social actions, carried out by millions of individuals
interacting in a multitude of way and through traditional or
digital means, and economic processes, where highly hetero-
geneous economic actors are interconnected by transactions,
ownership relations, competition, and mutualism, are two
paradigmatic kinds of complex systems. Policies, as a set
of actions to enhance social life and economic processes,
are an archetypical example of controlling them. Policies are
the product of the interaction of agents and institutions in
time and space in which knowledge of current state provides
only incomplete views of future states of the system. Policy
modeling, as an attempt to design the operation of such
interactions, presupposes some level of comprehension of the
mechanisms, processes, and likely trajectories while main-
taining a strict knowledge of the inherent incompleteness of
modeling complex systems [8–12].
This view that policies are complex enables the applica-
tion of complex systems’ methodologies onto the analysis of
public (and private) policy-making. Such application feeds
on early contributions and takes many forms that vary from
simple construction of indicators andmeasures of complexity
a` la Shannon [13–15], to cellular automata and artificial
intelligence [16], to agent-based modeling [17] and network
science [18].
This review provides an overview of contemporary appli-
cations of policy modeling that follows the traditional com-
plex systems’ methodologies portfolio. Mainly, we focus on
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agent-based modeling, network science, and data mining.
First, we discuss the methodologies themselves and then we
examine three cases in detail. A large consortium for infras-
tructure analysis applied to the case of Britain, one of the
most consolidated families of macroeconomics agent-based
models and its applications on fiscal and monetary policies
and a land-use model in use by metropolitan governance
entities across the USA and abroad. Implications for policy
modeling close the paper.
2. Policy Modeling Methodologies
Fuentes [19] describes a landscape of eleven distinct method-
ologies coming from complex systems’ sciences (the complex
science referred by Fuentes [19, pp. 55–56] include “nonlin-
ear science, bifurcation theory, pattern formation, network
theory, game theory, information theory, super statistics,
measures of complexity, cellular automata, agent-based mod-
eling, and data mining”). While that approach is more
exhaustive, here, we emphasize applications to public policies,
thus focusing more extensively on the discussion of agent-
based modeling and cellular automata, data mining, network
analysis, and game theory. Other relevant methodologies are
considered together in a specific subsection.
2.1. Agent-Based Modeling and Cellular Automata. Agent-
based modeling (ABM) is a computational or algorithmic,
artificial implementation of agentswho interact among them-
selves and with the environment following a set of rules. As a
result of the interaction, the variables that describe the state
of the agents may be modified [20–23]. ABM is useful when
analytical solutions are too complex or impossible to be cal-
culated. Results are sensitive to initial conditions, although, in
many cases, still deterministic, and thus useful interpretation
relies on distributions of stochastically repeated simulations
of the model and reasonable validation.
The uniqueness of ABM methodology led Epstein [24,
25], probably inspired by Ostrom [26], to suggest a third
way of doing science. Verbal or argumentative would be
the first one, mathematically quantification a second, and
algorithmic simulation the third [27]. Such proposal is in line
with the views of philosopher Nicolescu [28] in which social
sciences (and therefore, policy-making) have a contained
maneuvering space when experimenting with populations
and individuals. ABM provides just that liberty of experi-
menting in silico with additional degrees of freedom. Hence,
ABMmay enhance the capabilities of social sciences to bridge
science and policy.
In fact, agent-based modeling as a methodology has
a number of attributes that probably make it the method
of complex systems most attached to policy-making. It is
flexible, adaptable to empirical analysis, cost-effective, and
adequate to ever-changing analysis scenarios [29]. ABM is
also applied to a number of different disciplines in the realm
of policy studies from demography [30], to anthropology
[31], and it also gains recognition and scope in economics
[27, 32] and international politics [33]. Finally, there is also a
profusion of available tools specifically designed formodeling
[34].
In economics, Dawid and Delli Gatti [35] categorize
seven distinct families of macroeconomic models [36–44].
Dosi, Fagiolo, Roventini, and coauthors [41, 45–47] probably
lead the most prolific evolutionary branch of economic
modeling whereas Lengnick is a single standalone model
proposal which does not include a credit market [42]. Despite
these large macroeconomic models, economic studies also
emphasize market-specific models: in electricity [48, 49],
labor market [47, 50], economic behavior [51, 52] and the
problem of commons [53]. Further in economics, ABM is
used to criticize current, quantitative, yet perfect (without
endogenous crises) economic models [54–56]. Finally, it is
worth mentioning the use of ABM to test policies applied
to the financial markets, from the early contributions of
LeBaron [57, 58] and Westerhoof [59] to the detailing of
the effects of transaction taxes and trading halts on assets
volatility [60].
Despite all these contributions, institutions and govern-
ments are still slow in adopting recommendations. Bank of
England [61], OECD [62], the European Union [63] and
some academic institutions (such as MITRE, DARPA, and
NECSI) have helped fuel the debate. Although Page [64]
reminds uswith the essence of understanding themechanism
underpinning economic phenomena, policy-makers do not
seem ready to accept general results and explanations [65–
67], rather sticking to precise (yet probably wrong [54])
numbers.
Cellular automata (CA) also goes back to the infancy
of complex studies [3, 6, 68, 69]. Its fundamental design
is the related analysis of diffusion by contact processes
in a deterministic way when the state of the agents can
be described by a finite set of states. Despite a stream of
literature by itself, contemporary conceptualization of CA
may consider it as a special case of agent-based modeling in
which agents are fixed and not mobile and their relationships
follow a matrix of adjacency [70, 71]. Even then, CA is much
used for spatial analysis, having once been called “space
theory based models” [72].
In fact, among geographers and spatial analysts “Land-
Use and Transportation” models (LUTs) have yielded results
and recommendations for the past two decades. Early models
[73, 74] focused on urban development, but those were
readily followed by more general land-cover models [75, 76].
Transportation and activities models also intensified their
uses in the 2000s [77, 78] and became paradigmatic for actual
use in urban planning and transportation [79–81], especially
by metropolitan bodies.
Advances in the area have been so intertwining that
new models have started to feed from different trends of
spatial-modeling literature bridging transportation and land-
use models to macroeconomics [82] and actual life-cycle of
individuals in order to generate individual demand models
[83]. The bridge has also been generous when crossing
automated computing techniques and traditionalmodels [84]
or when aiding its validation [85].
2.2. Network Science. Network science studies the structure
of a given system in general by recourse of tools originated in
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graph theory. Here, nodes describe the system constituents
and edges conform the interactions between them. One may
consider again that networks are generalizations of agent-
based models in which not only agents have attributes,
but also edges, with varying attributes and lengths. These
connections are abstractions, or dimensional relationships
of the typical fixed neighborhood found in CA models.
These arguments are purely conceptual and only aid the
highlighting of the complementarity of complex systems
methodologies [86]. In fact, two similar economic models
may use either networks [42] or spatial distance [82] as rules
towards consumer decision-making.
Despite this inherently attached connection with both
ABM and CA, network science has come a long way after
its relatively recent birth as an independent yet gregarious
discipline, marked by the seminal papers by Watts and
Strogatz [87] and Baraba´si and Albert [88]. In fact, it has
developed a large field of literature that has evolved from
recent work on network statistics [89] to studies that describe
dynamic changes of the network itself [90].
In Finance, applied network analysis has helped illumi-
nate likely policy effects of systemic risk within interbank
trading. An early work by Battiston et al. [91, p. 2082]
showed that local interactions travellingwithin networksmay
function as “an alternative mechanism for the propagation
of failures”. Subsequent work was able to measure network
systemic relevance more precisely [92] and thus apply policy
testing, including transparency advocacy [93] and leverage
regulation [94]. Together, these analyses have demonstrated
with considerable easiness the possibilities of simulating
alternative policy scenarios.
A current challenge in network science is “understanding
the relationship between structure and function” [95, p.
9]. Scientists are trying to comprehend how the topolog-
ical structure of a given network—how their nodes are
connected–influences their systemic functions and what they
do. An example would be to clarify how the connection
of proteins determines a resulting phenotype. Conversely,
others [96] are trying to find the function or purpose of the
network given observed data, having applied examples on
migration, congress voting, and the human brain.
2.3. Data Mining. Data mining, or more generally data sci-
ence, has benefited from continuously decreasing hardware
prices, larger software communities, and an abundance of
data following generalization of desktops first and mobile
devices more recently, which subsumed giving rise to the
ongoing digitalization of society.One could date this quantifi-
cation and empirical emphasis back to around 2001’s book by
Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman [97], deepening the effort
in 2009 [98]. Quickly, deep learning [99] and neural networks
[100] became standard, maybe due to available software (and
accelerators), such as TensorFlow [101].
There is no doubt of the beneficial effects of data science
on social life enhancement in fields such as pinpointing
fraudulent actions [102, 103] helping in medicine diagnostics
[104], training of professionals via simulation [105], or aiding
mobility through autonomous systems [106]. However, some
concerns are also present [107]. Specifically, there are men-
tions of results without theory, like the infamous Garbage In,
Garbage Out (GIGO) [108].
Such lack of theory is of minor concern for somemachine
learning scientists who want solely to achieve the best
possible prediction, no matter the processes or prejudices.
Conversely, there is the argument that complex “description”
[109], hitherto unavailable, may provide new theories by
induction, which previously seemed as a lackluster source of
scientific reasoning.
2.4. Game Theory. Game theory focuses on how a group
of agents or elements (which may describe individuals,
organizations, economic actors, etc.) interact using strategic
decision-making. The two branches that one can visualize in
this field are cooperative or noncooperative. A good reference
for a discussion on this topic can be seen in [110]. It is
usually understood that cooperative game theory is applica-
ble when agreements are enforceable, while noncooperative
game theory is applicable otherwise. McCain argue that
noncooperative game theory is an effective tool for problem-
finding (or diagnostic method). These observations make
game theory a useful methodology to be applied in societies
that faces continuous decision-making processes. Moreover,
recent studies suggest that a combination of game theory
with psychology and neuroscience has great potential to
understand mechanism involved in social decision-making
[111]. It is worth mentioning that the connection between
game theory and complexity can be achieved, or it is clearer,
when an important number of agents are connected in a
network interacting under a game theory dynamics, as in the
case of evolutionary game theory [112].
2.5. Other Policy Methodologies. Dynamical systems (DS) is
a modeling approach in which there are timed flows among
stocks and control of probabilistic input of variables in order
to conform a systemic analysis with feedback [113]. On such
setting, each stock entity is an abstract construction that
allows mathematical simulation of future states of the system.
There is not, however, heterogeneity within each entity as in
ABM, nor spatial representation, as Batty reminds us [21]. DS
was introduced in the 1970s [114] and has accumulated many
applications and supporting technologies since then [115].
Even though DS and ABM share some characteristics, they
also have important, fundamental, differences [116]. Some
of those are the applications on different levels of analyses
using ABM on complex networks [117]. In those types of
systems, the emergence of new characteristics at higher levels
is difficult to analyze using first principles, something that is
one of the main characteristics and properties of classical DS
[118].
Moreover, numerical simulation, microsimulation, or yet
mathematical simulation is also a methodology that solves
otherwise intractable analytical equations numerically [119].
It is the simple application of known rules, usually probabilis-
tic ones, to known states so that the researcher can observe the
trajectory and results into the future. Numerical simulation
is useful, for example, to understand the effects of a given
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tax change on specific sectors or taxpayers. Crooks and
Heppenstall [120], however, highlight that microsimulation
accounts only for direct effects, the effect of taxes on the
market, but not the counterreaction, i.e., the indirect effect
of having a market that is different from the original one.
Numerical simulation has been used in various fields ranging
from regional economics [121], to fluids, to pollution.
Before concluding, we highlight that this review is def-
initely not exhaustive, but covers the methodologies most
attached to policy applications. We describe some applica-
tions in the following section.
3. Policy Modeling Applications
There has been a wide and spread range of research and out-
put for policy using complex systems’ various methodologies.
This special issue is, as far as we know, a first effort to put
together the main strands of literature specifically on the area
of policy. On the same vein, the previous section lists a sample
of the most referenced publications that discusses policy
modeling and applications in order to help crisscross leading
researchers over different fields. In this section, we dwell a bit
longer on three cases of larger impact and reverberation, in
our opinion.
Specifically towards policy and management, there is
significant difference between planning for a known, well-
designed trajectory development and planning within a com-
plex system environment. “Complexity theory demonstrates
that there are fundamental conceptual difficulties in the
concepts of “planning” in any open system which contain a
significant level of decentralization of decision-making” [12]
[122, p. 320]. In other words, referring to fishery governance,
systems are neither predictable nor controllable [123], thus,
the need to consider ever-changing environments when
doing policy-making.
3.1. System of Systems. A consortium of seven leading uni-
versities and other partners in the United Kingdom has
formed the Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium
(ITRC). ITRC has put together a National Infrastructure
Model (NISMOD) that in turn has evolved into a current
program named Multiscale Infrastructure Systems Analytics
(MISTRAL). All those acronyms depict a large institutional
effort aimed at applying “complexity-based methods” to
public policy based on a criticism of reductionist science,
systems theory, and mainstream neoclassical economics.
ITRC proposed focusing on fourmain themes (according
to the Report “Final Results from the ITRC” (2015), available
at https://www.itrc.org.uk/wp-content/PDFs/ITRC-booklet-
final.pdf. For a longer discussion, see [124]):
(a) Develop a capacity to compare quantitative metrics
of infrastructure capacity and demand given a varied
number of alternative scenarios, which ITRC call
national strategies, while accounting for interdepen-
dent effects among infrastructure sectors
(b) Develop a specific model of vulnerabilities and cas-
cading cumulative failures (and resilience) in con-
nected infrastructure systems
(c) Develop an understanding of the dynamics of infras-
tructure when coupled with evolving socioeconomic
(heterogeneous), spatially specific social groups
(d) Develop sound long-term planning of infrastructure
systems
MISTRAL proposes going further with four encompassing
challenges (see Report [125]): (a) downscale, detail, and
emphasize local complexity of infrastructure, (b) focus on
its interdependencies and connections, (c) take the expe-
rience abroad and change infrastructure decision-making
internationally, and (d) maintain its focus on quantifying the
relationships between infrastructure and economic growth.
All in all, the best output to follow the production of
ITRC’s proposal is the book by leading researchers Jim
W. Hall, Martino Tran, Adrian J. Hickford, and Robert J.
Nicholls [124].The authors introduce the bookmotivating the
relevance of infrastructure systems, discussing the challenges
of handling infrastructure within a contemporary, advanced-
economies, interdependent environment, and outlining their
“system of systems approach”.
Such an approach, the authors claim, would equalize
both assumptions and metrics across different infrastructure
sectors and make them robust against future uncertainties,
all in accordance with strategies developed and scenarios
that are outside the control of policy-makers. Further, the
system of systems would be able to capture possible risks and
vulnerabilities, thus making the infrastructure system more
resilient. Hence, better, long-term planning would ensue.
According to their proposed framework, the first meth-
odological step is scenario generation. A scenario builds upon
a range of possible futures unfolding from demographic,
economic, climate change, and environmental alternatives.
As a result, “a complete set (times series) of external
parameters defining the boundary conditions” [126, p. 15] is
produced.The total number of possible scenarios considering
all alternatives amounts to 2,112 combinations. However,
given that difference, close scenarios provide very similar
results and have different probabilities; in practice a set of
three most likely scenarios with some variants is actually
employed in the analysis.
Next, strategies, defined as the possible ways to tackle
infrastructure provision in terms of planning, investment,
and projects, are developed. The proposals need to be based
on national policy directives and detailed enough so that
they can be simulated. At the same time, three approaches
per sector are observed: (a) demand management, such as
regulation of a given sector, which may affect demand; (b)
system efficiency, including possible gains that come from
technology adoption for instance, and (c) capacity expansion
changes, which actually involves physically altering infras-
tructure assets.
The third methodological step implies the use of detailed
models that are specific for each sector, but that are inter-
twined with one model’s input coming from another model’s
output.The best description of the system of systems method
is that of a “family of models” in which communication and
special links are consistent so that policy trade-offs across the
full infrastructure system are properly evaluated.
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Qualitatively, there are four ways to incorporate changes
within the model. When policy-makers propose a change of
policy, such a proposal enters the model as a strategy-change,
which will end up as a measured change in demand. When
incorporating an innovative process, efficiency parameters
change. When physical infrastructure changes, the capacity
(supply) of the system changes. Finally, when exogenous
change happens, scenarios also change. When all the above
steps have been implemented, the system is ready to provide
evaluation and prognostics. As the authors claim, a “web-
based data-viewer (. . .) combines and compares performance
across sectors, across time, across regions, and across future
conditions” [126, p. 24].
The project has certainly spanned a wide range of results
and publications (a full reference guide, divided by nine
themes (complex adaptive systems, databases, demograph-
ics, digital communications, economic impacts, governance,
infrastructure system network risk analysis, and solid waste)
can be found at https://www.itrc.org.uk/outputs/research-
outputs/). Among the ones with larger reach is amethodolog-
ical proposal (with 25 authors) [127] and a study on the link
between energy and water [128].
3.2. Macroeconomics Agent-Based Model. One of the seven
families of macroeconomics models described by Dawid and
Delli Gatti [35] and also featured in Dosi and Roventini
[129] is coined “Keynes meets Schumpeter” (KS) and was
led by Dosi, Fagiolo, Roventini, among other coauthors (we
have chosen this family to detail, as it seems to have the
larger number of stylized facts reproduced and the more
proficuous production).Themodel baseline was described in
[45] and has a recent consolidation in [130]. A new model
validation proposal uses KS as case-study [85] and policy
applications have been done on climate change [131], labor
market [46, 132], and monetary policy [133, 134]. A review
on macroeconomics agent-based models policy application
is available in [135].
Thegreat contribution of KS is the ability to endogenously
reproduce long-term economic cycles [130], while also main-
taining short-term results, thus, breaking with the economic
paradigm of equilibrium in which crisis is only deviations
from a supposedly correct natural path [54]. Crisis in fact
may have long-lasting effects on the economy. Further, the
KS model seems especially relevant given that it has been
shown to be validated [85]. As such, KS refutes the main
valid criticism of agent-based modeling which is the lack of
validation. Further, it provides actual policy case studies that
are concrete and foundational enough to be applied to policy-
making.
KS models the attempt of translating conceptual inno-
vation theory into measured, validated output growth, con-
textually dependent on macroeconomic conjuncture. Such
an attempt covers both the short-term (and indicators such
as unemployment) and the long run (such as GDP). KS
approach is novel, when compared to traditional macroe-
conomic Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
models as traditional ones do not treat technology as an
endogenous factor for model explanation [130].
Themodel is composed of firms from two sectors (capital
and consumption-goods), banks, Central Bank, labor force,
and government. Capital firms drive innovation when invest-
ing in R&D and output more efficient, cheaper machines.
Government defines taxes values and unemployment subsidy
levels and the Central Bank decides on interest rate levels
[130].
The authors list 17 stylized facts, in both macro- and
microeconomics, that help ensure the model validity for
policy analysis. Those stylized facts go from replicating
endogenous economic fluctuations, to recession durations
to cross-correlation of macro- and credit-related variables.
Further, in microeconomics, the model mimics firms size
distribution, firms’ productivity heterogeneity, bankruptcies,
among others [130]. Despite these resemblances, as previ-
ously mentioned, KS model was used as a case-study by [85,
p. 138, our emphasis] in which they compared the structures
of vector autoregressive models in a five-step process to
show that KS “resemble between 65% and 80% of the causal
relation” in observed macroeconomic time-series.
A bundle of eleven policy analyses derived from KS
is available [46, 133, 134]. They include firms’ innovation
search capabilities, technological opportunities, patents, new
firms’ productivity, market selection, antitrust, among oth-
ers. Specifically about income inequality, [133] reports that
markup setting influences both the dependence of financial
support and the share between profits and wages. Such
mechanism affects macroeconomics’ stability and growth.
Together, the authors agree with inputs by Stiglitz and Piketty
that claim that there is a downward trend feedback loop in
economics that can be tied to higher levels of inequality. In
such a scenario fiscal austerity hasmore negative effects when
coupled with higher markup levels.
Furthermore, recent applications of the KS model on the
labor market [47, 136, 137] have helped show that more rigid
markets with higher levels of protection and less flexible
wage may in fact keep output at increased levels, while
maintaining lower inequality. Dosi et al. [137] suggest that
coordination failures bringwages down and thus significantly
impacting aggregate demand. The authors also suggest [136]
that the core reasons of rising unemployment are lower
innovation rates, workers’ skills deterioration, and reduced
firms entry dynamics. This is also relevant because it goes
against typical policy recommendations based on DSGE
applications hitherto supported by international institutions
such as OECD and the IMF, but which is under discussion
[138].
In sum, KS model suggests that (a) technological changes
and market open for new firms lead to strong positive
growth; (b) patent enforcement, however, reduces growth
dynamism; and (c) competition is relevant, but producing
weaker effects. KS further recommends countercyclical fiscal
policy (opposed to fiscal austerity) as a means to convey
(a) unemployment and output stability; (b) “higher growth
paths”, whereas fiscal austerity would be detrimental to the
economy and government debt in both the short and long
run.
KS is thus amodel that clearly exemplifies a new tradition
for a given segment of macroeconomics [135]. It seems
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to have been able to capture most of the variations of a
complex system, the economy, allowing for policy analysis in
a validated, fact replicating reasonable model.
3.3. UrbanSim. UrbanSim was first proposed in the mid-
1990s [77, 78, 139, 140] as a model that focused on feedback
effects from land use into transport and back.Their modeling
process include a family of submodels that run indepen-
dently, feeding on empirical data, while exchanging inputs
and outputs among themselves. In practice, a GIS interface
with a typical 150-meter grid works as a single unit summing
up households and firms. The land price model follows
typical neoclassical urban economics [141] and hedonic price
regression modeling [142] which is update at each year-step
of the model.
Since then, UrbanSim has grown and changed into a 3D
platform in 2012 and became proprietary software (urban
canvas) in 2014. They have now expanded the simulation to
include not only land use and transportation but also the
economy and the environment. They claim to account for
unfolding effects of infrastructure onto transport, housing
affordability, and the environment.
The agents of the model include households, individual
citizens, and firms, including land developers, government,
and their political constraints [143]. Facing a given environ-
ment, agents make choices, such as (a) whether to find a job
(andwhich one) or stay at home, (b) where to locate your own
family or your business, and (c) whether a family or business
relocation is a sensible move.
The market in the model is asynchronous. Households
search for new dwellings facing the short-term needs for
a given year. Land developers observe house demand, but
augment house supply within a wider, cumulative number
of years [143]. Although prices are modeled (calculated)
endogenously, the model does not impose equilibrium; i.e.,
there is no need for markets to “clear” [77].
A first application of the model is available for Eugene-
Springfield, Oregon [77]. The interested policy stakeholder,
Oregon Department of Transportation, actually financed the
project. The model uses data starting in 1994 and runs for 15
years with a resolution grid of 150 square meters. A previous
time-frame from 1980 to 1994 was used to validate the model
capabilities. A good accuracy (of less than 50 households
between simulated and observed results) was achieved for
57% of the sample. A larger error of up to 200 households
included 89% of the sample for number of households and
76% for the number of jobs. Although reasonable, the results
did not predict isolation and pinpoint change occurrences
and have also overpredicted and underpredicted for small
areas.
The takeaway from the first UrbanSim implementation is
that effective integration of at least land use, transportation,
and environmental issues’ mechanisms is a must [77]. Such
an integration should also be accompanied by considering
that, in practice, those areas usually involve different, distinct
institutions (responsible for each issue), with conflicting
values, epistemologies, and pragmatic policies [143].
Applications of UrbanSim were later developed for
Detroit, Michigan [144], Salt Lake City, Utah [139], San
Francisco, California [145], Seattle, Washington [146], and
Paris, France [147].
The belief for integrated planning shown in the 2011s
[143] paper is still present in UrbanSim’s most recent output
[79]. Oncemore financed by an interested policy stakeholder,
US Department of Energy, the authors propose an inte-
grated “pipeline” among UrbanSim, called amicrosimulation
platform, along with ActivitySim, an agent-based model
platform responsible for the generating traffic demand based
on citizens choice of activities and a traffic assignment
model (a routing mechanism). The motivation behind the
attempt is clear: how to effectively quantify both intended
and unintended consequences on urban complex environ-
ments, given a specific change in infrastructure or policy.
Further, as the authors put it, urban systems are those in
which “transportationnetwork, the housingmarket, the labor
market ([via] commuting), and other real estate markets are
closely interconnected...” [79, p. 2].
4. Conclusions
In this review, we show some of the impact of the complexity
science methodologies has had in public policy. We take spe-
cial attention to agent-based modeling, network science, data
mining, and game theory. We believe that these methodolo-
gies are important not only being used extensively nowadays,
but also being the ones that are creating the bridge between
science (its quantitative and qualitative methods, ways of
thinking, etc.) and policy decision-making. We also have
presented real cases where the use of suchmethodologies has
been used.
The case analysis suggests that larger efforts are being
developed in policy applications of different realms, from
macroeconomics (fiscal andmonetary policy), to urban plan-
ning (mobility and air pollution), to infrastructure (energy,
water, andwaste).We have selected these examples as they are
paradigmatic, while we acknowledge that they are only some
of the high-magnitude works currently being developed.
The list of references amassed account for other smaller,
scattered applications that seem to be wide and spread across
disciplines.
Nevertheless, such a growing body of literature does not
show that these methodologies have been understood, nor
accepted without caveats in academia (in general) and policy-
makers. Namely, most macroeconomics policy follows DSGE
methods although they have been also heavily criticized
[54]. Most infrastructure projects are planned in an isolated
manner, following sector guidelines with little or no interface
with other sectors. Further, most urban planning carried out
observes all of the challenges issues listed by [143] conflicting
institutions, values, epistemologies, and policies, but also the
inherent communication issues across heterogeneous fields.
All in all, results of the three cases presented in detail
reinforce the belief that integrated modeling performed with
input originated across disciplines, sectors, and institutions
within a complex systems framework deliveries with the
added bonus of unveiling large scale effects of policies in an
adaptive, evolutionary, nonhierarchical manner.
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The dynamics of conﬁdence aﬀect a plethora of ﬁnancial phenomena including liquidity hoarding. We present a multiagent model
of a ﬁnancial network in which conﬁdence dynamics are shaped by structural uncertainty—that is, the lack of knowledge about the
network of interbank cross-exposures. During a ﬁnancial crisis, structural uncertainty makes it diﬃcult for banks to assess the risk
of ﬁnancial contagion and their own health. Under such conditions, banks are more likely to behave conservatively and quickly act
on information they receive from their local environment. A sudden ﬁnancial shock, therefore, can be characterized by high-
intensity local impact on conﬁdence. We ﬁnd that such local impacts quickly spread throughout the network, causing more
damage than a shock that evenly aﬀects all localities in the system; for example, a complete breakdown of the system occurs
with a higher probability. The results are explained analytically by linking system performance to the speed of decrease in
conﬁdence.
1. Introduction
The “freeze” of the interbank market in the recent ﬁnancial
crisis denied ﬁnancial institutions (banks, for short) access
to liquid assets when they needed them most. In late 2007,
the U.S. and European markets experienced simultaneous
runs on asset-backed commercial papers [1]. The second
large shock occurred in the fall of 2008 when failures of
AIG and Lehman Brothers set oﬀ defaults of money-market
funds (e.g., the Reserve Primary Fund), which subsequently
triggered runs on the repurchase agreement market. Banks
responded with precautionary liquidity hoarding, causing
interbank market to dry up [2, 3]. The resulting diﬃculty of
borrowing money and the increase in interest rates produced
a series of adverse consequences for ﬁnancial and real sectors.
First, pressure to obtain liquidity through sales of long-term
assets led to ﬁre sales that further deteriorated banks’ asset
positions. Second, facing the growing prospect of illiquidity,
banks struggled to maintain their lending activities. Third,
given that the price of money in interbank markets is a
benchmark for the interest rates in the economy, the real
sector experienced diﬃculty obtaining funding under reason-
able conditions. Together, these factors further aggravated
already existing symptoms of the crisis.
There are two common explanations for the interbank
market collapse: the increase in counterparty risk and
liquidity hoarding [4]. The uncertainty about the network
of cross-exposures between banks, also known as structural
uncertainty [5], however, made both of these factors more
eﬀective. The fear of counterparty risk—a risk that a business
partner cannot meet its obligation—can be linked to the
subprime market crash that led a large fraction of banks
holding mortgage-backed securities to experience ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. The resulting increase in liquidity demand and
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the reduction in the number of liquidity providers set oﬀ
basic conditions for banks to withhold liquidity from the
market—liquidity hoarding. Furthermore, structural uncer-
tainty made it diﬃcult for liquid banks to assess the risk of
events farther in the network and identify risk-free parties.
For the same reason, liquid banks could not rule out the pos-
sibility of suﬀering a sudden loss through already existing
cross-exposures. In such a context, they were more likely to
anticipate increased liquidity needs in the future, as well as
the possibility of limited access to the interbank market.
The loss of conﬁdence in the interbank market and liquidity
hoarding were hence the result of a number of interrelated
factors, but it was the structural uncertainty that made each
of them more consequential.
In this paper, we explored a model of a banking network
in which the conﬁdence of banks is shaped by uncertainty
about the network of interbank lending. This is a realistic
assumption since the network of interbank cross-exposures
is not known due to the over-the-counter character of
interbank transactions. We found that when conﬁdence is
sensitive to local information only, the probability of sys-
temic failures increases substantially.
We adopted the framework of Arinaminpathy et al. ([6];
hereafter the AKM model) in which a bank’s conﬁdence is
modeled to reﬂect the severity of the ﬁnancial situation in
the banking system. A bank’s conﬁdence is directly linked
to its decision to roll over or withdraw previously established
interbank loans—the lower the conﬁdence, the higher the
possibility of precautionary withdrawals. The model also
includes the eﬀects of ﬁre sales and asset price contagion, as
they are in a close relationship with market liquidity. Here,
we assumed that banks are responsive to information
received from their direct interbank counterparties but not
from the banks that are further away in the network. The
intuition is that in the face of structural uncertainty, banks
rely on actions that take place in their locality. As was done
in the AKMmodel, we also considered a case in which banks
receive information from all banks in the system, but we
made the information either noisy or delayed relative to the
distance information needs to travel in the network to reach
the receiver.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
start with the discussion of related literature in Section 2,
followed by the model of a banking network in Section 3.
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to our model of uncertainty
and the application of initial shock(s) to the system, respec-
tively. In Section 6, we detail our simulation procedure; our
main results are presented in Section 7 and additional analy-
sis in Section 8. We end with the discussion in Section 9.
2. Related Literature
Our paper is related to the network models of ﬁnancial
contagion [7]. Network approaches have proven useful for
understanding contagion processes in biological, social, and
ﬁnancial systems (e.g., [8–12]). In ﬁnancial systems in partic-
ular, individual institutions are linked to each other through
a complex system of interbank lending [13] and holdings in
common assets [14, 15]. Such a system lends itself naturally
to being modeled with a network approach.
Most models of ﬁnancial networks have treated conta-
gion as being directly transmitted between institutions (e.g.,
[16–19]), leaving the mechanism of market panics largely
unexplored. One reason may be because the outbreak of
herding behavior is not well captured by a cascade that
spreads through the network of cross-exposures. Instead, it
is predominantly driven by a collective change in expecta-
tions, which does not exhibit simple cascade-like spreading
patterns. A simultaneous drop in banks’ conﬁdence, for
instance, can be a mediator of collective withdrawal of liquid-
ity and ﬁre sales. This is because the interbank market relies
on the collective conﬁdence in its service as a safe resort in
case of unforeseen liquidity needs. Furthermore, the func-
tioning interbank market attenuates banks’ liquidity buﬀers
by allowing them to operate with minimal holdings of low-
proﬁt liquid assets. Thus, the steady reduction in banks’
liquid reserves in the decades prior to the ﬁnancial crisis
reﬂects the increasing market eﬃciency and the growing
conﬁdence in its reliability (Figure 1). However, the recent
crisis demonstrated that such a scheme is not resistant to
large ﬁnancial shocks, which proved to be capable of under-
mining the collective conﬁdence. Taken together, these all
point to the importance of understanding of how conﬁdence
decay spreads in the banking system.
Hansen and Sargent [20] studied the sensitivity of
beliefs to uncertainty, although they did not look at how
such beliefs spread in the ﬁnancial system. Gai et al. [21]
introduced a network model of liquidity hoarding where
the propensity for precautionary withdrawals, a proxy of
the collective conﬁdence, was exogenously decided. Such
a setting left the process of conﬁdence loss out of consid-
eration. By contrast, in the AKM model [6], conﬁdence
was endogenously determined as a function of the severity
of the ﬁnancial situation in the interbank market but
with the unrealistic assumption that banks have complete
information about other banks in the system. This
implied that conﬁdence shocks were well distributed
among all banks, leaving the impact of structural uncer-
tainty and heterogeneously distributed conﬁdence in the
network unexplored.
Our paper is also related to the literature focused on the
relationship between liquidity hoarding and asset prices
(e.g., [4, 22–24]). For instance, Gale and Yorulmazer [4]
and Diamond and Rajan [24] showed that in certain
conditions, privately optimal decisions can lead to hoarding
behavior and ﬁre sales. These authors also considered specu-
lative hoarding, when a liquidity shortage stimulates liquid
buyers to withhold liquidity in expectation of high returns
from potential ﬁre sales. Nevertheless, the main diﬀerence
from our work here is that their studies were not concerned
with the complexity of interbank cross-exposures or accom-
panying structural uncertainty.
There have been several studies connecting diﬀerent
sources of uncertainty to market liquidity. Caballero and
Krishnamurthy [25] argued that capital immobility and
liquidity hoarding can be explained by the reactions of
decision makers to the Knightian uncertainty embedded in
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the ﬁnancial environment in the form of sudden events
and untested ﬁnancial innovations. Routledge and Zin [26]
showed how derivative pricing under uncertainty produces
diverse eﬀects on market liquidity. A link between uncer-
tainty and market complexity was tackled by Zawadowski
[27], who found that the layers of ﬁnancial intermediation
amplify uncertainty about the availability of funding, causing
a cascade of liquidity withdrawals. However, all banks were
familiar with the underlying network of lending.
In a recent paper addressing the same problem as our
study, Caballero and Simsek [28] considered structural
uncertainty in a model of liquidity hoarding and ﬁre sales.
They argued that ignorance about the underlying network
of interconnections, a dormant factor in normal times,
becomes relevant in a crisis when liquid banks have to
consider who will be next aﬀected by the cascade of failures.
This shifts their preference toward keeping liquid assets
instead of investing long term, causing liquidity shortages
and ﬁre sales. While sharing the assumption that banks
reliably know only information about their counterparties,
the Caballero and Simsek study diﬀers from ours by assum-
ing that banks know the outline of the network of cross-
exposures. For simplicity, they also assumed that the banking
network forms a circular shape. In our model, the network of
interbank lending approximates features of real-world
banking networks, and its shape is not known to the banks.
Unlike the circular arrangement, the small-world feature of
real ﬁnancial networks makes all banks relatively close to
each other [29], which has implications on the spread of
information and ﬁnancial risk in the system.
3. Model of a Banking Network
In the AKMmodel, banks are connected by lending relation-
ships and holdings in common assets. Our analysis is focused
on a short-term horizon in which banks can decide to roll
over, shorten loan maturity, or terminate already established
lending contracts. Their decisions depend on their conﬁ-
dence, which is expressed as a function of the level of assets
and interbank loans in the system. When the system faces
ﬁnancial diﬃculties and bank defaults, the value of its assets
and interbank loans shrinks, lowering conﬁdence. This in
turn leads to more preemptive actions of banks, putting
pressure on their counterparties and causing more defaults.
In this way, the model captures positive feedback between
the severity of the ﬁnancial condition in the system and
individual behaviors of banks.
In addition to liquidity hoarding, two other contagion
mechanisms take place in the model. One relates to the prop-
agation of counterparty credit risk, which aﬀects lenders when
borrowers are not able to repay their loans. The other is asset
price contagion, which occurs when liquidation of assets of
failed banks pushes the corresponding asset prices down. All
banks holding the aﬀected assets suﬀer from the price drop,
which is modeled according to Cifuentes et al. [30]. Correla-
tions between assets are not included in our model.
3.1. Nodes and Edges. For simplicity, nodes or banks in the
network can only be large or small, where the size disparity
is ﬁxed by the size ratio q q = large bank assets/small bank
assets . Banks are represented as simpliﬁed balance sheets
with properties listed in Figure 2. The liability side con-
tains capital (also known as owner’s equity), retail deposits
(money in the accounts of banks’ customers), and interbank
borrowing (assets borrowed from other banks). The level of
capital represents the amount of asset loss that a bank can
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Figure 1: Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets in the United States (1960–2016), that is, the ratio of domestic currency holdings and
deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other governments, nonﬁnancial public enterprises, the private sector, and other banking
institutions. The recent 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis led banks to hoard liquidity. Source: the World Bank, retrieved from http://WorldBank.
com and http://NationMaster.com.
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Figure 2: A balance sheet representation of a bank (adapted
from [6]). a= total assets; γ= capital ratio; l = liquidity ratio; θ=
interbank loans-to-assets ratio; z = average number of incoming
and outgoing loans.
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withstand before becoming insolvent and going bankrupt
(insolvency and illiquidity are separately discussed in Section
5). Retail deposits are taken to be external to the system and
do not play an active role in the model. Interbank borrowing
represents loans received from other banks, and the number
of incoming loans represents the in-degree of an individual
node. On the asset side, there are n external asset classes
(investments in assets that are external to the banking sys-
tem), liquid assets (e.g., cash), and interbank lending (assets
lent to other banks). External asset classes are distributed
among banks from a ﬁxed number of distinct asset classes
contained in the system (see next section). This means that
multiple banks will share the same asset class, which can lead
to asset price contagion—the drop in value of one asset class
will aﬀect multiple banks. Liquid assets are a small fraction l
of the overall assets that banks keep in the most liquid form
to meet immediate needs. They are mostly composed of cash
or any cash equivalent, such as central bank reserves or high-
quality government bonds, which are easily convertible to
money. Finally, interbank lending corresponds to outgoing
loans to other banks in the system, thus giving rise to a
lending network, as described below. Parameters γ and θ
(Figure 2) determine the initial proportions of capital and
interbank loans in the total assets a, respectively. The balance
sheet’s parameters reﬂect the values observed in the banking
sector before the crisis [31]: the proportion of total assets
initially determined to be held in interbank loans θ = 0 2,
the proportion of total assets initially liquid l = 0 01, and
capital-to-asset ratio γ = 0 04.
3.2. Network. The network is a directed random graph with
N = 120 banks (Figure 3). The default value of the size ratio
q is 10 (The main pattern of results is insensitive to changes
of q and N as long as they are large enough.), which given
total number of banks results in a network with Nb = 11 large
and Ns = 109 small banks. The in-degree and out-degree of
banks are determined by a Poisson distribution with param-
eter z = 5 for small and q × z = 50 for large banks. That is,
small (large) banks on average have ﬁve (50) incoming and
ﬁve (50) outgoing loans. Each edge in the network is a loan
with direction from lender to borrower. The default value
of each single loan is normalized as 1. The maturity of inter-
bank lending is also simpliﬁed: a random half of interbank
loans are assigned to be “short-term” and the rest to be
“long-term” loans. The short-term loans can be withdrawn
immediately by a lender in a single decision, whereas long-
term loans have to be shortened ﬁrst. The banks are also
interrelated by sharing the same external asset classes. These
relationships are the basis for the asset price contagion.
Small banks have 10, and large banks 20 external asset
classes ns = 10, nb = 20 . Given that on average 10 banks
share the same asset class (g = 10), this implies 131 distinc-
tive external asset classes G = Nbnb +Nsns /g .
The diﬀerence in the connectivity of large and small
banks and the random assignment of their connections result
in the core-periphery structure of the network. That is, large
banks with many links are densely interconnected—forming
the core, and small banks with few links are loosely intercon-
nected—forming the periphery. The resulting structure is
“shallow,” (This is in agreement with the core-periphery
structure of the global banking network [13]. Roughly speak-
ing, any two banks at the periphery are a few connections
away since they are linked via the well-connected core.)
meaning that the average path length in the network is
relatively short due to the well-connected core.
3.3. Conﬁdence and Individual Health. Conﬁdence C is the
ﬁrst important determinant of a bank’s behavior. In the
AKM model, conﬁdence is calculated as a function of A
and E, which are measures of solvency and liquidity of the
system, respectively:
C = AE,
A = 〠
N
i=1
Ai,
Ai =
ai
∑Ni=1a0i
,
E = 〠
N
i=1
Ei,
Ei =
ei
∑Ni=1e0i
1
At a given point in time, A denotes the total value of all
remaining assets in the system as a proportion of its initial
value; E is similarly the fraction of interbank loans not with-
drawn from the system; Ai and Ei are the remaining assets
and interbank loans of bank i as the proportion of initial
value of total assets in the system; ai and ei are the absolute
values of remaining assets and interbank loans of bank i;
Figure 3: Bankingnetworkwith 120banks. Thenode size isweighted
by its degree. Large banks are colored in light green, whereas small
banks are colored in dark green. The network is constructed using
the default values of the model parameters (Section 3.2) and has
a core-periphery structure: large banks with many links are
densely interconnected—forming the core, and small banks with
few links are loosely interconnected—forming the periphery.
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and a0i and e
0
i are the initial absolute values of assets and
interbank loans of bank i.
To calculate C as deﬁned in the AKM model, and to take
any action, banks have to know the current and initial values
of assets and interbank loans of all banks in the system. To
explore how the network behaves in a more realistic setting,
especially in times of crisis when the system is changing
rapidly, we consider several uncertainty scenarios, described
in Section 4.
Unlike C, which is a systemic parameter, hi denotes the
individual health of bank i and is calculated as a function of
its indicators of solvency ci and liquiditymi:
hi = cimi, 0 < hi < 1,
mi =min 1,
ASTi + li
LSTi
,
2
where ci is the capital of bank i deﬁned as a proportion of its
initial value; mi is the fraction of i’s short-term liabilities that
the bank can settle immediately, through its liquid and short-
term assets; ASTi is the total value of i’s short-term interbank
assets; LSTi is the total value of i’s short-term interbank liabil-
ities; and li is the amount of liquid assets held by bank i.
3.4. Decision Rules. The dynamics in the model are deter-
mined by decisions that banks make in discrete simulation
time. For each of its outgoing connections, a loan provider
can decide whether to shorten a long-term loan and whether
to withdraw a short-term loan. A lender can withdraw
short-term loans in a single decision, resulting in the connec-
tion between the two banks being removed immediately;
long-term loans can only be “shortened” in a single decision,
resulting in the connection between the banks becoming a
short-term loan. Thus, an eventual withdrawal of a long-
term loan requires an additional decision, i.e., time step (see
Appendix B). Depending on its maturity, a loan between two
banks i and j is, respectively, shortened and withdrawn when
hihj < 1 − C ,
hihj < 1 − C 2
3
If C is high (1 or close to 1), these conditions are satisﬁed
only under extreme conditions for hi and hj. In contrast, a
drop in C can cause liquidity hoarding, as both decision con-
ditions are more likely to be satisﬁed for all banks in the sys-
tem. In addition, the shortening condition is easier to satisfy
than the withdrawing condition, which means that banks
resort to withdrawal only in relatively urgent situations.
4. Model of Uncertainty
In interbank markets, business partners trade privately,
which often leads to a relationship with preferential treat-
ment and repeated transactions [32, 33]. Accordingly, in
our main uncertainty setting—the local information (LI)
scenario—we restricted information availability to the
nearby, that is, “local” banks in the banking network. This
makes banks highly sensitive to local events and insensitive
to events that take place further away in the network. Their
responsiveness is calibrated so that they do not take action
unless they notice signs of trouble in their locality; but when
they do, then their reaction is intense. As a reference to
models of complete information such as the AKM model,
we also consider delayed information (DI) and noisy infor-
mation (NI) scenarios, in which banks receive information
from all banks in the system, but information is either
delayed or noisy. For simplicity, details of the DI and NI
scenarios are presented in Appendix A. As described in Sec-
tion 3.3, the assumptions used in the AKM model are equiv-
alent to what we call the complete information (CI) scenario.
To model uncertainty and determine the amount of
information that is included in the calculation of
conﬁdenceC, we rely on the distance between nodes in the
network. The distance d i, j is the shortest path length
between information user i and information source j. If
banks are directly connected, the distance between them is
1 and we call them neighbors. All neighbors of a particular
bank constitute its neighborhood. The distance between
neighbors of neighbors is 2 and so forth. The main principle
for modeling uncertainty is that information availability and/
or quality deteriorates when the distance from the informa-
tion source increases. Once uncertainty is introduced, instead
of one common estimate of conﬁdence for all banks
(∀i Ci = C in the AKM model), each bank has its own indi-
vidual perception of conﬁdence Ci.
We use the following notation template of any model
parameter P Ptime step optional ;observerobserved optional . For example, a
0i
j
denotes bank i’s judgment of j’s initial (0 time step) absolute
value of assets. Absence of the time step indicator implies
the current value of a parameter. The indicator of an
observed bank is omitted in the case of aggregate parame-
ters, such as C, which are not based on information of an
individual bank.
In the LI scenario, information is available only up to a
certain “interbank” distance. That is, bank i calculates C
based on the information about itself and all banks placed
within the ﬁxed value of distance dmax. This is our general
deﬁnition of locality where the value of dmax determines
whether the locality includes only neighbors or also neigh-
bors of neighbors and so forth. For instance, if dmax = 1, then
only i and its immediate neighbors contribute information to
C. Now we can express the conﬁdence of bank i as
Ci = AiEi,
Ai =
ai +∑j∈Ji dmax a
i
j
a0i
,
a0i = a0i + 〠
j∈J i dmax
a0ij ,
Ei =
ei +∑j∈J i dmax e
i
j
e0i
,
e0i = e0i + 〠
j∈Ji dmax
e0ij
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A set Ji dmax contains all banks that i considers for
estimation of C, except for i itself, and is a function of dmax.
It is useful to think of dmax as a parameter that determines
the reach of i’s perception. To deﬁne Ji dmax , we ﬁrst deﬁne
the set J = 1, 2,… ,N , which contains all banks in the
network. Then, its subset Ji dmax is deﬁned as
Ji dmax = j ∈ J d i, j ≤ dmax&j ≠ i 5
We consider two versions of the LI scenario (Figure 4):
LI1 in which dmax = 1 and LI2 in which dmax = 2. Since the
network is quite shallow (average path length is barely above
2), LI2 contains almost the full graph, and LI3 is equal to CI.
Thus, LI2 will provide a useful sanity check in respect to CI.
5. Model of Shocks and Bank Failures
Under each of the conditions described above, we simulated
the response of the system to an initial shock. We explored
two types of initial shock: (i) a concentrated shock (or a
single-bank shock), applied by randomly selecting a large or
a small bank and forcing it to fail by setting its capital to zero,
and (ii) a distributed shock (or a multiple-bank shock),
applied by forcing multiple small banks to fail simulta-
neously. The multiple-bank shock is designed to involve a
number of small banks whose aggregate assets are equivalent
to the assets of a large bank. Therefore, comparing these two
treatments can be informative about how the system
responds when the same shock is concentrated in a single
bank or distributed among multiple banks.
A bank can go bankrupt for both liquidity and solvency
reasons. A bank is illiquid if its liquid assets and interbank
loans are insuﬃcient to meet the demand of other banks to
repay the loans previously taken from them. A bank is insol-
vent once the asset devaluation (from an external asset price
decrease or counterparty default, for instance) exceeds its
level of capital.
6. Simulation
In our simulation, each replication is a computational
experiment with two phases. The ﬁrst phase is to form the
network and apply the initiating shock. The second phase is
to simulate the propagation of the shock through the
network, which unfolds in several iterations, here called
time steps.
To form the network, in- and out-degrees that determine
the numbers of banks’ incoming and outgoing links were
drawn from a Poisson distribution. (To design a network,
we ﬁrst drew out-degrees from a Poisson distribution and
used this draw as weights for random sampling of corre-
sponding in-degrees. If both in- and out-degrees were drawn
directly from a Poisson distribution, the procedure would
require the random draw to be repeated until the sum of all
in-degrees is equal to the sum of corresponding out-
degrees. As a result, draws with nonmatching degrees would
have to be discarded, which is computationally expensive and
problematic for the purpose of the analytical analysis.) We
used a zero-truncated version of a Poisson distribution to
ensure positive values of interbank assets and liabilities,
which provided more balanced initial liquidity of banks.
Once in- and out-degrees were determined, it was possible
to reconstruct the rest of the bank’s balance sheets based
on the parameters of the model (see Section 3.2).
After the network was formed, a shock was applied. The
shock hit one or several randomly chosen banks, depending
on the type of shock to be applied. Then, the remaining
simulation procedure entailed iteration of actions that take
place in discrete time (see Appendix B).
7. Results
The results are based on 1,000 simulation replications per
scenario, with each replication lasting until the system came
to rest. Figure 5 depicts the probability distribution for the
total number of failed banks after a shock is applied to a
single small, a single large, and multiple small banks. In the
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Information availability in the banking network of 120
banks in two local information (LI) scenarios: LI1 and LI2. In the
LI1 scenario (a), information is available up to distance 1 in the
network. That is, the bank in blue receives information only from
the orange banks—its immediate neighbors. In the LI2 scenario
(b), information is available up to distance 2. That is, the bank in
blue receives information not only from the orange banks but also
from the red banks—its neighbors of neighbors. The remaining
banks are colored in grey. The node size is weighted by its degree.
The network is constructed using the default values of model
parameters (Section 3.2).
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cases of a large-bank shock and amultiple-bank shock, the fat
tail of the distribution indicates that the entire system col-
lapses with a probability of nearly 20% and 30%, respectively.
When uncertainty is introduced, the highest impact
on the probability distributions of number of failed banks
is realized in the LI1 scenario. Figure 6 shows that the
probability of systemic breakdown (i.e., all banks in the
system fail) after a large-bank shock is now more than 90%
and that even a small-bank shock results in a nontrivial
probability of systemic breakdown (In high-resolution data
of 10,000 repetitions, the probability of whole-system break-
down after a small-bank shock increases from 0% in the CI
scenario to 0.16% in the LI1 scenario. This is easier to see
in Figure 7.), whereas the same probability drops to under
20% in the case of a multiple-bank shock.
Figure 7 displays a comparison of probabilities of
systemic breakdown across diﬀerent scenarios in all three
shock treatments. The probabilities are consistently higher
in the multiple than in the single-shock treatment, except
for the LI1 scenario. In fact, the LI1 scenario, which is associ-
ated with the largest probability of systemic collapse in the
case of a large bank’s shock, is at the same time associated
with the smallest probability of systemic collapse in the
distributed shock condition.
The results of the LI1 scenario are particularly striking as
they show that a limited information ﬂow further intensiﬁes
the contagion dynamics observed in the AKM model after a
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Figure 5: Probability distribution of number of failed banks in the complete information (CI) scenario after a shock is applied to a small bank,
a large bank, and multiple small banks. The systemic breakdown occurs with sizable probability of nearly 20% and 30% after a large-bank
shock and multiple-bank shock, respectively.
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Figure 6: Probability distribution of number of failed banks in the
LI1 scenario after a shock is applied to a small bank, a large bank,
and multiple small banks. In comparison to the CI scenario, the
probability of systemic breakdown increases after both single-
bank-shock treatments, whereas it drops after multiple-bank
shock. LI1 is a scenario in which a bank has access only to
information from its direct neighbors at distance 1. LI = local
information; CI = complete information.
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Figure 7: Probability of whole-system breakdown in complete
information (CI) and local information (LI) scenarios. The LI1
scenario obtains the highest probability of systemic breakdown in
both single-bank shock treatments. LI1 and LI2 = scenarios in
which banks have access only to information from banks up to
distance 1 and 2, respectively (Figure 15 in Appendix A displays
all scenarios).
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large-bank failure. At the same time, the LI1 scenario miti-
gates the impact of a multiple-bank shock when compared
to the CI scenario, in which this treatment in fact yields the
highest probability of systemic failure (Figure 7). While this
illustrates that the LI1 scenario does not merely amplify the
contagion dynamics, it also shows how an alternative
assumption about information availability can ﬂip the
conclusion about which event is more likely to trigger
catastrophic failures.
In the following section, we mainly focus on explaining
the diﬀerence between the results obtained in the CI and
LI1 scenarios. Given the insigniﬁcant change in results
produced in the other manipulations (NI and DI scenarios;
Appendix A), we discuss those results very brieﬂy.
8. Explaining the Results
In the CI scenario, conﬁdence is assessed over the extent of
the whole system: although this captures the notion of a gen-
eralized psychological context, it also has the eﬀect of diluting
the local impact of a shock. In the LI1 scenario, by contrast,
we have introduced the notion of “locally perceived” conﬁ-
dence that can vary with the neighborhood of diﬀerent banks.
The local impact of an initiating shock is therefore more
intense than in a CI scenario but limited to the neighbor-
hood, leaving the conﬁdence of the remaining system initially
intact. Yet, this local impact is subsequently transmitted
through the system (analogous to the dynamics of crack
propagation in a solid medium), resulting overall in a higher
risk of system collapse than in the CI scenario. The similarity
of the results of the LI2 and CI scenarios (Figure 7) provides a
useful sanity check, as the portion of the system taken into
account for the conﬁdence estimation is minimally diﬀerent
in the two scenarios (Figure 4).
A similar rationale applies to the results of the distributed
shock treatment, which involves a failure of multiple small
banks. While the impacts of the small-bank failures on
conﬁdence “add up” in the CI scenario, irrespective of their
placement, in the LI1 scenario, they independently harm
conﬁdences of the disparate localities in which they
randomly fall. As a result, the probability of whole-system
failure after a distributed shock in LI1 is noticeably reduced
when compared with the CI scenario (Figure 7). That the
“adding-up eﬀect” is less prominent in the LI1 scenario can
also be seen by contrasting the results obtained from CI
and LI1 after small idiosyncratic and multiple-bank treat-
ments. For this purpose, it is useful to interpret a multiple
shock as adding extra instances of small shocks to a small
shock. The resulting pattern is somewhat counterintuitive.
While a small-bank shock alone leads to a higher probability
of systemic failure in the LI1 scenario (than in the CI sce-
nario), after multiple shocks, the system fails with a higher
probability in the CI scenario.
To better understand how the dynamics of C aﬀect the
discrepancy in the results between the CI and LI1 scenarios,
we conducted a further analysis to assess the portion of the
system that is initially aﬀected by the shock applied in LI1
scenario, the magnitude of C drop that corresponds to the
applied shock, and the sensitivity of the system to diﬀerent
manners in which C can deteriorate. Finally, we compared
the time course of C obtained in computational simulations
in the two scenarios and designed tests to assess if the
observed diﬀerence can explain the results.
8.1. Dynamics of Local Conﬁdence. The only distinction
between the CI and LI1 scenarios corresponds to the diﬀer-
ence in conﬁdence contexts in which banks’ decisions are
made. Given the complexity of conﬁdence dynamics, we
aimed to compare the two scenarios in terms of initial conﬁ-
dence eﬀects caused by the applied shock. Then, we analyzed
if the initial diﬀerence could account for the results. We
focused on the impact of the large-bank shock, which is
associated with the most striking contrast between the two
scenarios, but the same rationale applies to the small-bank
shock. In the CI scenario, to calculate C1 (the level of C in
the immediate aftermath of the shock), one needs to know
only the number of small Ns and large Nb banks as well as
the size ratio q. Then, from C = AE, it follows that
C1 = qNs +Ns − q
qNb +Ns
2
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For the default values of the model parameters, C1 ≈ 0 92,
which corresponds to the drop of C for approximately 0 08.
Unlike CI scenario where conﬁdence eﬀects are uniformly
distributed among all banks, in the LI1 scenario, the shock
initially aﬀects only the conﬁdence of banks in the neighbor-
hood of the shock. The assessment of the fraction of banks
aﬀected by the shock, therefore, requires the estimation of
the size of “average-bank neighborhood”—that is, the
expected number of unique large and small banks that are
connected to a given bank, including only its borrowers and
lenders (Figure 8).
For default values of model parameters, a large bank is on
average connected to 40 small and 10 large banks, whereas a
small bank is connected to 4 large and 5 small banks (for the
proof see Appendix C). This implies that the large-bank
shock on average aﬀects approximately three-quarters of
the system assets; and among aﬀected banks, large banks
experience a decline of conﬁdence to C1b ≈ 0 87 and small
banks to C1s ≈ 0 61. The faster decline of conﬁdence of small
banks is both intuitive because the average-bank neighbor-
hood of a small bank is relatively smaller, and realistic,
because it is to be expected that a smaller bank suﬀers larger
conﬁdence loss when faced with a shock of a given size. In
what follows, we describe a test designed for the assessment
of system sensitivity to the steepness of C decline.
8.2. Test 1—System Sensitivity to the Loss of Conﬁdence. How
does the system behave under diﬀerent C regimes? To inves-
tigate this, we externally enforced diﬀerent time courses of C
while keeping the assumption that all banks share the same C.
(This means that C is no longer endogenously determined
from the ﬂuctuation of asset levels.) The independent manip-
ulation was designed to test the resistance of the system to a
variety of hypothetical conﬁdence contexts. The goal was to
explore how the system responds if only the perception of
decision makers is manipulated, while keeping all remaining
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processes endogenous. We considered diﬀerent magnitudes
of C drop and for each of them we also manipulated the slope
of decline. We used the exponential function f x = e−rx to
model the slope manipulation, where the value of parameter
r determines the slope (Figure 9).
Figure 10 shows that the sudden drop of C (r = 100) has
by far the highest impact on the system. This is a strong indi-
cation that the quicker loss of conﬁdence in the LI1 scenario
as compared to the CI scenario played a role in the increase in
systemic risk. In addition, we compared standard deviations
of conﬁdence across the scenarios (Figure 11). The standard
deviations of the end-state conﬁdence (when the system is
at rest) were calculated across 1000 simulation replications,
taking into account only the surviving population of banks.
Two results stood out. First, standard deviations of conﬁ-
dence were consistently higher after the large concentrated
shock than after the distributed shock. The immediate impli-
cation is that the outcome of a large concentrated shock is
less predictable. Second, there was a large diﬀerence between
the standard deviations of conﬁdence in the CI and LI1 sce-
narios. To determine if this contributed to the diﬀerence in
the corresponding results, we carried out an analysis of the
variance of conﬁdence, described next.
8.3. Test 2—Variance of Conﬁdence. The goal of this test was
to assess the sensitivity of total assets A and total interbank
loans E to the change in variance of C. A realization of C in
a simulation replication is in fact a vector C t , which con-
tains values of C at diﬀerent time steps. The manipulation
ﬁrst entailed construction of two vectors C t iCI and C t iLI1
based on data from realizations of C in the CI and LI1 scenar-
ios when a large-bank shock is applied. Two newly composed
time sequences of C values were generated from a normal
distribution with the same mean and two variances: C t iCI
~N CAVi , VCIi and C t iLI1~N C
AV
i , VLI1i . The mean CAVi
was estimated by averaging the conﬁdence from the realiza-
tion of the CI scenario over simulation repetitions. The ﬁrst
variance, VCIi , was calculated from vectors of global conﬁ-
dence realized in the CI scenario and the second, VLI1i , from
vectors of local conﬁdence realized in the LI1 scenario.
Finally, the two vectors C t iCI and C t iLI1 were exogenously
applied to the CI setting of the simulation (Figure 12). The
exogenous application of conﬁdence implies that the
calculation of conﬁdence is decoupled from assets and
interbank loans in the actual simulation and taken as given.
The sequences of realized networks were controlled to be
the same in both conditions by setting the same seeding
of the random number generator in the simulation C
t iCI~N C
AV
i , VCIi .
Even when the mean of C over simulation replications is
kept constant, as Figure 12 illustrates, a higher variance of C
yields a faster drop of total assets A. Given that assets deter-
mine the level of C by deﬁnition, we designed an additional
test to assess the impact of the time course of C on the results.
8.4. Test 3—Time Course of Conﬁdence. For this purpose, the
mean of individual conﬁdences of all banks in the LI1
(a)
(b)
Figure 8: Neighborhood of a small bank (a) and a large bank (b) in
the banking network of 120 banks. The small (large) bank is colored
in blue, whereas its immediate neighbors are colored in orange. The
remaining banks are colored in grey. The node size is weighted by its
degree. The network is constructed using the default values of model
parameters (Section 3.2).
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Figure 9: Manipulation of conﬁdence C change over time: C
drops 20, 30, or 40%, with the slope of decline determined by the
parameter r of the exponential function f x = e−rx ; the higher r,
the steeper the slope of C decline. Time step refers to discrete
simulation time where each step iterates a deﬁned set of actions
(see Appendix B). Note: the observed time horizon is extended
from 100 to 150 time steps, as additional time steps were needed
for the system to reach the steady state when the slope of C
decline was low (r = 1).
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scenario was calculated and denoted as local conﬁdence.
Conﬁdence calculated according to the standard procedure,
as in the CI scenario, was denoted global conﬁdence.
Figure 13 indicates a steeper decline of local as compared to
global conﬁdence when corresponding simulations were
performed in an identical simulation setting, that is, when
the identically placed large-bank shock was applied to an
identical set of networks by controlling the seeding of the
random number generator in the simulation.
In the next step, we estimated the impact of the observed
slope diﬀerence between the two C curves by exogenous
application of the local conﬁdence to a hypothetical CI
scenario together with the large-bank shock treatment. In
the hypothetical scenario, as in the standard CI scenario, all
banks in the system perceive conﬁdence equally, but their
perception is no longer endogenously determined. Instead,
we forced their global conﬁdence to be equal to previously
determined local conﬁdence taken from the realization of
the LI1 scenario depicted in Figure 13. This procedure
yielded a probability of over 90% of the whole system failing,
a result similar to that in the LI1 scenario (Figure 14). The
decline of conﬁdence is therefore capable of explaining the
diﬀerence in the results between the scenarios.
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Figure 10: Probability of systemic breakdown for various magnitudes and speeds of conﬁdence (C) decline. The magnitude of decline refers
to the percentage of the initial value of C that is lost. The speed of decline is determined by the parameter r of the exponential function
f x = e−rx ; the greater the value of r, the greater the speed of C decline. The sudden decline of C (r = 100) is associated with a sharp increase
in the probability of systemic breakdown, especially in the cases of 20% and 30% of C decline.
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Figure 11: Standard deviation of conﬁdence across complete
information (CI) and local information (LI) scenarios and three
shock treatments: to a small bank, a large bank, and multiple
small banks. The LI1 scenario inﬂates standard deviations of
conﬁdence in both single-bank-shock treatments. The multiple-
bank treatment involves a number of small banks whose total
assets amount to the assets of a single large bank. LI1 and
LI2 = scenarios in which a bank has access only to information
from banks up to distance 1 and 2, respectively (Figure 16 in
Appendix A displays all scenarios).
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Figure 12: The impact of exogenous manipulation of conﬁdence
C on the level of total assets (A) in the system. Two applied
manipulations of C follow normal distribution with the same
mean and diﬀerent variances: VCIi [derived from the complete
information (CI) scenario] and VLI1i [derived from the local
information (LI) LI1 scenario]. The higher variance corresponds
to the faster decline of total assets in the system. CI is a scenario
in which a bank has access to information from all other banks in
the network. LI1 is a scenario in which a bank has access only to
information from banks at distance 1.
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9. Discussion
The increasing interconnectedness of the global ﬁnancial
network has introduced an enormous amount of structural
uncertainty in the ﬁnancial system. Yet, its implications went
unnoticed until the recent ﬁnancial crisis when the interde-
pendencies in the network made it nearly impossible to
disentangle low- from high-risk investments and partner-
ships. In this paper, we presented a model where structural
uncertainty shapes patterns of conﬁdence loss in a ﬁnancial
network. We found that a severe conﬁdence loss in a limited
part of the network carries a higher systemic risk than a
moderate conﬁdence loss in the entire network.
Our use of a multiagent model allowed us to analyze
more speciﬁc aspects of conﬁdence decline and to consider
diﬀerent types of shocks that can aﬀect the system. We found
that while the magnitude of decline was important, as was
expected, a sudden decline of conﬁdence was also a major
factor in the increase in systemic risk; when the average level
of conﬁdence was controlled for, higher variance of conﬁ-
dence corresponded to higher systemic risk. We also found
that under uncertainty, a shock aﬀecting one large bank
was by far more impactful than the same shock distributed
among multiple smaller banks; when complete information
was assumed, the opposite was true. This suggests that it
is the failure of a large bank that poses a major threat to
the system.
One caveat of our work is that there is a lack of
understanding of how banks react to structural uncer-
tainty during a ﬁnancial crisis. Here we assumed that in
a crisis, when it is infeasible to assess relevant risks, banks
emphasize the information that they observe in their local
environment. An alternative view explored in the litera-
ture assumes that banks maintain the practices developed
prior to the crisis and rely on their own assessment of
relevant risks (e.g., [28]). However, such an assessment
would require the knowledge of the underlying structure
of the ﬁnancial network, which is exactly unavailable
under structural uncertainty. Moreover, a possible exten-
sion of our work would be to explore how structural
uncertainly interacts with other sources of uncertainty,
such as uncertainty about the value of assets [34], in
hoarding behavior.
From the view of policymaking, our observed sensitivity
of the system to sudden loss of conﬁdence suggests that inter-
ventions, such as bailouts of distressed banks or liquidity
injections, should be done without delay. Our results also
conﬁrm previous ﬁndings that large banks carry dispropor-
tionate amount of systemic risk and hence are more likely
to require stricter regulations than what was previously
assumed. More generally, our results indicate the need for
regulation designed to improve overall transparency in the
ﬁnancial system. For instance, policies that aim at reducing
and eventually eliminating over-the-counter markets or con-
straining the complexity of ﬁnancial contracts would be
highly desirable. Only a transparent ﬁnancial system would
allow banks to make sound decisions from the perspective
of systemic risk.
Appendix
A. Delayed Information and Noisy
Information Scenarios
Unlike in the LI scenarios, in the DI scenarios banks receive
information from all other banks in the system (dmax is no
longer exogenously set), but some of the information is
outdated. We modeled information delay as a function of
distance—the further the information source, the longer the
delay. If k denotes the time step when information originated,
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Figure 13: Time course of global and local conﬁdence. Global
conﬁdence is calculated in a standard way as in the complete
information (CI) scenario. Local conﬁdence is an average of
individual conﬁdences of all banks in the local information (LI)
LI1 scenario. CI is a scenario in which a bank has access to
information from all other banks in the network. LI1 is a scenario
in which a bank has access only to information from banks at
distance 1.
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Figure 14: A comparison of probability distributions of number of
failed banks after a large-bank shock in the LI1 scenario, and
scenario in which conﬁdence from the LI1 scenario was
exogenously applied to the CI scenario. The probability of
systemic breakdown is nearly the same in both scenarios. CI is a
scenario in which a bank has access to information from all other
banks in the network. LI1 is a scenario in which a bank has access
only to information from its direct neighbors at distance 1.
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t the time step in which it is received, ds the distance at which
delay starts, and s the size of applied delay, then
We designed four variants of the DI scenario by manipu-
lating s and ds (Table 1). For instance, in the DI1 and DI3 sce-
narios, the size of the delay is 1 time step (s=1), and in the
DI2 and DI4 it is 2 time steps (s=2). In the DI1 and DI2 sce-
narios, delay starts from neighbors of neighbors (ds=2),
whereas in the DI3 and DI4 scenarios, it starts immediately
from neighbors (ds=1). We set the minimum value of k
to 0 since negative values of time do not make sense in
this context.
In the NI scenario, noise in information increases with
distance. If ∈ denotes a random error with normal distribu-
tion ∈ ~N 0, σ2 , v the size of variance in the noise term,
and dmax maximal distance in the network, then
aij = a
j
j + d ∈ , d i, j = 1, 2,… , dmax, σ2 = va
j
j
eij = e
j
j + d ∈ , d i, j = 1, 2,… , dmax, σ2 = ve
j
j
A 2
We considered two variants of the NI scenario: NI5 and
NI30. In the former, v=5% and in the latter, v=30%.
Regardless of the amount of noise, the NI scenarios yield
similar results to those of the CI scenario. In the case of the
DI scenarios, although the impact is very small the probabil-
ities of systemic failure increase with delay. This is particu-
larly noticeable in the nonzero probabilities of systemic
failure after a small-bank shock. In the NI scenarios, nor-
mally distributed noise averaged out across banks, producing
no diﬀerence in results compared to the CI scenario
(Figures 15 and 16). Assuming an alternative distribution of
noise would potentially produce more interesting results.
On the other hand, the DI scenarios indicate that the delay
matters. The result can be accounted for as the eﬀect of over-
conﬁdence. Namely, in the DI scenarios, conﬁdence at a
particular moment in time was higher than what actual infor-
mation would imply. This narrows the time window for the
preemptive action that would enable shortening of long-
term loans, which otherwise could not be used to meet the
upcoming liquidity needs.
B. Simulation Procedure over Time Steps
After the application of the shock, the simulation procedure
entailed ﬁve actions taking place in each time step:
(1) Recalculate health hi of all banks. The health is used
for stipulating liquidation of banks. Zero health
implies that a bank needs to be liquidated.
(2) Liquidate banks that failed in the previous time
step (or those that failed because of the initial shock).
If bank i is to be liquidated then the procedure is
as follows:
(a) Withdraw all short-term loans ASTi that can be
collected from the borrowers of i. Triggering the
collection procedure means that i’s borrowers
will ask their own borrowers for money, and so
forth. Record banks that consequently satisfy
the condition of illiquidity and are to be liqui-
dated in the next time step.
(b) Settle all short-term borrowings LSTi of bank i
that can be paid from its initial liquid assets li
and collected short-term loans ASTi. Record the
resulting shortage or surplus.
(c) Calculate the total long-term assets of i by add-
ing long-term loans to the capital ci. To this
sum add the result from substep b. If there is a
shortage of assets when the sum is compared to
Table 1: The size of delay in time steps assigned to banks at diﬀerent distance in diﬀerent scenarios.
Scenario
Size of delay
0 1 2
DI1 i+ neighbors All remaining banks
DI2 i+ neighbors All remaining banks
DI3 i All remaining banks
DI4 i All remaining banks
Note: DI = Delayed information; i = information user.
aji = a
kj
i , e
j
i = e
kj
i
k =
t if d < ds
max 0, t − s if d < ds
, d i, j ∈ 1, 2… dmax , ds ∈ 1, 2 , s ∈ 1, 2
A 1
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long-term liabilities of i, then i’s long-term
lenders suﬀer from this amount of shock u
applied to their capital. The shock is evenly dis-
tributed among the lenders, but only up to the
level of individual exposures. This ensures that
the shock cannot exceed the level of individual
lending amount.
(d) Sell external assets of i, applying the shock to all
holders of the same asset classes that i had in its
portfolio. The external assets are sold at a market
that is taken to be external to the model. The
price of asset w is assumed to be decreasing to a
fraction exp(−αxw) of its initial value (modeled
as in Arinaminpathy et al., 2012), in which xw is
a proportion of the asset w that is sold by i, and
α is an indicator of market liquidity that is
directly related to conﬁdence C, α=1−C. If any
bank suﬀers from the capital default based on
the shocks from substeps c and d, its health once
it is recalculated will be 0. This automatically
qualiﬁes such banks for liquidation in the next
time step.
(3) Apply decision rule 2 (see Section 3.4) and withdraw
short-term loans if condition is satisﬁed. It is
assumed that loans are perfectly divisible and partial
withdrawals are possible. Then, record all banks that
become illiquid during the withdrawal in order to be
liquidated in the next time step. Note that the second
decision rule is applied ﬁrst as otherwise it would
be possible to withdraw long-term loans in a single
time step.
(4) Apply decision rule 1 (see Section 3.4) and admin-
ister shortening of long-term loans if the condition
is satisﬁed.
(5) Recalculate the network and other parameters and go
back to step 1 for the next time step.
C. Calculation of the Size of an
Average–Bank Neighborhood
In the main text, we stated that the size of a particular bank
neighborhood is probabilistic. Here, we provide a simple
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Figure 15: Probability of systemic failure across all scenarios. CI =Complete information; LI = local information; NI = noisy information;
DI = delayed information; LI1 and LI2 = scenarios in which banks have access only to information at distance 1 and 2, respectively; NI5
and NI30 = scenarios in which noise parameter v is 5% and 30%, respectively; the delay scenarios are deﬁned in Table 1.
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Figure 16: Standard deviations of conﬁdence across all scenarios and three shock treatments: to a small bank, a large bank, and multiple
banks. CI =Complete information; LI = local information; NI = noisy information; DI = delayed information; LI1 and LI2 = scenarios in
which a bank has access only to information at distance 1 and 2, respectively. NI5 and NI30 = scenarios in which noise parameter v is 5%
and 30%, respectively. The delay scenarios are deﬁned in Table 1.
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calculation of the size of an average-bank neighborhood for a
small and a large bank.
Let us consider a network of N banks, of which Ns are
small andNb are large. Let L be the out-degree of a small bank
and q be the ratio of average degree of a large bank over aver-
age degree of a small bank. In the main text we assumed that
in- and out-degrees of all banks are drawn independently
from a Poisson distribution with mean z for small and qz
for large banks. Here, we make a simplifying assumption that
out-degrees of all small (large) banks are equal. When tested
in a simulation this assumption did not change our previ-
ously reported results. To determine the size of an average-
bank neighborhood of a bank i, which includes i’s borrowers
and lenders, we have to calculate the expected number of
unique small and large banks connected to i. For this pur-
pose, let us deﬁne random variables:
X ij =
1 if there is a directed connection from i to j
0 otherwise
Xij =
1 if there is a connection between i to j
0 otherwise
C 1
with the correspondence Xij =max X ij , X ji . From here it
follows that
E Xij = 1P Xij = 1 + 0P Xij = 0
= P Xij = 1 = 1 − P Xij = 0
C 2
Given there are small and large banks in the system, there
are three cases: one bank is small and another is large, both
banks are small, and both banks are large.
Case 1: both banks (i and j) are small.
The probability that a connection originating from i goes
to j is a fraction of the in-degree of j and the total in-degree of
all banks in the network except for i:
wssij =
L
Ns − 1 L + qNbL
= 1
Ns − 1 + qNb
C 3
From Equations C.4 and C.13 it follows that the probabil-
ity that there is at least one connection from i to j is
P X ij = 1 = 1 − P X ij = 0 = 1 − 1 −w
ss
ij
L
, C 4
where 1 −wssij
L is the probability that none of L outgoing
links of i connect to j (note that the probabilities of connec-
tions are independent).
Then, the probability that there is at least one connection
between i and j irrespective of the direction is
P Xij = 1 = P X ij = 1 ∪ X ji = 1
= P X ij = 1 + P X ji = 1
− P X ij = 1 ∩ X ji = 1
= 2P X ij = 1 − P
2 X ij = 1
∵P X ij = P X ji &X ij∐X ji
= P X ij = 1 2 − P X ij = 1
= 1 − 1 −wssij
L
1 + 1 −wssij
L
= 1 − 1 −wssij
2L
C 5
We can now express the expectation of Ysi , which is the
number of unique small banks connected to i, as:
E Ysi L = 〠
Ns−1
i=1
P Xij = 1 L = Ns − 1 1 − 1 −wssij
2L
C 6
Case 2: one bank is small and another is large.
Case 2a: i is a small and j is a large bank.
The probability that a connection originating from i goes
to j is
wsbij = qwssij =
q
Ns − 1 + qNb
C 7
The probability that there is at least one connection from
i to j is
P X ij = 1 = 1 − P X ij = 0 = 1 − 1 −w
sb
ij
L
C 8
Case 2b: i is a large and j is a small bank.
The probability that a connection originating from i goes
to j is
wbsij =
L
NsL + q Nb − 1 L
= 1
Ns + q Nb − 1
C 9
Similarly to Case 2a, it follows that
P X ij = 1 = 1 − P X ij = 0 = 1 − 1 −w
bs
ij
qL
C 10
14 Complexity
From Case 2a and Case 2b we derive the probability that
there is at least one connection between i and j irrespective of
the direction:
P Xij = 1 = P X ij = 1 ∪ X ji = 1
= P X ij = 1 + P X ji = 1
− P X ij = 1 P X ji = 1
= 2 − 1 −wsbij
L
− 1 −wbsij
qL
− 1 − 1 −wsbij
L
1 − 1 −wbsij
qL
C 11
Then, the expectations for the number of unique large
banks connected to a small bank i (Case 2a) and the num-
ber of unique small banks connected to a large bank i
(Case 2b) are
E Ybi L = 〠
Nb
i=1
P Xij = 1 L
=Nb 2 − 1 −wsbij
L
− 1 −wbsij
qL
− 1 − 1 −wsbij
L
1 − 1 −wbsij
qL
,
E Ysi L = 〠
Ns
i=1
P Xij = 1 L
=Ns 2 − 1 −wsbij
L
− 1 −wbsij
qL
− 1 − 1 −wsbij
L
1 − 1 −wbsij
qL
C 12
Case 3: both banks (i and j) are large.
The probability that a connection originating from i goes
to j is
wbbij = qwbsij =
q
Ns + q Nb − 1
C 13
The probability that there is at least one connection from
i to j is
P X ij = 1 = 1 − P X ij = 0 = 1 − 1 −w
bb
ij
qL
C 14
Similarly to the previous cases, it follows that
P Xij = 1 = P X ij = 1 ∪ X ji = 1
= P X ij = 1 2 − P X ij = 1
= 1 − 1 −wbbij
2qL
C 15
The expectation of the number of unique large banks
connected to a large bank i is
E Ybi L = 〠
Nb−1
i=1
P Xij = 1 L = Nb − 1 1 − 1 −wbbij
2qL
C 16
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Design, structure, modelling, and analysis of complex systems can signiﬁcantly beneﬁt from a systematic approach. One way to
address a complex system using a systematic approach is to combine creative and analytical methods, such as general
morphological analysis and design structure matrix. The aim is to propose a framework to address complex systems in two
stages: ﬁrst, formulation and generation of alternatives through general morphological analysis, and second, improvement and
integration with design structure matrix for sequence optimization and cluster analysis. Moreover, general morphological
analysis is further optimized through a novel sensitivity analysis approach reducing up to 80% the iteration time. The proposed
approach is showcased in a case study of sustainable policy formulation for a wastewater treatment plant at a pulp and paper
industry in Brazil. The results show that it is possible to generate a solution space that highlights the best possible combinations
of the given alternatives while also providing an optimal sequence and grouping for an optimized implementation. The paper
contributes to the ﬁeld of conceptual modelling by oﬀering a systematic approach to integrate sustainability.
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Deﬁnition. In recent years, tackling problems
regarding water management policies has received consider-
able attention. Water management has embedded within
complex issues such as industrial wastewater treatment, water
protection and conservation, and rational water use. The
growing complexity of water management systems generates
increasingly diﬃcult policy design problems [1]. Policy design
is rather complex due to the increasing amount of policy mea-
sures available for addressing the problems of a system. Con-
sequently, policy problems are often deﬁned as “messy” [2]
or “wicked” problems [3–5]. Rittel and Webber [5] stated that
“Wicket Problems do not have an enumerable set of potential
solutions.” (Rittel and Weber [5] coin the term wicked prob-
lems, assigned ten characteristics to wicked problems, which
have been further generalized by Conklin [4], to the following
six characteristics: (1)Wicked problems cannot be understood
until a solution has been developed. (2)Wicked problems have
no stopping rules. (3) Solutions to wicked problems are not
right or wrong they are better or worse. (4) Every wicked prob-
lem is essentially unique and novel. (5) Every solution to a
wicked problem is a one-shot operation. (6) Wicked prob-
lems have no given alternative solutions.)
The term wicked problems is used to describe social
complex problems that are multidimensional and possess
nonquantiﬁable aspects, where causal modelling and simula-
tion are not appropriate [6]. For example, in the industry
sector, decision-making commonly includes complex prob-
lems associated with conﬂicting performance objectives and
contradictory requirements, for which the application of tra-
ditional multiobjective decision-making approaches shows
evident limitations [7]. In addition, there is a growing need
to create a systematic approach to facilitate the deﬁnition
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and structuring of relevant problems and the decision-
making process among stakeholders for transparent decision
support systems (DSS). A major challenge facing industrial
organizations is “green policy” design and upgrading of
policy measures [8]. This problem involves, for instance,
knowledge management specialists, planners, and decision-
makers, who all work with rather complex issues [9]. The
task thus requires the creation of new tools to improve the
understanding of the complexities embedded in tackling
problems and reaching optimal solutions. Engineers fre-
quently use analytical modelling methods to aid understand-
ing the operation of complex systems, to gauge to what extent
systems achieve overall their goals and targets, and how the
systems in question can be improved [10].
Many traditional quantitative methods have been explored
for dealing with multiobjective decision-making in the public
policy realm. For example, Philips et al. [11] presented his
work by applying quality function deployment (QFD) tech-
niques to product design procedures, which are used to for-
mulate annual policy, leading to designs that better reﬂect
customer’s requirements. Yeomans [12] applied the coevolu-
tionary simulation-optimization modelling-to-generate-alter-
natives approach in order to generate eﬀectively multiple
solutions for environmental policy formulation to municipal
solid waste management. Taeihagh et al. [13] proposed a
network-centric policy design approach based on network
analysis and ranking of alternatives [14], often done using
multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) methods, to select
and analyse the internal properties of proposed measures
and their interactions in the transport policy domain.
Moreover, Taeihagh et al. [15] argued that agent-based
modelling could be used for the analysis of diﬀerent combi-
nations of policy measures, aiming at generating policy
packages to advance sustainable transportation. However,
traditional multiobjective optimization and simulation are
not suﬃcient to tackle complex multidimensional and non-
quantiﬁable problems. Besides, in the case of physical sci-
ences and economics, research in the policy domain mostly
focuses on the simulation and optimization of policy alterna-
tives, instead of their synthesis and generation. Therefore,
there is still a need for further research to enhance the capac-
ity of policy generation and evaluation of this approach.
Consequently, a systematic approach is imperative, partic-
ularly when addressing complex problems, such as socio-
technical systems.
The analysis of complex sociotechnical systems, like a set
of policies, is a challenging problem [16]. The ﬁrst reason is
that the elements contained in the systems are often non-
quantiﬁable, as they are of social, political, or cognitive
nature. The second reason is that uncertainties characteristic
for such complex problems are hard to be represented. The
emerging need of speciﬁc tools, techniques, and systems to
aid the generation, management, and enforcement of eﬀec-
tive policies requires research on the suitability of various
approaches in the context of policy instruments’ choice [17].
Various problem-structuring methods (PSMs) have been
presented in the literature. Among them, general morpholog-
ical analysis (GMA) [6, 18, 19] is presented as a promising
method for the generation of new concepts and ﬁnding the
best solution. In principle, GMA is based on the “divide
and conquer technique” [20], which tackles a problem using
two basic approaches: “analysis” and “synthesis”—referred to
as “the basic method for developing scientiﬁc models” by
Ritchey [21]. In addition, some authors propose diﬀerent
creative methods to be used in early conceptual design to
support new concept of business model creation [22] and
new concept of selection [23, 24]. GMA, as a creative method,
has been used widely and tested in various domains such as
policy planning and scenario development [25], strategic
foresight [26], technology forecasting [27–29], and idea crea-
tion [30–32]. The core objective of GMA is to structure and
investigate the behaviour and solutions among stakeholders.
From the engineering design perspective, diﬀerent
matrix-based tools and techniques have been developed also
to aid the design process. An example of this is design struc-
ture matrix (DSM), typically used to map, visualize, and
analyse the dependences and relationships among properties
of a product or activities in the design process. In other
words, by applying the DSM, these dependencies can be
reorganized so the process can be optimized.
However, no work has been done before on combining
GMA with DSM. Furthermore, to the authors’ best knowl-
edge, GMA and cross-consistency assessment- (CCA-) based
optimization techniques have not yet considered optimiza-
tion of the iteration process through sensitivity analysis, nor
have DSM-based simulation techniques been considered
for reworking of policy improvements in areas such as pol-
icy design and policy measures. Therefore, the presented
research ﬁlls this speciﬁc gap in the policy design literature.
In this paper, a case study example of the Brazilian pulp
and paper mill industry related to wastewater treatment plant
(WWTP) is shown in order to display the empirical use of the
presented model for policy formulation. Brazil is an upper
middle-income country with a fast-rising economy [33],
which may eventually develop into the world’s leading pro-
ducer of pulp and paper. The pulp and paper industry is
tackling a wide array of implementation of sustainability
trends, such as (but not limited to) conservation and rational
water use; development of sustainability measures for indus-
trial wastewater treatment and water systems management
becomes necessary. It is evident that there is a large potential
for the adoption of sustainable practices in the pulp and
paper industry in a developing country’s environment.
1.2. Motivation and Purpose of the Study. This research is
motivated by an attempt to assess the potential of integrating
modelling methods in such a way that the integrated
approach supports complex problem solving for policy
design in water management systems, while supporting
sustainable development in the organization.
The aim of this paper is to develop a systematic approach
for generating, designing, and improving policy alternatives
using a computational methodology that integrates the
diverse modelling techniques of GMA, sensitivity analysis,
and DSM. The speciﬁc goal is to interlink GMA and DSM
as potential problem structuring methods to tackle wicked
problems and to support the decision-making of policy
formulation in complex systems.
2 Complexity
By developing a systematic approach, it is possible to
(a) better understand the problem structure and to decom-
pose it into subproblems, (b) improve analysis and optimi-
zation of the environmental policy formulation process
through sensitivity analysis, and (c) decrease the time
required for problem analysis and problem solving. The
proposed methodology will enable decision-makers and
managers to generate and explore various alternatives and
to promote combination of alternatives, their optimization,
and improvement of the policy development process. The
proposed approach includes sensitivity analysis for optimi-
zation of the iteration process of GMA, clustering analysis
through DSM, and development of the conﬁgurations of
policy measures included in the policy package so that they
match the objectives of the organization.
This study focuses on speciﬁc objectives as the following:
the ﬁrst objective is to generate policy measures or alterna-
tives using GMA for policy design. While policy measures
can be extracted from literature or derived from an expert’s
opinions, diﬀerent organizations can have diﬀerent percep-
tions of policy measures to create a coherent policy. There-
fore, the same policy measures may have diﬀerent eﬀects
for diﬀerent companies, industries, or countries. Hence, the
reduced set of viable policy measures is then the subject of
analysis by the stakeholders involved in policy formulation
in various organizations. The second objective is to evaluate
and improve the policy measures or alternatives. In light of
this, a DSM approach is used for identifying the relationships
of the policy measures in a qualitative manner [34].
The signiﬁcance of this work, and how it diﬀers from the
other works, is that decision-makers can utilize the full poten-
tial of the proposed systematic approach to tackle wicked
problems in the context of policy design andmeet the compa-
nies’ objective for increasing their sustainability scores.
The results are expected to further promote the use of
modelling methods for policy formulation in sectors such
as energy, environment, healthcare, food, water, and e-waste,
in which modelling can be systematically employed as part of
a DSS. Consequently, the work facilitates greater use of
modelling procedures to address complex problems such as
those found in environmental policy management.
1.3. Structure of the Paper. The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows: ﬁrst, key considerations in policy
design, particularly sustainable policy design and problems
of policy formulation, are brieﬂy described. Then, the main
features of the design modelling approaches used, GMA
and DSM, are presented. The following section discusses
the proposed approach integrating GMA, optimized through
sensitivity analysis, with DSM. To illustrate the approach
considered in this work, an illustrative case study is
described. The ﬁndings are then revealed, and the paper
concludes with the main results, discussion of contributions,
limitations, and suggestions for future work.
2. Literature Review
When attempting to improve policy in areas such as
water management and to mitigate problems arising from
the complexity of modern sociotechnical systems, adop-
tion of a systematic approach has become an essential
part of policy design. Further consideration is given to the
selection of appropriate methods, software, and tools to sup-
port understanding of the complexities embedded. For
instance, Taeihagh et al. [32] developed a novel framework
and design support system to ease and accelerate the design
of polices to meet the CO2 emission targets for the transport
sector in the UK. The proposed method and computer
implementation constituted the ﬁrst general approach
towards the development of a branch of computer-based sys-
tems that support environmental policy. Moreover, policy
design research can be divided into several categories dealing
with diﬀerent types of objectives and criteria in public
environmental policy formulation [13, 35].
In recent years, the topic of policy portfolios [36] and
policy mix formulation has evolved from deﬁnition of prob-
lems via exploration of basic concepts, to development of
policy measures and classiﬁcation of policy measures into
categories, and further to analysis of descriptive and norma-
tive scenarios. In addition, Howlett [17] deﬁned that the
nature of the criteria for eﬀective policy design is a signiﬁcant
aspect in order to ensure the portfolio’s eﬀectiveness to policy
formulation and its implementation. Current research trends
focus on advanced and practical levels of design policies,
which involve greater integration of the related concepts
and methodologies [13, 15, 35, 37]. The perception of
policy design has evolved from a “single-target/single-
tool” approach towards a “multitarget/multitool” approach
in order to tackle complex policy design [13, 37, 38].
Earlier work on policy design and policy formulation
methodology was based on dynamic modelling approaches
such as network analysis [13], agent-based modelling (ABM)
[39], and multiple criteria decision analysis (MCDA) [40].
Taeihagh et al. [15] introduced ABM to formulation of
transport policies and proposed a systematic approach for
use of a virtual environment for the exploration and analysis
of diﬀerent conﬁgurations of policy measures. Furthermore,
Wollmann and Steiner [41] proposed a model for strategic
decision processes that takes into account the inﬂuence of
limited rationality and organizational policy. The proposed
model combines strategic decision-making, complex adap-
tive system (CAS), and the mathematical techniques analytic
network process (ANP) and linear programming (LP) [41].
Also, complexity theory has been proposed as a complexity-
driven approach to assist project management in decision-
making, while deﬁning complexity-based criteria [42].
2.1. Sustainable Policy Design. A policy is generally described
using natural language, which makes it diﬃcult to under-
stand, especially when they occasionally compete and conﬂict
with each other. According to Pohl [43], a “policy” is a
“principle or guideline for action in a speciﬁc context” and
“policy design” is “the task of selecting policy components
and formulating overall policy.” Policy formulation is deﬁned
as “the development of eﬀective and acceptable courses of
action to address items on the policy agenda” [8, 44]. Policy
design involves the deliberate and conscious attempt to
deﬁne policy goals and connect them to instruments or tools
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expected to realise those objectives, and to formulate a policy,
there is a need to follow a policy agenda that meets the stan-
dards and regulations [44]. It can be considered one of the
most diﬃcult parts of the policy design process [35], and it
underlies the explicit actions of policy design [8, 44]. The
development of successful and acceptable policy is usually a
manual task involving various activities and several teams
with diﬀerent objectives and criteria for policy success [32].
Within environmental management studies, environ-
mental policies have traditionally been deﬁned as poli-
cies that assist successful decision-making to meet the
requirements of sustainable development [45, 46]. To meet
the criteria of sustainable development, policies have to
address the legal, technological, social, economic, and envi-
ronmental aspects.
Policy formulation and policy implementation are two
very diﬀerent activities. Policy formulation is an important
phase devoted to “generating options about what to do about
a public problem” ([47], p. 29) and is inherent to most, if not
all, forms of policymaking [48]. The agenda-setting step in
the policy cycle focuses on identifying where to go, while
the policy formulation step focuses on how to get there
[49]. Considering policy formulation as “a process of identi-
fying and addressing possible solutions to policy problems
or, to put it another way, exploring the various options or
alternatives available for addressing a problem,” then the
development or use of policy formulation tools becomes a
vital part of the policy formulation process ([47], p. 30). It
is diﬃcult to conceive, or properly study, policy formulation
without thinking in terms of tools. According to Dunn [50],
these are tools for forecasting and exploring future problems,
tools for identifying and recommending policy options, and
tools for exploring problem structuring.
Some of the most traditionally used approaches are
cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA) and MCDA in the environmen-
tal policy domain [13, 51]. However, CBA has signiﬁcant
drawbacks such as diﬃculty to measure social costs and
beneﬁts, conﬂict between wellbeing and ﬁnancial beneﬁts,
and assigning controversial monetary value to human dis-
placement and human life [52]. Likewise, the methods that
fall under the MCDA umbrella struggle to manage decisions
with inherent uncertainty, are unable to address dependen-
cies, are prone to manipulation, and face diﬃculties with
problem structuring [51].
Currently, decisions on what to include in policies
(their synthesis) is done manually, and considering the size
of the space of alternative policies, a large portion of the
design space is left unexplored [32]. Moreover, Howlett
and Mukherjee [53] and Chindarkar et al. [54] conducted
research on comparative policy analysis, making an emphasis
on eﬀectiveness and impact of managing the policy processes
[55]. Furthermore, the knowledge and objectives of the
diﬀerent stakeholders involved (e.g., central authority, local
authority, employees, company/industry, NGOs, local resi-
dents, and researchers from academia) may diﬀer greatly
and bring dissimilar attitudes to proposed solutions, which
inﬂuences the decision-making process [56].
Therefore, traditional approaches to policymaking are
not well suited for solving today’s complex problems. A
comprehensive methodology that supports the identiﬁcation,
design, modelling, and evaluation of policies to tackle com-
plex problems is still missing, and existing methodologies
and frameworks to tackle the complexity of sustainable
policy formulation in organizations are not fully developed.
Therefore, alternative approaches and tools are required in
order to overcome the limitations of traditional approaches.
One possibility is to integrate multiple methods based on pol-
icy design concepts. For example, GMA and DSM are both
modelling methods that may be systematically employed in
a DSS [57], and this paper proposes combining GMA and
DSM to facilitate modelling procedures in problem solving
of complex problems such as those found in sustainable
policy design.
2.2. The Complex Problem of Policy Formulation. For policy
design in general, and water management in particular,
decisions regarding measures for inclusion in policy require
exploration of a large pool of policy options as part of the
problem space [32, 53, 54]. Furthermore, designing a sustain-
able policy is rather complex because of the inﬂuence of
diﬀerent factors—technical, legal, and ethical—an example
of this is management of industrial wastewaters. These fac-
tors require the adoption of a large number of diﬀerent policy
measures. In addition, the multiple tasks to be carried out
require input from multidisciplinary teams [58]; hence,
policymakers still struggle with evaluating and improving
the outcome of the policy design process.
To date, a single universal approach for sustainable policy
design in wastewater treatment does not exist, and suitable
policy measures need to be identiﬁed based on the organiza-
tion’s strategy and environmental aims. Utilization of a
systematic approach to generate alternative policies by using
GMA [18] and DSM [34] will help decision-makers to
accelerate and improve policymaking. Furthermore, incorpo-
rating and adopting the diverse preferences from various
interest groups and stakeholders will improve the policy’s
performance and acceptance.
While identiﬁcation of feasible policy measures for
complex industrial wastewater treatments can be obtained
from literature review and expert inputs, it is worth noting
that diﬀerent companies might have diﬀerent views regard-
ing suitable policy measures. This paper considers well-
deﬁned policy measurement criteria such as legal, technical,
ﬁnancial, social, and environmental measures taking into
consideration sustainability development goals (SDGs) [59].
The selection of policy measures to be considered is
complex for several reasons. Under a simpliﬁed setting, a
local company requiring an environmental permit for the
installation of a WWTP would require a local permit, fol-
lowing regulations familiar to local experts. However, in this
case study, the complexity is largely increased because it is
an international company with headquarters in Finland,
seeking an environmental permit for a WWTP in Brazil;
thus, it requires following protocols from the company and
from the location. Moreover, the speciﬁc location of the case
study WWTP is next to a river separating two states, so both
the regional regulation (Instituto Ambiental do Pantanal/
Secretaria do Empresas y Meio Ambiente) IMAP/SEMA
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and the federal regulation (Conselho Nacional do Meio
Ambiente) Conama 20 apply in this case. The selected 25
policy measures were thus extracted by the experts from
the aforementioned regulations. This selection and the ﬁrst
stages of GMA analysis happened during the ﬁrst day of
the workshop.
The policy measures were divided into ﬁve categories
based on sustainability criteria (law-related policy mea-
sures, technical-related measures, ﬁnancial-related measures,
social-related measures, and environmental measures) using
expert evaluation (data collection and data analysis details
are given in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). The speciﬁc policy
measures identiﬁed are provided in Table 1.
2.3. GMA for Generating Alternatives. GMA was originally
introduced by Zwicky [19] and Zwicky and Wilson [60]
as a “non-quantiﬁed modelling method for identifying,
structuring and studying complex problems.” The GMA
approach has been widely used for identiﬁcation of possi-
ble combinations of problem variables in many diﬀerent
disciplines [29]. The GMA technique is a decomposition
method that splits a system into subsystems with their
parameters and selects the most valuable alternatives [61].
GMA enables problem representations using a group of
parameters, which can take any of several values [62]. The
identiﬁed conditions in each dimension can be combined to
derive all the possible alternatives that can solve the problem.
Yoon and Park [29] recommend a group of 5–7 experienced
experts representing diﬀerent aspects of the problem to be
resolved. The speciﬁc way of application of GMA for this
study is described further in Section 3.3.
The basic procedure of GMA is described by Wissema
[63] as follows. First, in the morphological ﬁeld, the system
is decomposed into multiple parameters [29]. In the next
step, the possible alternatives or values in each parameter
are identiﬁed. The values for each parameter should be
deﬁned in a mutually exclusive manner [62]. A morphology
matrix is then built with the obtained parameters and
values. The whole system should be described in the
morphology matrix as comprehensively as possible [23].
Finally, solutions are obtained by combining the values
of each parameter. The number of possible solutions can be
calculated by multiplying the number of values in each
parameter [24].
GMA has been applied to a wide variety of ﬁelds and
contexts like jet and rocket propulsion systems [19] and
Table 1: List of policy measures designed for an industrial WWTP in Brazil.
Parameters Values
Implementation of
legislation (legal aspects)
Requirements in Brazilian Environmental Law, Conama 20 EU-BAT Bref (2001) sectorial Best Available
Technology listing and associated limit values
World Bank/IFC EHS sectorial (pulp and paper industry) environmental performance limit values
Parana river water quality requirements (Class II) local limit values for river water
Saving water target to diminish water footprint of the mill
Storm water control to prevent accidental impacts to the river water
Water/eﬄuent quality
(technical aspects)
Determination of the appropriate treated eﬄuent quality for physical and chemical parameters
Determination of the concentrations of organic compounds, nutrients, and absorbable organic halogens in
treated eﬄuent
Determination of the organic compounds, nutrient, and absorbable organic halogens in treated eﬄuent and
temperature increase no more than 3°C at mixing zone in the river
Determination of dissolved oxygen and turbidity in the river water
Separation of uncontaminated and contaminated storm water to keep hydraulic design of the eﬄuent treatment
plant reasonable
Eﬄuent treatment plant
(ﬁnancial aspects)
Implement speciﬁc process equipment (cooling towers) to achieve legal requirements
Choose those pulping processes (oxygen deligniﬁcation, ECF bleaching) to give lower emissions
Choose an eﬄuent treatment process (extended aeration) to give good treated eﬄuent quality and less
sludge production
Create water management system for clean used process water (collecting, controlling, and recycling used
clean waters)
Storm water management by sectorial storage lagoons
Capacity building
(social aspects)
Training courses for all at the site for safety measures
Environmental training events for workers of production departments
Detailed training of operators of eﬄuent treatment plant concerning process, incomes and outcomes, and
equipment and their control and maintenance
Monitoring
(environmental aspects)
Preparation and implementation of an integrated program for monitoring river water
Preparation and implementation of an internal program for monitoring untreated eﬄuent for process upsets
Preparation and implementation of an integrated program for monitoring treated eﬄuent
Preparation and implementation of an integrated program for monitoring groundwater at the production area
Preparation and implementation of an integrated program for monitoring groundwater as a part of monitoring
system of the landﬁll
Preparation and implementation of an internal program for monitoring outlet of storm water lagoons
WWTP: wastewater treatment plant; BAT: best available technology; EFC: elemental chlorine free; Conama: Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente.
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computer-aided designmodelling [64].The research reported
by Belaziz et al. [65] was aimed at simplifying computer-
aided design model modiﬁcation by integrating GMA into
the design process. In addition, Ölvander et al. [66] proposed
a computerized optimization framework for the morpholog-
ical matrix applied to aircraft conceptual design. In the ﬁeld
of scenario space modelling and development, the research
conducted by Coyle and McGlone [67], Coyle and Yong
[68], Voros [69], and Johansen [25] conﬁrmed that GMA
has been extensively applied. Also, as reported by Haydo
[70], GMA has been successfully applied to optimize
complex industrial operation scenarios.
According to Ritchey [71], GMA is a “basic, conceptual
(non-quantiﬁed) modelling method that can be compared
with a wide range of other scientiﬁc modelling methods,
including System Dynamics Modelling (SDM), Bayesian
Networks (BN) and various forms of ‘inﬂuence diagrams.’”
Furthermore, Duczynski [72] developed general morpholog-
ical analysis for application in organizational design and
transformation, while Zeiler [73] used the morphology
in conceptual building design. In addition, Buzuku and
Kraslawski [74] proposed applying GMA to policy formula-
tion for wastewater treatment. In particular, GMA provides
a possibility for generating unexpected combinations of
policy measures [18].
The morphological approach has several advantages,
including discovery of the total set of new conﬁgurations
and its suitability for utilization with work groups. The use
of work groups increases scientiﬁc communication and
enables integration of state-of-the-art knowledge from prac-
titioners of diﬀerent ﬁelds. However, the main advantage of
this method lies in its ability to structure models for complex
problems in a nonquantitative manner through system-
atic procedures [75]. Another signiﬁcant advantage is the
method’s ability to provide an auditable trail [76].
Drawbacks of the method include issues with vague
formulation, static analysis modelling of the values, nontreat-
ment of variable interdependencies, and insuﬃcient screen-
ing and selection of satisfactory combinations. Thus, the
approach demonstrates limitations in deﬁning and evaluat-
ing diﬀerent parameters against each other and generating
conditions within the problem space. Therefore, GMA
requires support from other processes.
The most promising method in this context is DSM [34],
which can describe diﬀerent methods and enables visuali-
zation, analysis, and improvement of partial solutions. In
this study, GMA is integrated with DSM as a screening,
visualizing, and development tool [57].
2.4. DSM for Analysing and Improving Alternatives. DSM is
an often-used eﬃcient method for analysing complex sys-
tems by enabling the overview of the system and the interde-
pendencies of the system’s elements, developed by [77, 78].
DSM provides the representation of a complex system and
the dependencies, relationships, and interactions of the
system’s elements [34]. In addition, DSM breaks down a
complex problem into smaller problems and enables decon-
struction of the organizational and functional components
of a system by eliciting the relationship between components
in ways that make trade-oﬀ analyses more understandable
and manageable [10].
DSM generates a directed graph that describes relation-
ships between elements or parameters for the design,
management, and optimization of a complex system, organi-
zation member assignments, and activity scheduling, con-
centrated in an n by n adjacency matrix. A system of n
number of parameters is represented by DSM in an n by n
matrix, in which the elements are listed in the exact same
order from 1 to n both in rows and in columns, where the
dependencies between the parameters can be marked. When
parameter a depends on parameter b, then the cell a, b
(where both a and b < n) is marked in a binary manner with
any symbol, e.g., with a “●.” In case of no dependency, the
cell a, b is left empty [79]. When the parameters are listed
in the DSM in their execution order, if cell a, b is marked
under the diagonal of the DSM matrix, it represents an out-
put (or “outwards” relationship) from parameter a to b.
However, if a cell a, b is marked over the diagonal of the
matrix, it means that cell a receives feedback from b (a
depends on b).
DSM has been used in the past to solve complex decision-
making problems and to improve organizational perfor-
mance [77]. Therefore, DSM is considered a consolidated
approach to manage complexity [9, 80–82]. DSM is known
as a contemporary method that has been used for modelling
and managing complex systems in engineering [83, 84],
design planning [85], and operation management [86].
According to Eppinger and Browning [34], DSM can be
applied to public policy because public policy and social
systems are multidimensional and uncertain complex prob-
lems. Environmental policy design and its implementation
is a complex problem comprising a mix of numerous types
of policy instruments or measures [87, 88] adopted by a
range of organizations and stakeholder participation [89].
DSM visualization provides the advantage of compact-
ness and clear representation of essential patterns. On the
other hand, as the graph becomes larger with nodes and
edges, it can become diﬃcult to understand the overall
network representation. Moreover, DSM further provides
the option to improve the system’s structure using matrix-
based analysis techniques. Although the policy measures
are listed as sequential steps in the DSM, the modelling pro-
cess requires attention to their dependencies, interdepen-
dencies, and relations. The main advantage of DSM lies in
combining elements/components in a novel and creative
integrative framework, displaying, analysing, and improving
satisfactory combinations. It is thus suitable for evaluating
policy measures extracted from GMA ([90], 2015; [34]).
3. Methodology
In this section, the overall process mechanics of the two-part
approach for generating and improving policy measures with
experts’ evaluation feedback is described. The experts inter-
act with the stakeholders outside the frame of this study.
The methodology proposes an integrative framework for
designing a sustainable policy that helps to improve policy
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eﬀectiveness, as well as a comprehensive system structure for
sustainable management in organizations.
The proposed methodology is aimed at improving the
impact of the diﬀerent policy measures generated during
policy formulation in the early stages of conceptual project
design, when decision-makers start to set up and embed
design solutions into problem-solving systems. During
policy formulation, decision-makers and designers often
model a functional net using a graph structure [91, 92],
and they may produce a set of partial solutions (or alter-
natives) for a speciﬁc type of problem. Each set of partial
solutions is interpreted and strengthened by a DSM in
order to better manage the complexity and, subsequently,
to aid reasoning about the sustainability of environmental
policy formulation concepts.
Among alternative approaches, the choice had to be
made between a matrix representation or a network repre-
sentation. Network representations are often simple and
easier to read; however, they are not as ﬂexible for increasing
or decreasing in size and can become almost impossible to
follow if the number of inputs is very large. Ultimately, a
matrix representation was chosen because a matrix can easily
be rearranged, it is able to show parameters for a rather large
number of inputs, it can always be expanded [93], and it can
be mathematically analysed (in this case with sensitivity
analysis), among other advantages.
The experts are quite familiar with the sustainability
assessment of relevant environmental policy measure con-
cepts, a very relevant factor for the evaluation of policy
measures. The policy concepts themselves belong to either
corporate, regional, or federal environmental regulations,
and they were designed and assessed by their corresponding
institutions. Moreover, the experts made it a speciﬁc goal
to include or consider the most relevant policy measures
that tackle the social, environmental, and technoeconomic
requirements of a sustainable endeavour. Therefore, the
sustainability assessment of the policy measures is not
addressed in this paper.
3.1. Proposed Approach. This section examines the overall
process and gives a brief explanation of each stage. The pro-
posed new approach is divided into two stages (Figure 1):
Problem deﬁnition 
Identiﬁcation and formulation of policy
measures for WWTP
Development of morphological matrix with
design parameters and their alternatives/
values
Cross-consistency assessment of all values of
the variables
II
III
I
Visualizing and analyzing the best
alternatives for implementation
Reorganizing and improving process ﬂow
of policy measures in DSM
FIRST STAGE: identiﬁcation and
derivation of policy measures
with MA
SECOND STAGE: screening
and improving of the policy
measures with DSM
Select the best policy packages for
implementation
(i) Generate and select the best alternatives of parameters
(ii) Extract a set of possible alternatives from MA
(iii) Select & encode the best combinations
(i) Screen out the set of policy measures extracted at the
initial stage of the DSM
(ii) Analyse and improve the process cost, duration, and risk
(iii) Display the best results for implementation
I
II
(i) Extract the set of policy from MA
(ii) List the set of policy into DSM
INTEGRATION 
GENERATE
IMPROVE
If combinations ok? Sensitivity analysis
Store data
NO
YES
Figure 1: Process overview of the integrated general morphological analysis (GMA) and design structure matrix (DSM) method.
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(1) Generation: identiﬁcation and derivation of policy
measures with GMA, and optimization of GMA
through sensitivity analysis
(2) Improvement: screening and improving the policy
measures with DSM
The ﬁrst stage comprises generation of sustainable policy
measures or alternatives using GMA for policy design. The
identiﬁcation and derivation of policy measures with GMA
entails the following steps: (a) identiﬁcation and formulation
of a library of policy measures, (b) development of a morpho-
logical matrix by building dimensions (parameters) and
generating policy measures as named alternatives (values),
(c) assessment of the consistency of all possible combina-
tions of parameter values, and (d) optimization through
sensitivity analysis.
The second stage consists of searching for improvements
to the policy measures or alternatives using DSM clustering.
Since GMA is not able to investigate and explore the depen-
dence and interdependence relationships between policy
measures or alternatives, the DSM approach is employed to
analyse and better manage the policy design structure,
thereby supporting the identiﬁcation of the interdepen-
dencies and improving the overall process ﬂow. The obtained
results and the reduced sets of policy measures are analysed
by the experts involved in policy formulation.
3.2. Problem Deﬁnition. The full complexity of water man-
agement systems and policy structure is diﬃcult for
managers and designers to understand using traditional
modes of analysis. Hence, this study develops a systematic
approach for exploring, generating, and improving the pol-
icy alternatives using GMA, sensitivity analysis, and DSM
to identify, optimize, and improve the policy measure inter-
actions of the system. The approach will enable managers
and designers of water management systems and WWTPs
to tackle the system’s complexity more wisely, a topic
increasingly relevant in developing regions like China and
Brazil [94, 95].
The environmental policies, provided in Table 1, are
virtually represented in the GMA matrix so that it is possible
to analyse their eﬀectiveness in the speciﬁc project. The main
target of the resulting designed policies is the improvement of
the quality of measures and their performance. In an optimal
scenario, all stakeholders are involved.
3.3. First Stage: Generation of Policy Measures with GMA.
The ﬁrst stage of GMA comprises the identiﬁcation and
formulation of a set of speciﬁc policy measures related to
the problem, in the illustrative case in this work, an industrial
WWTP. The policy measures identiﬁed were categorized by
experts into economic, environmental, social, and technical
sustainability criteria, using the GMA tool to build the
morphological box during the workshop.
There are multiple ways to conduct GMA. Zec and
Matthes [96] elaborated in four possible ways the application
of the method: (1) alone, (2) in a relaxed manner with like-
minded individuals, (3) in a workshop with experts and
stakeholders, and (4) in a distributed manner through remote
online workshops. The third option, a workshop with experts
and stakeholders further detailed by [97], is the approach
chosen for this study. The exercise for evaluation of policy
measures and classiﬁcation into the categories they belong
was performed with preprinted forms, white paper, and pen
from a groupthink of experts in a workshop, described in
Section 4.3.1.
The identiﬁcation and derivation of policy measures with
GMA comprise the following steps: (a) identiﬁcation and for-
mulation of a library of policy measures and classiﬁcation by
the experts, (b) development of a morphological matrix by
building dimensions (parameters) and generating policy
measures as named alternatives (values), (c) assessment of
the consistency of all possible combinations of parameter
values, and (d) optimization through sensitivity analysis for
subsequent iterations.
The experience and knowledge of experts from a wide
range of disciplines is required to develop the morphological
matrix. A methodology to gather and organize this knowl-
edge through a participatory dialogue process, such as a
structured workshop, is also required. Approaches like
CCA, invented by Ritchey [18], allow the number of alterna-
tives and iterations to be reduced signiﬁcantly. The reduced
set is then the subject of process analysis by the experts
involved in the policy formulation. The role of expert opinion
and experts’ participation in decision-making is crucial for
environmental policy management [98].
The set of combinations of alternatives obtained from the
morphological matrix is analysed, screened, and improved
with DSM. The consistency of combinations is evaluated by
exploring all possible combinations of the morphology
matrix via CCA. The sensitivity analysis step proposed in this
work can further optimize the CCA process and highlight the
most relevant parameters.
3.4. Second Stage: Improvement of Policy Measures with DSM.
The use of DSM enables visualization of the dependencies
and interdependencies of combinations of variables and
values. Once optimal combinations of policy measures have
been derived using GMA (described in detail in Section
4.1.3), it is necessary to integrate them into the DSM for
screening and improvement of the policy measures and to
select the most suitable set of policy measures for implemen-
tation. More speciﬁcally, the proposed approach (shown in
Figure 1) can be used to observe the complex interactions
and improve the understanding of underlying relationships
between the policy measures. To perform the analysis of the
policy correlations, this study suggests visualizing and
identifying of the best alternatives for implementation, and
reorganizing and improving the process ﬂow of policy
measures with DSM. Since results extracted from GMA are
used as input to DSM, the DSM process can be applied from
the analysis step.
4. Illustrative Case Example
The proposed approach is illustrated with a case study for
the construction, operation, and maintenance of a large
industrial WWTP. This case study was conducted with an
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international engineering and consultant ﬁrm, hereafter,
called “company A.” Due to increasing pressure for sustain-
able wastewater treatment globally, particularly in the pulp
and paper industry [95], there is a signiﬁcant need to design
and formulate sustainable policies that promise sustainable
solutions for wastewater treatment facilities. The new plant
was planned to become an integrated facility in the wastewa-
ter sector through collaboration with the local community,
potential stakeholders, and enhanced engagement with the
company in the region. Industrial water systems manage-
ment, including wastewater treatment systems, is a complex
problem that requires expert’s knowledge and years of
experience in a wide range of disciplines. The decision-
making can be classiﬁed as a complex problem, the activity
is situated on a federal river forming a border area between
the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Sao Paulo, Brazil,
and there are large capital and operational costs involved,
as well as involvements of multistakeholders. A relevant
factor in the development of sustainability measures for
industrial wastewater treatment is the participation of stake-
holders from various levels and functional areas of society
[99] involved in the process.
Some policy measures are of interest to both internal
and external stakeholders. This interest generates a “policy
measure-stakeholder” relationship. In the case in progress,
stakeholders are
(i) Central Authority. The central authority commonly
is responsible of taking care for the issues that
could destabilise the relationships between the
present stakeholders and any other possible conﬂict
on stage.
(ii) Local Authority. The local authorities have interest
in the issues related to the legal aspects of operation
of the plant on their territory.
(iii) Employees. The main interest of the employees is in
environmental aspects, health and safety (EHS)
issues including training programs, and workshops
aiming for the better quality of the working
conditions.
(iv) Company/Industry. For the company or industry,
and more speciﬁcally its top management level
authority, the key interests are the health and safety
conditions for the staﬀ, aiming for the high quality
of the work environment and other social aspects
that are directly linked to the plant operation
and its maintenance, and of course to proﬁt from
the activity.
(v) NGOs. The civil society and NGOs have interest in
the topics that are related to broader perspectives,
which target environmental, advocatory, and other
social issues, e.g., human work rights.
(vi) Local Residents. Local residents and the community
around usually have interest in the public services
provided by WWTP, and having impact on their
healthy lifestyle.
(vii) Researchers from Academia. The researchers from
the academia typically have high interests in pro-
viding conditions for collecting data and sampling
analysis for scientiﬁc research purposes.
The stakeholders provide feedback to the experts. After-
wards, with the acquired knowledge, the experts participated
in the workshop. In this way, stakeholders remotely inﬂuence
the decision-making in this case study. Nor were the experts
or the stakeholders previously familiar with the methods
used for this research.
4.1. Identiﬁcation and Derivation of Policy Measures with
GMA. The empirical knowledge of experts, stakeholders,
and members of society is required to compile available envi-
ronmental measures [99]. The compiled set of environmental
policy measures has been generated as described in Section
2.2, and the selection is depicted in Section 3. Measures
may be regulatory (e.g., legislation on emission limits),
economic (e.g., taxation of wastewater discharge), technical
(e.g., investment in best available technology), social (e.g.,
increase in social awareness), and environmental (e.g.,
decrease in pollutant concentrations in eﬄuents). The
measures can be quantitative or qualitative and aﬀect all
aspects of sustainability. The policy measures can be ranked
by eﬀectiveness, time of deployment, cost, risk, uncertainty,
technical complexity, social acceptability, and organizational
complexity, depending on whether the policy is meant to
adapt or mitigate, or whether it is designed to reward
improvements or punish noncompliance.
4.1.1. Development of the Morphological Matrix with Design
Parameters or Dimensions and Alternatives or Values. After
problem deﬁnition, the main task in GMA is generation of
a morphological ﬁeld comprising the most relevant dimen-
sions (parameters) and production of design alternatives
(values) for each parameter. Therefore, policy measures must
be identiﬁed and formulated in accordance with sustain-
ability criteria to achieve the environmental targets. These
sustainability criteria are considered the constituents of the
WWTP and can be used as the morphological ﬁeld’s
parameters. The parameters of the morphological ﬁeld
are set in the header in the spreadsheet table, and their gener-
ated values are placed under each parameter. Figure 2 shows
the development of a morphological ﬁeld with ﬁve parame-
ters—legal, ﬁnancial, technical, social, and environmental
dimensions—and their values. The speciﬁc WWTP parame-
ters in the case study are written in bold. For each parameter,
possible values are deﬁned in their respective column.
Table 2 illustrates the combination of diﬀerent design
parameters and values obtained using the principles pro-
posed by Zwicky [19] and Ritchey [18], and Table 1 shows
the list of policy measures designed for the industrial WWTP
in Brazil considered in the case study. The combination of
policy measures of one partial solution from every column
leads to the overall principle solution or policy formulation
concept. Since GMA has many iterative steps [100], modi-
ﬁcations in the morphological matrix can occur throughout
the process [62]; thus, the proposed GMA optimization
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through sensitivity analysis described in Section 5.2 is
thus justiﬁed.
The GMA approach outlined in this study may take
practitioners and researchers up to several weeks to execute.
The actual time and eﬀort required for any GMA application
depends on several factors, including familiarity with the
process being modelled and the degree of diﬃculty of infor-
mation gathering and deﬁning and evaluating parameters
and values. In the case of parameter building, Geum and Park
[30] and Geum et al. [101] suggest that an expert-based qual-
itative approach provides more powerful results. Although
some GMAmodels can be extracted automatically from pro-
ject management models, most entail the direct involvement
of experts.
4.1.2. Assessment of Consistent Combinations of All
Parameter Values. CCA, proposed by Ritchey [18], can be
used to evaluate all the feasible combinations of parameter
values. CCA assesses compatibility for each value via pairwise
comparison (one pairwise value from one column or mor-
phological class with another pairwise value from another
morphological class). To reduce the problem space, decision
elements are compared pairwise by experts (further detailed
in Section 4.3.1) in terms of their control criteria. Each
condition is compared with another condition and evaluated
for internal consistency, which is noted as their assigned
values in a matrix called the CCA matrix.
Figure 3 presents the CCA matrix for this study. The
assessment of the conditions, done by the experts, is carried
out by evaluating the level of compatibility of two parameters
during a workshop described in Section 4.3.1. For example,
the question is asked to the experts: is P1, V4 “Parana River
Table 2: Combinations of parameters/values.
Values
Parameters
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
V1 P1V1 P2V1 P3V1 P4V1 P5V1
V2 P1V2 P2V2 P3V2 P4V2 P5V2
V3 P1V3 P2V3 P3V3 P4V3 P5V3
V4 P1V4 P2V4 P3V4 P5V4
V5 P1V5 P2V5 P3V5 P5V5
V6 P1V6 P5V6
Legal Technical Financial Social Environmental
Parametersvalues
P1
Implement
legislation
P2
Water/eﬄuent
quality 
P3
 Eﬄuent treatment
plant
P4
Capacity building
P5
Monitoring
V1
Conama 20
Requirements –
Brazilian
Environmental Law 
Temperature = 40°C,
settleable solids = 1 ml/1 L Cooling towers
Training for safety
measures in the
working place (for all)
River water
(authorities)
V2 EU- BAT Bref (2001) COD = 8 – 23 kg/ADt,AOX< 0.25 kg/ADt
Oxygen deligniﬁcation,
ECF bleaching
Training for general
environmental
aspects (for workers
at various
departments)
Untreated eﬄuent
quality
V3 World Bank/IFC EHSGuidelines
Temperature increase
no more than 3°C at
mixing zone
Extended aeration 
Training for operators
of the eﬄuent
treatment plant
Treated eﬄuent
quality
V4
Parana River Water
Quality Requirements
(Class II)
DO = 5 mg/l,
minimum
Turbidity 100 NTU,
maximum
Collection, control, and
recycling used clean
waters
Groundwater
(especially in the
surroundings of big
tanks)
V5 Water footprint
Separation of
uncontaminated and
contaminated storm
waters
Storage lagoons
Groundwater
(especially in the
surroundings of big
tanks)
RUN
HID
PRE
G
B
V6 Storm water control Outlet of storm waterlagoons
Figure 2: Development of the morphological ﬁeld with ﬁve parameters and their values. BAT: Best Available Technology; IFC
EHS: International Finance Corporation Environmental Health and Safety; COD: chemical oxygen demand; ADt: air dry tons;
AOX: absorbable halogen compounds; DO: dissolved oxygen concentration; NTU: nephelometric turbidity unit; ECF: elemental chlorine
free; Conama: Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente.
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water quality requirements (Class II)” compatible, neutral, or
incompatible with P3, V1 “Cooling towers”? When compati-
ble, the interaction is evaluated as optimal (marked with a 3
in the CCA matrix). When neutral, the interaction is
evaluated as acceptable (marked with 2). Finally, if the
interaction is incompatible, it is evaluated as nonacceptable
(marked with a 1). The values assigned in the example shown
in Figure 3 are 122 (49.4% of the total) optimal combinations,
27 (11%) acceptable, and 98 (39.6%) nonacceptable.
The CCA matrix reduces the total problem space to an
internally consistent solution space. Furthermore, the CCA
in a multidimensional matrix is then reduced to ﬁnd an
approximation for an optimal solution. A “parameter-
block” is the two-dimensional block of cross-referenced
values between two parameters and their values, and it is
shown as alternate white and shaded blocks in Figure 3.
In some cases, all the cells in the blocks will have optimal
combinations, meaning that these two blocks do not con-
strain each other. If more than half of the block contains
optimal values, the solution space will not reduce signiﬁ-
cantly. On the other hand, if more than half of the values
are nonacceptable (or even fewer if distributed in large
consecutive arrays), then it will risk choking the model,
and no solution will be possible. Poorly and nonadequately
deﬁned parameters make the process diﬃcult to manage,
and parameters and values must be reformulated in such
cases. This process can prove rather time-consuming, and
consequently, it is very important to optimize the iteration.
This work proposes the use of sensitivity analysis to address
this issue.
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Conama 20 Requirements
Brazilian Environmental Law 3 1 2 3 1 3 1 1 2 3 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3
EU- BAT Bref (2001) 1 3 1 2 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 1 3
World Bank/IFC EHS
Guidelines 3 3 3 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 3
Parana River Water Quality
Requirements (Class II) 1 2 3 3 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3
Water footprint 1 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 1
Storm water control 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 3
Temperature = 40°C,
Settleable solids = 1 ml/1 l 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 3 2 3 1 3 3
COD = 8 – 23 kg/ADt,
AOX< 0.25 kg/ADt 1 3 3 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 3 1 1 3
Temperature increase no
more than 3°C at mixing zone 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 1 1 1
DO = 5 mg/l, minimum
turbidity 100 NTU, maximum 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 3
Separation of uncontaminated
and contaminated storm waters 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3
Cooling towers 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1
Oxygen deligniﬁcation,
ECF bleaching 3 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 1
Extended aeration 1 2 3 1 1 3 1 1 1
Collection, control, recycling
used clean waters 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3
Storage lagoons 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3
Training for safety measures
in the working place (for all) 2 1 2 3 2 1
Training for general
environmental aspects
(for workers at various departments)
2 2 2 3 3 2
Training for operators of
the Eﬄuent treatment 3 3 3 2 2 3
Figure 3: Cross-consistency assessment matrix.
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4.1.3. Generation of New Sets of Policy Concepts. As seen in
Figure 3, some parameter values have more optimal com-
binations than others do. The parameters with the high-
est amount of optimal combinations share between each
other nineteen satisfactory sets of policy concepts. These
identiﬁed parameters are grouped into three clusters or
packages as a ﬁnal result of GMA. The mentioned clusters
are the following.
The parameter value P1, V1 “requirements in Brazilian
environmental law, Conama 20,” seen in the ﬁrst row of
Figure 3, has eleven optimal pairwise combinations with
other values. The parameter values P2V1, P2V4, P3V1, P3
V5, P4V2, P4V3, P5V1, P5V3, P5V4, P5V5, and P5V6,
described in detail in Table 3, optimally combine pairwise
with P1,V1. For simplicity purposes, P1,V1 and its optimal
combinations will be referred from this point onwards as
policy 1. The high level of compatibility of policy 1 makes it
relevant for WWTP and therefore is selected for further
analysis in the next stages.
Likewise, the parameter value P1,V3 “World Bank/IFC
EHS Guidelines” (third row in Figure 3) combines optimally
pairwise with twelve parameter values. The parameters
combining in an optimal manner with P1,V3 are P2V1, P2
V2, P2V3, P3V1, P3V2, P3V3, P4V1, P4V2, P4V3, P5V2,
P5V3, and P5V6, and from now on will be referred to as
policy 2. Just as in the case of policy 1, the high compatibility
of this cluster makes it relevant for further analysis and thus
is selected to be taken to the next stages.
In the same manner, the parameter value P1,V4 “Parana
River Water Quality Requirements (Class II)” (fourth row of
Figure 3) combines optimally pairwise with twelve parameter
values. The parameter values mentioned are P2V3, P2V4,
P2V5, P3V4, P3V5, P4V2, P4V3, P5V1, P5V3, P5V4,
P5V5, and P5V6 and henceforth constitute policy 3. Just like
in the previous two cases, the high compatibility of policy 3 is
enough to be taken for further analysis in the following steps.
A list of the parameter values and the amount of optimal
pairwise combinations is shown in Figure 4, where policies
1, 2, and 3 are highlighted in yellow.
After deﬁning and identifying the packages or clusters
(policies 1, 2, and 3), these clusters are presented back to
the experts for their judgment and approval according to
their experience. Figures 5 and 6 show the selection of the
parameter values that generate optimal combinations of
polices 1, 2, and 3 for newWWTP according to environmen-
tal experts’ judgments. All the parameter values that present
optimal combinations to either/or policies 1, 2, and 3 seen in
Figure 4 are listed in Figure 5.
To facilitate visualization of the correlation between the
policies and their optimal parameter values, a colour code
was created and assigned to each policy, further improving
understanding of the interactions of the parameter values
contained within policies 1, 2, and 3. Red, blue, and green
were assigned to the parameter values that combine opti-
mally with policies 1, 2, and 3, respectively. When policies
1 and 2 share a common optimal parameter value combi-
nation, it is marked as magenta. Similarly, when policies 2
and 3 share optimal parameter values, it is marked as cyan,
and for policies 1 and 3, yellow is used. When policies 1,
2, and 3 share a common parameter value, it is marked
as purple.
Figure 6 shows the constitution of the policy packages
and the parameter values they have in common. For example,
policy package 1 is constituted by 11 parameter values, all of
which appear common to either or both policy packages 2
and 3 as indicated in Figure 6. Likewise, it can be seen also
for policy packages 2 and 3.
4.2. Optimization through Sensitivity Analysis. In order to
establish a relationship between parameters to evaluate
Table 3: Detailed description of the parameters that combine optimally pairwise in policy 1.
Compared parameter Combines optimally pairwise with values
Parameter Description Values Description
P2V1 Determination of the appropriate treated eﬄuent quality for physical and
chemical parameters
P2V4 Determination of dissolved oxygen and turbidity in the river water
P3V1 Implement speciﬁc process equipment (cooling towers) to achieve legal requirements
P3V5 Storm water management by sectorial storage lagoons
P1V1
Requirements in Brazilian
Environmental Law,
Conama 20
P4V2 Environmental training events for workers of production departments
P4V3 Detailed training of operators of eﬄuent treatment plant concerning process, incomes and
outcomes, and equipment and their control and maintenance
P5V1 Preparation and implementation of an integrated program for monitoring river water
P5V3 Preparation and implementation of an integrated program for monitoring treated eﬄuent
P5V4 Preparation and implementation of an integrated program for monitoring groundwater at
the production area
P5V5 Preparation and implementation of an integrated program for monitoring groundwater as a
part of monitoring system of the landﬁll
P5V6 Preparation and implementation of an internal program for monitoring outlet of storm
water lagoons
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the compatibility of diﬀerent combinations, meetings and
workshops must be organized with experts and iterations
must be repeatedly executed to achieve a desirable solu-
tion. A desirable solution requires that the number of
optimal combinations is big enough to provide options
for the decision-makers to analyse, but not so big that
the decision-making within the optimal solutions becomes
complex again. According to [102], there are no strictly
deﬁned higher or lower limits to how extensive the share of
optimal combinations from the total possible combinations
should be, as it is very case-speciﬁc. Nevertheless, the share
of optimal combinations typically lies between 1% and 10%
of total possible combinations.
However, gathering the required experts for the amount
of time required to go through several iterations may be
a diﬃcult starting point for the project. In order to opti-
mize the iteration process, a sensitivity analysis can be
executed across the CCA matrix (Figure 3) to reduce the
number of relationships to evaluate, thus reducing the
time required for evaluative iteration.
Figure 7 shows the proportional distribution for pairwise
combinations of the values shown in Figure 3. The ratio of
combinations of Figure 7 is calculated by obtaining the
amount of combinations of value exclusivity and in each cell
(containing a parameter value) of the CCA matrix, then
aggregating them row-wise. Value exclusivity in this case
P2,V1
P2,V2
P2,V3
P2,V4
P2,V5
P3,V1
P3,V2
P3,V3
P3,V4
P3,V5
P4,V1
P4,V2
P4,V3
P5,V1
P5,V2
P5,V3
P5,V4
P5,V5
P5,V6
Separation of uncontaminated storm water 
Implement speciﬁc equipement cooling tower
Oxygen deligniﬁcation, EFC bleaching 
Policy 1
Policy 2
Policy 3
Policy 1 + 2
Policy 2 + 3
Policy 1 + 3
Policy 1 + 2 + 3
Physical and chemical parameters
Organic compounds and nutrients
Temperature in the mixing zone 
Dissolved oxygen and turbidity in the river
Program for monitoring outlet of storm water lagoons
Detailed training of operators of eﬄuent treatment plant
Integrated program for monitoring river water
Integrated program for monitoring untreated eﬄuent 
Integrated program for monitoring treated eﬄuent
Integrated program for monitoring system of the landﬁll
Integrated program for monitoring groundwater 
Environmental training for production department
Extended aeration for eﬄuent quality 
Create water management system for clean used process water 
Storm water control to prevent accidents
Training for safety measures
Figure 5: Colour-coded selection of the parameter values that generate optimal combinations for policies 1, 2, and 3, for a new WWTP.
P5,V4
P4,V3
P5,V3
P5,V5
P5,V2
P5,V4
P5,V6
P5,V3
P5,V5
P5,V6
P5,V6
P5,V1
P5,V6
P4,V1
P4,V3
P5,V3
P5,V5
P5,V3
P4,V2
P5,V1
P5,V6
P4,V2
P5,V2
P3,V2
P3,V5
P5,V2
P5,V6
P5,V5
P5,V6
P4,V3
P5,V1
P5,V2
P4,V3
P5,V3
P3,V3
P4,V2
P5,V6
P5,V1
P5,V4
P5,V3
P1,V1
P1,V2
P1,V3
P1,V4
P1,V5
P1,V6
P2,V1
P2,V2
P2,V3
P2,V4
P2,V5
P3,V1
P3,V2
P3,V3
P3,V4
P3,V5
P4,V1
P4,V2
P4,V3
P2,V1
P2,V2
P2,V1
P2,V3
P2,V5
P2,V5
P3,V1
P3,V2
P3,V1
P3,V3
P3,V4
P4,V1
P4,V1
P4,V3
P4,V2
P4,V2
P5,V4
P5,V4
P5,V1
P2,V4
P3,V2
P2,V2
P2,V4
P3,V1
P3,V4
P4,V3
P3,V3
P3,V5
P5,V1
P3,V5
P4,V2
P5,V2
P5,V3
P4,V3
P4,V3
P5,V5
P5,V2
P3,V1
P3,V3
P2,V3
P2,V5
P3,V4
P3,V5
P5,V1
P4,V3
P4,V1
P5,V3
P4,V2
P4,V3
P5,V3
P5,V1
P5,V1
P5,V3
P3,V5
P4,V3
P3,V1
P3,V4
P3,V5
P5,V1
P5,V3
P5,V3
P4,V2
P5,V6
P4,V3
P5,V1
P5,V6
P5,V6
P5,V6
Figure 4: Results of cross-consistency assessment, highlighting the parameter values that generate optimal pairwise combinations.
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means that cells of value 3 are combined exclusively with
other cells of value 3 in the matrix. While in theory the
method can combine parameters of all values, an optimal
solution in principle (and for this case) is considered to be
constituted by a combination of optimal parameter values.
For the CCA matrix presented in Figure 3, the optimal
combinations of parameter values of the cell P1, V3–P2,V1
presented in Figure 8(b) is larger than P1, V1–P2V1
shown in Figure 8(a) and P1, V4–P2,V3 in Figure 8(c).
Simultaneously, the aforementioned cells have more opti-
mal correlations than, for example, P1,V4–P2,V1. Based
on this premise, by analysing the CCA matrix (Figure 3), it
is possible to extract the number of correlations of every
combination pair (cell) and then compare the number of
correlations to the total number of combinations of a selected
value, which is done taking into account each parameter
value (optimal, acceptable, or nonacceptable) separately.
All cells in a row are then aggregated according to
their parameter value, as shown in Figure 7. For example,
the row P1V1 adds up to 286 unique combinations when
only cells of the same value are combined, out of which
226 are of optimal value, 30 are acceptable, and 30 are
nonacceptable (or 79.2% optimal, 10.4% acceptable, and
10.4% nonacceptable).
Figure 7 also shows the total distribution of optimal,
acceptable, and nonacceptable combinations (right-hand col-
umn). The high number of optimal combinations (49.1%)
means further iterations can be considered to revaluate the
combinations if considered necessary, in order to reduce
the number of optimal combinations. The proposed sensitiv-
ity analysis is aimed at identifying the eﬀect of modifying the
dependence value between two speciﬁc elements in the total
number of solutions. As expected, some combinations are
strongly correlated to more parameters than others.
Figure 8 shows all the unique optimal combinations (value
3) present for the cells: (a) P1V1–P2V1 (20 combinations),
(b) P1V3–P2V1 (27 combinations), and (c) P1V4–P2V3
(20 combinations). The rows containing these cells (P1, V1,
P1V3, and P1,V4, respectively) contain the largest number
of optimal correlations, both in relative numbers (columns
1, 3, and 4 of Figure 7) and in absolute numbers. Therefore,
these rows, and the elements contained within them, are thus
selected to be the policy packages policy 1, policy 2, and policy
3, chosen for analysis in DSM. The large number of optimal
combinations present in these speciﬁc cells highlights the
potential impact of modifying the values in such cells whilst,
for example, changing the value of cell P1V5–P2V5 could
only reduce 4 optimal combinations from the solution space.
Figure 8 shows also something that is not so clear at ﬁrst
glance. For every additional parameter block, the amount of
combinations increases in an exponential manner, at a ratio
proportional to the number of parameter values of that
parameter block. Likewise, the larger number of parameter
values within a parameter block would increase signiﬁcantly
the amount of combinations. For example, if an additional
parameter block of the size of P4 (the smallest parameter
block from the example as visible in Figure 2) is added, the
total possible amount of combinations would triple. This
can potentially become rather problematic, as the evaluation
time and computational time can eventually increment
beyond the capabilities of a workshop. Hence, decreasing
the amount of parameter pairs to be evaluated becomes
paramount, opening a gap for sensitivity analysis to select
only the most inﬂuential values to evaluate, based on their
relative weight, thus decreasing dramatically the array of
evaluations to be made by experts in one iteration.
Equation 1 shows the method used to calculate the
relative weight (RW). The RW of an element pair in respect
to the total combinations “K” (subsequent combinations
calculated as indicated by Ritchey [18] and exempliﬁed in
Figure 8) of value “x” (1, 2, or 3 in the example) in position
(a, b) (where “a” is the row and “b” is the column of the
CCA matrix). In the equation, “R” stands for the total
number of rows; “C” stands for the total number of columns.
For example, if the number of combinations of value “3” of
the element pair (3,4) is seven K3 3,4 = 7 and the total of
subsequent combinations of all element pairs is one thou-
sand, ΣRΣCK3 i,j = 1000 = then the RW3 3,4 would be 0.7%
RWx a,b =
Kx a,b
∑Ri=1∑
C
j=1Kx i,j
1
Figure 9 shows the relative weight of all element pairs,
colour-coded to facilitate the evaluation; the colour coding
and sensitivity limits assigned for this case are also shown.
Once the RW of all element pairs has been analysed
and classiﬁed, it is possible to focus on reiteration of the
combinations with higher RW value. By revaluating only
the combinations with higher RW, shown in red and yellow
in Figure 9, up to 54.4% of the total combinations can be
shifted from one value to another. This means reducing the
optimal solution space by revaluating and possibly changing
a combination value from optimal to acceptable, for example,
while reiterating only 45 out of the 247 element pairs that
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Figure 8: Example of unique optimal combinations for the cells associated with policies 1, 2, and 3 (a, b, and c, respectively).
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would otherwise be reiterated. Assuming that experts
would require roughly the same amount of time to evalu-
ate every combination, conducting a sensitivity analysis in
the iteration presented reduced the iteration evaluation
time by 81.8% in this example. To put it into numbers,
the evaluation of 247 combinations was done in this case
during a two-day workshop described in general by
Ritchey [97] and in detail for the case study in Section
4.3.1. Considering 9 hours of work (9 hours of the second
long day of the workshop) to evaluate 247 combinations,
the time required breaks down into an average of one
combination evaluated every 2.2 minutes, a rather fast
pace due to the high level of experience from the experts.
If only 45 element pairs are evaluated instead (as in the
example), the whole iteration process would take approxi-
mately one hour and forty minutes.
Using the same method, a reduction of over 80% was
achieved in all iteration experiments carried out with
diﬀerent variants of the values obtained from the case study.
Moreover, through a 1000 loop of randomly generated values
for a matrix of the same dimensions (done inMatlab R 2014),
it was found that by revaluating an average of 12.2% of total
cells, the solution space can be reduced by an average of
73.9%. Even considering that the revaluation of certain
combinations would require a diﬀerent amount of time
from others, still by the amount of revaluations avoided the
potential for optimization is clear.
Furthermore, sensitivity analysis can be done automati-
cally and directly from the CCA matrix with a spreadsheet
to further optimize the iteration process, since the RW of
diﬀerent combinations would change after every iteration
and single-cell evaluation.
4.3. Screening and Improving Policy Measures with DSM
4.3.1. Data Collection. The data gathering was conducted
through a workshop preceded by interviews and feedback
with design practitioners at the industry. In the case under
study, a two-day workshop was organized with the partici-
pation of 10 experts. Among them were designers and engi-
neers, planners, and managers of diﬀerent backgrounds and
specializations, to rate the sets of policy measures and
derive suggestions for reorganization and improvements.
Their opinions serve as the directional driver for policy
design improvements towards sustainability. The formed
group of experts consisted of one general manager, one
ﬁnancial manager, one environmental manager, two heads
of manufacturing plants, two designers, two senior planning
analysts, and one IT manager with more than 10 years’ expe-
rience. None of the workshop participants had any experi-
ence with GMA or CCA. One of the advantages of carrying
out the evaluations of the pairwise combinations in a group
of 10 experts is that the individual bias factor is greatly miti-
gated, as the ultimate chosen value is the result of a consensus
between all 10 experts.
The workshop held had a duration of two full days in
March 2016 at the facilities of the engineering and consulting
company. The experts in the workshop participated on a
voluntary basis. A meeting face-face with the experts for a
detailed interview preceded the workshop. The abovemen-
tioned participants selected and evaluated 25 policy measures
for the WWTP during the workshop. The ﬁrst author was
personally involved in the workshop as a facilitator and direct
observer and responsible for data collecting. The interviews
and the workshop were not recorded due to conﬁdentiality,
but detailed notes of answers and their feedback were taken
from each interview and the workshop. The members of
the multidisciplinary group validated the policy measures
for further procedures of the DSM model.
4.3.2. Data Analysis.When building a DSM model, the main
objectives are to highlight the information in the system’s
elements, to design parameters or elements that can be repre-
sented in a DSM graph, and to identify the intensity of
P2,V1 P2,V2 P2,V3 P2,V4 P2,V5 P3,V1 P3,V2 P3,V3 P3,V4 P3,V5 P4,V1 P4,V2 P4,V3 P5,V1 P5,V2 P5,V3 P5,V4 P5,V5 P5,V6
P1,V1 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 1.3% 1.5% 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 0.8% 0.8% 1.3%
P1,V2 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 0.7% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2%
P1,V3 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.3% 1.5% 0.0% 1.1% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5%
P1,V4 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.2% 0.0% 1.3% 1.6% 1.3% 0.0% 1.4% 0.9% 0.9% 1.4%
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P2,V2 0.0% 0.4% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1%
P2,V3 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.6% 0.9% 1.2% 1.2% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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P3,V1 0.5% 0.8% 1.1% 1.0% 0.7% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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P3,V4 0.0% 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%
P3,V5 0.0% 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%
P4,V1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0%
P4,V2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0%
P4,V3 0.8% 0.4% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9%
Red = RW > 1.5% 
Yellow = 1% < RW < 1.5% 
Blue = 0.5% < RW < 1%
Green = RW < 0.5%
Figure 9: Colour-coded relative weight (RW) of element pairs.
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dependencies among those elements. A dataset involving
policies 1, 2, and 3 with their 19 attributes obtained from
GMA (see Figures 4 and 6) was used to build the elements
of the DSM matrix. The data was used to examine options
for chunking components into subsystems. The analysis
was conducted for each dimension of dependency and for
the overall DSM.
First, the policies and their elements or policy measures
were mapped on a 25× 25 square DSM (that includes all
policy measure of the system for consistency), where these
policy measures are listed vertically in the “Component”
column. Second, the dependencies of the elements to be
analysed are deﬁned. Based on the dependencies, a DSM
graph structure was built and analysed using the ProjectDSM
v2.0 (http://www.projectdsm.com) software, which provides
an automated DSM optimization step for triangulation. By
running the software, the input data is analysed using
an algorithm for optimization that consists of two steps:
sequencing and clustering. The sequencing step rearranges
the order of the parameters to improve the ﬂow based on
their dependencies, while the clustering step groups the
elements that are strongly interconnected.
The total interactions for each of the 19 elements were
assessed, resulting in 22 entries (red dots in Figure 10) in
the dataset. The screening mechanism was conducted and
implemented using the ProjectDSMv2.0 project planning
software. This is extremely helpful for users to optimize the
policy sequence within coupled blocks. Therefore, analysing
and optimizing the interactions and sequence of policy mea-
sures can signiﬁcantly improve the performance of the policy
formulation process [90].
4.3.3. Model Analysis and Visualization of the Policy
Measures for Implementation. The policy measures obtained
from GMA are listed in the DSM as rows and columns
symmetrically. All policy measures’ dependencies used for
the DSM were obtained during the ﬁrst day of the workshop
for the identiﬁed policy measures. The corresponding inter-
action levels are identiﬁed and evaluated in joint collabora-
tion with the experts, chosen, based on their familiarity
with the system.
The DSM results are formulated through clustering and
partitioning, which, in turn, are used for future work on
development of business process diagrams. The second
stage of the proposed approach consists of visualization
and analysis of the optimal clustering alternatives in order
to estimate and reduce the process costs’ required time
and evaluate risk (high, medium, and low) and eﬀort
(days). The visual representation of the policy measures’
dependencies provides further insight into the relationships
within a complex system, sometimes highlighting informa-
tion that otherwise could have been missed. This type
of evaluation is a fundamental characteristic of design-
science research.
The improved sequence of policy in the DSM is shown in
Figure 10, indicating the elements and their interdepen-
dencies after clustering of the original matrix. This DSM
analysis resulted in four clusters, each of which was then
deﬁned as a development sequence of policies. The four
coupled blocks (in sequence) are (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), (9, 10),
(13, 14, 15, 16, 17), and (18, 19, 20). Each block is visualized
separately and independently, and this places the most
connected elements in the matrix. It can clearly be seen that
four shaded blocks along the diagonal were deﬁned based
on interdependencies that generally require reorganizing
policies with stakeholders.
From the elements’ interactions shown in Figure 10, the
elements in the lower part of the matrix require inputs from
the elements of the upper part of the matrix. Because of this,
the elements in the upper part of the matrix should be given
higher priority, in order to improve the ﬂow of the policy by
executing ﬁrst the elements that are input to others.
Figure 10: WWTP policy formulation process DSM after partitioning.
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4.3.4. Reorganization and Improvement of the Process Flow of
Policy Measures in DSM. The last stage consists of the reorga-
nization, screening, and improvement of policy process ﬂow
understanding via DSM sequence optimization. In the
proposed framework, diﬀerent interaction types in DSM
clustering (given in Figure 10) document the original struc-
ture of the policy design system in the case study. Next,
the DSM partitioning function reveals the most interde-
pendent elements in the matrix. Last, the policy design
structure is reorganized and optimized by splitting the
larger interdependent clusters into smaller subgroups
(shown in Figure 11) that are more manageable.
Although various criteria have been proposed to evaluate
policy measures and packages [37, 103], details for a policy
package have rarely been revealed with DSM. In this study,
interdependent elements were identiﬁed and analysed for
improvements in the presence of domain specialists and
experts involved in the project, who found the process and
its resulting sequence of policy measures quite valuable.
The reorganized structure of the DSM matrix through
partitioning in Figure 11 proposes an improved organiza-
tional structure for the policy measures in the system, thus
minimizing the instances of rework. For instance, Figure 11
shows that the element in row 2 “Implement cooling tower”
is related to the element “Requirements in Brazilian Environ-
mental Law, Conama 20” under subsystem “Implement
legislation,” which makes perfect sense. This element in row
2 “Implement cooling tower” originally belonged to the
eﬄuent treatment plant (ﬁnancial aspects in GMA matrix).
As a result, managers and designers should consider to
restructure their policy design system by reassigning row 2
to “Implement legislation,” for better coordination. Through
several computational clustering iterations, optimal solutions
are reached while considering internal and external block
dependencies under certain assumptions. The results were
approved by the panel of environmental experts, engineers,
and managers who participated in the workshop.
5. Discussion and Managerial Implications
5.1. Policy Measure Development vs. Policy Formulation.
GMA and DSM were conducted with the participation of a
panel of domain experts in a two-day workshop that resulted
in a policy measure reduction model. The concept of policy
measures is very complex, since the policies are generally
described using natural language, making them diﬃcult to
be interpreted, especially when they are competing and
conﬂicting with each other. Another important characteris-
tic of policy measures is that they are intangible, and due to
this, it is very hard to systematically break down, analyse,
and improve. This is especially diﬃcult considering integra-
tion of the sustainability aspects in the early stage of concep-
tual design. Hence, DSM allows the mentioned analysis
and improvement.
5.2. Development of Parameters and Development of Values
in GMA. The two morphology constituents, parameters
and values, are very diﬀerent in nature. The deﬁnition of
parameters requires comparatively more consideration of
an expert in comparison to a value, because the interaction
of parameters should comprehensively represent the policy
concept. To achieve the development of innovative solu-
tions of policy concepts, parameters must be mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Furthermore, the
iterative process of GMA and CCA receives a signiﬁcant
improvement through the use of sensitivity analysis [104].
Sensitivity analysis as an optimization tool can be per-
formed with any set of values, in every iteration, and target
any type of combination (optimal, acceptable, and nonaccep-
table). It is a powerful and adaptable tool capable of obtaining
desirable solutions in a fraction of the time required other-
wise. The analysis can also be automated in a spreadsheet.
In addition, the sensitivity limits can be tailored to adapt
the method to CCA matrixes of any dimensions, adding
another layer of ﬂexibility.
Figure 11: Partitioned DSM.
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5.3. Deﬁning Information Flow, Dependencies, and
Interdependencies in DSM. The most important constitu-
ents of DSM—system elements, deﬁning the strength of
these element dependencies and interdependencies, and
cluster analysis—set the foundation for the advantages
of DSM usage. The approach itself helps to illustrate
the power of the process architecture, provides a cluster-
ing and reorganizing method, and shows all possible
information hidden in the policy design and its measures
or alternatives. A key insight from the model is the dif-
ference between planned and unplanned iterations. With
this tool, it is possible to increase the overall understanding
of environmental sustainability policy design of wastewater
treatment system management among diﬀerent experts
and decision-makers.
5.4. Involvement of Field Experts. The proposed approach of
combining GMA and DSM can eﬀectively and eﬃciently be
used for managing complexity of environmental policy for-
mulation. Both GMA and DSM approaches are qualitative
methods, and the involvement of the expert’s judgment has
high impact in the evaluation of solutions, elimination of
contradictions in the GMA, building of the elements, and
analysis and evaluation of DSM dependencies. In addition,
close collaboration between academic or research institutions
and companies could facilitate the work of domain experts in
order to make optimal decisions.
5.5. Managerial and Practical Implications. The current
manuscript has multiple implications for policy design
science and society. The main contribution is facilitation of
the decision-making process for decision-makers and indus-
try experts. It allows designers and managers to become
aware of the complexity of policy measures’ generation,
policy improvement, and policy implementation in a DSS
context. Once the basic understanding of these policy
measures and issues is acquired, the relevant authorities have
further insights for addressing and tackling counterproduc-
tive measures implemented in the industry. The authorities
also become more capable of recognising the most important
policy measures in order to coordinate eﬀorts to create
eﬀective strategies. This work ﬁnally aids decision-makers
to prepare and practice the implementation of DSS. The pro-
posed approach may assist decision-makers to identify and
assess the environmental policy measures, while enabling
them to enhance the sustainability of the companies imple-
menting the measures.
The results show the potential of applying DSM to signif-
icantly improve the development of policy alternatives, accel-
erate the design of policies, and improve the entire system’s
policy structure towards sustainable management. The ﬁnd-
ings obtained in this work are aimed at further promoting
the use of modelling methods in policy formulation with
the purpose of performance and eﬀectiveness improvement
of policies.
In this sense, the proposed approach targets to support
decision-making and to address speciﬁc problems in a
systematic manner.
6. Conclusions
Environmental policy formulation is a rather complex
process that is aﬀected by several uncertain factors, nonquan-
tiﬁable problems, and unspeciﬁed targets. In this paper, a
new systematic integrative approach to environmental policy
formulation based on structural modelling techniques was
presented. The goal of the proposed approach is to support
the design of policy, management, and planning in the early
stages of conceptual design. The aim was to integrate
GMA and DSM, using a case study for generation and
improvement of policy measures. The approach consisted
of two stages:
(1) First stage: generation, identiﬁcation, and derivation
of policy measures with GMA
(2) Second stage: improvement and screening of the
policy measures with DSM
Furthermore, GMA optimization was achieved by reduc-
ing iteration time using sensitivity analysis. The methodology
for combination of GMA with DSM and avenues for their
integration was discussed in detail.
The eﬀectiveness of this integrated approach was illus-
trated with a real case study of industrial WWTP manage-
ment planning. The results show the potential of applying
GMA and DSM to signiﬁcantly generate and improve the
development of policy alternatives, hasten the design of
policies, and improve the whole system’s policy structure
for sustainable management in WWTP for pulp and
paper companies.
The main results of this paper are as follows:
(i) The integration of DSM with GMA improves the
overall process from conception and design to
integration for improvement and management of
complex systems
(ii) The combination of DSM with GMA signiﬁcantly
reduces the policy design process time
(iii) GMA optimization using sensitivity analysis reduces
the iteration time
(iv) Combined GMA and DSM methods can deﬁne
absolute priority importance in a DSS
6.1. Contributions
6.1.1. Theoretical Contribution. This study has several contri-
butions to the ﬁeld of the sustainable policy design literature.
First, from the fundamental research perspective, this work
opens the door for further studies of theoretical aspects of
the integration of system modelling methods beyond GMA
and DSM.
Second, from a methodological point of view, this
work expands to the utilization in policy formulation area,
by applying systematic modelling methods to sustainable
policy design. The presented approach contributes to and
promotes research in the domain of multicriteria analysis
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and multiobjective optimization using the complex and
challenging example of industrial water systems manage-
ment. Third, the proposed optimization method of CCA
through sensitivity analysis is showcased.
6.1.2. Empirical Contribution. From the practical perspective,
the suggested approach will help decision-makers and man-
agers in dividing a complex problem into subproblems in
the process of policy design. Using creative and analytical
modelling methods and decision tools can further improve
environmental decision-making performance of policy for-
mulation. Finally this study is, to the authors’ best knowl-
edge, the ﬁrst attempt to develop a systematic integrative
approach for environmental policy formulation. Therefore,
the suggested approach may be used for future policy design
in the current and potentially other ﬁelds.
6.2. Limitations. Along with these contributions, however,
there are some limitations. First, the GMA-based structural
model was not an easy task to implement by the participants
in the workshop. All participants needed several iterations of
the exercise and guidelines from the facilitator on how to
develop the parameters and generate the values in order to
familiarize them with the methods. The proposed approach,
particularly development of parameters and values in mor-
phological space, is rather signiﬁcant and strongly dependent
on the expert’s judgment. Second, the suggested optimization
of GMA and CCA through sensitivity analysis should be tai-
lored by the user to matrixes of varied dimensions, as well as
decide speciﬁc sensitivity limits for each case. Since a large
number of combinations are generated in a solution space,
appropriate optimization methods and tools can be con-
sidered and procedures should be prepared to facilitate
the process.
Third, the DSM visualization and clustering method is
required to validate the relationships of the policy measures.
However, it is still unclear how to prioritize the implementa-
tion of policy measures within the clusters. Currently, the
scope of this study is limited to the sustainable policy design
for water management system and WWTP. Further research
and application of the proposed approach to other contexts is
still required and will be addressed in future work.
Data Availability
The data used to support the ﬁndings of this study have not
been made available because of privacy agreements with the
interviewees and their respective companies. However, the
form used to gather information from the interviewees is
available and attached in Appendices A, B, and C.
Additional Points
Highlights. (i) Proposes an integrated framework for genera-
tion and improvement of policy measures. (ii) Shows the
beneﬁts of combining general morphological analysis and
design structure matrix. (iii) Proposes optimization of
general morphological analysis through sensitivity analysis.
(iv) Presents a case study to show strengths and weaknesses
of methods in policy design.
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The integration of renewable power supplies into existing electrical grids, or other major technology transitions in electric power, is
a complex sociotechnical process.While the technical challenges are well-understood, the process of adapting electricity policy and
market rules to these new technologies is understudied. Planning andmarket rules are a critical determinant of the technical success
of renewable energy integration efforts and the financial viability of renewable energy investments. Organizational adaptation can
be particularly complex in electric power, where transmission grids cross multiple political boundaries and decisions are made not
by central authorities or governments, but in cooperative regional frameworks that must accommodate many divergent interests.
We add to a recently emerging literature on the governance of regional organizations that plan and operate electric power grids by
developing and illustrating a novel approach to the study of political power in multistakeholder electricity organizations. We use
semistructured interviews with participants in a specific regional electric grid authority, the PJM Regional Transmission Operator
in the Mid-Atlantic United States, to elicit perceptions of where tensions arise in stakeholder-driven processes for changing PJM’s
rules and perceptions of those groups of stakeholders that possess political power. We treat these perceptions as hypotheses that
can be evaluated empirically using five years of data from PJM on how stakeholders voted on a wide variety of regional electricity
policy issues. Representing voting behavior as a network, we use a community detection method to identify strong coalitions of
stakeholders in PJM that provide support for some stakeholder perceptions of political power and refute other perceptions. The
degree distribution of the voting network exhibits a fat tail relative to those in other canonical graph models. We show, using
relatively simple network metrics including degree, betweenness, and the mixing parameter, that the reason for this fat tail in the
degree distribution is the existence of “swing” voters in RTO stakeholder networks. These voters are identifiable in the tail of the
degree distribution of the voting network and are influential in pushing highly contentious rule change proposals towards passage or
failure.Themethod we develop is generalizable to other contexts and provides a new framework for the study of regional electricity
policy formation.
1. Introduction
As large-scale electric power systems undergo various types
of technological transition, including the integration of large
amounts of renewable power generation and an increase in
adoption of distributed power generation and electrification
of transportation, the rules that govern markets, planning,
and operations of the power grid need to adapt along with
technology [1–6]. These rules are important for determining
the value of technology options that explicitly or implicitly
compete to provide electric generation and transmission
services [7].The challenges in integrating weather-dependent
wind and solar power into regional electric grids have
provided some recent examples of how grid operators have
needed to adapt their rules, especially when those grid
operators span multiple political jurisdictions (e.g., regional
grid operators covering all or parts of several states in the
United States or coalitions of national grid operators in
Europe). In the United States, grid operators have adapted
to rapid growth in wind energy by changing market and
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generator dispatch rules to minimize the frequency with
which wind energy output must be curtailed [5] and have
adopted new power transmission planning procedures aimed
at finding synergies between wind energy development and
other electric transmission needs [8]. In California, growth
in solar energy has challenged that state’s power grid to be
able to balance the rapid decline in solar output that occurs
at the end of the daytime period with a coincident increase
in demand [4]. The response of the California grid operator
has been to establish a new market construct for “imbalance
energy” services that are able to increase and decrease output
quickly in response to changes in state electricity demand
or solar power production. The Irish electric grid operator
has responded to increased wind penetration by adjusting
market rules to require other generation resources to provide
a certain level of system support.
The necessity of power grid operators to adapt planning
and operational rules to handle the increased penetration
of renewable energy or other technologies on the electric
power system is clear, but an underappreciated aspect of
this adaptation is that in many jurisdictions the market,
planning, and operational rules are made in a collective
decision process requiring coordination and negotiation
among multiple parties rather than by a government or
other central authority [7]. The process of integration of
renewable energy or distributed energy resources into large-
scale power grids is thus not simply a problem of engineering
and technology but is a complex sociotechnical process in
which the process for enacting changes in the rules governing
power grid planning and operations can have a measurable
impact on grid performance after the rule changes have been
made [4, 7, 9].
In contrast to the large literature that has used models of
distributed decision-making or multiagent models to analyze
the impacts of consumer or distributed energy decisions on
power grid operations (examples from this voluminous liter-
ature include [7, 10–14]), the analysis of how regional power
grid operatorsmake decisions has emerged only recently.This
literature has largely focused on the governance of regional
power grid operators and the relationship between these grid
operators and their regulators [2, 4, 15, 16]. Particularly in the
United States, however, the rules governing the operation and
planning of regional power grids are made in a stakeholder-
driven setting that resembles a negotiated political process
more than a regulatory process (although the stakeholder-
driven proceedings will typically end with the regulatory
approving or disapproving of the rule changes supported by
the stakeholder group) [17, 18].
Some very recent analyses of these stakeholder processes
in regional power grids in the United States have suggested
that the decisions emerging from these processes are highly
influenced by the structure of the process itself [16–19].
Which parties have standing to participate formally in the
stakeholder process, the way that stakeholders are segmented
into coalitions, and the voting mechanisms can all shift
political power in ways that can be consequential for the
performance of the electric power system. Political power
within the stakeholder process has been identified in the
literature as particularly problematic when stakeholders are
asked to make collective decisions on highly contentious
issues such as the rules governing incentives for new power
plant construction [18]. This literature, however, is not in
agreement as to which interests may or may not wield
political power in different circumstances.
We provide and illustrate a network-based method for
identifying political power structures in the stakeholder-
driven organizations (Regional Transmission Organizations
or RTOs) that govern the electric power grid in many
jurisdictions that have adopted some form of electricity
restructuring and deregulation. We illustrate this method
using a detailed case study of one particular jurisdiction in
North America but the method itself is portable to other
contexts. The issue of how RTOs engage in stakeholder-
driven self-governance has been raised as an important
energy policy issue in the academic literature and by pol-
icymakers [15–19], and the approach that we develop and
implement opens up the study of restructured electricity
market processes to the use of network-based tools. Our
paper makes three distinct contributions addressing RTO
governance and the development of network tools for elec-
tricity policy analysis. First, we synthesize qualitative infor-
mation from semistructured interviews with participants in
RTO stakeholder processes to formulate hypotheses about the
distribution of political power in these processes. Second, we
use quantitative information fromRTOvoting histories in the
PJM Interconnection to evaluate these hypotheses. We find
empirical support for some perceptions of the distribution
of political power but not others. Third, we show how
relatively simple network metrics contain information that
can identify “swing” voters in RTO stakeholder networks.
These swing voters have previously been shown to play an
important role in enabling or thwarting the ability of the
RTO to make changes to its market rules and procedures
[17, 18].
We apply this analysis framework to the PJM Regional
Transmission Organization in the United States. PJM Inter-
connect operates the electric grid in all or parts of thirteen
states plus theDistrict of Columbia in theMid-Atlantic region
of the United States. In addition to being one of the largest
regional power grid operators, PJM makes public highly
detailed data on the proceedings of its stakeholder process.
The special role and decision structure of the Regional
Transmission Organization is described in the remainder of
this section. In Section 2, we describe our analysis frame-
work and the process for conducting the semistructured
interviews. In Section 3, we provide qualitative evidence
from our stakeholder interviews for multiple perceptions
of political power; these perceptions serve as hypotheses
that we evaluate with our voting network data in Section 4.
Based on our analysis of voting data, we find some evidence
in support of some of these stakeholder perceptions and
evidence that refutes some stakeholder perceptions. We are
also able to refute some of these perceptions based on the
voting network data. Finally, we show that some simple
properties of the voting network are sufficient to identify
participants who may possess pivotal voting power in highly
contentious issues. Section 5 provides some concluding
thoughts and future directions for integrated qualitative and
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quantitative research into the governance of large energy
organizations.
1.1. The Role of Regional Transmission Organizations in
North American Electric Power Planning and Operations.
The electric power system integrates a highly diverse set of
technologies and organizations by means of regional high-
voltage transmission grids that can span multiple politi-
cal jurisdictions. Most of North America, for example, is
served through three large-scale power grids that cross
state and national boundaries. Many parts of the electric
power industry have undergone a process of restructuring
and deregulation over the past two decades, involving the
unbundling of electric utilities into separate companies for
power generation, transmission, and distribution; the cre-
ation of competitive markets for power generation (effec-
tively replacing the function of the electric utility or state-
owned electricity authority with competitive market signals
for power system planning and investment); and, in North
America specifically, the increased regionalization of power
grid operations through the creation of Regional Transmis-
sion Organizations (RTOs). Currently, approximately 70%
of all electricity demand in the United States, along with
some Canadian provinces and portions of Mexico, is served
through Regional Transmission Organizations. A map of
those areas in North America that lie within RTO footprints
is shown in Figure 1.
The RTO was originally created in the United States
to meet regulatory standards for regional coordination in
power system planning [21] and broadening of electricity
markets to enable generation resources frommultiple utilities
to compete with one another using the regional transmission
grid as a kind of market platform. The formation of RTOs
in the United States has been voluntary. Utilities are not
required to form or join one of the RTOs but are encouraged
to do so by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), which regulates RTO practices. Broadly, the role of
the RTO in North America can be described in a few distinct
functions:
(i) The RTO is responsible for determining investment
needs for power generation and transmission to meet
standards for reliable power system operations, but it
does not own any physical assets and must provide
financial incentives for generation and transmission
firms to make needed investments. Many of these
incentives come through market signals.
(ii) The RTO is responsible for real-time operations
within its footprint (dispatching power generation
to meet electricity demand) but the command-and-
control capabilities of the RTO are very limited. Most
RTOs use market mechanisms to provide financial
incentives for power plants to offer electricity produc-
tion services.
(iii) RTOs are intended to be technology-neutral (they
cannot favor one technology or fuel over any other,
including renewable and distributed power genera-
tion) and the FERC has asked RTOs to operate in a
very stakeholder-driven way.
1.2. The Decision Structure of RTOs. With relatively few
exceptions, changes to market rules or operational and plan-
ning protocols within RTOs happen through a stakeholder-
driven process that reflects the many different organizations
and interests that make up the electric power sector. Organi-
zations that are typically recognized as stakeholders within
the process include power generation and transmission
owners (including renewable energy and distributed energy),
electric distribution utilities, large electricity consumers
(such as manufacturing facilities), and firms that engage
in the wholesale trade of electric power. RTOs typically
have a large number of formally recognized stakeholders:
PJM, the focus of the illustrative analysis in this paper, had
525 recognized stakeholders at the time that we conducted
our analysis. These stakeholders are stratified according to
one of five defined industry sectors, as shown in Table 1.
These industry sectors include End Use Customers (EUC),
which primarily represent large industrial electricity users;
Electric Distributors (ED), which primarily includes util-
ities that deliver electricity to retail consumers; Genera-
tion Owners (GO), which own and operate power plants;
Transmission Owners (TO), which own the high-voltage
transmission wires; and Other Suppliers (OS), a diverse
group of financial players in electricity markets and firms
who offer services like demand curtailment to electricity
markets but do not fit easily into any of the other four sector
categories.
While the structure of these stakeholder processes varies
somewhat by RTO, the movement of a rule change generally
involves a few different steps [2, 22]. Proposed RTO rule
changes are first debated and discussed in one of a number
of thematic working groups or task forces, where there
may be more limited participation. Rule changes that are
approved by the working group or task force are elevated to
a vote by a central committee consisting of all stakeholders.
Successful issues are then passed to the RTO Governing
Board and then on to the FERC for regulatory approval.
It is important to remember that the scope of stakeholder
involvement in the RTO is limited to rule changes and not
real-time operational decisions or planning outcomes. For
example, the stakeholders in an RTO might determine the
specific reliability criteria that are used in a transmission
planning study or they might determine the level of the
price cap for offers into an RTO’s electricity market, but
the stakeholders would not have any direct involvement in
the conduct of planning studies or the clearing of mar-
kets.
The analysis in this paper uses the PJM stakeholder
process and voting data from that process as an illustrative
case study. The central committee in PJM, which votes on
all proposed rule changes, is referred to as the Members
Committee (MC). All stakeholders are eligible to vote on
any issue that is brought before the MC. The MC in PJM is
interesting not only because of howmuchdetailed voting data
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Figure 1: RTOs in North America.The PJM RTO, which is the focus of our case study, covers the Mid-Atlantic United States. Source: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission.
Table 1: Composition of voters in the PJM Members Committee (MC). Source: [18], based on data from [20].
Sector Number of Firms (%) Example Firms
End Use Customers (EUC) 21 (4%) Air Products, Proctor &Gamble
Electric Distributors (ED) 43 (8%)
Old Dominion Electric
Cooperative, Northern
Virginia Electric
Cooperative
Generation Owners (GO) 95 (18%) Calpine, NRG
Transmission Owners (TO) 14 (3%) Duquesne Light, PSEG
Other Suppliers (OS) 354 (67%)
Direct Energy (Curtailment
Service Provider),
Citigroup Energy
(Financial), EDF Trading
(Marketer)
is available from the proceedings of this committee, but also
because the PJMMC has perhaps the greatest degree of rule-
making authority of any North American RTO. They make
decisions on behalf of all the others who could not participate
on operating rules and policies. The MC uses a system of
sector-weighted voting in which all five industry sectors (as
outlined in Table 1) are equally weighted and the vote of each
individual member carries identical weight within a sector.
When voting, all participants vote yes or no or abstain on
a single issue, producing a sector-specific voting score that
measures the proportion of voting stakeholders in that sector
supporting the rule change. The final voting score 𝑉 is the
sum of all sector-level scores, defined as
𝑉 = ∑
𝑘
(𝑛𝑘−𝑎𝑘)∑
𝑗=1
𝑤𝑗𝑘 = ∑
𝑘
(𝑛𝑘−𝑎𝑘)∑
𝑗=1
𝛿𝑗𝑘
𝑛𝑘 − 𝑎𝑘 (1)
where 𝛿𝑗𝑘 is an indicator variable equal to one for a yes vote of
voter j in sector k and zero for a no vote. 𝑛𝑘 is the total number
of voters in sector k, and 𝑎𝑘 is the number of abstention votes
in sector k. Abstention votes are excluded when counting
the total number of votes and thus have the same effect as
a smaller number of sector voters; i.e., abstentions increase
the weight of an individual voter. Note that as the number of
voters in a sector increases, the weight of an individual voter
in that sector (1/(𝑛𝑘 − 𝑎𝑘)) declines. In the PJM stakeholder
process, an issue passes if the final voting score 𝑉 exceeds
3.335, roughly equivalent to a two-thirds majority among the
five sectors. This implies that any two sectors could jointly
prevent passage regardless of the number of voters in those
sectors.
Table 2 illustrates a hypothetical voting result, taken from
[18], that results in passage, with a total voting score of
3.457.The column showing the percentage of votes in favor is
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Table 2: Sector-weighted voting example. Source: [18].
Sector For Against Abstain Total Total - Abstain % in favor
Transmission Owner (TO) 8 2 4 14 10 0.8
Generation Owner (GO) 15 0 1 16 15 1
Other Supplier (OS) 10 10 5 25 20 0.5
Electric Distributor (ED) 3 7 15 25 10 0.3
End Use Customer (EUC) 12 2 0 14 14 0.857
Final voting score 𝑉 3.457
calculated by taking the proportion of For votes relative to the
total of For plusAgainst votes. Abstentions are not counted at
all in the voting process.
The decisions made by the PJM MC are highly conse-
quential to the functioning of PJM’s electricity markets and
the economic incentives faced by different power generation
technologies: these rules and incentives effectively emerge
from the many individual voters in the stakeholder process,
which have their own commercial interests. The relative
power of various coalitions (groups of stakeholders whose
interests are aligned across one or more issues) and the
behavior of voters that do not neatly align with identifiable
coalitions play an important role in determiningwhich power
grid rules are adopted and which rules are not adopted. The
performance of the physical power grid is thus inextricably
tied to the behaviors in the stakeholder process. Some
recent work has questioned the effectiveness and of PJM’s
stakeholder process [16, 19], pointing out that rule changes
have become so contentious as to make the passage of any
rule change very difficult, and also questioning the degree
to which the sector definitions themselves may concentrate
political power and influence voting outcomes.
Our work addresses a number of important RTO gover-
nance issues raised by this body of literature by describing
and illustrating a novel approach that uses mixed methods
of qualitative interview data with voting network analysis to
identify strong voter coalitions that could act in a coordinated
fashion and screen for the existence of pivotal voters whomay
be able to swing voting outcomes in certain directions.
2. Methods
In this section we provide a high-level overview of the analyt-
ical approach that we use to identify political power in RTO
stakeholder processes. This method integrates qualitative
information gleaned from semistructured interviews with a
network analysis of RTO stakeholder voting data to develop
quantitative measures and draw conclusions about political
power. The method that we employ draws from two distinct
research philosophies, the theory of engaged scholarship as
described by van de Ven [23] and the grounded theory
approach from Strauss et al. [24–26]. The engaged schol-
arship approach to developing organizational knowledge
emphasizes the need for repeated practitioner interaction to
define and refine relevant research questions and ensure that
research results are relevant to the organizational frameworks
being studied. Our analysis has some common threads with
grounded theory in that we allowed our interactions with
practitioners, through semistructured interviews, to assist
in defining the problem and identifying relevant analytical
hypotheses.
A schematic of our overall approach is shown in Fig-
ure 2. Semistructured interviews were conductedwith several
dozen stakeholders in multiple RTOs, and the qualitative
information from these interviews was used to identify
perceptions of the stakeholder process by those who were
participants in that process (panel A in Figure 2). These
perceptions will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.
Taking some of those perceptions as hypotheses provided a
framework through which we could build voting networks
and examine properties of those networks (panel B of
Figure 2). These network properties then gave us metrics or
other information that could be used to determine which
stakeholder perceptions were consistent with the voting data
and which were not (panel C of Figure 2). Specific voting
issues could be analyzed using the voting network data or
other models to generate predictions about the outcome of
similar voting issues (as was done in prior work on “capacity
markets” in RTOs, which are forward markets for electric
generation capacity), and computational experiments can be
run to examine possible voting outcomes under different
stakeholder process structures or voting rules and how those
voting outcomes manifest themselves in the performance of
the power grid or of electricity markets (panel D).The whole
research process can eventually circle back to the stakeholders
themselves (moving from panel D to panel A).
The analysis in the present paper is focused primarily on
showing how qualitative information can be used to build
quantitative theories in electricity policy formation through
RTO stakeholder processes. It thus effectively covers panels A
through C in Figure 2.
3. Using Semistructured Interview Data to
Generate Perceptions of Political Power in
RTO Stakeholder Processes
During the summer and fall of 2014, approximately 70
individual interviews were performed with stakeholders and
RTO staff at three RTOs in the United States: PJM, the
Midcontinent ISO, and the California ISO. Figure 3 shows
a breakdown of the types of respondents in our interviews.
A group of initial interviewees spanning the industry sectors
identified in Table 1 was initially selected, and additional
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(A) Qualitative
perceptions gleaned
through interviews…
(B) …provide
perspective and
ideas on how to
look at data…
(C) …and ideas on
how to formulate 
and test empirical
models…
(D) …which can be used
to run counterfactual
simulations, the results
of which can be shared
with stakeholders.
Figure 2: A model of integrating qualitative and quantitative data on electricity policy formation.
RTO Staff, 44%
State Policy Maker,
13%
Transmission
Owner, 10%
NGOs, 13%
Renewable
Generator, 3%
Others, 17%
Figure 3: Distribution of respondents to semistructured interviews.
respondents were identified via the snowballing method.
One-third of these interviews were with stakeholders and
RTO staff in PJM, which is the focus of our illustrative case
study. The interviews were conducted in-person as well as
over the telephone and ranged from 45 to 90 minutes in
length. In addition to interviewing stakeholders, we reviewed
a number of public documents related to the stakeholder
process and attended several working group meetings as well
as meetings of the full Members Committee in PJM.
Respondents were chosen based on a review of PJM
documents and identifying individuals and organizations
thatwere active and experienced, particularly in issues related
to the integration of renewable energy into large-scale power
grids. Our initial group of respondents also spanned the
industry sectors identified in Table 1. We engaged in some
snowballing to identify additional interview respondents
beyond those identified in our original document search.
Each interview was professionally transcribed and then
coded in the NVIVO environment by the research team.
Second-level coding within NVIVO focused on categories
such as political power, shifts in the dynamics of the stake-
holder process, and the complexities involved in seeing a
proposed rule change through to completion. Quotes used in
this paper are representative of perceptions shared with the
research team by multiple respondents, and respondents are
identified only as [PJM-XX].We describe the context of these
observations here and summarize the quotes in Table 3.
The semistructured interview format, along with the set
of questions for respondents, is described inmore detail in the
Appendix.We note that because of the semistructured nature
of the interviews few constraints were placed on the path of
the conversationwith each respondent other than to focus the
conversation on the stakeholder process.
In our interviews with PJM stakeholder participants,
we observed that many perceived the stakeholder process
as becoming more complex and time-consuming, in part
because the total number of stakeholders has grown as
more participants have joined PJM’s markets. One of our
stakeholder participants observed, “You needed significantly
smaller rooms to have themeetings.The intensity of disagree-
ments was just as great as today.There were things they never
reached agreement on but there was definitely more of a spirit
of, ‘We’re all in this together and we need to make it work,’
than there is today” (PJM-01). This perception was shared
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Table 3: Summary of PJM Stakeholder Perceptions.
Perception in the PJM Stakeholder Process Illustrative Stakeholder Quote
Growth in the number of stakeholders, and increasing conflicts in
commercial interests among stakeholders, are creating challenges in
moving rule changes forward.
You needed significantly smaller rooms to have the meetings. The
intensity of disagreements was just as great as today. There were
things they never reached agreement on but there was definitely
more of a spirit of, ‘We’re all in this together and we need to make
it work,’ than there is today” (PJM-01).
The stakeholder process has become factionalized into consumer-side
interests and supply-side interests. (Note that “load” is
electricity-industry parlance for consumers.)
“The problem that some people find is that one side can stymy the
other. You have generation, transmission, load, and so on.
Generation’s always worried that load can stop them from doing
things. Load is worried about generation.” (PJM-02).
Perceptions that consumer-side interests have more political power.
“There is a lot of leverage on the load side.” (PJM-03); What you
actually find now is the load interest, where it used to be they had
about 50 percent of the vote, they now have 65 percent of the vote.”
(PJM-04.)
Perceptions that supplier-side interests have more political power.
“[The stakeholder process is] tilted towards the supplier side”
(PJM-05); “There have certainly been complaints by load
that. . .PJM pushed through a whole bunch of changes through the
capacity market without really knowing how they were going to
interact with each other.” (PJM-03)
by a number of our stakeholder respondents across multiple
sectors of the PJMmarket.
Along with the perceptions of increased tension within
the stakeholder process and a greater level of effort required
for the process to culminate in a passable rule change
when rule changes were needed, we also observed different
perceptions of which stakeholder groups were more or
less influential, either in pushing rule changes through the
Members Committee or in stopping rule changes from being
approved. One observer of the stakeholder process noted that
“The problem that some people find is that one side can
stymy the other. You have generation, transmission, load, and
so on. Generation’s always worried that load can stop them
from doing things. Load is worried about generation.” (PJM-
02).
We observed multiple stakeholder respondents suggest-
ing that since consumer-side (or “load”) interests dominated
two of the five sectors in the PJM stakeholder process
that these consumer-side interests were able to exercise
substantial political power. According to one such respondent
describing the voting process in the Members Committee,
“There is a lot of leverage on the load side.” (PJM-03). An
observer of the stakeholder process reported, “What you
actually find now is the load interest, where it used to be they
had about 50 percent of the vote, they now have 65 percent of
the vote.” (PJM-04).
We also observed multiple stakeholder respondents sug-
gesting the opposite: that supply-side (or “generation”) inter-
ests were able to exercise substantial political power in the
PJM Members Committee. One consumer-side respondent
expressed the belief that the process was “tilted towards the
supplier side” (PJM-05), while another observer noted that
“There have certainly been complaints by load that. . .PJM
pushed through a whole bunch of changes through the
capacity market without really knowing how they were going
to interact with each other.” (PJM-03).
4. Finding Evidence of the Perceptions on
Political Power via Voting Network Analysis
Multiple organizational and political processes have been
represented using network-based tools [27–33]. The present
analysis is the first to do so in the context of regional
electricity markets and is motivated by the use of voting data
to support or refute the stakeholder perceptions identified in
Section 3.The perceptions about the PJM stakeholder process
elicited as part of our semistructured interviews suggest two
possible hypotheses about the balance of political power.
Hypothesis 1. Supplier-side perceptions are correct, and
consumer-side interests possess substantial political power in
the Members Committee.
Hypothesis 2. Consumer-side perceptions are correct, and
supplier-side interests possess substantial political power in the
Members Committee.
If the perceptions of supply-side interests are correct and
consumer-side interests jointly possess a substantial amount
of political power, we should observe a strong voting bloc
among the two consumer-side sectors in the PJM stakeholder
process (the ED and EUC voters). If the perceptions of
consumer-side interests are correct, we should observe a
strong voting bloc among generation firms in the PJM
stakeholder process (principally those stakeholders in the
GO and TO sectors). We represent several years’ worth of
stakeholder voting data from PJM as a network (Section 4.1)
and use a community detection method [34] to identify
coalitions from the voting data (Section 4.2).
Prior analysis of some specific issues in the PJM stake-
holder process [19] has found circumstances in which a
few voters can sway a voting result. While this prior work
showed the importance of such “swing voters” in determining
the outcomes of highly contentious voting issues, in the
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present paper we use the structure of the voting network
to specifically identify these swing voters. We compare the
structure of the PJM voting network with several canonical
graph models of similar size to the PJM voting network.
We observe similar properties in the PJM voting network as
would emerge from a model of preferential attachment (we
would expect such homophily if stakeholders’ perceptions of
a strong voting bloc are correct), but we also observe a small
number of stakeholders exhibiting a higher node degree than
would be expected from a preferential attachment network.
We argue in Section 4.3 that these high-degree voters
are effectively swing voters who tend not to vote with any
of the identified voting blocs on a consistent basis. Since
betweenness centrality has been identified in the literature as
an indicator of power within a social network [29, 35–38] we
also examine thismeasure as a potential way to identify swing
voters. Finally, we also use the detected community structure
to calculate the mixing parameter for each voter and evaluate
that as an identifier for a swing voter. We then examine the
actual voting behavior for each stakeholder identified as a
swing voter by each network structure measure and calculate
a false-positive rate for each measure.
This section of our analysis utilizes firm-level voting data
from the PJMMembers Committee since detailed voting data
is only available for that specific stakeholder body.We are not
able to quantitatively describe political power in any of the
lower-level working groups or task forces, since data from
those proceedings are not made public. We gathered data
from PJM that contains information on 26 voting items from
2011 to 2015, including the outcome of each vote and the
way that each stakeholder voted (we note that by aggregating
data across a five-year period we are ignoring any dynamic
changes to the structure of the voting network. While this
structure may change from year to year depending on the
kinds of voting issues presented to the PJM MC, we note
that over this period there were very few changes in the
composition of the stakeholder group in PJM). Our dataset
also includes stakeholder information such as name, sector,
subsector, and other asset-related information about specific
stakeholders.
4.1. Construction of the Voting Network for the PJM Members
Committee. We gathered data from PJM that contains infor-
mation on 26 voting items from 2011 to 2015. The dataset
includes a brief description of the issue being voted on, the
outcome of each vote, and that way that each stakeholder
voted. Our dataset also includes stakeholder information
such as name, sector, and other information about specific
stakeholders. Unlike many social networks there is thus little
semantic information that we can use to identify ideological
preferences or alignment among voters [39]. We use this
voting data to construct an undirected voting network [30,
33, 40], in which a vertex represents a single voter in the MC
and is connected to another vertex when the two vertices
(voters) vote on the same side, yes, no, or abstain, on the same
issue. A connection in our voting network thus represents
ideological alignment between two voters on a specific issue.
In this way our voting network has some commonalties
with the similar-view networks constructed on social media
platforms [41]. The connections, or edges, are weighted by
the frequency of the two connected voters voting together.
Figure 4 shows the voting network in the PJM MC when
connections represent two stakeholders voting “no” on a
specific issue (the no network), while Figure 5 shows the
voting network in the PJM MC when connections represent
two stakeholders voting “yes” on a specific issue (the yes
network). We did construct a network for abstentions, but
this network turns out to be quite sparse so it is not shown
here.
In Figures 4 and 5, vertices are located on one of the five
axes representing each industry sector in an order of degree
and the size of vertices is proportional to the weighted degree.
Edge colors represent different detected communities, as
described further in Section 4.2. Among 147 nodes in the
network, there are 21 GOs, 18 TOs, 61 OS’s, 30 EDs, and 17
EUCs. The no network has 8,173 edges and an average degree
of 111.2 as well as an average weighted degree of 284.83; the
yes network has 8,853 links with an average degree of 119.63
and average weighted degree of 505.54.
4.2. Detection of Strong Coalitions. We apply the Louvain
method [34, 40] to discover the community structure of
the PJM voting network. A number of different community
detection algorithms exist [42–46]; we chose the Louvain
method because our network has a relatively small number
of nodes and relatively large average mixing parameters [45].
The algorithm maximizes modularity through iterative pro-
cess of clustering nodes and altering community assignments.
The modularity is a function that measures the difference
between the number of edges within communities and the
expected number of randomly placed edges; it has been
used in a number of studies of community structure [33,
40, 47–51]. Thus, high modularity is desirable for searching
community structure since it implies that there are more
edges than expected within communities, or nodes in the
same community are more connected than expected [34, 40,
47, 52]. Hence, the scheme optimizes the modularity measure
over the possible segmentation of a network and finds a divi-
sion that produces the largest modularity value. Equation (2)
is a mathematical representation of the modularity measure
[34] where 𝐴𝑖𝑗 is the edge weight between vertices 𝑖 and 𝑗,𝑘𝑖 represents the sum of edge weight of vertex 𝑖, and 𝑐𝑖 is the
assigned community of vertex 𝑖.𝑚 = (1/2𝑚)∑𝑖,𝑗 𝐴 𝑖𝑗 and the
delta function 𝛿(𝑎, 𝑏) is 1 if 𝑎 = 𝑏 and 0 otherwise.
Q = 12𝑚 ∑𝑖,𝑗 [𝐴 𝑖𝑗 −
𝑘𝑖𝑘𝑗
2𝑚 ]𝛿 (𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗) (2)
The community detection algorithm identifies three dis-
tinct communities in the no network, indicated by the green,
yellow, and orange colors in Figure 4. It identifies two distinct
communities in the yes network, indicated by the red and blue
colors in Figure 5. In the context of voting, we interpret an
identified community as a coalition, meaning voters in the
same community voted more frequently together than voters
of the other communities.
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Electric Distributor
End-Use
Customer
Figure 4: The no voting network in the PJM Members Committee from 2011 to 2015. The node and edge colors correspond to the three
different communities detected within the no network.
Generation
Owner
Transmission
Owner
Other
Supplier
Electric Distributor
End-Use
Customer
Figure 5:The yes voting network in the PJMMembersCommittee from2011 to 2015.Thenode and edge colors correspond to the two different
communities detected within the yes network.
Table 4 shows the number of voters in the communities
by sectors in the no network, while Table 5 shows the yes
network. Voters in the ED and EUC sectors tend to be entirely
contained within the ED-EUC community, while voters in
the GO and TO sectors are distributed more evenly among
the identified communities.
We acknowledge that modularity may show a resolution
limit that suggests failure to detect small size communities
and there are potential improvements to this limitation [46,
53]. Although this could remain as a future work, this study
focuses on identifying sizable coalitions that could exercise
political power (e.g., veto power). Still, to address a concern
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Table 4: The number of voters in the detected communities by industry sectors (no network).
Community 1 Community 2 Community 3 Total
(orange) (yellow) (green)
Generation Owners (GO) 13 (62%) 5 (24%) 3 (14%) 21
Transmission Owners (TO) 11 (61%) 3 (17%) 4 (22%) 18
Other Suppliers (OS) 25 (41%) 21 (34%) 15 (25%) 61
Electric Distributors (ED) 2 (7%) 0 (0%) 28 (93%) 30
End-Use Customers (EUC) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 17 (100%) 17
Numbers in parenthesis are percentages of voters in each community within a sector.
Table 5: The number of voters in the detected communities by industry sectors (yes network).
Community 1 Community 2 Total
(red) (blue)
Generation Owners (GO) 18 (86%) 3 (14%) 21
Transmission Owners (TO) 13 (76%) 4 (24%) 17
Other Suppliers (OS) 41 (65%) 22 (35%) 63
Electric Distributors (ED) 1 (3%) 29 (97%) 30
End-Use Customers (EUC) 0 (0%) 17 (100%) 17
Numbers in parenthesis are percentages of voters in each community within a sector.
of the quality of detected communities, we adopt a measure
calledmixing parameter [42, 54].This parameter is defined as
𝜇 = 𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 , (3)
where 𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 is the external degree of node 𝑖, meaning the
number of edges connecting node 𝑖 outside its community
(or, intercommunity edges), and 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑖 is the internal degree
of the node or the number of intracommunity edges. If 𝜇 is
high, the communities are not well defined. In other words,
a high value of the mixing parameter indicates that vertices
are more connected to vertices of different communities than
within the community. The threshold for a “high” value of 𝜇
varies in the literature. Reference [55] suggests that any value
of 𝜇 greater than 0.5 is considered large, while [42] suggests a
criterion for 𝜇 to be smaller than (𝑁 − 𝑛𝑐)/𝑁, where𝑁 is the
total number of nodes and 𝑛𝑐 is the number of nodes of the
community 𝑐. Tables 6 and 7 show the mixing parameters by
identified communities in the no and yes networks, respec-
tively. All communities identified in the PJM voting network
satisfy the condition suggested by [42], having lower average𝜇 than (𝑁 − 𝑛𝑐)/𝑁. Only community 2 in the no network
(made up largely of voters from the ED and EUC sectors
and thus representative of a consumer coalition) has average𝜇 lower than 0.5, which would satisfy the mixing-parameter
threshold suggested in [55]. The consumer coalition in the
both the no and yes networks has the lowest average mixing
parameter, suggesting that voters in the consumer coalition
tend to have the same position with the coalition more
frequently compared to voters in the supplier coalition.
The strong consumer-side coalition that we identify is
consistent with the perception of some of our interview
respondents that consumer-side interests wield a greater
amount of political power than supplier-side interests. Recall
that because of the structure of the voting system in the PJM
Members Committee; two sectors that vote in the same way
can effectively prevent any potential rule change from pass-
ing. The strong ED-EUC coalition suggests that consumer-
side interests do possess structural voting power. We do see
evidence in the voting data set of four instances in which
a proposed rule change failed to pass because the ED-EUC
coalition. We do not, however, see evidence in our voting
data of a strong supplier-side coalition that is able to ensure
or prevent passage of any proposed rule change. Information
from our interviews does shed some light on why consumer-
side interests are able to form a stronger coalition than
supplier-side interests. As one of our stakeholder respondents
put it, “Therefore, when there’s a load interest or industrial
interest vote, you . . . get Generators voting yes, and the reason
is because they’re actually industrial customers disguised as
Generators.” (PJM-04). The implication from this quote is
that stakeholders in the GO and TO sectors have a more
heterogeneous set of interests than voters in the ED or EUC
sectors.
4.3. Topological Structure of the Voting Network. Although
there have been numerous studies of identification of com-
munities, to the best of our knowledge, topological structure
of a voting network is not well-explored, especially given
the lack of studies on RTO governance. In this section, we
compare degree distribution of PJM MC’s voting network
to those of common abstract network models: Erds-Re´nyi
(ER), small-world (SW), and preferential attachment (PA).
By doing so, we would be able to check whether the voting
network has similar properties of abstract network models
and to put the PJM’s voting network in the context of existing
social network literature.
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Table 6: Mixing parameters in detected communities in the no network.
Community 0 Community 1 Community 2
(Supplier coalition) (Supplier coalition) (Consumer coalition)
Number of nodes in the community 51 29 67
Range of mixing coefficient 𝜇 within a community [0, 0.667] [0.48, 0.769] [0.147, 0.514]
Average mixing coefficient 𝜇 of a community 0.556 0.682 0.449
(𝑁 − 𝑛𝑐)/𝑁 0.653 0.803 0.544
Table 7: Mixing parameters in detected communities in the yes network.
Community 0 Community 1
(Consumer coalition) (Supplier coalition)
Number of nodes in the community 75 73
Range of mixing coefficient 𝜇 within a community [0.049, 0.485] [0.088, 0.61]
Average mixing coefficient 𝜇 of a community 0.417 0.464
(𝑁 − 𝑛𝑐)/𝑁 0.493 0.507
A summary of our synthetic networks is shown in Table 8.
The synthetic networks that we generate are designed to have
the same number of nodes and a similar number of edges
as the PJM voting network. Our structural analysis uses a
version of the PJM voting network with near-unanimous
votes removed, since these votes will tend to inflate the node
degree distribution. After producing synthetic networks, we
tested whether they have a power-law degree distribution
by Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) goodness-of-fit test (based on
1,000 simulations) [48, 56–58]. Parameters for generating
an ER random network [59] are the number of nodes and
the probability for drawing an edge between two arbitrary
nodes, which in our case is the total number of edges
divided by all the possible number of edges with 147 nodes.
The parameters for generating small-world networks [60]
are dimension of the lattice, number of nodes, number of
neighbors, and rewiring probability. We use one dimension,
147 nodes, 28 neighbors, and a rewiring probability of 0.3.
The number of neighbors, 28, is set to yield a similar number
of edges as the actual PJM voting network (4,116 edges).
We generate three small-world networks by three different
rewiring probabilities (0.2, 0.3, and 0.5) [60–62]. Finally, we
created a scale-free network with 147 nodes and 4,290 edges.
To have similar number of edges to the PJM voting network,
we specified 33 edges to be added in each time step of the
network growth.
Even though the average degrees are similar, the degree
distributions showdifferent shape: Figure 6 shows cumulative
degree distributions (in log-scale) of all three synthetic
networks and the PJM no voting network. The degree
distributions of the ER randomand the small-world networks
are more concentrated around their average degrees than
commonly observed synthetic networks, which is due to a
small number of nodes (n = 147) with high probability of
drawing edges (p = 0.408). The degree distribution of the
PJMMC voting network exhibits similar shape to that of the
preferential attachment network but the longer tail is more
pronounced.
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Figure 6: Cumulative degree distribution of the ER random (grey),
the small-world (blue), the scale-free (cyan), and the PJM voting
(red) networks.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests, also shown in Table 8,
reject the null hypothesis that the tested sample is drawn from
the power-law distribution. While this is surprising (par-
ticularly for our synthetic preferential attachment graphs),
examination of the tails of the degree distributions shows
why. Figure 7 shows the power-law fit for both the synthetic
preferential attachment graph and the PJM voting network.
Both have fast-decaying tails but have a small number of
nodes with a larger than expected degree.
Based on the structure of the PJM stakeholder process,
we argue that these tail voters are likely swing voters, who
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Figure 7: Power-law fitting of (a) the scale-free network and (b) the PJM voting network.
may be able to sway the final voting outcome by switching
their positions. Our reasoning behind this argument is that
if a voter is connected by a degree to which one can explain
with homophily, then the voter is just following a common
behavior: voting with others who have shared interests.
If, however, a voter is connected to more voters than we
can explain with homophily, then it means that the voter
has voted with diverse groups of voters who might have
opposite interests. In other words, given the community
structure that we have detected in the PJM MC the voters
in the tail of the degree distribution in Figures 6 and 7 are
those who have voted with all of the coalitions at various
points.
We thus have a more nuanced view of how to capture
whether the tail voters are, in fact, swing voters. We have
already seen how we expect swing voters to have high degree.
Because our voting network covers a number of different
voting issues over a period of five years, a swing voter would
also be one that connected two voters that otherwise are
unconnected. Thus, we would also expect swing voters to
have high betweenness centrality. Finally, we would also
expect swing voters to be connected to multiple detected
communities (i.e., sometimes voting with consumer interests
and sometimes voting with supplier interests), implying a
high mixing parameter for these voters. Figure 8 shows
the betweenness centrality distribution and the mixing-
parameter distribution of the PJM voting network. Most
voters in the network have low betweenness centrality value,
between 0 and 0.01, but there are a few that have extremely
higher betweenness centrality than the other nodes; four vot-
ers have the centrality over 0.03 including one voter with the
centrality value over 0.06.Themixing-parameter distribution
ismore symmetric than the betweenness distribution, though
it is somewhat left-skewed.
To examine whether our network structure measures
(node degree, betweenness centrality, and mixing parameter)
are sufficient to identify swing voters, we correlate these
measures for potential swing voters (those in the tail of the
degree distribution) with the proportion of time that these
voters voted with the consumer coalition on issues that we
identified as contentious: based on issue’s clear divisiveness
between consumers and suppliers and existence of strong
coalition formation (an example of such a contentious issue
was a set of proposed pricing changes in PJM’s market
for generation capacity, further described in [19]. Some of
these proposed pricing changes would have clearly benefited
suppliers and harmed consumers, while others would have
had the opposite effect.We identified twelve such contentious
issues for this analysis). Voting with the consumer coalition
very frequently or very infrequently would suggest that the
voter in question was not actually a swing voter. Thus,
network structuremeasures candetect potential swing voters,
while a review of the frequency of voting with the consumer
coalition acts as a kind of false-positive test.
Table 9 shows the frequency of a false positive when
we attempt to identify swing voters using each of our
three structural measures. Each column of Table 9 shows
the top fifteen voters (identified by name) based on node
degree, betweenness centrality, and mixing parameter. The
percentage figure next to each voter’s name is the frequency
with which that voter voted with the consumer coalition on
contentious issues.
We note a few important observations about Table 9.
First, there are relatively few voters that are identified as
potential swing voters based on all three network metrics.
Direct Energy and Enerwise are example of voters that
are identified as potential swing voters regardless of the
network metric used. Second, the false-positive rate for
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Figure 8: Histogram of (a) (normalized) Betweenness centrality and (b) mixing-parameter distribution of the PJM voting network.
Table 9: Top fifteen voters in the PJM voting network based on node degree, betweenness centrality, and mixing parameter. The figures in
the % column represent the frequency with which each voter voted with the consumer coalition on contentious rule changes in PJM.
Degree % BetweennessCentrality % Mixing parameter %
Brookfield Energy
Marketing LP 38%
Brookfield Energy
Marketing LP 38%
Direct Energy
Business, LLC 50%
Potomac Electric Power
Company 40%
Potomac Electric
Power Company 40%
Enerwise Global
Technologies, Inc 33%
PBF Power Marketing
LLC 40%
PBF Power Marketing
LLC 40%
MidAtlantic Power
Partners, LLC 50%
Enerwise Global
Technologies, Inc 33%
TransCanada Power
Marketing Ltd 25%
Iron Mountain
Generation LLC 33%
Direct Energy Business,
LLC 50%
Central Virginia
Electric Cooperative 100%
West Deptford
Energy, LLC 33%
Iron Mountain
Generation LLC 33%
Virginia Electric &
Power Company 0%
Black Oak Energy,
LLC 50%
Central Virginia Electric
Cooperative 100%
Energy Consulting
Services, LLC 100% Apple Group, LLC 33%
West Deptford Energy,
LLC 33% Invenergy LLC 0% Dyon, LLC 33%
Apple Group, LLC 33% Enerwise GlobalTechnologies, Inc 33% E Minus LLC 33%
Dyon, LLC 33% Direct EnergyBusiness, LLC 50%
Great Bay Energy I,
LLC 33%
E Minus LLC 33% Galt Power Inc 100% Hexis EnergyTrading, LLC 33%
Great Bay Energy I, LLC 33% Borough of Lavallette,New Jersey 100% Mac Trading, Inc 33%
Hexis Energy Trading,
LLC 33%
The Trustees of the
University of
Pennsylvania
100% MontereyMA, LLC 33%
Mac Trading, Inc 33% Borough of Madison,New Jersey 100% Pure Energy, Inc 33%
MontereyMA, LLC 33% Borough of Milltown,New Jersey 100% BJ Energy, LLC 33%
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betweenness centrality as a swing voter identification metric
is quite high. Two-thirds of those identified as swing voters
using betweenness centrality either voted with the consumer
coalition 100% of the time on contentious issues or never
voted with the consumer coalition on contentious issues.
By this criterion, the false-positive rate for node degree is
one out of fifteen, and the false-positive rate for the mixing
parameter is zero. The betweenness centrality may in this
case be capturing voters that make connections between the
nonconsumer coalitions. Finally, we note a high degree of
overlap between those voters identified as potential swing
voters using node degree and those identified using the
mixing parameter. Eleven of the voters identified as potential
swing voters using node degree were also identified using the
mixing parameter.
5. Conclusion
Technological change in electric power systems requires not
only that physical systems adapt to integrate new technologies
and market players, but also that policies and rules adapt to
support that technological integration. The process of policy
and rule adaptation in many areas of the world is not driven
by the decisions of governments or other central decision-
making authorities but emerges as the output of a political
process involving stakeholders representing many divergent
interests. These stakeholder-driven decision processes can be
modeled theoretically, but the literature on governance of
regional electricity organizations has only recently attempted
to do so.
Thiswork adds to an emerging body of literature on stake-
holder decision processes and electricity policy formation by
developing and illustrating a novel method for integrating
qualitative information elicited from stakeholder perceptions
with quantitative voting data; using community detection
methods to identify political coalitions among stakeholders
in Regional Transmission Organizations; and leveraging
voting network structure to identify potential swing voters in
the stakeholder group. Using the PJM Regional Transmission
Organization in the United States as a case study, we elicited
perceptions of the stakeholder process from process partici-
pants via semistructured interviews.We treated those percep-
tions as hypotheses regarding the presence and possession of
political power and used a network representation of voting
data in PJM to evaluate these hypotheses. We find some
evidence in support of the perception that customer-side
interests form a strong coalition that is able to exercise some
power in defeating proposed rule changes in the PJMmarket.
We find less evidence in support of the perception that
supplier-side interests are able to exercise a similar amount
of political power in the PJM Members Committee. The
structure of the voting network and detected communities,
particularly as embodied in the node degree and mixing
parameter, also allow us to identify a number of stakeholder
participants that act as swing voters on highly contentious
rule changes. These swing voters tend not to vote with any
one of the identified coalitions on a consistent basis and may
thus be engaged in vote trading or other strategic activity.
The framework illustrated for the PJM Regional Trans-
mission Organization in the United States is portable to other
contexts and represents an approach to defining questions
and hypotheses about stakeholder-driven governance, using
data from these processes to build models and evaluate
hypotheses and (as part of future work) using these models to
evaluate alternative structures or voting rules for stakeholder
processes.
Appendix
Interview Protocol and Questions
There were three versions of the interview protocol used.
Shown here is the second and main version. The first version
used for early interviews wasmodified in language, especially
in the probing questions, to better reflect a natural flow
of conversation. The content remained essentially the same.
A customized protocol was used for the final interview to
target the respondent’s specific employment background. All
interviews were semistructured.
Opening Script. The primary goal of our research project is to
understand how the decision making process works at RTOs.
We’ve been trying to understand the formal process; we need
to understand better the experiences of those who participate
in the actual process. Our questions are really a conversational
guide to help us understand your experience at/with [RTO].
Demographics/History
How have you been involved with [RTO]?
Probe: How long have you been involved with
[RTO]?
Understanding the Process for Decision Making
How would you characterize the stakeholder process at
[RTO]?
Probe: What is a typical meeting like?
Probe: Are there any other elements in the process
that I wouldn’t understand from information on the
website?
Probe:
It sounds like you’ve had a positive experience;
can you tell me more about what works well in
the process? Is there anything that you would
change?
It sounds like you’ve had a negative experience;
what were some of the challenges or what would
you change in the process?
How would I know when a decision has been made?
Probe: Who is involved in deciding what items are put on
the agenda or how quickly issues move through the process?
Probe: Could you provide an example?
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Do stakeholders or staff work on issues outside of the
formal meetings?
[UNDERSTAND EXPERIENCE / SENSE OF RTOs]
Probe: How does that work?
Probe: Is it important to have certain stakeholders or
staff involved in an issue?
Understanding the Stakeholder Groups
Who are the stakeholder groups involved [in the issues
you are working on?
Probe: Who are the stakeholders frequently involved
in stakeholder processes?
How would you characterize the stakeholders?
How would you describe the influence of certain
stakeholder groups?
How would I recognize different stakeholder groups
in a meeting?
What is it like for newcomers to participate in the
stakeholder process?
Probe: What have [names of new stakeholder
groups] had to do to be part of the process?
Probe: How would you know if a newcomer is doing
something wrong or how would you help a newcomer figure
out the process?
Understanding Influences
Are issues regarding transmission, markets and reliability
related?
Are these coordinated in the decision making pro-
cess?
What are some common disagreements you see in the
process?
How do people enter into leadership positions?
I’m trying to understand leadership. Do stakeholder
groups identify formal or informal leaders?
Can you describe the board/advisory committee
nomination process?
Conclusion
That’s all for my questions. What else should I know or be
asking in order to understand the [RTO]’s processes,
stakeholder groups and participation?
Is there anything you would like to ask me?
Would you mind recommending anyone else who you
think I should speak with that would be interested in
participating?
Thank you for your time. We really appreciate it!
Data Availability
The data used to construct the PJM voting network are freely
available from the PJM Members Committee website at
http://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/committees/
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is restricted by the Office of Research Protections at the
Pennsylvania State University in order to protect the privacy
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corresponding author for researchers who meet the criteria
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Protection rackets cause economic and social damage across the world. States typically combat protection rackets using legal
strategies that target the racketeers with legislation, strong sentencing, and increasing the presence and involvement of police
oﬃcers. Nongovernmental organizations, conversely, focus on the rest of the population and counter protection rackets using a
social approach. These organisations attempt to change the actions and social norms of community members with education,
promotional campaigns, and discussions. We use an agent-based model, which draws on established theories of protection
rackets and combines features of sociological and economic perspectives to modelling social interactions, to test the eﬀects of
legal and social approaches. We ﬁnd that a legal approach is a necessary component of a policy approach, that social only
approaches should not be used because they lead to large increases in violence, and that a combination of the two works best,
although even this must be used carefully.
1. Introduction
Protection rackets are widespread and can be found in many
countries in the world. Although they vary in multiple ways,
maﬁas can be deﬁned as groups that specialise in the produc-
tion and sale of protection to people and businesses [1, 2].
Put another way, maﬁas run protection rackets. The Sicilian
Maﬁa [1]—as well as other maﬁas in Italy [3], the Russian
Maﬁa [2, 4, 5], and the Yakuza [6] may all be considered to
be maﬁas. The protection they provide includes the supply
of real, but often illegal, services, whereby the racketeers pro-
tect businesses from criminals and legal competition, as well
as pure extortion, in which the only “protection” that racke-
teers provide is from themselves [1]. Ultimately, maﬁas harm
the societies in which they operate. Among the many costs
are those that they impose on businesses for maintaining
security, the direct costs of crime, the state-level costs to com-
batting and countering protection rackets, and the help that
they provide to criminals and businesses to conduct illegal
transactions [7–13]. While estimates of the costs vary greatly,
all agree upon the basic point: the costs of protection rackets
are substantial [9–15]. One study, for instance, estimates that
the presence of maﬁas has lowered GDP growth per capita by
16% in Apulia and Basilicata (regions of Italy) relative to
“synthetic controls” [9], while a much more inclusive esti-
mate by the United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime cal-
culates the crime proceeds of transnational organised crime
at $0.9 trillion [16]. Despite the damage caused by protection
rackets, they have proven to be resilient. A core diﬃculty
around combatting them is that they comprise a complex
system with multiple relevant actors including a state, a maﬁa
(of which there may be multiple competing against each
other), shopkeepers and business-people, consumers, non-
governmental organisations, and the rest of society, as well
as nonlinear feedback loops between the actions of these
actors. Another problem is that it is extremely diﬃcult to
conduct experiments on diﬀerent policies to test their
causal eﬀects. Yet, doing so would allow knowledge about
eﬀective counter-maﬁa techniques to accumulate. To
understand this usually hidden phenomenon of protection
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rackets, and test policy approaches to countering them, we
use computational tools. This is diﬀerent from the tools
traditionally used in criminology although there are some
recent exceptions [17, 18].
Speciﬁcally, our contribution here is to use our agent-
based model (ABM) of protection rackets, conﬁgured to
represent a single neighbourhood in the city of Palermo,
to conduct experiments that are relevant to policy, with a
focus on the dynamics of social norm change, and discuss
the implications of these results for countering protection
rackets. We also describe the theoretical grounding of the
model. We have presented our model before from a technical
perspective in [19], and the simulator underlying the model
has been described in [20]. The model, the normative archi-
tecture, and some of the results are described in the deliver-
ables of the FP7 EU project GLODERS (deliverables 3.1,
3.3, and 3.4). Some preliminary results are published in a
conference proceedings [21] and the model as a book chapter
[22]. We use our ABM to ask how eﬀective are laws alone at
countering protection rackets? How resilient are any eﬀects
that emerge? Are laws suﬃcient to change social norms and
promote a “culture of legality?”. Is a social approach capa-
ble of countering protection rackets? Our experimental tests
yield insights into the policies that may be eﬀective, the pol-
icies that are unlikely to be eﬀective, and the policies that
have troubling side eﬀects. They also allow us to consider
the resiliency and long-term eﬀects of these approaches.
ABMs allow researchers to observe the social system
under study at multiple levels. They can observe agents’ cog-
nitive processes, their individual behaviours, and the patterns
of behaviour that emerge from their interactions. As an
example of the ﬁrst level, we could inspect the “minds” of
individuals and investigate the dynamics of the expectations
and beliefs that support certain behaviours and their change.
Such a multilevel investigation is crucial for enriching our
understanding of this social phenomenon. ABMs also allow
researchers to manipulate variables and run experiments that
could not be conducted in real settings. We cannot run ﬁeld
experiments on the diﬀerent counter-racket approaches, so
we test them in our virtual world [17].
The entities in our model are the state, the maﬁa,
business-people (entrepreneurs), the broader population
(consumers), and a nongovernmental (NGO) antimaﬁa orga-
nisation. We gave these entities rules on how to behave based
on the literature in criminology, discussions with organised
crime experts (see Validation for details), and information
extracted from specialised databases. We then use our ABM
to test two common approaches of combatting maﬁas. To
counter protection rackets, governments typically use a top-
down legal approach. They enact and enforce legislation,
and increase policing and sentencing, in an attempt to
imprison maﬁosi. Nongovernmental organisations use alter-
native means. They use a bottom-up social approach to
change peoples’ actions through nonlegal means. Often this
is aimed to shape the expectations and beliefs of the popula-
tion about the socially appropriate action to take—“reporting
protection racketeers to the police” for instance. In other
words, they work on the social norms of a population. Educa-
tional and promotional campaigns, communal discussions,
and commitment devices—asking to consumers to sign
declarations stating that they commit to not buying from
pizzo-paying shops, are all tools in the NGO toolkit [23, 24].
In guiding our ABM development, we draw on two,
out of many, theoretical approaches [25]. One approach,
which can be found predominantly in the early works
on the Sicilian Maﬁa, emphasises the role of culture in
shaping protection rackets and determining behaviour
[26–31]. Schneider and Schneider [30], for instance, argue
that cultural codes celebrating honour, cleverness, and
friendship are especially important for understanding the
organisation and success of the maﬁa (p. x). When char-
acterising the maﬁa too, many of these scholars focus on
culture. For them “maﬁosi personiﬁed a series of attitudes
and values, a ‘subculture’ widespread throughout the
whole of Sicilian society” [32]. Santoro describes another
example of this approach: Pitré “famously argued against
the identiﬁcation of Maﬁa as a criminal social organiza-
tion, insisting on its being a diﬀuse cultural attitude
instead” [25]. When these authors make their substantive
claims, among them that the Sicilian Maﬁa is not a united
organisation, they employ a cultural focus to elucidate
their arguments.
Another, more recent but now-widespread, approach
relies on the theoretical framework of economics to explain
the features and success of organised crime and maﬁas. It
draws on, among others, “game theory, transaction costs anal-
ysis, economic neo-institutionalism” [25] and uses beliefs,
preferences, and constraints as the core components of its
explanations. It provides explanations at the individual level
and in terms of people’s decisions. Exempliﬁed in the founda-
tional works of Thomas Schelling [33] and Diego Gambetta
[1, 34], this approach draws parallels between protection
rackets and businesses. Gambetta, for instance, characterises
the Sicilian Maﬁa as being involved in the industry of pri-
vate protection and that low levels of trust (the belief that
people will cheat other when possible) leads to a demand
for protection that is fulﬁlled by those who are both willing
to provide it (based on certain preferences) and are able to
do so given their resources.
A fundamental distinction between these two theoretical
approaches is in their conception of human nature. The cul-
tural perspective relies on Homo Sociologicus as its model: an
“oversocialised conception of man” that presumes people
unthinkingly follow the social norms that they have inter-
nalised, blindly shifting their actions according to others’
expectations [35, 36]. Conversely, the economic perspective
employs aHomo Economicus view of human nature in which
people follow their incentives, often self-interested ones, irre-
spective of social norms or others disapproval, when deciding
what to do [35].
Extensive research now shows that both contain insights.
Incentives are fundamental drivers of human behaviour [37–
40], yet people consider also social factors when deciding
how to act (e.g., [35, 41–43]). Social norms are one of the
most important of these social factors [40]. In addition to
the decades of observational studies (e.g., [44]), extensive
experimental evidence demonstrates the important inﬂuence
of social norms on behaviour [45–55].
2 Complexity
Social norms can be deﬁned as shared behavioural rules
proscribing or prescribing certain actions that are followed
because of reciprocal expectations and, in some cases, social
punishment [51, 56–58]. Norms may, in their simplest incar-
nations, take the forms “do X” or “do not do Y” [37], but they
can be more complex and take conditional forms. The expec-
tations motivating norm compliance can be separated into
empirical and normative expectations [56]. The former are
people’s beliefs about how prevalent a behaviour is, while
the latter are people’s beliefs about what others expect them
to do. From another perspective, social norms can also be
considered as particular components of institutions [59].
Social norms inﬂuence many aspects of our lives: shaping
how we interact with our family, friends, and strangers [60].
Given that social norms permeate social life, it seems highly
likely that they also operate in the domain of protection
rackets. There are empirical hints to back up this supposition.
Norms of fairness, reciprocity, in-group favouritism, and
omertà—a code of silence—are all plausibly important in
aﬀecting paying pizzo, money paid by businesses and indi-
viduals to maﬁas in exchange for protection, and reporting
pizzo requests to the police (see [61]).
Our model integrates Homo Economicus and Homo
Sociologicus. Key agents in our model, entrepreneurs, who
represent business people, and consumers, who represent
the broader population of citizens, consider both their
incentives and social norms when deciding how to act. These
decision makers’ utility is based on the economic rewards
that they obtain and on the degree to which their actions
comply with social norms, in the form of taking actions con-
sidered as socially appropriate and avoiding those viewed as
socially inappropriate. Ultimately, they weigh up both indi-
vidual and normative reasons to determine what they do
(see also [46, 54, 62]).
In the past, the empirical basis for social norms, what
they are and how they aﬀect behaviour, was weak. In partic-
ular, both the measurement of expectations—the drivers of
norm-following behaviour, and experimental manipulations
to test the causal eﬀects of social norms were lacking. With
the advent of more precise measurement and experimental
techniques, we are now better able to provide an empirical
grounding for social norms [49, 50, 54, 56]. Another critique
of social norms was that they are vague, ignore cognitive
mechanisms, and that they are used as a catch-all term.
Using a computer simulation forces us to be explicit and
precise about what social norms are and the eﬀects they
may have in our model. Our model uses prior work done
by scholars who have developed a normative agent archi-
tecture, “EMIL-A,” that allows norms to be realistically
implemented in a model [57]. It is a cognitively grounded
normative agent architecture that provides a measure that
indicates how active and prominent, or inactive and incon-
spicuous, a norm is, the “salience of a norm,”which facilitates
the incorporation of normative considerations into the
agents’ decision-making processes.
There is a large literature on modelling social norms in
the complex systems ﬁeld as well as in the social sciences.
Much of this addresses how cooperation can be promoted
with social norms [63]. Schlüter and colleagues [64]
consider a common pool resource problem and test how
resource abundance and variability inﬂuences norm-driven
cooperation, while Tessone and coauthors [65] focus on
how the distribution of individuals’ sensitivities towards
social norms within a population aﬀects norm-following.
The latter ﬁnd that heterogeneity in sensitivity can increase
norm-following. Others examine the roots of social norms
and test how they emerge [66–69]. Some work tests how
social structure and access to information about the behav-
iour of other agents, only those close by or also those more
distant, inﬂuences norm-following [70]. ABMs of institu-
tions are also related to our work here [71].
The closest existing ABM that speciﬁcally addresses pro-
tection rackets comes from the work of Troitzsch [72–74].
Troitzsch presents an ABM of a protection racket in which
he integrates instrumental and normative considerations in
the decision-making of agents. Diﬀerent to ours, Troitzsch’s
model is more complex, containing more parameters and
processes, and he does not use a calibrated version of it to
run policy-relevant experiments. Other related ABMs look
at instrumental factors [75], how a team-reasoning approach
changes entrepreneurs’ willingness to resist [76], and whether
presence of fakers, who pose as maﬁosi but are unwilling to
use violence towards nonpaying shopkeepers, changes the
protection racket dynamic [77].
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Model Overview. Our event-based agent-based model is
conﬁgured to represent a single neighbourhood of Palermo
in which a maﬁa runs a protection racket and hence we call
it the Palermo Scenario. We built our agent-based model as
part of the FP7 EU funded project GLODERS. This project
included more than twenty domain experts from multiple
European countries allowing us to use an iterative participa-
tory modelling approach to construct the model, identify the
main actors, and validate the model’s assumptions, dynam-
ics, and outcomes. We identiﬁed entrepreneurs, the state,
the Sicilian Maﬁa, consumers, and nongovernmental organi-
sations as key players in the dynamics of protection rackets
and implemented these as the agents (Figure 1). This was
based on the iterative participatory modelling process with
the domain experts and evidence that we extracted from a
range of sources including judicial and conﬁscated maﬁa
documents, academic studies, and newspapers and television
interviews. We draw on the model description we previously
used in [19] for this section; see also the same paper for
technical details of the model. We present an ODD+D
(Overview, Design Concepts, and Details + Decision) docu-
ment [78] concerning our model in Table S1 of the
Supplementary Information.
Entrepreneurs represent businessmen and the self-
employed. They sell products to consumers and receive an
income periodically. They face the decisions to pay pizzo,
or not, if approached by maﬁosi (pay); report pizzo requests
to the state if they decide not to pay pizzo (report); report any
damages to the state that they sustained from maﬁosi attacks
(report); collaborate with the state against speciﬁc maﬁosi
following a request by the state (collaborate); and join the
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NGO to signal that they are unwilling to pay pizzo and likely
to report pizzo requests and punishments (join). Entrepre-
neurs and consumers are connected to each other in a
static scale-free network [79] that is deﬁned at the start
of the simulation. This network deﬁnes their range of per-
ceptions regarding others’ actions and it is used to update
their normative behaviour.
Consumers represent people buying goods from shops.
Consumers have a single decision regarding which entre-
preneur to buy a product from (buy), restricted to their
neighbour entrepreneurs in the deﬁned scale-free network.
Consumers also spread information through this network
that can inﬂuence other consumers and entrepreneurs
and serve as reservoirs of normative behaviours (social
norm spreading).
The state represents the government and its institutions
that are responsible for enforcing antiracket laws. It is com-
posed of police oﬃcers who try to detect pizzo requests and
imprison maﬁosi based on general or speciﬁc investigations
(investigate). General and speciﬁc investigations diﬀer in
how they are initiated, their duration, and the probability of
success. General investigations, which may be thought of as
a patrol, occur on an ongoing basis without speciﬁc evidence.
As such, they have a short duration—allowing police oﬃcers
to explore more space—but have a low probability of success.
In contrast, speciﬁc investigations are initiated based on evi-
dence and reports by entrepreneurs, thus justifying the use of
resources for a longer period as they have a higher probability
of success. Imprisoned maﬁosi are removed from the simula-
tion for a set amount of time. After the police capture a maﬁ-
oso, they may ﬁnd information about the entrepreneurs who
paid pizzo to that maﬁoso—some maﬁosi keep accounting
books to record information about pizzo payers. The state
can then use this evidence to elicit collaboration from those
entrepreneurs (collaborate). If collaboration is obtained, the
state uses the collected information to prosecute that maﬁ-
oso. If collaboration is not obtained, the state may, with a
small probability, ﬁne entrepreneurs. The state can also sup-
port entrepreneurs who have suﬀered damages at the hands
of maﬁosi (assist). Entrepreneurs may apply for monetary
support from a fund that periodically recharges and is specif-
ically set up for this purpose. In Italy, this fund is known as
the “Fondo di Solidarietà.” The state also spreads information
about successful actions that it has carried out against the
maﬁa: consider this as the state providing information to
journalists who report and propagate the news in newspapers
and television programs (social norm spreading), and it can
work to change people’s social norms regarding the maﬁa
by sponsoring and supporting antiracket festivals (social
norm spreading). The Festival della Legalità is one example
of the state supporting antiracket festivals.
The maﬁa represents a “family” covering a neighbour-
hood and is composed of maﬁosi who request pizzo from
entrepreneurs (request) and provide beneﬁts, which we
intend as a simple representation of protection, to pizzo-
paying entrepreneurs (beneﬁt). Maﬁosi can also punish non-
paying and reporting entrepreneurs. Since they are part of
the same family, maﬁosi coordinate their actions—whom
they target, how often they request pizzo, how much they
request, and how severely they punish (punish). Maﬁosi
can, with a small probability, turn informant and help the
state capture other maﬁosi that they know (collaborate).
The model maﬁa in our setup is intended to represent the
post-1990s Sicilian Maﬁa. Following a change in leadership
from Totò Riina to Bernardo Provenzano, and protests by
parts of the Sicilian population over their public execution
of government oﬃcials, the maﬁa undertook a “hidden”
strategy in which they limit obvious violent retaliations and
request modest pizzo from a greater proportion of the popu-
lation (see Table S2 for the parameters used).
The NGO represents an antiracket nongovernmental
organisation. We primarily draw on Addiopizzo (“goodbye
pizzo”) for our model NGO and we go into more detail about
this organisation in Section 3.1. It promotes lawful behaviour
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Figure 1: Schematic of the agents in the Palermo Scenario and their dynamics. Boxes represent agent types and arrows represent actions.
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among consumers and entrepreneurs through events such as
talks in schools or the organisation of and participation in
festivals (social norm spreading). The civil society organisa-
tion Libera is the main organiser of the aforementioned Fes-
tival della Legalità. The NGO spreads information depending
on the number of actions the state takes against the maﬁa and
the number of extortive actions shared by the aﬃliated entre-
preneurs. It serves as an organisation that entrepreneurs can
join if they are not paying pizzo.
2.2. Decision-Making. Agents can be separated into two
groups based on their decision-making complexity. The
state, the maﬁa, and the NGO are represented as agents
whose decisions are based on ﬁxed probabilities initialised
at the start of the simulation. In contrast, entrepreneurs and
consumers use more sophisticated reasoning abilities. They
base their choices on a combination of instrumental and
social considerations.
Instrumental considerations approximate instrumental
rationality. They involve strict cost-beneﬁt calculations that
motivate agents to take decisions that maximise their own
material pay-oﬀs, independently of what a certain norm dic-
tates. Exactly what factors are considered depends on the
agent and on the decision being made. For instance, when
deciding whether to pay pizzo or not, entrepreneurs consider
the cost of paying pizzo, the potential beneﬁt received from
paying, the anticipated violence from the maﬁa to not paying,
and the ability of the state to identify pizzo-paying entrepre-
neurs and the resulting ﬁne.
Social considerations represent the agents’ motivations
to comply with a norm. The parameter considered is the
“salience of a norm.” It refers to a measure that indicates
how active and prominent, or inactive and inconspicuous,
a norm is within a group in a given context. It is a function of
how important agents believe norms to be and it approx-
imates in a single value the combined empirical and nor-
mative expectations that agents have about a norm. Norm
salience is updated by each agent based on its own behaviour
(whether it followed the norm or not), the information gath-
ered by observing the behaviour of and actions inﬂicted on
neighbouring agents (whether others followed the norm or
not) and normative information spread by the state and
NGO (see also [46, 62]).
2.3. Social and Legal Norms. Social norms in our model are
implemented using the agent architecture EMIL-A [57], an
architecture speciﬁcally designed to capture the complex
dynamics of social norms. Agents that possess normative rea-
soning modules (entrepreneurs and consumers) in our
model can recognise social norms and decide to comply with
the social norm.
Recognition entails that agents discriminate between
whether others’ behaviour is driven by, at least in part,
the existence of a social norm and if this is the case, to sub-
sequently form a belief concerning that norm. This belief
may simply state that the norm exists or it may be more
complex and include the further speciﬁcations that the
norm is applicable to the belief-holding agent who
recognised it, and potentially, that the norm is supported
by rewards or punishments.
Following recognition, agents adopt a norm and decide
whether to comply with it. Compliance means here that the
goals of agents are potentially turned into action. Turning a
goal into an action however depends on both the normative
goal and instrumental considerations. A key part of the
decision-making process that determines the inﬂuence of
social norms on behaviour is social norm salience. This repre-
sents the importance that agents place on a social norm and
is determined by multiple factors including observed compli-
ance, observed violation, and observed and applied punish-
ments. For details, (see [19], Section 5.4).
The speciﬁc social norms we include for entrepreneurs
are pay pizzo requests, do not pay pizzo requests, report
pizzo requests, and do not report pizzo request. We explicitly
represent both a norm and its opposite norm for entrepre-
neurs, such as pay pizzo and do not pay pizzo, because this
allows us to model a greater space of normative situations
than if we were to make them complementary. We can repre-
sent situations in which the norm of pay pizzo and do not pay
pizzo are both low in salience, in which case there are weak or
no social norms associated with paying pizzo, or that they are
both high in which case there is internal normative conﬂict
within agents. Although these social norms are aimed to cap-
ture the maﬁa-relevant features of the reciprocity, fairness,
in-group favouritism, and omertà, they are not meant to
relate in a one-to-one way with the norms that occur in real-
ity. Rather, they summarise and capture the eﬀects of those
norms that are relevant to the protection racket. The eﬀects
of norms of fairness, for instance, are summarised in the
salience the four social norms of entrepreneurs.
Consumers also have one social norm: to avoid pizzo-
paying entrepreneurs. This is a norm that is not yet wide-
spread nor established in Sicily, but there is some sugges-
tion that it is growing. We do not include the opposite
norm, to choose pizzo-paying entrepreneurs, because we
could not ﬁnd evidence that this exists in Sicily or Palermo.
We also include legislation in the model that primarily
works by targeting maﬁosi. All these norms are summarised
below (Table 1).
It is worth mentioning that our implementation captures
an important feature of real social norms. It allows social
norms to simultaneously exist, contained within agents’
minds, yet remain latent in a population without being man-
ifested as behaviour [51, 56–59]. It may be that everybody
within a population abandons a norm; however, since agents
know about this, they keep monitoring how salient it is
within their community. Consequently, it is possible that
social norm consistent behaviour emerges or reemerges.
2.4. Validation. We built the model using an iterative par-
ticipatory modelling process. This means that we presented
the model to people with antimaﬁa expertise, they gave us
feedback, we updated the model, and then at a later stage,
we presented them the model again. This process gives
the agents and model dynamics prima facie validity. In
addition, we used participatory modelling as a “powerful
tool that can (a) enhance the stakeholders’ knowledge and
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understanding of a system and its dynamics under various
conditions, as in collaborative learning and (b) identify and
clarify the impacts of solutions to a given problem, usually
related to supporting decision-making, policy, regulation,
or management” ([80], see also [81]). Ultimately, an itera-
tive participatory modelling approach increases the beneﬁts
that can be derived from the model to both policymakers
and researchers.
Although the iterative participatory validation approach
is an important piece of specifying a general protection racket
simulation model—as well as increasing the relevance of the
model, it does not validate the model for a speciﬁc protection
racket, e.g., the Sicilian Maﬁa. To do this, we compare
whether the model’s outputs match data already acquired
from the real system (known as replicative validity or retro-
diction) [82]. Zeigler [82] distinguishes between three types
(or levels) of validity for this purpose: replicative validity
means that the model matches data already acquired from
the real system (also known as retrodiction); predictive valid-
ity means that the model matches data before the data are
acquired from the real system; and structural validity means
that the model is not only capable of replicating the observed
real system behaviour but reﬂects exactly the sequence of
steps the real system operates to produce this behaviour.
Structural validity can almost never be accomplished, espe-
cially in models that represent individuals who are reluctant
to communicate about their motivations and behaviour pro-
pensities. In these circumstances, one will never uncover
how real individuals operate to produce their behaviour in
suﬃcient detail. Predictive validity is also diﬃcult to accom-
plish due to this same issue in which one would not have
enough detail about the behaviours to consistently repro-
duce them in yet unknown future circumstances. However,
if we succeed in ﬁnding simulation output which is in line
with relevant statistics, we can claim that our model is repli-
catively valid—but this has no direct consequences for its
predictive and, more so, for its structural validity. We
undertake replicative validation by comparing the model’s
outputs to historical trends in Sicily and to contemporary
empirical data collected from police records and judicial tri-
als as well as surveys. By applying this approach, we vali-
date our model in two further ways.
Our ﬁrst approach is to compare the qualitative patterns
observed in the model to historical trends reported from
Sicily (for further details of this validation, see [19]). To do
this, we group the relevant historical periods into ﬁve catego-
ries: pre-1980s, 1980 to early 1990s, early 1990s to mid 1990s,
mid 1990s to 2000, and post-2000. We draw on historical
information to qualitatively set up the model’s parameters
and then we run the model for 50,000 time units. At every
10,000 time units, we shift the parameter setup to match that
drawn from the historical literature and carry over the infor-
mation from the prior time units. This provides a continuity
to the simulation. Each 10,000 time units thus corresponds to
a historical time period (time units are not intended to corre-
spond on a 1 : 1 basis with real time. Instead, the 10,000 time
units per historical period were chosen to allow changes to
stabilise before the model’s parameters are changed). We
repeated the simulation, for the purposes of validation, 10
times to ensure that the results are robust.
We ﬁnd results that are broadly consistent with the
trends from these periods in Sicily. Pre-1980s, the govern-
mental authorities did not have eﬀective laws to ﬁght the
Sicilian Maﬁa. So, the maﬁa could proliferate and use vio-
lence against entrepreneurs without fear of strong reactions
from the authorities, resulting in a high number of pizzo
requests and pizzo paid [83]. During the 1980 to early
1990s, several antimaﬁa laws were implemented enabling
the state to eﬀectively ﬁght against maﬁa (Rognoni-La Torre
law; law n. 646, 1982; law n. 8, 1991; law n. 82, 1991; law n. 44,
1999; law n. 512, 1999). This reduced the absolute number of
pizzo payments, but increased the amount of damage and
violence against entrepreneurs who did not pay [84]. From
the early 1990s to mid-1990s, however, the Sicilian Maﬁa
changed its strategy by reducing violence and the amount
of pizzo requested, thus being less visible and avoiding
imprisonment [84–86]. However, the level of pizzo reporting
did not increase in these periods because the population’s
social norms were not changed. In the mid-1990s to 2000,
the improvement in legislation has been highly eﬀective at
imprisoning maﬁosi (see law n. 356, 1992), seizing their
properties (see law n. 109, 1996; law n. 296, 2006; law n.
92, 2008; law n. 40, 2010), and creating the conditions for
the emergence and thriving of civil society organisations.
In this period, several nongovernmental organisations began
to operate and to raise awareness of the importance of
reporting extortion to the authorities. This change on the
population mind-set increased the number of reports help-
ing the authorities to ﬁght the maﬁa. Later, the state also
started to raise awareness on the population helping to
increase even further the proportion of reports and investi-
gations successes.
The second validation approach we take is to compare
the output pattern of our model to contemporary empirical
data extracted from police reports and court trials that
indirectly gives us information on the Sicilian Maﬁa. This
empirical data is a database of more than 600 cases of extor-
tion in Sicily and Calabria during the past decade (database
available at https://doi.org/10.7802/1116). For this valida-
tion, the percentages of unreported cases (i.e., cases where
the police got to know about an extortion without the help
of the victim) and the percentages of completed extortions
(i.e., not only attempted, but also unsuccessful) that took
place in Palermo were calculated.
Table 1: Social and legal norms in the Palermo Scenario.
Legal norms Social norms
Criminalise maﬁa-style
organisations
Pay pizzo request
Conﬁscate maﬁosi resources Do not pay pizzo request
Reimburse victims
of maﬁa crimes
Report pizzo request
Do not report pizzo request
Avoid pizzo-paying
entrepreneurs
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We calibrate some of the input parameters using data
concerning Southern Italy and the surrounding islands that
are extracted from surveys such as the European Values
Study (European Values Study data is available at https://
europeanvaluesstudy.eu). Using this survey data, Troitzsch
[87] estimates that the population in Southern Italy has indi-
vidual weight of 0.41 and normative weight of 0.59, which
implies that people in this region are highly sensitive to
norms—even more so than individual factors. We use the
ordering, a greater weight on normative than individual fac-
tors, reported by Troitzsch, but ﬁne-tune the weights by com-
paring the outputs of our model with data observed in
Palermo. We ﬁnd that the weights of 0.2 and 0.8, respec-
tively, for the individual and normative weight, replicate
the data observed in Palermo well and thus use these. How-
ever, to check whether our results depend on these weights,
we also run our model with an individual weight of 0.41
and a normative weight of 0.59 and ﬁnd that the substan-
tive results remain the same (see Figures S1–4 in the
Supplementary Information).
Given the fact that the empirical data do not cover all
parameters of the model due to the secretive nature of protec-
tion rackets, we cannot use traditional validation methods in
which empirical data is extensively used. Instead, we let input
parameters randomly vary, run our simulation model multi-
ple times varying these parameter values at each run, and we
then compare the outcomes of the simulation with the trends
of empirical data. If they match, we can claim that our model
is replicatively valid and calibrated.
Therefore, we run our model 400 times varying multiple
input parameter values (i.e., the state’s frequency and dura-
tion of general investigations, probability of accepting to con-
duct and duration of speciﬁc investigations, probability to
capture and convict maﬁosi, and duration of imprisonment
and the maﬁa’s pizzo amount request, probability, and sever-
ity of punishment or beneﬁt) and compare the outcomes with
the empirical data collected in several cities in Sicily concern-
ing the percentages of unreported cases (i.e., the number of
extortions that were identiﬁed by the police through inde-
pendent investigations, so never reported, divided by the
total number of extortions) and the percentages of completed
extortions (i.e., the number of extortions paid to the maﬁa
divided by the number of extortion requests). Figure 2 shows
that the percentage of unreported cases and completed extor-
tions generated with our model (black plus “+” signs) closely
reproducing the outcomes observed in Palermo as the
Palermo empirical data (red square) lies within the cloud
formed by the simulation outcomes. These results indicate
that our model is calibrated to represent the protection racket
characteristics observed in Palermo more than in other city
in Sicily.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Treatments and Research Questions. We test three treat-
ments in the Palermo Scenario and compare them against a
baseline setup (B). The treatments are a legal approach
(LA), a social approach (SA), and a combined approach
(CA). For the speciﬁc parameters used in our treatments,
see Table S2. Our core research question is what are the
independent and combined eﬀects of legal and social
approaches on the maﬁa and the rest of the population?
States typically use legal approaches to combat organised
crime (this is represented by our LA treatment). These rely
on the institutions of the state to identify, prosecute, and
incarcerate people running protection rackets. Their tar-
gets, in an ideal system, are only criminals. In Italy, the
government introduced speciﬁc laws that allow maﬁosi to
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be prosecuted and help victims and increased police pres-
ence and sent special investigators to direct the antimaﬁa
eﬀorts, for instance, General Carlo Alberto Della Chiesa
during the Second Maﬁa War (see [89]) into Sicily. The
crime of maﬁa association was introduced by the
Rognoni-La Torre law n. 646 of 13/9/1982 along with
the possibility of conﬁscating maﬁa properties with their
consequent social reuse. In addition, law n. 8 of 15/01/
1991 and law n. 82 of 15/03/1991 aim at providing
denouncing incentives and protecting victims who report
extortion activities. Finally, law n. 44 of 23/02/1999 and
law n. 512 of 22/12/1999, respectively, introduced eco-
nomic support to victims of extortions and the solidarity
fund for victims of maﬁa crimes and intimidation (see [88]
for details). Here, we test if this approach works to imprison
maﬁosi and reduce the activity of maﬁa, as expected, and
whether it has any eﬀects on the behaviour and social
norms of the population. Moreover, we explore whether
a LA has resilient eﬀects (see below for an explanation
of how we test the resilience of the treatments).
While a social strategy is typically used by NGOs, in
recent years, the Italian state also supports these social
initiatives through festivals (e.g., Festival della Legalità),
education campaigns, and strongly publicized successful
antimaﬁa operations. We include this pathway in our
model. In Italy, a number of NGOs use such an approach,
among them, Addiopizzo, Fondazione Rocco Chinnici, Lib-
era, and Professionisti Liberi. Consider the approaches used
by Addiopizzo to combat the maﬁa [23, 24]. They (i) certify
shops as pizzo-free and provide them with a visible indica-
tor of their certiﬁcation allowing shopkeepers to reliably
signal their opposition to the paying pizzo, (ii) condemn
maﬁa activity in the media, (iii) educate schoolchildren
in various campaigns, and (iv) collect signatures from con-
sumers in which they declare that they will avoid pizzo-
paying shops. The expectation is that these activities will
change the social norms and behaviours of the population
thereby indirectly undermining the maﬁa. Will this be
borne out in our model? And is this approach resilient
to exogenous shocks?
Combined approaches use both legal and social strategies
to counter protection rackets. They employ the traditional
institutional tools of the state to capture and imprison maﬁ-
osi, and, they add a bottom-up norm-change strategy that
targets citizens. This two-pronged approach to targeting
maﬁas, with both legal and cultural sides, is an approach
that is advocated for among scholars by Godson and coau-
thors [90, 91] and by Orlando, the current, and previous,
mayor of Palermo [89]. They argue that the development
of a “culture of lawfulness” is a crucial factor in ﬁghting
organised crime.
“Bolstered by a sympathetic culture ‘culture of lawful-
ness’ law enforcement and regulatory systems function more
eﬀectively in myriad ways. Those who transgress the rules
ﬁnd themselves targeted not only by law enforcement but
also by many sectors of society. Community support and
involvement can also focus on preventing and on rooting
out criminal and corrupt practices without the need for
expenditures for a massive law enforcement and punitive
establishment. This involvement also reduces the risk and
expense of intrusive government surveillance and regulatory
practices harmful to individual liberties and creative eco-
nomic, social, and political initiatives” [90].
We put this idea to the test: will a combined approach
perform best?
We compare these three approaches to a baseline setup.
This setup represents a state of aﬀairs in which the state
almost entirely lacks a legal approach and there is no social
approach at all. It is used as an experimental control.
Almost all systems, states and NGOs, use some combina-
tion of social and legal approaches to reduce crime, and,
where applicable protection rackets. So, this is an important
approach to test. The reason we also explore social and legal
approaches in isolation is to see the causal eﬀect that these
“extreme” strategies would lead to and to contrast it with that
of the combined approach. Because of this reasoning, we test
a pure legal approach in which there is no campaigning or
information promotion by the state or NGO. When testing
the social approach, we leave a weak legal backing in place:
this is because it is never the case that a state has no legal
approach entirely. Were this to be the case, the “state” would
cease to be a state in that area.
To test the causal eﬀect and robustness of each treatment,
we run the Palermo Scenario for 10,000 time units and then
revert the parameters of the simulation to the B setup and
continue to run the simulation for a further 10,000 time
units. With this approach, we test the average treatment
eﬀect with the initial 10,000 time units and the stability of
the results that arise from each of the diﬀerent approaches
by comparing the second 10,000 time units. We then repeat
the simulation 30 times for each treatment to give us a robust
average of the results. The simulation has 100 entrepreneurs,
200 consumers, 20 maﬁosi, 1 NGO, and 1 state agent. The
state has 20 police oﬃcers. For simplicity, the number of each
type of agents remains ﬁxed throughout the simulation (e.g.,
there are always 20 maﬁosi in the simulation).
3.2. Findings. To understand what happens in the diﬀerent
treatments, we consider the following outcomes: the impris-
onment of maﬁosi, the eﬃciency of the state at imprisoning
maﬁosi, pizzo requests and punishments meted out by the
maﬁa, pizzo paying and reporting by entrepreneurs, and
the social norm saliences of entrepreneurs. The model out-
comes we refer to are always averages of the 30 repetitions
aggregated by 1000 time units because our model is based
on an event-based rather than a time-step approach.
Consider the ability of the state to imprison maﬁosi. In
both the B and the SA, very few maﬁosi are incarcerated
(3/20 and 5/20 on average, respectively), while in the LA
and the CA, around 65% (13/20) are incarcerated
(Figure 3(a)). None of the eﬀects on increased imprisonment
are really robust. After the change in parameters, LA and SA
tend to converge with the B treatment, although the CA
retains some capacity to imprison over the baseline.
While the LA and CA end up imprisoning a similar num-
ber of maﬁosi, they do so in very diﬀerent ways (Figure 3(b)).
The LA achieves this solely through general investiga-
tions—the police conducting their routine antimaﬁa activity.
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While the CA attains a substantial percentage of its impris-
onments through speciﬁc investigations. This suggests that
the CA is more eﬃcient at imprisoning maﬁosi since it can
target them based on information it receives from entrepre-
neurs. The BA, similar to the LA, uses no speciﬁc investiga-
tion and there are very few maﬁosi whom it imprisons,
while the SA, even though the state pursues speciﬁc investiga-
tions, leads to little imprisonment.
Pizzo requests are substantively aﬀected by the diﬀerent
policies (Figure 4(a)). The LA and the CA hugely decrease
the number of pizzo requests that entrepreneurs are
approached with relative to the B. However, there is little
resilience to the LA but some resilience to the CA following
a change to B parameters. The SA has a small eﬀect on reduc-
ing the number of pizzo requests.
Particularly interesting is the treatments’ eﬀects on pun-
ishment (Figure 4(b)). The SA, in the ﬁrst 10,000 time units,
strongly increases the number of punishments that entrepre-
neurs receive. Employing only a SA leads to increased violence
relative to the B treatment. This is because Entrepreneurs
increase their refusal to pay pizzo, yet because they lack state
support, in the form of strong counter-maﬁa measures, they
are punished for their resistance. Conversely, the LA and the
CA both reduce violence to a lower level even than in the B.
Following the change in parameters back to the baseline
setup, violence returns to baseline levels in the LA treatment,
but in the SA, the harmful eﬀects are maintained, while in the
CA, harmful eﬀects emerge. Punishment in the CA becomes
higher than in the B and worst of all, in terms of punish-
ment is the SA. Two factors drive this: entrepreneurs not
paying and reporting pizzo requests in the SA and CA com-
bined with the inability of the state to imprison maﬁosi
(Figures 5(a) and 5(b)). As maﬁosi are released from prison
in the CA, punishment rapidly rise.
Given the persistence with which our model citizens
report maﬁosi and refuse to pay pizzo despite the punishments
that they receive in the SA, one may wonder whether the high
punishment ﬁnding would extend to the real world. As men-
tioned before, we consider this, as well as the LA, to be extreme
tests. Yet, we think that the core ﬁnding, a higher level of pun-
ishment than in the other treatments, would be found also in
reality. Even if the extent to which it occurs is lower, the lack
of state support, coupled with some reporting and refusal to
pay pizzo would increase punishment.
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Entrepreneurs in the B treatment pay pizzo the greatest
percentage of the time (Figure 5(a)). The LA has no eﬀect
on reducing pizzo payment relative to B (79% are paid in
both), while the SA and the CA reduce pizzo payment sub-
stantially to 49% and 54%, respectively (it is unclear whether
the diﬀerence in pizzo paying between SA and CA is mean-
ingful. There are reasons to be sceptical: it is small, likely to
decrease in longer simulations—much of it arises in the ﬁrst
5000 time units, and it essentially disappears with diﬀerent
individual and normative weights (see Figure S3A). More-
over, the eﬀects of the treatments are largely resilient to the
change to the baseline parameters. This implies that the
changes brought about in pizzo payment by the SA and CA
are robust. Later, we show that this is down to changes in
social norms (see Figure 6).
A greater proportion of pizzo requests are reported in the
CA (10.7% on average) and the SA (10.9%) than in the LA
(0.2%) and the B (0.2%) (Figure 5(b)). So, the CA and the
SA are the most eﬀective at eliciting cooperation from citi-
zens. And the LA is entirely ineﬀective. Interestingly, the
SA is comparable to the CA in increasing reporting also in
its resilience: after 10,000 time units reporting in the SA
increases to 12.8%, while in the CA, it increases to 16.3%.
The eﬀects of the SA and CA treatments are maintained, and
even increased, after the parameters return to the B levels.
Consider now the social norms for paying and not paying
pizzo. In the B, the social norm salience for paying pizzo
decreases slightly from the starting level and stabilises (aver-
age of 89.2%; Figure 6(a)), while the salience of not paying
pizzo remains stable at an average of 6.8% (Figure 6(b)).
The norm saliences for both norms in the LA follow the same
pattern. In contrast, the salience of the norm for paying pizzo
decreases strongly (average of 53.7% in the SA and 60.2% in
the CA) and the salience of the norm do not pay pizzo
increases strongly (average of 51.2% in the SA and 44.4% in
the CA) in the SA and the CA (Figures 6(a) and 6(b)). All
these eﬀects are resilient to the change in parameters that
occurs after 10,000 time units.
Following closely the pattern observed for pay pizzo
and do not pay pizzo, we ﬁnd that the saliences for the
norms report pizzo and do not report pizzo in the B and
the LA are very similar (Figures 6(c) and 6(d)). The norm
salience for reporting pizzo remains stable at the low level
of 2.3% in the B and 4.2% in the LA and the norm salience
remains high at 97.2% in the B and 96.4% in the LA. The
SA and the CA are able to change the norms to make them
less maﬁa supporting (Figures 6(c) and 6(d)). In both treat-
ments, the norm salience of report pizzo increases to
around 40% (average of 39.6% in the SA and 37.5% in
the CA) and the do not report pizzo goes below the 50%
level for the SA and approaches that level in the CA
(average of 44.6% in the SA and 58.2% in the CA). The
treatment eﬀects are unaﬀected by the change in parame-
ters at 10,000 time units.
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Social norms remain stable even after the change in
parameters at 10,000 time units because once they have been
built up, they are diﬃcult to change. It is particularly diﬃcult
to change them through punishment by maﬁosi since this has
a low weight in the norm salience calculation relative to the
observation of other entrepreneurs’ actions. Additionally,
the actions of entrepreneurs inﬂuence norm salience in the
opposite direction to the punishment of maﬁosi making their
net eﬀect on social norm salience small.
Concerning norm diﬀusion and change, we ultimately
ﬁnd that norms, whether good or bad, are unaﬀected by
a B or LA approach. Instead, social norms are strongly chan-
ged with a SA or CA approach. Interestingly, a social only
approach, SA, diﬀuses and changes norms faster than a com-
bined approach. This counterintuitive result is a consequence
of an increase on extortion-related actions—pizzo requests
and punishments due to more free maﬁosi—which causes
the NGO to increase the promotion of lawful behaviour
among the population. It is also a ﬁnding that holds when
we use individual and normative weights of 0.41 and 0.59
(see Figure S4).
4. Conclusion
Our agent-based model combines elements of both cul-
tural and economic approaches to understanding protection
rackets, in part, by modelling agents that combine core fea-
tures of Homo Sociologicus and Homo Economicus. This
implementation allows us to represent realistic aspects of cul-
tural and normative transmission and inﬂuence. Agents are
capable of enacting cultural change by aﬀecting each other’s
behaviour through changes in the strength of social norms
and agent’s actions shape culture and culture simultaneously
shapes agent’s decisions.
Using the model, we then test widespread approaches
that policymakers and law-enforcement agencies employ to
counter protection rackets. Simulations of social, legal, and
combined approaches in our model world have uncovered a
range of relevant ﬁndings.
Start with the legal approach: the standard tool in the
antimaﬁa toolkit of agencies and governments. We ﬁnd that
the LA approach dramatically increases the state’s capability
to imprison maﬁosi (although not its eﬃciency in achieving
this). Consequently, requests for pizzo and punishment
received by citizens are greatly reduced. Thus, such antimaﬁa
eﬀorts lead to strong and direct results.
The LA, however, fails to change how compliant citizens
are to the maﬁa: the proportion of entrepreneurs paying
pizzo and reporting remain the same as in the baseline. Addi-
tionally, the LA does not change social norm and the beneﬁts
that it produces lack resilience. These ﬁndings imply that if a
state reduces its antimaﬁa eﬀorts, say, due to a decrease in
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Figure 5: Entrepreneurs’ actions. Means plotted and error bars indicate ±1 standard deviation. The (a) proportion of pizzo requests paid and
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resources or a change in political agenda, then the gains that
it previously made are lost. For these reasons, a legal only
approach is not an ideal, nor a long-lasting, anti-maﬁa tool.
Next, consider the strategy utilised by NGOs: the social
approach. This approach changes citizens’ behaviours and
social norms for the better. Entrepreneurs decrease the pro-
portion of pizzo that they pay, increase their reporting of
maﬁosi to the tate, and their social norms become less sup-
portive of the maﬁa. These positive changes are robust and
remain even after the SA is abandoned.
Yet the SA has ﬂaws. The approach barely increases
the number of maﬁosi in prison and the eﬃciency with
which the state puts them there. Because of the former, the
number of pizzo requests made to entrepreneurs decreases
only a little. Although one could expect that decreased sup-
port and increased reporting among citizens leads to
distributed enforcement, thereby imprisoning maﬁosi and
reducing pizzo requests, this is not the case. The lesson to
draw is that without state support, reporting by citizens is
largely ineﬀective.
Worst of all, the lack of support from the state leads to
large increases in violence. This is the fatal problem of the
SA approach: it substantially increases the number of punish-
ments that maﬁosi inﬂict on citizens. It does this to a higher
level than in all the other treatments. And, even after the SA
approach is stopped, the increase in violence remains. In
other words, initiating the policy increases violence straight-
away and stopping the policy does not revert punishments to
baseline levels. For this reason, a pure SA is dangerous and
not a viable antimaﬁa policy.
The ﬁnal approach we look at combines the legal and
social approaches simultaneously. The CA also leads to a
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higher number of maﬁosi being imprisoned and it increases
the eﬃciency with which the state imprisons maﬁosi.
Although the number of maﬁosi that the state imprisons in
the CA is similar to the number that it imprisons in the LA,
the former approach is more eﬃcient at achieving the same
outcome since it relies on targeted investigations for the
job. This means that a state operating with a CA, in real-
world terms, spends fewer resources to achieve the same level
of imprisonment as a state using only a LA.
Other beneﬁts created by the CA are that it reduces pizzo
requests, punishments, and pizzo payment and increases
reporting to the state. The CA also changes the social norms
of entrepreneurs to make them less maﬁa supporting.
Some of the eﬀects of the CA are robust: the increase in
speciﬁc investigations, the reduction in pizzo payment, the
increase in reporting, and the change in social norms are all
resilient. These changes last even after the approach is
reverted back to the baseline. To a much smaller degree, the
increase in maﬁa in prison and the reduction in pizzo
requests all retain some resilience.
There is however a drawback of the CA. Surprisingly,
once the CA is removed, and the parameters are reverted to
the baseline, punishments against Entrepreneurs increase.
This increase is nearly as high as that which occurs in the
SA following a reversion to the baseline. Using the CA and
then abandoning it lead to high levels of violence.
Overall, the CA has many beneﬁts. It imprisons maﬁosi
the most eﬃciently, and it changes citizens’ behaviours and
social norms for the better. Moreover, some of these beneﬁ-
cial changes are resilient. Yet, it has one important failing:
preemptively stopping the CA leads to high levels of violence
against entrepreneurs. If a state starts a combined approach,
it needs to fundamentally undermine a maﬁa before it
decreases its counter-maﬁa eﬀorts.
We can summarise the main ﬁndings from our model as
follows:
(1) Legal approaches are necessary components of an
eﬀective antimaﬁa strategy. Without legal backing,
antimaﬁa eﬀorts fail
(2) Purely social approaches should be avoided. Small
advantages are more than oﬀset by the increase in
punishment and violence towards citizens
(3) Combined approaches are the most powerful antima-
ﬁa tools
(4) Combined approaches should not be stopped pre-
maturely, before the maﬁa is essentially defeated,
because this leads to high levels of violence
It is worth reiterating an unexpected but troubling ﬁnd-
ing. The most violent situations are those in which entrepre-
neurs are convinced to change their behaviour by the state
and the NGO but are not supported by legal power. This is
because in these conﬁgurations, entrepreneurs partially
change their behaviour but, since they are not supported by
the state, are subject to high levels of punishments and retal-
iation by the maﬁa. This occurs directly in the SA and in the
CA after the policy is stopped. A clear policy recommenda-
tion can be drawn from this: states should ensure that any
social change initiatives are suﬃciently supported by legal
backing and that such combined approaches should be used
until maﬁas are overcome. The crucial part of this recom-
mendation is the last one: combined approaches should not
be prematurely stopped as this could lead to large outbreaks
of violence.
From the perspective of nonstate actors, a possible policy
implication is that NGOs should only work carefully and to a
limited extent and avoid directly challenging protection
rackets when governments are weak. Conversely, when
governments are strong, NGOs can be bolder in their
counter-maﬁa steps and change the population norms.
Our ﬁndings need to be accompanied with a number of
caveats. First, although our model is complex, it still is only
a model of reality. Empirical tests are essential to check
whether its predictions hold in the real world. Second, the
maﬁa in our setup is conﬁgured as a marginally exploitative
organisation. Entrepreneurs pay slightly more to the maﬁa
than the beneﬁts that they receive in return. This setup
captures important cases in which the state is providing
eﬀective protection and the protection from a genuine
protection-providing maﬁa is unnecessary and somewhat
costly. Alternatively, it may be that the maﬁa is somewhat
parasitic, irrespective of the state’s protection provisioning.
What it does not capture is the situation in which the maﬁa
provide genuine protection that is useful to many entrepre-
neurs, which, as Gambetta [1] and Varese [92] write, is
undoubtedly true in some cases. Thus, our results may not
apply to a maﬁa type organisation that entrepreneurs prefer
to pay. Third, even in the best-case conﬁgurations, the
majority of entrepreneurs pay pizzo, and only minority of
them ever choose to report. Moreover, entrepreneurs’ social
norms are only just reversed regarding pizzo paying and not
reporting, from maﬁa supporting to antimaﬁa, and their
social norms for reporting are never reversed. Putting these
caveats to one side, our results are fairly encouraging
regarding the possibility of overcoming protection rackets
using a combination of top-down legal and bottom-up
social approaches.
Our simulation demonstrates how complex and hard-
to-study social problems such as protection rackets can be
fruitfully addressed using an ABM. Simulations may have
substantial untapped beneﬁts in studying hidden and dan-
gerous phenomena and have relevance to policy develop-
ment in constantly changing environments. Our model has
allowed us to understand the relative beneﬁts that diﬀerent
counter-maﬁa public policies may yield as well as their
longer-term resilience. We have also been able to explore
the dynamics of norm change within a population and iden-
tify policies that may be eﬀective, ineﬀective, and harmful.
Data Availability
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The drug shortage crisis in the last decade not only increased health care costs but also jeopardized patients’ health across theUnited
States. Ensuring that any drug is available to patients at health care centers is a problem that official health care administrators
and other stakeholders of supply chains continue to face. Furthermore, managing pharmaceutical supply chains is very complex,
as inevitable disruptions occur in these supply chains (exogenous factors), which are then followed by decisions members make
after such disruptions (internal factors). Disruptions may occur due to increased demand, a product recall, or a manufacturer
disruption, among which product recalls—which happens frequently in pharmaceutical supply chains—are least studied. We
employ a mathematical simulation model to examine the effects of product recalls considering different disruption profiles, e.g.,
the propagation in time and space, and the interactions of decision makers on drug shortages to ascertain how these shortages can
be mitigated by changing inventory policy decisions. We also measure the effects of different policy approaches on supply chain
disruptions, using two performance measures: inventory levels and shortages of products at health care centers. We then analyze
the results using an approach similar to data envelopment analysis to characterize the efficient frontier (best inventory policies) for
varying cost ratios of the two performance measures as they correspond to the different disruption patterns. This analysis provides
insights into the consequences of choosing an inappropriate inventory policy when disruptions take place.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background. Between 2006 and 2016, drug shortages
in the United States increased a whopping 120%, with the
highest peak of 280% in 2011 [1]. In 2017, 146 new shortages
were added to the list of nonresolved shortages from prior
years, and by the end of 2017, there were 183 active shortages
[1]. Drug shortages not only bring the cost of health care
above $400 million annually [2] but can also be considered a
public health threat since patient lives are put at risk. Despite
all the efforts undertaken by health care administrators to
ensure product availability, there are still drugs that have
experienced shortages for several years [3].
One drug that consistently creates challenges for health
care providers is saline (sodium carbonate 9%) which has
experienced shortages since 2013. In the United States, saline
has been widely used (more than 40 million bags per month
[4]) for treating dehydration and for patients undergoing
dialysis, surgery, and chemotherapy. In the past decade,
shortages of saline have raised questions about the ability to
manage the pharmaceutical supply chain. What makes saline
interesting to study is its low price (approximately US $4
for a 250ml bag of saline [5]), simple ingredients (only salt
and water), high demand, exclusive production by certain
manufacturers, and in some cases nonsubstitutability [6].
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced
an ongoing national shortage of saline in early 2014. Several
disruptions occurred around this time in the saline supply
chain, e.g., multiple recalls and spikes in demand due to
flu seasons [7], and the FDA attempted to mitigate these
shortages by advising manufacturers to collaborate with each
other and importing saline from other countries such as
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Norway and Germany. Despite these efforts, shortages in the
United States persisted for several months [7]. The failure of
these two approaches can be explained by the fact that: (1) the
FDA cannot dictate the production changes by manufactur-
ers, and (2) the import of saline from new sources requires
several months of regulatory processing. Compounding the
latter challenge, outsourcing was limited since manufacturers
in other countries have limited capacities to expand their
production.
The saline shortage is getting worse, and its supply chain
was not fully recovered when a sudden severe disruption in
the production of saline occurred after Hurricane Maria, in
Puerto Rico in 2017 [8]. The hurricane shut down two of
the United States’ main manufacturers of saline for several
months and created a major disruption in the supply chain.
A combination of this disruption with the other preexisting
shortages amplified the shortages even more. Following that,
the shortage increased as another producer interrupted its
production for maintenance purposes. Interestingly, this was
announced several months in advance, yet there remained no
clear plan to stockpile the inventories to bolster the supply
chain. Additionally, due to high rates of influenza during
the 2017 flu season, demand for saline increased and drove
further shortages of saline in most of the United States [8].
Despite the direct effect of these shortages on patients, health
care providers faced the challenge of deciding who should
receive the limited supply of saline and how to procure more
units of saline, if any were available.
Commonly identified causes of drug shortages include
complex manufacturing processes, supply or demand uncer-
tainties, regulatory actions, and the discontinuation of prod-
ucts [9]. Furthermore, quality issues or a lack of incentives
formanufacturers to produce high-quality products are other
known reasons for drug shortages [9]. However, 53% of the
reasons behind the shortages of drugs in 2017 designated by
the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP)
database are labeled as unknown [1]. In fact, these shortages
may be explained by a combination of these reasons in
conjunction with the effects of decision making by supply
chain stakeholders.
In general, pharmaceutical supply chains mirror other
supply chains that are exposed to the risk of disruptions.
Previous research has indicated that because drug shortages
are caused by one or multiple disruptions in the phar-
maceutical supply chain, preventing these disruptions can
be nearly impossible [6]. The reasons for recalls can vary
including mislabeling, defective products, or defects in the
container. When product recalls occur in a pharmaceutical
supply chain, the inventory of some or all of the supply chain
members is removed. While product recalls are common
for pharmaceutical products, the characteristics and patterns
of recalls can differ between products both in terms of the
frequency of shortages and the size of each recall, or the total
number of units affected. Beyond recalls, pharmaceutical
supply chains can also experience temporary shutdowns of
manufacturing plants for multiple months on end. Designing
a supply chain that remains resilient to different types of
disruptions is among the major challenges researchers in
supply chain risk management must tackle.
One common solution for mitigating shortages is to keep
more inventory [10], as this will ensure that more inventories
are available to treat patients in the event that products
are recalled. However, retaining more inventory results in
added costs in the supply chain and may not be feasible
for many health care centers due to storage and budget
limitations. With the need to balance the advantages and
costs of holding inventory, strategic decisions about inventory
policies throughout the supply chain become critical.
1.2. Research Problem and Contribution. The importance and
complexity of supply chain management in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry raises critical questions that are not addressed
in the literature. In this paper, we focus on answering the
following questions. What is the effect of altering inventory
policies on the ability to withstand product recalls? How
should inventory policies be chosen to address a variety of
disruption patterns? Is there any inventory policy that is
robust to all disruption patterns?
In order to address these questions, we evaluate the
performance of inventory policies such that the policies
defining order quantities and target inventory levels do not
change over time. Further, we evaluate the performance
under various disruption patterns. We model product recall
disruptions in pharmaceutical supply chains under deter-
ministic and stochastic settings which are more realistic
for pharmaceutical supply chains. To demonstrate the com-
plexity of the pharmaceutical supply chains under disrup-
tions including interactions among key decision makers,
we employ a mathematical simulation model accounting
for the dynamic features of the system. Different inventory
policies are implemented as decision rules in the simulation.
As the most critical consequences of drug shortages are
experienced at the health care centers with unmet patient
demand, the performancemetric used to distinguish between
policies is the total cost of the health care center. We also
employ an approach similar to data envelopment analy-
sis to prune inefficient policies corresponding to different
disruption patterns and the ratio of costs. Finally, we aim
to demonstrate the effects of making unsuitable inventory
policy decisions under different types of disruptions and
explore if an inventory policy exists that is efficient for all
types of disruptions.
While the present study focuses on saline shortages, it
should be noted that the findings are applicable to a wider
range of drugs that frequently experience shortages, such
as chemotherapy drugs and antibiotics, among others. The
results of the presented research reveal that an inventory
policy that is optimal for one disruption patternmay be ineffi-
cient when an alternate disruption pattern occurs.Therefore,
preparing for one intense disruption will not render a system
robust if multiple small disruptions happen instead.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, we provide a review of the literature.
Our model formulations and assumptions are then presented
in Section 3, followed by numerical analyses in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusion and future research
directions.
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2. Literature Review
In order to address our research questions, we divide the
literature areas into three sections: pharmaceutical supply
chain modeling, supply chain disruption mitigation, and
simulation modeling for supply chains.
Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Modeling. In recent years there
has been a noticeable focus on researching pharmaceutical
supply chainmanagement. A study by Lu¨cker and Seifert [10],
focuses on operational strategies for managing pharmaceuti-
cal supply chains under disruption. They model disruptions
with features defining the probability of the occurrence
and intensity in length. They analyze three operational
risk mitigation strategies for pharmaceutical supply chains
experiencing disruption risks, namely (i) Risk Mitigation
Inventory (RMI), (ii) Dual Sourcing and (iii) AgilityCapacity,
with a focus on minimizing the total cost, as a function of
product stock-outs and fulfilled demand, over only one cycle
[10]. While Lu¨cker and Seifert’s [10] study considers one type
of drug, Uthayakumar and Priyan [11] model an inventory
decision tool for a two-echelon pharmaceutical supply chain
with multiple products without considering disruptions in
the system.Theyuse continuous ordering policies to optimize
and define the lot size, lead-time, and the number of deliveries
for a hospital to minimize the total cost for the supply chain
with respect to the target cycle service level for the hospital or
pharmaceutical companies.
Overall, research in pharmaceutical supply chain disrup-
tions has neglected to examine the role of product recalls, a
critical type of disruption in this domain [10–15]. We develop
amodel to capture the role of various recall disruptions in the
pharmaceutical supply chain.
Supply Chain Disruption Mitigation. While the focus on
disruption mitigation in pharmaceutical supply chain man-
agement research is limited in the scope of the types of
disruptions examined, research on modeling supply chain
disruptions and response strategies has been conducted for
other industries. There are many different approaches for
mitigation of disruption risks that have been examined.
Common tactics for alleviating the effects of disruptions are
financial mitigation, operation mitigation, and operational
contingencies [16]. Mitigation tactics are those in which
the firm takes an action in advance of a disruption and
correspondingly incurs the cost of the action regardless
of a disruption’s occurrence. Operational tactics, such as
inventory management, multiple sourcing, and flexibility in
production are also studied in the literature of supply chain
disruptions [16].
Researchers in the supply chain disruption area, demon-
strate that an optimal strategy to implement when coping
with a disruption varies based on the characteristics of the
disruption. Tomlin [16] suggests inventory, dual sourcing,
and acceptance strategies for dealing with disruptions, and
demonstrates that the optimal strategy changes as disruptions
become longer ormore frequent. In this research, disruptions
are modeled as an uncertainty in supply or demand. Tomlin
and Snyder [17] demonstrate how strategies change when
a firm has advanced warning of an impending disruption.
Chopra et al. [18] evaluate the errors resulting from
“bundling” disruptions and yield uncertainty for making
inventory decisions. Atan et al. [19] present hybrid strategies
for dealing with supply uncertainty or demand uncertainty in
multiechelon supply chains.They consider disruptions which
occur at a specific location and demonstrate that an optimal
policy for addressing a supply uncertainty disruption is not
the same as the optimal policy for addressing a demand
uncertainty disruption.
A variety of different features have been used by
researchers for characterizing and modeling supply chain
disruptions. The majority of disruptions are modeled as
follows: (i) all-or-nothing events (also known as on and off
disruptions, in which a disruption at a node will deplete
the entire capacity) or (ii) random yield disruptions [20–24].
Most studies focus on large disruptions that happen for a
short time duration. Some studies look at the different order-
ing policies and frequency of the disruptions, e.g., frequent
but short disruptions versus rare but long disruptions [16]. To
the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that examine
the sequence of the disruptions.
In this study, we examine operational mitigation tactics
which characterize the role of inventory policies in the
prevention of shortages by studying the relationship between
the performance of these policies and the disruption pattern
exhibited. Rather than all-or-nothing disruptions or random
yield disruptions, this research is unique in the focus on
removing a fraction of inventory from nodes throughout the
network.
Simulation Modeling for Supply Chains. In pharmaceutical
supply chain disruptions, and particularly in cases of product
recalls, inventory management behaviors are believed to be
key to the behavior of the entire system. Often theoretical
models in Operations Research misrepresent the ‘behavioral’
aspects of supply chain stakeholders and focus solely on the
supply chain mechanisms. Unlike many of these models, sys-
tem dynamics (SD) simulation modeling is able to represent
interactions, nonlinearities, time delays, and feedback among
the members of the supply chain [25–27]. Sterman [28]
develops a simulated inventory distribution system for the
beer game distribution supply chain which contains multiple
actors. He examines the interaction of individual decision
makers who make irrational decisions with the objective of
minimizing the total supply chain costs and demonstrates
the resulting bullwhip effect in the system. Lee et al. [29]
demonstrate that even if each agent acts rationally and uses
optimal ordering policies, the supply chain is still at the risk
of experiencing the bullwhip effect.
Some studies using SD as a tool to model food or drug
supply chains include Minegishi and Thiel [30], Georgiadis,
Vlachos, and Iakovou [31], and Strohhecker and Gro¨ßler
[14, 15]. Minegishi and Thiel [30] study the complexities of
the behavior of poultry supply chains.They examine different
simulations to reveal the role of changes in the demand
on the behavior of the supply chain. Georgiadis, Vlachos,
and Iakovou [31] develop an SD model for a multiechelon
food supply chain. In this study, they try to identify effective
long-run policies for managing a food supply chain under
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uncertainty of demand and transportation capacity using a
periodic order-up-to-level policy (R,S,s) when demand has a
normal distribution. Strohhecker and Gro¨ßler [14] study the
effects of severe production shutdowns on the performance
of pharmaceutical products. In separate work, Strohhecker
and Gro¨ßler study the effect of severe but infrequent quality
breakdowns, as disruptions, on the conditions for preventing
stock-outs by adapting safety stock levels using a SD simula-
tion [15]. Among the SD-based studies, there is only one study
which examines the performance of the system when there
are transportation disruptions at twodifferent locations in the
supply chain and it compares the results for a traditional sup-
ply chain with a vendormanaged inventory supply chain [32].
Prior research on supply chain disruptions, including
those focused on pharmaceutical supply chains, reveals the
importance of distinguishing the disruption features and
identifying operational mitigation policies that address these
characteristics. Despite this, minimal research examines sup-
ply chain performance as it pertains to (i) pharmaceutical
product recalls and the unique features of recalls, (ii) patterns
of disruptions that account for disruptions affecting multiple
nodes and multiple disruptions occurring over time, and (iii)
the inventory management policies and behaviors that drive
the dynamics of the system.
To address these features, we employ a mathematical
simulation model that accounts for the dynamics underlying
the system.While there are a limited number ofmodelswhich
analyze the complexities of supply chains with disruptions,
this is the first simulation model that focuses on product
recalls and the role of disruption patterns in pharmaceutical
supply chain.
3. Mathematical Modeling
We integrate two analytical methods to examine the per-
formance of inventory policies in pharmaceutical supply
chains experiencing disruptions: simulation modeling and
data envelopment analysis (DEA) approaches. To identify the
optimal performance—which is a function of the inventory
policy corresponding to the safety stock level, inventory
holding costs, and shortage costs—for varying disruption
patterns, we populate data points from the simulation results.
Using the simulation results, an approach derived from DEA
is used to identify the optimal inventory policy for various
types of disruptions and relative values of shortage and
inventory holding costs.
3.1. Model Structure. Thepharmaceutical supply chain that is
presented in this paper has a serial network structure consist-
ing of four echelons: manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler,
and health care center with a single pharmaceutical product
being distributed across the system over a finite time horizon.
The assumption of considering the pharmaceutical supply
chain as including four echelons is in alignmentwith themain
players identified by the FDA [32]. Additionally, this is similar
to the assumptions made in other models of these supply
chains [33, 34].The formulation of this model is adapted from
the beer distribution game simulated by Sterman [28] and
Croson and Donohue [33].
The supply chain members, each corresponding to one
echelon, are denoted as 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 4 for the health care center,
wholesaler, distributor, and manufacturer, respectively. In
each time period 𝑡 (𝑡 = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 260) representing a
week during a 5-year period, each supply chain member will
receive product shipments from the supply chain member
immediately upstream, resulting in increased inventories,
and will receive orders for products from supply chain mem-
bers immediately downstream. Since there is no upstream
echelon for the manufacturer, the inventory of the manu-
facturer is increased by the quantity that is produced in the
previous period. Moreover, there is no downstream node for
the health care center. Hence the health care center should
satisfy the patients’ demand in each period.
After satisfying orders, if there are not enough inventories
available, the remaining orders are added to the backlog of
each member, except for the health care center, and must
be satisfied in the next period. The unsatisfied demand for
the health care center is lost, resulting in a shortage. At
the end of each period, each supply chain member, other
than the manufacturer, will place an order for more products
with the supply chain member immediately upstream. The
manufacturer will determine how much to produce in the
next period, similar to an order. In this model, we assume all
members use a periodic review inventory model with zero
fixed costs when determining how much to order in each
period.This order quantity is dependent on two features: cycle
stock (for satisfying the expected demand) and safety stock (as
extra inventory to buffer against uncertainty). Cycle stock is
calculated as the mean of lead-time demand, and safety stock
is a function of the standard deviation of lead-time demand
and the target cycle service level (CSL).The cycle service level
can be defined as the expected percentage of order cycles
in which no shortage occurs. Each member wants to keep
safety stock to address the uncertainty related to demand
fluctuations during the lead-time.
Additionally, information about disruptions in the supply
chain due to product recalls may become available to the
affected member during any time period. If there is a product
recall, some products will be removed from the inventory
of the health care center, wholesaler, and distributor (in
Section 3.2.2 we discuss why we do not consider removals
from themanufacturer). Eachmember’s remaining inventory
which was not recalled can be used to satisfy orders or patient
demand.
We assume that the members of the supply chain make
their ordering decisions based on a forecast of uncertain, but
stationary, demand in each period. Lee et al. [29] indicate
that even a rational ordering decision—which is changed
dynamically—can lead to the bullwhip effect or the phenom-
ena inwhich orders placed by downstreamnodes to upstream
nodes are variable over time and variability is amplified at
members further upstream from the customer.There are four
elements considered for the bullwhip effect in a supply chain:
demand signal processing, rationing game, order batching,
and price variations. Due to the lack of fixed ordering costs,
price variability, and rationing ability in the presented model
of these elements, only demand signal processing would be
expected to cause the bullwhip effect phenomena.
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3.2. Model Formulation
3.2.1. Ordering Decisions. The model used in this paper
assumes that members place orders based on a periodic
review policy with zero fixed costs. We follow the same
notation as presented by Sterman [28]. The indicated order
rate for echelon 𝑖 (𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡) is based on the anchoring and adjust-
ment heuristic. In our model, we assume that each member
is a rational decision maker and uses an approximately
optimal local policy to place orders. Therefore, the indicated
order rate is a function of demand, lead-time, service level,
inventory level, and the order amount that has ordered but
has not been received (on-order).The anchoring corresponds
to the base stock (𝑆𝑖𝑡) over time which is locally optimal
for a periodic review policy under certain assumptions.
Furthermore, adjustments can be equivalent to the inventory
position (𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡), which is a function of on-hand inventory, on-
orders (orders that have been placed but not yet received),
backlog (health care center does not have backlog), and
disruptions (as recalls).𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡, (1)
Asmentioned earlier eachmember is assumed to be a rational
optimizer and uses a periodic review policy with zero fixed
costs to place orders.The periodic inventory policy with base
stock (order-up-to-level) is optimal under these assumptions:
(1) demands are stationary,
(2) the lead-time is fixed and there is no limitation on
production,
(3) there is no fixed ordering cost and there are no
changes in the purchase cost of the product over time.
When using a periodic review policy, the base stock level at
time 𝑡 is given by
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑧𝛼𝜎𝐿𝑖𝑡, (2)
where 𝜇𝐿𝑖𝑡, and 𝜎𝐿𝑖𝑡, are the mean and standard deviation of
the stationary demand for echelon 𝑖 over the fixed lead-time,
respectively. Furthermore, 𝑧𝛼 is denoted as the 𝛼𝑡ℎ fractal of a
standard normal distribution, known as the cycle service level
(CSL). Also, it can be interpreted as the likelihood of being
able to satisfy demand assuming no disruptions. In return,
this drives the level of safety stock that is held to buffer against
uncertainties in demand.
Since the distribution of the demand is unknown andmay
change in each period, we use the moving average forecasting
technique to estimate the mean and standard deviation of the
lead-time demand. This estimation may change periodically
and adjust based on the demand for the previous 𝑛 time
periods.This process of updating demand forecasts is known
as demand signal processing and can result in the bullwhip
effect [34, Ch. 10]. Assuming that the demand is independent
of previous periods, then, as demonstrated by Snyder and
Shen [34], the estimator for the mean lead-time demand (𝜇𝐿𝑖𝑡)
is
𝜇𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿(∑𝑛𝑗=1𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑗𝑛 ) , (3)
where 𝐿 is lead-time and 𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑗 is demand at time 𝑡.
The forecast error for the lead-time demand is
?̂?𝐿𝑖𝑒𝑡 = 𝑘√∑𝑛𝑗=1 (𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑗)
2
𝑛 , (4)
where 𝑘 is a constant and assumed to be√𝐿.And the forecast
error in time 𝑡 is assumed to be the one-period forecast error
as
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇1𝑖𝑡. (5)
Following from the definition above, the base stock level at
each period is defined as
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑧𝛼𝜎𝐿𝑖𝑒𝑡, (6)
where it is approximately optimal by using the defined
estimators to forecast demand.
The other element necessary to calculate for the indicated
order is the inventory position of member 𝑖 in time 𝑡 (𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡),
which is defined as follows:
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝑛𝑂𝑖𝑡, (7)
where 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 is the acquisition amount in time 𝑡−1,𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 is the
demand in time 𝑡−1,𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 is the quantity of recalled products
that is removed from the inventory of member 𝑖 in time 𝑡 − 1,𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 is the quantity of back ordered units in time 𝑡 − 1, and𝑂𝑛𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the quantity of on-order products expected to arrive
in time period 𝑡.
If the health care center does not have enough inventories
to satisfy all patient demand, then the unmet demand is lost
and not transferred to the next period, and a shortage will
result. Shortage is defined as
Shortage1𝑡 = 𝐷1𝑡 − (𝐷1𝑡 ∗ Fullfillment ratio1𝑡) , (8)
where the fulfillment ratio is the percentage of demand at the
health care center which is satisfied. However, for the rest of
the supply chain members, the excess amount is added to the
backorder quantity and must be satisfied in the subsequent
periods.
Finally, the order amount should be nonnegative such
that
𝑂𝑖𝑡 = max (0, 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡) . (9)
3.2.2. Disruption Modeling. In the model, we examine supply
chain disruptions due to product recalls, which are mod-
eled as exogenous shocks that can affect the availability of
inventory at all echelons of the system. As discussed earlier,
a product recall happens when there are concerns related to
the safety of products produced in the past. Consequently,
the manufacturer enforces a voluntary recall of the affected
product that has been already distributed within the supply
chain. Because this process usually begins after some time
has passed, we only consider recalls from three echelons,
the distributor, the wholesaler and the health care center. It
is possible to have multiple disruptions, or product recalls,
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Periodicity of disruption Breadth of disruption
Short break in events Longer break in events Single continuous disruption Two disruptions
with a break in events
Length of disruption Size of disruption
Brief disruption Prolonged disruption 5% loss of inventory 10% loss of inventory
Figure 1: Graphical description of elements characterizing disruptions including the periodicity, breadth, length, and size.
occurring over a period of time. Additionally, the size of the
disruption, as defined by the amount of product recalled, can
vary significantly based on the driving forces.
Disruptions as external interruptions have been stud-
ied in supply chain risk management as deterministic and
stochastic events [16, 24, 35, 36]. However, to the best
of our knowledge, there are no studies which model the
effects of product recalls. To address the lack of modeling
of pharmaceutical shortages, we develop deterministic and
stochastic models of these types of disruptions which account
for the possibility of multiple events over time and varying
sizes of the disruptive events.
In deterministic scenarios, the hypothetical disruptions
are defined in advance. There are multiple different elements
that are considered for characterizing disruption patterns.
Adapted from [37], the elements that are considered for
characterizing a disruption are disruption periodicity, disrup-
tion breadth, disruption length, and disruption size. Figure 1
demonstrates each element. The periodicity of disruptions
refers to the duration of time between disruption events.
Disruption breadth refers to whether the disruption hap-
pens once or if there are multiple distinct disruptions. In
this paper, we examine the effect of a single disruption
versus multiple disruptions. Additionally, the length of the
disruption refers to the duration of the time period during
which the disruption occurs. In our model, we assume this
element is either brief but severe in intensity or prolonged
but moderately sized. The disruption quantity lost or the size
of disruption refers to the total loss of the system due to
disruption occurrence.
In addition to the deterministic set of disruptions, we
model disruptions as exogenous stochastic events that hap-
pen during the simulation time horizon. We assume that
the time between disruptions is variable and uncertain,
but the occurrence of disruptions is modeled as a Poisson
distribution with an average arrival rate lambda (𝜆). For
the Poisson process with a mean of 𝜆 events occurring
in a specified time period, the time between events are
𝑇0 ←󳨀 0𝑖 ←󳨀 0
while (𝑇0 < 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑖 ←󳨀 𝑖 + 1
generate𝑈𝑖 ∼ 𝑈(0, 1)𝑇𝑖 ←󳨀 𝑇𝑖−1 − (1/𝜆) ln(1 − 𝑈𝑖)
Return 𝑇1, 𝑇2, . . . , 𝑇𝑖−1
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for simulating a Poisson Process with
Exponential interarrival times between disruption events.
independent and identically distributed with a continuous
exponential distribution of mean 1/𝜆. In order to generate
the random interarrival times with the rate of arrival as 𝜆
in a Poisson distribution, we use the algorithm presented in
Algorithm 1.
In our model, we assume that the duration of recalls
is greater than or equal to the lead-time to make sure
that no defective product remains in the transshipment.
The current simulation model is employed over multiple
random scenarios which facilitates the comparison of the
effects of recall periodicity and the size of disruptions on
the shortages and inventory costs with varying inventory
policies. Furthermore, in order to compare the different
patterns of disruptions, the expected total amount recalled
for all scenarios is assumed to be fixed. Another challenge
for modeling recalls in both deterministic and stochastic
settings is the need to ensure that there are enough defective
products in the inventory compared to the recall amount
which is removed, such that the inventory cannot be negative.
Correspondingly, we assume that the amount that we recall
from each echelon is proportional to the available inventory
of that echelon.
The objective is to minimize the total costs of the health
care center, as presented in (10), which consists of the
summation of the total cost of shortages and the total cost for
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Table 1: Model parameters.
Parameter Deﬁnition Value
𝑇 (Time to review inventory and place an order at Hc,
Ws, Ds, Mn) Review period length 1 week
𝐿 (Lead-time from the upstream node to a downstream
node)
Time required to transport/ship products between
upstream nodes and downstream nodes 2 weeks
Manufacturing cycle time Time between the production decision point and thefirst shipment point 3 weeks
𝑛 (Forecast demand time period Hc, Ws, Ds, Mn) Number of previous time periods used in theestimation and the forecast of demand 12 weeks
𝐶𝑆𝐿 (Cycle service level) The CSL parameter defines the inventory policy andlevel of safety stock held by Hc, Ws, Ds, and Mn 0.95 (initial value)
holding inventory at the health care center where ℎ is the per
unit holding cost and 𝑝 is the per unit shortage cost. The total
cost varies based on the product recall disruption pattern and
the inventory policy, as defined by the target cycle service
level (CSL).
minimize ℎ𝐼𝐿1𝑡 + 𝑝 Shortage1𝑡. (10)
3.3. Data Envelopment Analysis. Accessing the true value of
the inventory costs and the shortage costs is challenging
because health care centers are unlikely to share this infor-
mation with the public. Moreover, if these costs are available
for a particular drug, it may vary substantially in comparison
to other pharmaceutical products. In order to assess the
performance of the system, without knowledge of the true
underlying costs of the system, we employ an approach
derived from the concepts of the data envelopment analysis
(DEA) approach. DEA is a data-driven approach which
seeks to assess the relative performance of multiple systems,
referred to as decision-making units (DMUs), accounting for
multiple inputs and outputs without exact information about
the relative costs and values associated with the inputs and
outputs, respectively. Thus, a system, or DMU, is defined as
efficient, in comparison to the others under consideration,
if there is some set of costs of inputs and values of outputs
that leads it to have the best, or most efficient, performance.
A set of optimization problems are solved in order to
determine which DMUs are denoted as efficient under some
combination of costs and values. These DMUs are defined as
making up the ‘efficient frontier’ [38, 39].
We employ an approach similar to DEA to evaluate
which policies, as defined by a CSL, are efficient for some
set of inventory costs and shortage costs, under different
disruption patterns. The data created from the simulation is
used as input into this approach. Using an approach similar
to DEAwith constant-returns to scale [38], we identify which
policies, defined by the CSL value, are efficient, or perform
best for some relative value of inventory and shortage costs.
Correspondingly, we also identify which CSL values never
perform best for any set of inventory and shortage costs,
and therefore are denoted as inefficient. When plotting the
outcomes of the policies, with respect to both the level of
shortage and inventory, the efficient frontier can be estimated
by connecting the efficient policies with isoquant lines. This
efficient frontier can be interpreted as the set of inventory and
shortage levels that are efficient for somepair of inventory and
shortage costs.
4. Analysis
4.1. Data. Using the saline demand patterns as a basis for the
model, we assume that demand follows a normal distribution
with amean of 10,000 bags per week and a standard deviation
of 100 bags per week. In all experiments, we use a common
random number seed to generate demand data. This allows
for the isolation of variations due to ordering behavior and
inventory policies rather than variations due to different
demand streams in the comparison of the results.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the simulated supply chain
has a serial structure with four echelons (manufacturer,
distributors, wholesalers, and health care centers).We assume
that there is no limit on the capacity of the manufacturer to
meet the demand. The simulated model is defined by several
parameters. These parameters are assumed to be consistent
across the duration of the entire simulation run, or 5 years.
However, in order to capture the effect of inventory policies
on the ultimate goal of minimizing shortages and limiting
inventory costs as the health center, the CSL value which
defines the inventory policy may change. While the CSL may
vary among simulation runs, we assume that all echelons
will have the same CSL. Table 1 provides a summary of the
parameters and their values.
4.2. Disruption Pattern Comparison. As the characteristics
defining product recalls can vary based on multiple char-
acteristics, the goal of this section is to provide insights
into the behavior of the supply chain defined in Section 4.1
under different disruption patterns while assuming that the
inventory policies, as defined by the CSL, remain the same.
For this purpose, we create five disruption scenarios (A-E)
to examine the effects of disruption characteristics, presented
in Figure 1, on the health care center behavior and the
performance metrics.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of each scenario.
To allow for easy comparison of these scenarios, we assume
that all disruptions start at the same time (week 50), and
that the total recall quantity remains the same for all of the
scenarios, except Scenario C, which has a greater recall size.
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Table 2: Disruption scenarios.
Scenarios Deﬁnition TotalRecall
Breadth
(𝜆)
Time
Between∗
Duration
(𝛾)∗ Intensity (𝜃) % Lost Start Time∗
A
1% loss of inventory,
brief disruption,
single continuous
disruption
26,200 1 - 12 2,183 1% 50
B
1% loss of inventory,
prolonged disruption,
single continuous
disruption
26,200 1 - 24 1,092 1% 50
C
5% loss of inventory,
prolonged disruption,
single continuous
disruption
131,000 1 - 24 5,458 5% 50
D
1% loss of inventory,
two disruptions, short
break in events
26,200 2 3 12 1,092 1% 50
E
1% loss of inventory,
two disruptions, long
break in events
26,200 2 24 12 1,092 1% 50
∗The unit of measure for time is weeks.
The total recall amount corresponds to the area under the
rectangles in Figure 1. Therefore, we define the variable 𝜆
as the number of disruptions (breadth), 𝛾 as the duration
of each disruption, and 𝜃 as the intensity of the disruption.
The intensity of the disruption corresponds to the quantity
of product effected, or recalled, during each period of time
during the disruption. Equation (11) shows the relationship
among these factors. In all scenarios, we assume that the total
recall amount is equal to a percentage of the total demand
during the simulation duration, or the percentage lost. The
total recall amount is defined as
Total recall = 𝜆𝛾𝜃. (11)
Length of Disruption. To examine the effect of the length
of the disruption, Scenarios A and B are compared. While
both scenarios have the same amount of total recalls, corre-
sponding to 1% of the total demand, Scenario A represents a
disruption that has a higher quantity of product recalled per
week which lasts for fewer weeks than Scenario B. All other
features of the scenarios are the same. Graphical depictions
of the disruption pattern and behavior at the health center
including inventory levels, shortage levels, and order amounts
for Scenarios A and B are presented in Figure 2. While both
systems quickly recover to a state of no shortages within
one week after the disruption occurs, the ultimate effects
of the disruption scenarios are different. For example, as
presented in Table 3, the total shortage is 19% greater in
Scenario A than in Scenario B when demand is modeled
stochastically. When demand is modeled deterministically,
the shortage in Scenario A is 13% greater than in Scenario B.
While the shortage amounts differ, the total inventory does
not vary significantly between the scenarios. These results
demonstrate that the effects of recalls are driven bymore than
just the total amount recalled. Instead, the rate of products
recalled per week and the duration of time over which recalls
occur will affect the total number of individuals that are
unable to receive the needed product, referred to as the
shortage amount.
Breadth of Disruption. To examine the effect of the number of
disruptions, or the disruption breadth, we compare Scenarios
B and D. While in Scenario B there is one disruption that
lasts for a total of 24 weeks, in Scenario D there are two
disruptions each with a length of 12 weeks and with 3
weeks passing between the disruptions. Both scenarios have
the same intensity (𝜃), defined as the number of products
recalled eachweek during the disruption.The results for these
scenarios with deterministic demand are shown in Figure 2.
Scenario B and D have slightly different behavior. It takes
one week more for Scenario D to return to steady state than
Scenario B. Also, the total order amount in Scenario D is
greater than in Scenario B. As presented in Table 3, the total
shortage is 2% greater in Scenario D than in Scenario B
when the system is modeled with stochastic demand and 1%
greater when the demand is modeled deterministically. This
implies that the system performs slightly better when there is
a continuous disruption as opposed to having a short break
between the shortages. This is further examined by studying
the effects of periodicity of the disruptions.
Periodicity of Disruption. Scenarios D and E are compared in
order to examine the effect of periodicity of the disruptions.
All disruption parameters except for the time between the
disruptions are the same. Unlike the 3-week duration that
occurs in Scenario D, in Scenario E there is a 24-week break
between the disruptions. Similar to the results seen through
the comparison of Scenarios B andD, as the time between the
recall disruptions increase, so does the level of shortage in the
system. As presented in Table 3, the shortage in Scenario E is
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Figure 2: Inventory levels, shortage rates, and orders at health centers over time for disruption Scenarios A-E when demand is modeled
deterministically.
10% greater than that in Scenario D for both deterministic
and stochastic demand patterns. We hypothesize that the
reason for this behavior is that when another disruption has
recently occurred the system is already working to recover,
with greater production and shipping levels. Thus it is more
prepared for a subsequent disruption. As the time between
disruptions increases the system is more likely to revert to
a steady state which is not prepared to accommodate an
additional disruption.
Size of Disruption. Finally, we examine the effect of the size
of the disruption on the system by comparing Scenario B and
Scenario C. In Scenario C, the number of products recalled
per week is five times that found in Scenario B. From exam-
ining Figure 2, it is shown that the pattern is the same for the
two disruption scenarios, but the intensity differs. Similarly,
the temporal patterns pertaining to the inventory, orders, and
shortage at the health center are similar for the two scenarios,
although the scale of the effects are different. As shown in
Table 3, the total shortage in Scenario C is 470% of that
in Scenario B when demand is modeled deterministically.
Similarly, when demand is modeled stochastically, the total
shortage in Scenario C is five times that found in Scenario B.
The higher rate of shortage in proportion to the increase
in the recall rate is expected since it is assumed that the
inventory policy, as defined by the CSL, is the same regardless
of the recall pattern. In practice, it would be natural for
a supply chain stakeholder to choose a higher CSL if it
was expected that substantially greater recalls were likely.
Similarly, if a particular product is more likely to exhibit
short and intense disruptions rather than long andmoremild
disruptions this should inform the management decisions
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Figure 3: Effects of inventory policies, defined by CSL, on the total
shortage and health center inventory and an estimate of the efficient
frontier defining nondominated inventory policies. The CSLs equal
to .86, .87, .91, and .94 are inefficient and not included on the efficient
frontier.
made by supply chain members. As demonstrated in the
comparison of scenarios here, even with just one change in
the features of the disruption and no changes in the inventory
strategy or the total amount recalled, the performance of the
system can vary significantly. Thus, it is important to consider
potential disruption features when choosing an inventory
strategy.
The results for the defined scenarios show that the
system acts very differently based on the differing disruption
characteristics. In the next section, we examine how different
policies affect the performance of the underlying system.
4.3. Effect of Inventory Policies on the Performance. The driv-
ing parameter that defines the inventory management policy,
and correspondingly the safety stock, at each echelon of the
supply chain, is the cycle service level. In the previous section,
it was seen that for different recall disruption scenarios (A-
E) and a constant CSL the performance of the system varied
significantly. Next, we examine the effects of changes to the
inventory policies as they correspond to changing the CSL for
the different recall scenarios. While we allow for the policies
to change, it is assumed that all echelons will have the same
CSL value. Further, we examine the effects of these changes
in inventory policies and disruption patterns jointly on two
performance metrics, (i) total shortage and (ii) inventory at
the health center.
To provide a baseline performance level for the inventory
policies, Scenario 0 is defined which represents the system
when no disruptions occur.
Figure 3 demonstrates the effects of different CSL values
on the two performance metrics in Scenario 0. As this
figure shows, by increasing the CSL, the total inventory level
increases and the total shortage level decreases.
Identifying the optimal CSL among the policy options
is dependent on the relative costs associated with the two
performance measures of total shortage and health care
center inventory. We evaluate the performance of the policy
options for different relative costs using the approach dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.The efficient frontier in Figure 3 depicts
the estimated levels of both shortages and health care center
inventory that can be achieved, and would be optimal, for
some relative value of shortage and inventory costs. Thus,
all CSL values that do not fall precisely on this efficient
frontier are classified as inefficient by the DEA approach. An
alternate interpretation of inefficiency is provided by noting
that there is a point on this efficient frontier that achieves
fewer shortages or fewer inventories while keeping the same
level with respect to the second measure. Thus, the outcomes
estimated by the efficient frontier are strictly better than those
achieved with the inefficient CSL value. As shown in Figure 3,
and determined by applying the DEA approach, the policies
corresponding to the CSLs of 0.86, 0.87. 0.91, and 0.94 are
not on the corresponding efficient frontiers and therefore are
never efficient when no shortages occur, regardless of the
relative values of the inventory holding cost and the shortage
cost. All efficient inventory policies among those simulated
are on the efficient frontier in the graph in Figure 3.
To identify efficient inventory policies when the system is
experiencing disruptions, we introduce a stochastic model of
recalls to present amore realistic setting in which the number
of disruptions and the time between disruptions vary. To
ensure that the total expected number of products recalled
is consistent across scenarios, we model the disruptions
with a Poisson distribution with the parameter lambda (𝜆)
corresponding to the expected number of disruptions, or
the disruption breadth. Additionally, with the assumption
that the duration of each recall disruption (𝛾) is the same,
the average recall quantity per week (𝜃) is scaled to ensure
that the total expected quantity recalled is the same. Due
to the stochastic nature of the modeling, it is possible
that simulation instances experience different numbers of
disruptions, and therefore different quantities are recalled,
but the expected number recalled remains the same.
In order to study the effect of different inventory policies
on the performance metrics of the health center, we simulate
each recall pattern for 16 different CSLs. Furthermore, we
run the simulation for multiple disruption patterns defined
by the value of 𝜆, for 𝜆 = (5, 10, 15, 20), for a 5% of
loss inventory, to examine the relationship between policies
and recall patterns. For smaller values of 𝜆 there are fewer
disruptions with higher intensity. More frequent disruptions
with fewer recalls per week results from higher values of 𝜆.
Figure 4 shows the performance of these policies, defined
by the CSL, for different recall patterns, defined by the 𝜆
value. From the results, it is clear that different inventory
policies perform significantly different depending on the
disruption pattern. Additionally, the incremental difference
in inventory and shortage between policies varies for different
disruption patterns. Thus, the choice of policy should vary
with respect to the expected disruption characteristics and
with the relative costs of one unit of shortage and one unit
of inventory.
Similar to the identification of efficient inventory policies
for the scenario with no recalls, we can identify inventory
policies that are inefficient regardless of the relative valuation
of the two performance measures. This can be achieved
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Table 4: Optimal CSL for varying ratios of shortage and inventory costs under different disruption patterns as defined by the expected
number of recall disruptions (𝜆).
Relative value of cost (unit cost of shortage/ unit cost of inventory)
𝜆 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
5 0.9 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.99
10 0.9 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.999 0.999
15 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.999 0.999 0.999
20 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
.85 .86
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Figure 4: For different recall patterns, defined by 𝜆, the resulting
total shortage and health care center inventory for various inventory
policies, defined by the CSL.
by using an approach similar to DEA. For example, when𝜆 equals 5, 15 and 20, inventory policies with CSL equal
to 0.91, 0.86 and 0.96, and 0.95, respectively, are found to
be inefficient using the mathematical models in the DEA
approach. While an inventory policy may be identified as
efficient it will not be optimal for all relative values of per unit
shortage costs and per unit inventory costs.The optimal CSLs
for a selection of relative costs and for different disruption
patterns, defined by 𝜆, are provided in Table 4.
For different ratios of the unit cost of shortage and the
unit cost of inventory, we can identify the optimal CSL
for the inventory policy. Table 4 illustrates the result of
this analysis. This analysis reveals that increasing the CSL,
which is equivalent to choosing to hold more safety stock in
inventory, is not always best and it varies based on the ratio
of costs and the type of disruption that is expected to occur.
For example, if the ratio of the costs is 1, a CSL equal to 0.98
is optimal only if there are frequent recalls, of approximately
more than 15 over 5 years, or low intensity in this model.
However, if it is expected that there will only be one recall per
year (𝜆 = 5) of a high intensity, then choosing a CSL of 0.98
is no longer optimal and we should instead choose a CSL of
0.94.
Finally, the results in Table 4 demonstrate the sensitivity
of the choice of inventory policy for a disruption pattern. For
example, if the ratio of costs is 1.4, choosing an inventory
policy with the assumption of five recalls over the five-year
duration will leave the supply chain stakeholder very far
from the optimal policy if in fact there are fifteen recalls
and the same total quantity is recalled. This demonstrates
the criticality of choosing a policy that correctly matches the
expected recall disruption pattern. Further, this supports the
value of stakeholders gathering information about historical
patterns in recalls and forecasting future recalls. By achieving
a better understanding of the likely recall scenarios, supply
chain decision makers can adjust and ultimately reduce
costs from inventory and shortages. These results support
the consideration of the use of adaptive policies such that
inventory decisions change over time either in anticipation of
or in response to recalls. This ultimately may lead to reduced
drug shortages and reduced supply chain costs. As discussed
below, we suggest expanding the model to integrate adaptive
inventory policies in future work.
5. Conclusion
We present a mathematical simulation model of the phar-
maceutical supply chain to understand the behavior of the
drug shortages under different disruption patterns. There are
currently few models that study the entire pharmaceutical
supply chain, and none that focus on recalls and disruption
patterns. To provide insights into this critical relationship
we examine (i) the role of the disruption characteristics and
(ii) the role of the inventory management policies within a
simulation model inspired by the saline supply chain. Sterile
solutions, such as saline, constitute a large portion of the
pharmaceutical recalls and shortages that occur each year.
Through analysis of this supply chain, we find that small
differences in the disruption patterns lead to very different
system performance when the inventory management poli-
cies are held consistent. Further, this relationship holds for
changes to either the (i) length, (ii) breadth, (iii) periodicity,
or (iv) size of the disruptions. Additionally, we demonstrate
the sensitivity of the optimal inventory policy to these
features of the disruptions. Thus, rather than a traditional
approach of using a consistent cycle service level (i.e., holding
more safety stock in inventory), our results support the need
for evolving inventory management strategies that account
for the features of the disruption.
In the case of saline, frequent small recalls occurred
in the system prior to 2017. If the inventory policies were
designed to instead be resilient against major disruptions or
large recalls, the inventory management policy and levels
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of safety stock would not be efficient. Thus, choosing a
policy that best responds to the likely disruptions is critical.
Further, with an understanding of the effects of frequent
small disruptions, one option for stakeholders in the saline
supply chain would be to invest in manufacturing equipment
and institute practices that would decrease the likelihood of
this disruption pattern. Additionally, instituting policies that
allow for inventory policies to agilely adapt based on current
and expected future circumstances would improve the overall
system performance.
A key challenge to implementing policies that adapt to
disruptions is the critical unknown features of disruptions
that will occur in the future. But while full knowledge
of future events is not possible, the results of this work
support the need for supply chain managers to examine
and identify the best inventory management policies for a
variety of types of disruptions that are probable. In return,
understanding this relationship between the best policies and
the disruption characteristics can inform implementation of
policies that are robust to a variety of types of disruptions.
Further, as disruptions occur and estimates of their features,
such as length, breadth, size, and periodicity, are updated
supply chain stakeholders canmodify their inventory policies
accordingly. Lastly, these results support the importance of
supply chain stakeholder investing in gaining information
about these disruption characteristics both in anticipation of
or during a disruption. This additional information will be
valuable as it allows the decision makers to adapt policies in
real-time.
There are several limitations and extensions which
require further investigation. First, this paper considers that
there is no limitation on the manufacturing capacity. A
more realistic model with inclusion of limited capacities and
a sensitivity analysis examining the role of manufacturing
capacity may be informative for future consideration as the
capacity is expected to significantly influence the shortage
size and the time for the system to return to a steady
state. Second, we assume that all the echelons use the same
inventory policy and have the same CSL. This representation
may be violated for pharmaceutical supply chains in which
downstream nodes tend to hold more safety stock to reduce
the likelihood of unmet patient demand. Third, defining the
total cost of the system as the inventory holding cost and
shortage cost of the health care center is a limiting feature.
While we only consider the inventory of health care centers,
this can be considered to serve as a proxy that represents
the total inventory in the supply chain. Additionally, with
a focus on addressing the critical societal problem of drug
shortages, we focus on developing an understanding of the
elements driving shortages. Future extensions of this model
can account for additional system elements in the objective
function.
We propose to address these limitations in future
research. Additionally, since, in the real world, planners are
often unsure of the type of disruption that will occur, in future
research we aim to construct and examine the performance
of adaptive inventory policies by building on the findings
from this work. There are also opportunities to expand this
study to investigate other types of pharmaceutical supply
chain disruptions, including manufacturing shutdowns and
surges in demand to compare and contrast with the effects
of recall disruptions. Also, consideration of the cooccurrence
of manufacturing shutdowns and product recalls can further
inform operational policies for supply chain stakeholders
seeking to prevent future drug shortages.
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In economic researches, much effort was devoted to the problem of how to increase the economics of countries. However, the
development of a country may fluctuate a lot due to international and domestic problems. Thus, we should also evaluate the
robustness of countries against unexpected economic recessions. In this paper, we use perturbation to quantify the robustness
of countries using two renowned algorithms: method of reflections (MR) and fitness-complexity method (FCM). The robustness
characterizes the stability of countries’ competitiveness against economic recessions. The experiments in the international trade
networks show that FCM could characterize the robustness better than MR. High fitness countries of FCM have strong robustness
against economic crises, which enlarges the application fields of FCM. Additionally, we simulate the trade conflict between USA
and China. The simulation results show that China suffers much in the trade conflict, while USA loses very little and has strong
robustness in this conflict.
1. Introduction
In network science, the development of a country is assessed
by the amount of its imported and exported products. Recent
works developed methods to unveil the underlying factors
that drive the economic growth of countries based solely on
the international trade network [1–4]. As nowadays the eco-
nomic relationship between countries is strong, an economic
depression that starts fromone country may largely influence
other countries, whichmay lead to economic crisis and reces-
sions in the whole world. Thus, apart from the assessment
of the economic growth of countries, an important feature
of countries to consider is their robustness against various
economic recessions. However, a new problem arises: would
the increase of robustness lead to a decrease of economic
growth? Studies show that developed countries should focus
on some high-tech and profitable products [3, 5], since
the high-tech products help maintain and improve their
competitiveness. However, unexpected tariff protectionism
and natural disasters may deeply influence the exports of
some targeted products [6, 7]. Then, in order to protect
against this, a country should diversify its production [1,
8]. This is against the classical specialization theory [3, 5].
Consequently, the relationship between robustness and the
competitiveness of countries should be investigated.
Measuring the competitiveness of countries usually
requires the detailed industrial data [9, 10]. However, in
recent years, network-based methods provide a simplifica-
tion of this [8, 11]. In network-based methods, the only
required information is the amount of exports for each
country-product pair. If a country is competitive enough in
the export of a product, a link is created in the network
between the country and the product. The resulting network
is the country-product bipartite network. There are two
main network-based methods to investigate the countries
performance: (1) the method of reflections (MR), which
uses a linear iterative process to compute the scores of
countries and products; this method share similarities with
the famous algorithm PageRank [12–14]; (2) the fitness-
complexity method (FCM), which uses a nonlinear itera-
tive method to compute the fitness of countries and the
complexity of products [1]. MR was shown to outperform
previous indices based on governance, education, and other
economic competitiveness factors [15, 16]. However, MR
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fails in precisely evaluating the competitiveness of some
special countries, such as India and China [17, 18]. The
fitness-complexity method is based on the fact that only
competitive countries can produce high-quality products,
while less competitive countries can only produce low-quality
products. If a product is only produced by competitive
countries, it is a high-quality product; otherwise it is a low-
complexity product. FCM outperforms MR both in accuracy
and efficiency [8, 19]. The previous works mainly focused on
how to accurately evaluate and predict the economic growth
of countries. In this work, we use both methods to study how
a country is influenced by the international and domestic
economic recessions.
Based on state of the artMR andFCMmethods, our paper
explores the robustness of countries’ competitiveness. Using
the matrix perturbation theory, we propose a convenient
analytical method to test the stability of the competitiveness
of countries and complexity of products. Then the proposed
method is applied to the international trade networks, and
we show that FCM can not only evaluate the fitness of
countries, but also precisely characterize the robustness of
their competitiveness. On the other hand, the MR scores
fail to assess the robustness of countries’ competitiveness
compared to FCM. According to the results, only a very
small number of countries possess strong robustness against
economic recessions. In order to increase its robustness, a
country should improve its fitness, which is also equivalent to
diversifying its products according to refs. [1, 3, 8]. Moreover,
we also use ourmethod to simulate the trade conflict between
USA and China and predict that the trade conflict sharply
decreases the fitness of China, whereas it seldom influences
USA, revealing strong robustness of USA.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly
describe the method of reflection and the fitness-complexity
method, and then we introduce our way to use perturbation
method. In Section 3, we apply the proposed method to the
international trade networks. Finally, the conclusion is given.
2. Materials and Methods
In the section,we first describe the country-product networks
in Section 2.1 and then introduce the classical method of
reflections and fitness-complexity method in Section 2.2.
Finally we describe our method to test the robustness of
countries’ competitiveness in Section 2.3.
2.1. Dataset Description of the Country-Product Networks.
The dataset we use ranges from 1962 to 2014 [2, 20–23]. We
use a network representation, in which one kind of nodes
is countries and the other kind is products. Edges can only
connect country and a product, meaning that the network
is bipartite. The products are indeed not considered individ-
ually: each exported product was assigned to a predefined
category. The dataset has 263 countries (or zones) and 988
product categories. Besides, we neglect a very small fraction
of categories that are ambiguous (aggregate categories). Note
that in the rest of the work we use the word product for
category of product.
For each country-product pair, we know the total export
in US$ of products of a country. In practice, a country may
produce more or less of a product. In order to characterize
whether a country is a competitive exporter of a product or
not, we use the “Revealed Comparative Advantage” (RCA) to
renormalize the weight of the country-product relations and
only edges with weight greater than 1 are kept. The RCA is
defined as
𝑅𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝛼 = 𝑒𝑖𝛼/∑𝑗 𝑒𝑗𝛼∑𝛽 𝑒𝑖𝛽/∑𝑗𝛽 𝑒𝑗𝛽 , (1)
where 𝑒𝑖𝛼 is the export in US$ of country 𝑖 for product 𝛼.
After processing the data, we obtain the weighted matrix of
the country-product network, denoted by𝑀 = (𝑀𝑖𝑗)𝑁𝑐×𝑁𝑝 ,
where 𝑁𝑐 and 𝑁𝑝 represent the number of countries and
products, respectively, and𝑀𝑖𝛼 = 𝑅𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝛼. 𝑅𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝛼 determines
the relative importance of an export for a country and
compares it with its relative importance for other countries.
In network, we defined the number of products exported by
country 𝑖 as its degree 𝑑𝑖, and the number of times a product𝛼 is exported as 𝑑𝛼. Note that in general only the adjacency
matrix of the network is considered, but for perturbation
theory it is indeed more suitable to use the weighted matrix.
2.2. Methods of Reflections (MR) and Fitness-Complexity
(FCM). Method of reflections is a classical economic com-
plexity index by Hidalgo and Hausmann [3, 24].This method
defines a score or each country {𝑑(𝑛)𝑖 } and a score for each
product {𝑢(𝑛)𝛼 } in an iterative way,
𝑑(𝑛)𝑖 = 1𝑑𝑖∑𝛼 𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑢
(𝑛−1)
𝛼 ,
𝑢(𝑛)𝛼 = 1𝑢𝛼∑𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑑
(𝑛−1)
𝑖 ,
(2)
where 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑢𝛼 are the country degree and product degree,
respectively. According to (2), with the increase of iterations,{𝑑(𝑛)𝑖 } and {𝑢(𝑛)𝛼 } will asymptotically converge to a trivial fixed
point for arbitrary initial {𝑑(0)𝑖 } and {𝑢(0)𝛼 } [25, 26]. However,
this problem is solved by defining the final country score as𝑑𝑐𝑖 = (𝑑𝑐𝑖 −⟨𝑑𝑐𝑖 ⟩)/𝜎𝑑𝑐𝑖 , where ⟨𝑑𝑐𝑖 ⟩ and 𝜎𝑑𝑐𝑖 represent the average
and the standard deviation of the final score 𝑑𝑐𝑖 . When 𝑛 󳨀→+∞, the fixed point solution is equivalent to an approach
using the eigenvectors of the matrix 𝑀 [26]. In practice, we
use 𝑛 = 2, as different iterations have different interpretation.
The initial conditions for {𝑑(0)𝑖 } and {𝑢(0)𝛼 } are set as {𝑑(0)𝑖 } = 𝑑𝑖
and {𝑢(0)𝛼 } = 𝑢𝛼. The results of (2) agree with the assumption
that complex products (or high-quality products) have high
scores and tend to be produced by developed countries,
while developing countries only produce some low-quality
products. This can be used to evaluate the competitiveness
and the economic growth of a country. The index of (2)
outperforms the degree-based index [8].
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Fitness-complexity method defines the country fitness{𝐹𝑖} and product complexity {𝑄𝛼} as the stationary point of
the following nonlinear recursive process [1]:
𝐹(𝑛)𝑖 = ∑
𝛼
𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑄(𝑛−1)𝛼 ,
𝑄(𝑛)𝛼 = 1∑𝑖𝑀𝑖𝛼 (1/𝐹(𝑛−1)𝑖 ) .
(3)
The scores are normalized after each step:
𝐹(𝑛)𝑖 = 𝐹
(𝑛)
𝑖⟨𝐹(𝑛)𝑖 ⟩ ,
𝑄(𝑛)𝛼 = 𝑄
(𝑛)
𝛼⟨𝑄(𝑛)𝛼 ⟩ ,
(4)
where ⟨. . .⟩ is the average operation. The initial values of 𝐹(0)𝑖
and 𝑄(0)𝛼 do not influence the final stationary state except
some particular singular points. Without loss of generality,
the initial condition are set as 𝐹(0)𝑖 = 1 and 𝑄(0)𝛼 = 1. When
we apply (3) to the country-product bipartite networks,
developed countries and high-quality products are inclined
to have high fitness, while developing countries and low-
quality products tend to have small complexity. Therefore,
FCM can evaluate the competitiveness of countries and
the complexity of products [1, 25] and predict the future
economic development [19, 27]. This method has been suc-
cessfully applied to other fields, such as ecological networks
[28] and scientific competitiveness of nations [29].
Note that we use both MR and FCM to describe the
“Economic Complexity Index” of countries or “Product
Complexity Index” of products in the paper. In the following,
we define the competitiveness as the “Economic Complexity
Index” of both MR and FCM method. For MR method, the
competitiveness is represented by 𝑑𝑖 in (2), while, for FCM
method, the competitiveness is represented by the fitness 𝐹(𝑛)𝑖
in (4).
2.3. Robustness of the Countries’ Competitiveness. In order to
stimulate the economy, countries design various tariffs and
other policies to promote or reduce the exports/imports of
certain products. In theory, it would be possible to infer these
changes based on an analysis of the matrix 𝑀. However,
analyzing the detailed reason of the fluctuation of 𝑀 is
prohibitive in practice. In the work, we investigate how the
competitiveness of countries changes with perturbations of
matrix 𝑀. Smaller fluctuations of the metrics mean higher
robustness. This can reflect how resilient a country is to a
change of policy. For the precise relationship between the
exports and policies, please refer to [30–32].
In order to study the perturbation, we introduce a
small number 𝜀 and a perturbation matrix 𝐵. The resulting
perturbed matrix is 𝑀(𝜀) = 𝑀 + 𝜀𝐵, Δ𝑀 = 𝜀𝐵. After
the perturbation, the stationary points of (2) become 𝑑𝑖(𝜀)
and 𝑢𝛼(𝜀). A straightforward approach to obtain 𝑑𝑖(𝜀) and𝑢𝛼(𝜀) is recalculating (2) based on𝑀(𝜀). Here, we introduce
a perturbation method to compute 𝑑𝑖(𝜀) and 𝑢𝛼(𝜀), as well
as the FCM scores. If you are not interested in the complex
derivation procedure, please skip the following part, which
does not influence the global comprehension of the paper.
We use Taylor’s formalism [33, 34] to represent the
perturbed quantities 𝑑𝑖(𝜀) and 𝑢𝛼(𝜀); i.e., 𝑑𝑖(𝜀) = 𝑑𝑖 +∑+∞𝑘=1 𝑔(𝑘)𝑖 𝜀𝑘 and 𝑢𝛼(𝜀) = 𝑢𝛼 + ∑+∞𝑘=1 ℎ(𝑘)𝛼 𝜀𝑘. When 𝜀 = 0, 𝑑𝑖(𝜀)
and 𝑢𝛼(𝜀) reduce to 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑢𝛼. Moreover, the degree 𝑑𝑖 and𝑢𝛼 change to 𝑑𝑖(𝜀) = 𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑑𝐵,𝑖 and 𝑢𝛼(𝜀) = 𝑢𝛼 + 𝜀𝑢𝐵,𝛼, where𝑑𝐵,𝑖 = ∑𝛼 𝐵𝑖𝛼 and 𝑢𝐵,𝛼 = ∑𝑖 𝐵𝑖𝛼.
According to the perturbation theory [34, 35], by sub-
stituting the Taylor’s formalism of each variable into (2)
and keeping only the first order of 𝜀, we obtain Taylor’s
decomposition of (2),
𝑔(1)𝑖 𝜀 = −𝜀𝑑𝐵,𝑖𝑑2𝑖 ∑𝛼 𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑢𝛼 +
𝜀𝑑𝑖∑𝛼 (𝐵𝑖𝛼𝑢𝛼 +𝑀𝑖𝛼ℎ
(1)
𝛼 ) ,
ℎ(1)𝛼 𝜀 = −𝜀𝑢𝐵,𝛼𝑢2𝛼 ∑𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑑𝛼 +
𝜀𝑢𝛼∑𝑖 (𝐵𝑖𝛼𝑑𝑖 +𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑔
(1)
𝑖 ) .
(5)
We denote g(1) = [𝑔(1)𝑖 ]𝑁𝑐×1, h(1) = [ℎ(1)𝛼 ]𝑁𝑝×1,
C1(𝐵) = [𝑐𝑖(𝐵)]𝑁𝑐×1,C2(𝐵) = [𝑐𝛼(𝐵)]𝑁𝑝×1, where𝑐𝑖(𝐵) = −(𝑑𝐵,𝑖/𝑑2𝑖 ) ∑𝛼𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑢𝛼 + (1/𝑑𝑖)∑𝛼 𝐵𝑖𝛼𝑢𝛼 and 𝑐𝛼(𝐵) =−(𝑢𝐵,𝛼/𝑢2𝛼) ∑𝑖𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑑𝛼 + (1/𝑢𝛼)∑𝑖 𝐵𝑖𝛼𝑑𝑖.
Equation (5) can be written in matrix formalism as
[g(1)
h(1)
] = [C1 (𝐵)
C2 (𝐵)] + [
0,𝐷−11 𝑀
𝐷−12 𝑀𝑇, 0] [
g(1)
h(1)
] , (6)
where 𝐷1 = diag{𝑑1, 𝑑2, . . . , 𝑑𝑁𝑐} and 𝐷2 =
diag{𝑢1, 𝑢2, . . . , 𝑢𝑁𝑐}. g(1) and h(1) could be solved as
[g(1)
h(1)
] = (𝐼 − [ 0,𝐷−11 𝑀𝐷−12 𝑀𝑇, 0])
−1
[C1 (𝐵)
C2 (𝐵)] . (7)
Equation (7) is used to compute the influence of the perturba-
tion Δ𝑀 on the MR. Next we analyze the influence of Δ𝑀 =𝜀𝐵 on FCM. Supposing that 𝐹𝑖(𝜀) and 𝑄𝛼(𝜀) are the stable
point of the matrix𝑀󸀠 = 𝑀 + Δ𝑀 and could be represented
by Taylor’s formalism; i.e., 𝐹𝑖(𝜀) = 𝐹𝑖 + ∑+∞𝑘=1 𝑓(𝑘)𝑖 𝜀𝑘 and𝑄𝛼(𝜀) = 𝑄𝛼+∑+∞𝑘=1 𝑞(𝑘)𝛼 𝜀𝑘. Following the procedure introduced
above, we substitute Taylor’s formalism of each variable into
(3) and (4) and keep only the first order of 𝜀,
𝑓(1)𝑖 𝜀 = 𝑐1∑
𝛼
(𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑞(1)𝛼 + 𝐵𝑖𝛼𝑄𝛼) 𝜀 + 𝑐2𝜀,
𝑞(1)𝛼 𝜀 = 𝑐3∑
𝑖
(−𝑀𝑖𝛼 1𝐹2𝑖 𝑓
(1)
𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖𝛼 1𝐹𝑖)𝜀 + 𝑐4𝜀,
(8)
where 𝑐1 = 1/⟨𝐹𝑖⟩ and 𝑐3 = −𝑄2𝑖 /⟨𝑄𝑖⟩.𝑐2 = −(𝐹𝑖/⟨𝐹𝑖⟩2)⟨∑𝛼(𝑀𝑖𝛼𝑞(1)𝛼 + 𝐵𝑖𝛼𝑄𝛼)⟩ and 𝑐4 =(𝑄𝑖/⟨𝑄𝑖⟩2)⟨∑𝑖[(−𝑀𝑖𝛼(1/𝐹2𝑖 )𝑓(1)𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖𝛼(1/𝐹𝑖))𝑄2𝑖 ]⟩ are
two parameters relevant to 𝑖 and 𝛼, respectively, which
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Figure 1: (Color online) The decrease of the counties and products scores induced by individually reducing the exports of countries by 5%
for FCM andMR, as a function of the countries as rank in their respective method. (a) Change of the fitness scores (in FCM) of countries. (b)
Change of the countries scores (in MR). (c) Change of the complexity (FCM) of products. (d) Change of the products scores (MR). Note that
in the dataset, we have 263 countries (or zones) and 988 product categories. However, in the four panels, we only show the snapshot results
of some competitive countries and complex product because the influence of other countries and products is much small.
guarantee the normalization of 𝐹𝑖(𝜀) and 𝑄𝛼(𝜀). Though 𝑐2
and 𝑐4 are function of 𝑞(1)𝛼 and 𝑓(1)𝑖 , we treat them as constants
since they have average operations of the two variables when
calculating 𝑞(1)𝛼 and 𝑓(1)𝑖 . Denote f(1) = (𝑓(1)𝑖 )𝑁𝑐×1 and
q(1) = (𝑞(1)𝛼 )𝑁𝑝×1. Similar to (7), the perturbation of FCM is
[f(1)
q(1)
] = (𝐼 − [ 0, 𝑐1𝑀−𝑐3𝑀𝑇𝐷3, 0])
−1
[C3 (𝐵)
C4 (𝐵)] . (9)
where 𝐷3 = diag{1/𝐹21, . . . , 1/𝐹2𝑖 , . . . , 1/𝐹2𝑁𝑐 }, C3(𝐵) =(𝑐1∑𝛼 𝐵𝑖𝛼𝑄𝛼 + 𝑐2)𝑁𝑐×1, and C4(𝐵) = (𝑐3∑𝑖 𝐵𝑖𝛼(1/𝐹𝑖) +𝑐4)𝑁𝑝×1. Note that 𝑐2 and 𝑐4 seldom influence the analysis
of f(1) and q(1), since the eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue of matrix (𝐼 − [ 0,𝑐1𝑀
−𝑐3𝑀
𝑇𝐷3 ,0
] )−1 actually
represents the stationary point of the FCM. When analyzing
the perturbation of the stationary point of FCM, we can
ignore 𝑐2 and 𝑐4 for convenience.
f(1) and q(1) represent the fluctuation induced by a small
perturbation in FCM. In the experiments, based on the
proposed method, we will show how the competitiveness (𝑑𝑖
and 𝐹(𝑛)𝑖 ) of a country changes with different perturbations.
Note that without (7) and (9), we can still obtain the results
by recalculating (2) and (3) every time when𝑀 changes.
3. Results
The exports of countries are influenced by a wide range of
factors, and obtaining the precise influence of each factor is
prohibitive. Instead, we perturb the country-product matrix𝑀 following two different scenarios: (1) National reces-
sion: a country suffers from natural disasters (e.g., volcanic
eruptions, tsunamis), unexpected crisis, or inner industrial
problems. All its product exports are reduced by a fixed
quantity. (2) Product reduction: the exports of a certain
product are reduced for all exporting countries. For example,
adverseweather happens, or the products (e.g.,mobile phone,
clothes) may be out of fashion and people change their tastes,
which leads to the export decrease of a certain product. At
last, we utilize the method to simulate the trade conflict
between USA and China.
We first consider the case of national recession. Suppose
that country 𝑖 is the targeted country and that the export
of its products is reduced by 5%. Then the elements of Δ𝑀
are Δ𝑀𝑘𝑗 = −𝑀𝑘𝑗 × 5%(𝑘 = 𝑖) and Δ𝑀𝑘𝑗 = 0 otherwise.
The other changes (e.g., 1%, 4%) of the edge weights do not
influence the analysis. By substituting 𝐵 = Δ𝑀 and 𝜀 = 1
into (7) and (9), we obtain the changes of competitiveness of
the country and the country’s influence on other countries.
Figure 1 shows the influence of the national recession case as a
function of FCM and MR scores. In Figure 1(a), the decrease
of fitness mainly occurs on the diagonal elements, implying
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Figure 3: (Color online) The decrease of the counties and products scores induced by individually reducing the exports of products by 5%
for FCM and MR, as a function of the countries and products rank in their respective method. (a) Change of the fitness scores (in FCM) of
countries. (b) Change of the countries scores (in MR). (c) Change of the complexity (FCM) of products. (d) Change of the products scores
(MR).
that the targeted countries influence other countries a little.
Note that high fitness countries are well linked together
and influence each other more that low fitness countries,
whereas low high fitness countries seldom influence the
other countries. Consequently, FCM index could be used to
evaluate the robustness of countries; higher fitness means
stronger robustness and is better. In Figure 1(b), the influence
ordered by MR is chaotic, and, thus, the MR index cannot
characterize the country robustness. Further, Figure 1(c)
shows the influence of country recession on product com-
plexity, where competitive countries exert big influence on
the complexity of products, which is in accord with reality
that the prices of various products are largely determined by
the markets of developed countries. However, in Figure 1(d),
the influence of MR is chaotic.
According to Figure 1, FCM is a perfect index to charac-
terize the robustness of countries. Figure 2 shows the decrease
of the countries’ fitness when reducing the exports of them-
selves. We see that high fitness countries are sensitive to the
decrease of their exports. Moreover, in Figure 2(b), the fitness
decreases of countries have a positive correlation with their
fitness, which further illustrates the effectiveness of FCM
in characterizing the robustness of countries. Additionally,
we also investigate the robustness based on MR. Similar to
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Figures 2(a) and 2(b), the average decrease of country score
is about 4.9%.
Following the samemethod, we also analyze the influence
of reduced products in Figure 3. Suppose that the targeted
product reduces 5% weight of its connected edges, which
means that all countries reduce 5% exports of the particular
product. In Figure 3, FCM outperforms MR in characterizing
the relationship between product score and the robustness,
since the change of products’ complexity mainly occurs
on the diagonal elements. Note that decreasing the export
volume of a certain product would increase its complexity,
which agrees with the phenomenon “thing with rare be
expensive”. In order to better understand the complexity
fluctuation, Figure 4 shows the decrease of the complexity
as a function of the product perturbation. We see that the
reduced exports of somehigh-quality products lead to a sharp
increase of their complexity, while the complexity of low-
quality products fluctuate a little (see Figure 4(a)). However,
the relative fluctuations of high-quality products are very
small in Figure 4(b), revealing that high-quality products
have stronger robustness against the reduction of themselves
than low-quality products. Note that the results of Figure 4
are in contrast with Figure 2. The recession of countries
(products) will reduce (increase) their scores more than any
other countries (products).
Next, we investigate which countries and which products
have high scores and how the connection is between high
fitness countries and high-quality products. SinceMR cannot
describe the robustness of the countries’ competitiveness,
we focus on the FCM case. In Table 1, we can see that the
developed countries, such as USA, UK, and Germany, export
not only high-quality products, but also some low-quality
products including fish and accessories. China also exports
some high-quality products and ranks high in fitness. The
reason is that China exports some consumer electronics,
such as electric cookers and washing machines, which are
categorized into the same classes. Note that though Russia
is considered as a developed country, its exports are mainly
low-quality products and should be a developing country
based on FCM. Moreover, we also show the export countries
of products with different qualities in Table 2. In Table 2,
competitive countries export products of diverse qualities,
while less competitive countries only export low-quality
products. Note that the robustness is positively correlated
with the fitness in Figure 2.Though somedeveloped countries
have small product diversity, they have strong robustness
against different economic failures.
At last, based on the robust theory of the paper, we
simulate the current trade conflict between USA and China.
Recently, the president Donald Trump of USA imposes high
tariff on Chinese exports to force China renegotiating its
trade balance with USA, while China opposes the policy and
proposes the tit-for-tat tariff on American products. How to
quantify the win and loss of the two countries is an open
problem. Here, we simulate the fitness dynamics of the two
countries. We first show the evolving paths of the fitness
of USA and China range from 1962 to 2014, respectively,
in Figure 5. In Figure 5, the fitness of China grows slowly,
meaning the economic increase of China, whereas USA
has large fluctuation between 1979 and 1986. This can be
explained by several factors (e.g., political problems, cold war
between the Soviet Union and USA) influencing the trades.
According to the public news, USA imposes high tariff
onChinese high-tech products that include aircraft, iron, and
medical instruments [36]. China plans to improve the tariff
on products such as soya beans or cars [37]. Until now, we
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Table 1: The main export products of some high fitness countries. The first column is the descending order of the countries by the fitness
of countries in FCM. In the table, only the top-10 influential export products are listed here, where the products are ranked according to the
product scores by FCM.
Fitness
Ranking Country Top-10 influential export products
1 USA
(1) Fuel oils. (2) Construction and mining machinery. (3)Non-ferrous base metal
waste and scrap. (4) Gasoline and other light oils. (5)Machinery for specialized
industries. (6) Parts and accessories of some special instruments. (7) Special
transactions and commodities. (8) Crude petroleum and oils from bituminous
materials. (9) Petroleum bitumen, petroleum coke and bituminous mixtures. (10)
Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons.
2 UK
(1) Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, etc. (2) Non-ferrous
base metal waste and scrap. (3) Petroleum bitumen, petroleum coke and
bituminous mixtures. (4) Fish, dried, salted or in brine. (5) Crustaceans and
molluscs, prepared or unprepared. (6) Coffee green, roasted. (7) Sheep and lamb
skin without the wool. (8) Building and monumental (dimension) stone. (9) Fuel
oils. (10) Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons.
3 Germany
(1) Crude petroleum and oils from bituminous materials. (2) Parts and accessories
of some special instruments. (3) Surveying, navigational, compasses, etc,
instruments. (4) Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, etc. (5)
Coffee green, roasted. (6) Non-ferrous metal waste and scrap. (7) Fuel oils. (8)
Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons. (9) Fuel oils. (10)Diamonds
(non-industrial).
9 Italy
(1) Castor oil seeds. (2) True hemp, raw or processed but not spun. (3) Coal gas,
water gas and similar gases. (4) Potassium salts, natural, crude. (5) Iron pyrites,
unroasted. (6) Roasted iron pyrites. (7) Ores and concentrates of uranium and
thorium. (8) Vegetable textile fibres and waste. (9) Rye, unmilled. (10)Mate.
7 China
(1) Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap. (2) Crude petroleum and oils from
bituminous materials. (3) Fuel oils. (4) Construction and mining machinery. (5)
Parts of some special machinery and equipment. (6)Machinery for specialized
industries. (7) Passenger motor vehicles. (8) Trailers and transports containers. (9)
Surveying, navigational, compasses, etc, instruments. (10) Special transactions and
commodities.
10 Russia
(1) Coffee green, roasted. (2) Petroleum gases. (3) Building and monumental
(dimension) stone. (4) Crude petroleum and oils from bituminous materials. (5)
Fish, frozen, excluding fillets. (6) Fish fillets, frozen. (7) Fish, dried, salted or in
brine. (8) Crustaceans and molluscs. (9) Non-ferrous metal waste and scrap. (10)
Fuel oils.
cannot obtain the data to compute the volumes of the reduced
exports induced by the trade conflict. However, we can
simulate the influence based on historical dataset. Figure 6
shows the increases of different products for USA and China
covering from the year 1962 to 2014. The original dataset
only gives the product categories, not the export details
of each product. In the simulation, we treat all categories
that contain the key words, such as “iron” and “medical”,
as the corresponding products. In Figure 6, most of the
exports increase on the whole except the soya beans. Due
to enormous inner demands and restricted natural resource,
China reduces its export of soya beans from 1989. Integrating
Figures 5 and 6, we find that the exports of the two countries
increase on the whole.
Next, we artificially introduce some perturbation into the
exports of the two countries. Following the tariff policies of
the two countries, we suppose that the soya bean export of
USA reduces 5% and the iron export of China reduces 5%
for every year between 1975 and 2014. Here, we do not start
from the year 1962, because that USA and China established
diplomatic relations in the year 1972. Before 1972, China did
not integrate into the global economics completely and the
two countries had little trade connection. Thus, we start the
simulation from 1975 to avoid noisy fluctuations. According
to our proposed method (9), we obtain the fluctuation of the
fitness of the two countries in Figure 7. If we reduce 5% of the
American soya beans and of the Chinese Iron steels, China
will suffer more decrease of the fitness in Figure 7(a).
Next, we simulate another case. The aim of American
policy is to reduce the growth of China, especially high-tech
products. If USA does not start the conflict, supposing that
the high-tech aircraft of China increases by 5%, Figure 7(b)
shows the increase of the fitness of the two countries. We find
that the export increase of aircraft would improve the fitness
of China much, whereas the fitness of USA would decrease
only a little. Besides, we also simulate the perturbation of
other high-tech products, such as industrial equipment and
medical instruments, and the results are similar with Figure 7.
Thus, we can predict that the trade conflict between the
two countries would hurt China severely. However, USA
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Table 2: The main export countries of some products. The first column is the descending order of the products by the score 𝑄𝑖 of FCM. In
the table, the countries are ranked according to the country scores of FCM.
Product
Ranking Product Top-10 influential export countries
1 Wood-based panels (1) China. (2) USA. (3) Spain. (4) France. (5) India. (6)UK. (7)Venezuela. (8) Brazil. (9) Canada. (10) Germany.
2 Castor oil seeds (1) China. (2) USA. (3) Spain. (4) France. (5) India. (6)UK. (7)Venezuela. (8) Brazil. (9) Canada. (10) Germany.
3 Coal gas, water gas and similar gases (1) USA. (2)Oman. (3) UK. (4) Brazil. (5) China. (6) Ecuador.(7)Dominican Rp. (8) Algeria. (9) France. (10)Germany.
4 Copra (1) China. (2) France. (3)Morocco. (4) Tunisia. (5)USA. (6)Iran. (7) Italy. (8) Kazakhstan. (9) Pakistan. (10)Venezuela.
5 Manila hemp, raw or processed but not spun
(1) China. (2) Canada. (3) Germany. (4) Belgium-Lux. (5)
France. (6) Netherlands. (7)USA. (8) Austria. (9) Spain.(10)Australia.
766 Parts of and accessories for apparatuselectrical instruments
(1)USA. (2) UK. (3) France. (4) Germany. (5) Spain. (6)
Belgium-Lux. (7) Netherlands. (8) China. (9) Italy. (10)Brazil.
767 Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap (1) China. (2) France. (3) USA. (4) Brazil. (5) Australia. (6)Austria. (7) Belgium-Lux. (8) Germany. (9) India. (10)Morocco.
768 Machinery for specialized industries (1) China. (2) France. (3) USA. (4) Brazil. (5) Australia. (6)Austria. (7) Belgium-Lux. (8) Germany. (9) India. (10)Morocco.
769 Special transactions and commodities (1) China. (2) France. (3) USA. (4) Brazil. (5) Australia. (6)Austria. (7) Belgium-Lux. (8) Germany. (9) India. (10)Morocco.
770 Postal packages not classified into otherclasses
(1) Algeria. (2) Angola. (3) Argentina. (4) Australia. (5) Austria.(6) Belgium-Lux. (7) Brazil. (8) Bulgaria. (9) Canada. (10)Chile.
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Note that we do not simulate the performance before the year 1975, because that USA and China established diplomatic relations in the year
1972. After 1972, China built diplomatic relations with many western countries and started to integrate into the global economics. Thus, we
start the experiments from 1975 to avoid noisy fluctuations.
benefits only a little from the conflict. Note that, in the
analysis, we do not consider the decrease of the American
exports induced by the increase of theChinese corresponding
exports. China may take away some market shares of some
high-tech products, which is beyond the scope of the paper.
4. Conclusion
In summary, we propose an analytical approach to calculate
the robustness of the MR and FCM. The robustness of both
methods is tested using perturbation theory. This analysis
shows that the FCM is more resilient to perturbation, as the
propagation between countries is less important than in MR.
Moreover, we use our method to simulate the trade conflict
between USA and China using FCM. The simulation results
show that China will lose much competitiveness, whereas
USA will get a small benefit from the conflict. Therefore, our
work could supply additional information that organizations
could benefit by taking the competitiveness robustness of
countries into accounts. Since the robustness analysis is based
on the artificial simulation, the inner relationships between
countries (products) are not considered in the analysis.
Consequently, the fluctuation of real economics may be
different from the results in the paper. Detailed perturbation
of real economic data could be integrated into the method to
enhance the accuracy in the future.
Data Availability
The data used to support the findings of this study are
available in the dataset collection of [20].
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
Acknowledgments
This work was jointly supported by the National Natural
Science Foundation of China (nos. 61703281, 11547040,
61803266, and 61873171), the Ph.D. Start-Up Fund of
Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province, China
(nos. 2017A030310374 and 2016A030313036), the Science
and Technology Innovation Commission of Shenzhen
(no. JCYJ20160520162743717), Shenzhen Science and
Technology Foundation (nos. JCYJ20150529164656096 and
JCYJ20170302153955969), Guangdong Pre-National Project
(2014GKXM054), Guangdong Province Key Laboratory of
Popular High Performance Computers (2017B030314073),
Foundation for Distinguished Young Talents in Higher
Education of Guangdong (2015KONCX143), and the Young
Teachers Start-Up Fund of Natural Science Foundation of
Shenzhen University.
References
[1] A. Tacchella, M. Cristelli, G. Caldarelli, A. Gabrielli, and L.
Pietronero, “A new metrics for countries’ fitness and products’
complexity,” Scientific Reports, vol. 2, article 723, 2012.
[2] C. A. Hidalgo, B. Winger, A.-L. Baraba´si, and R. Hausmann,
“The product space conditions the development of nations,”
Science, vol. 317, no. 5837, pp. 482–487, 2007.
[3] C. A. Hidalgo and R. Hausmann, “The building blocks of
economic complexity,” Proceedings of the National Acadamy of
Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 106, no. 26, pp.
10570–10575, 2009.
[4] H. Liao, M. S. Mariani, M. Medo, Y.-C. Zhang, andM.-Y. Zhou,
“Ranking in evolving complex networks,” Physics Reports, vol.
689, pp. 1–54, 2017.
[5] G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman, “Quality Ladders in the
Theory of Growth,”The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 58, no.
1, p. 43, 1991.
10 Complexity
[6] D. Greenaway, International trade policy: From tariffs to the new
protectionism, Macmillan, London, UK, 1983.
[7] H. Liepmann, Tariff Levels and The Economic Unity of Europe:
An Examination of Tariff Policy, Export Movements and The
Economic Integration of Europe, vol. 25, Routledge, 2017.
[8] M. S. Mariani, A. Vidmer, M. Medo, and Y.-C. Zhang, “Mea-
suring economic complexity of countries and products: which
metric to use?”The European Physical Journal B, vol. 88, no. 11,
article 293, pp. 1–9, 2015.
[9] C. Kao, W.-Y. Wu, W.-J. Hsieh, T.-Y. Wang, C. Lin, and L.-H.
Chen, “Measuring the national competitiveness of Southeast
Asian countries,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol.
187, no. 2, pp. 613–628, 2008.
[10] E. Siggel, “International competitiveness and comparative
advantage: A survey and a proposal for measurement,” Journal
of Industry, Competition and Trade, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 137–159,
2006.
[11] C. Antonelli,Handbook on the Economic Complexity of Techno-
logical Change, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.
[12] S. Brin, “The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search
engine,” Computer Networks, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 107–117, 1998.
[13] L. Page, S. Brin, R. Motwani, and T. Winograd, “The pagerank
citation ranking: Bringing order to the web,” Tech. Rep., Stan-
ford InfoLab, 1999.
[14] S. Albeaik, M. Kaltenberg, M. Alsaleh, and C. A. Hidalgo, “729
new measures of economic complexity (addendum to improv-
ing the economic complexity index),” 2017, https://arxiv.org/
abs/1708.04107.
[15] J. Felipe, U. Kumar, A. Abdon, and M. Bacate, “Product
complexity and economic development,” Structural Change and
Economic Dynamics, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 36–68, 2012.
[16] S. Poncet and F. Starosta de Waldemar, “Export upgrading and
growth: The prerequisite of domestic embeddedness,” World
Development, vol. 51, pp. 1–15, 2013.
[17] A. Tacchella, M. Cristelli, G. Caldarelli, A. Gabrielli, and L.
Pietronero, “Economic complexity: conceptual grounding of a
new metrics for global competitiveness,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics & Control, vol. 37, no. 8, pp. 1683–1691, 2013.
[18] F. Battiston, M. Cristelli, A. Tacchella, and L. Pietronero,
“How metrics for economic complexity are affected by noise,”
Complexity Economics, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1–22, 2014.
[19] H. Liao andA.Vidmer, “A comparative analysis of the predictive
abilities of economic complexity metrics using international
trade network,” Complexity, vol. 2018, Article ID 2825948, 12
pages, 2018.
[20] A. Simoes et al., “Country-ProductDataset,” https://atlas.media
.mit.edu/en/resources/data/.
[21] R. Feenstra, R. Lipsey, H. Deng, A. Ma, and H. Mo,
“World Trade Flows: 1962-2000,” National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2005.
[22] R. Hausmann, J. Hwang, and D. Rodrik, “What you export
matters,” Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1–25,
2007.
[23] G. Gaulier and S. Zignago, Baci: International Trade Database
at The Product-Level (The 1994-2007 Version), 2010.
[24] R. Hausmann, C. A. Hidalgo, S. Bustos, M. Coscia, A. Simoes,
andM. A. Yildirim,TheAtlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping
Paths to Prosperity, Mit Press, 2014.
[25] M. Cristelli, A. Gabrielli, A. Tacchella, G. Caldarelli, and
L. Pietronero, “Measuring the intangibles: A metrics for the
economic complexity of countries and products,” PloS One, vol.
8, no. 8, Article ID e70726, 2013.
[26] G. Caldarelli, M. Cristelli, A. Gabrielli, L. Pietronero, A. Scala,
andA. Tacchella, “A network analysis of countries’ export flows:
firm grounds for the building blocks of the economy,” PLoS
ONE, vol. 7, no. 10, Article ID e47278, 2012.
[27] M. Cristelli, A. Tacchella, and L. Pietronero, “The heteroge-
neous dynamics of economic complexity,” PLoS ONE, vol. 10,
no. 2, Article ID e0117174, 2015.
[28] V. Domı´nguez-Garcı´a and M. A. Mun˜oz, “Ranking species in
mutualistic networks,” Scientific Reports, vol. 5, article 8182,
2015.
[29] G. Cimini, A. Gabrielli, and F. S. Labini, “The scientific compet-
itiveness of nations,” PLoS ONE, vol. 9, no. 12, 2014.
[30] D. Hausman, M. McPherson, and D. Satz, Economic analysis,
moral philosophy, and public policy, CambridgeUniversity Press,
2018.
[31] R. G. Ehrenberg, R. S. Smith et al., Modern labor economics:
Theory and public policy, Routledge, 2016.
[32] S. A. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria (Routledge Revivals):
Benefit-Cost Analysis for Planned Economic Growth, Routledge,
2014.
[33] M. Nørgaard, N. K. Poulsen, and O. Ravn, “New developments
in state estimation for nonlinear systems,” Automatica, vol. 36,
no. 11, pp. 1627–1638, 2000.
[34] T. Kato, Perturbation Theory for Linear Operators, vol. 132,
Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
[35] W. G. Stewart,Matrix Perturbation Theory, 1990.
[36] https://zh.scribd.com/document/375467984/Trump-China-
trade-targets#from embed.
[37] https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2018/04/04/
full-list-us-products-china-planning-hittariffs/485071002/.
Research Article
Analyzing Policymaking for Tuberculosis Control in Nigeria
Nura M. R. Ahmad ,1,2 Cristina Montañola-Sales ,2,3 Clara Prats ,1 MustaphaMusa,4
Daniel López ,1 and Josep Casanovas-Garcia 1,2
1Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
2Barcelona Supercomputing Center (BSC), Barcelona, Spain
3IQS Barcelona, Ramon Llull University, Barcelona, Spain
4Gombe State Primary Health Care Development Agency, Gombe, Nigeria
Correspondence should be addressed to Cristina Montan˜ola-Sales; cristina.montanola@iqs.edu
Received 18 May 2018; Revised 25 September 2018; Accepted 11 October 2018; Published 7 November 2018
Guest Editor: Bernardo A. Furtado
Copyright © 2018 Nura M. R. Ahmad et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
Today, tuberculosis (TB) is still one of the major threats to humankind, being the first cause of death by an infectious disease
worldwide. TB is a communicable chronic disease that every year affects 10 million people and kills almost 2 million people
in the world. The main key factors fueling the disease are the progressive urbanization of the population and poverty-related
socioeconomic factors.Moreover, the lack of effective tools for TB diagnosis, prevention, and treatment has decisively contributed to
the lack of an effective model to predict TB spread. In Nigeria, the rapid urbanization along with unprecedented population growth
is causing TB to be endemic. This paper proposes a mathematical model to evaluate TB burden in Nigeria by using data obtained
from the local TB control program in the community. This research aims to point out effective strategies that could be used to
effectively reduce TB burden and death due to TB in this country at different levels.The study shows that efforts should be oriented
to more active case finding rather than increasing the treatment effectiveness only. It also reveals that the persistence of the disease
is related to a large number of latently infected individuals and quantifies the lives that could be saved by increasing the notification
rate using active case finding strategy.We conclude that undiagnosis is the bottleneck that needs to be overcome in addition to the
incorporation, improvement, and/or strengthening of treatment management and other essential TB control measures in Nigeria.
1. Introduction
Tuberculosis (TB) is the most challenging infectious disease
that humankind faces. It is estimated that in the last 200 years
TB has killed one billion (1.000.000.000) people [1]. Cur-
rently, TB is still among the main worldwide causes of death
by an infectious disease [2]. In 2017, there were 10.4 million
new TB cases and 1.7 million related deaths worldwide [3]. It
is a very silent disease that has eludedmankind for a very long
time. It affects people of all social statuses, although most TB
cases occur in resource-limited countries.
TB is caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb). This
bacillus is transmitted by the inhalation of infected aerosols
generated by active TB patients. The inhalation of the bacilli
will usually lead to the trigger of an immune response that can
have one of the three different clinical outcomes: (1) complete
clearance of the pathogen, (2) latent TB infection (LTBI),
or (3) progression to primary active disease [4, 5]. LTBI
occurs when the host’s immune response manages the initial
containment of the Mtb by developing and encapsulating
granulomas. More often than not, the bacilli remain phys-
ically contained and immunologically constrained by these
encapsulated granulomas throughout the lifetimes of the
hosts [6, 7]. During this process, an endogenous reinfection
can produce new infection spotlights that will presumably
undergo the same control dynamics [4]. However, even
decades after infection especially in the case of immunocom-
promised hosts (like HIV patients), the control process can
fail and the host can develop an active disease. On average,
about 10% of the LTBI people develop active TB during their
lives [8]. A latent infected host can be reinfected several
times, thereby increasing the load of Mtb in its body and
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hence increasing the chance of progressing to active disease.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), there
were an estimated number of 2 to 3 billion people with LTBI
in 2015 [9], thus at risk of developing an active disease.
Overcrowding and time in contact with patients are key
factors of TB infection. Paradoxically, TB is often seen as a
XIX century disease, mainly associated with the poor living
conditions of workers in crowded cities. Today, TB is reaching
the highest number of cases in absolute numbers in the
history [9] precisely because of the massive urbanization
of populations. This fact is especially painful in Nigeria, a
country that is undergoing rapid urbanization with a rapidly
growing population. At the current growth rate of about 2.8%
to 3.5% a year, it is estimated that Nigeria’s urban population
will double in the next two decades [10]. As a consequence,
TB is endemic in Nigeria. The control of the disease is
coordinated by theNational Tuberculosis and Leprosy Control
Program (NTBLCP), in line with the End TB Partnership
initiatives whose ultimate target is to eliminate TB as a public
health problem by the year 2050 (meaning reaching less than
1 case per million-person population) [11]. Despite current
global control efforts to reduce TB, Nigeria’s TB incidence is
refusing to show any significant decline [9]. On March 14th,
2017, a wide circulated paper announced that Nigeria ranks
4th in TB infection worldwide [12]. This was followed by
the press release by the NTBLCP national coordinator. The
statistics show that over 80% of TB cases in Nigeria are still
undetected while the disease has been claiming millions of
lives over the years in the country [9, 13].
Many studies show that more intensified case finding is
needed especially in areas with higher prevalence of TB [14–
16]. For instance, Brewer et al. [17] indicated that active case
finding of TB in homeless individuals in the USA is the most
effective strategy that leads to a decrease in the death of theTB
patients. Moreover, a study by Dodd et al. [18] indicates that
policymakers need to alternate between active case finding
and passive case detection strategy from period to period
in order to have effective TB control. This paper aims to
use mathematical modeling in order to evaluate the effect of
an increase in diagnosis rate and treatment success on TB
dynamics in Nigeria.
Assessing TB Policymaking: Mathematical Models for TB
Transmission. Several mathematical models have been used
to estimate long-term dynamics of TB to help to assess the
development of strategies to control it. The literature on
compartment models to describe complex systems is exten-
sive [19–21]. Following a top-down approach, the population
is divided into different compartments (e.g., susceptible,
exposed, infected, and recovered in the case of an SEIR
model) and specific fluxes are set between these compart-
ments. The dynamics of the disease is therefore defined with
ordinary nonlinear differential equations through rigorous
mathematical analysis [22].
Many different studies have been able to draw important
conclusions on TB dynamics by means of models and
other methods [23–33]. Okuonghae and Ikhimwin [16], for
example, developed a model which classified the population
by their TB awareness level, a key factorwhich could affect the
case detection rate. Another factor which could contribute
to better adjust TB models is the HIV dynamics, especially
in the sub-Saharan African region [34]. HIV patients have a
higher risk of becoming infected and also of progressing to
active disease once infected than non-HIV infected people.
According toWHO [35], nearly all HIV-positive people with
active TB will die.
By means of mathematical models, Wallis [36] was able
to identify individuals with an innate resistance to Mtb. He
concluded that understanding the mechanisms of resistance
may lead to therapeutic strategies to counter immune evasion
by Mtb. Moreover, models were also used by Wallis [36]
to assess the affinity of LTBI reactivation when patients
are administered with drugs with TNF blockers. Similarly,
another research project by Moualeu-Ngangue et al. [37]
worked with a model simulating the global TB dynamics.
The study showed that TB spreading crucially depends on
the basic reproduction number (number of new cases one
case generates during its sick period, which is estimated to
be between 10 and 15 [36, 38]). The research was done in
Cameroon where the roles of TB diagnosis, treatment, TB
awareness level, and traditional medicine in the dynamics
of TB were assessed. Song et al. [39] investigated the epi-
demiological time scales of TB and they evaluated the risk
of infection from both close contacts (clusters) and casual
contacts (random). They concluded that the risk of infection
depends on the source of infection as well as on different
environmental characteristics.
Lastly, Guzzeta et al. [40] presented three different
ways to model TB dynamics: (1) an ODE model with no
age structure and constant population size, (2) an age-
structured, stochastic version of the ODE model, and (3) a
sociodemographic Individual-Based Model (IBM). An IBM
is a model formed by autonomous agents which interact
among them, including their environment, to follow their
objectives. The models were fitted to epidemiological data
from Arkansas, USA. The authors concluded that different
modeling techniques have their advantages and drawbacks
and they should be chosen carefully. For example, an ODE
model is best suited to describe the evolution of prevalence,
incidence, and mortality. On the other hand, an IBM would
be best to estimate the fraction of reactivated cases or to fit
age-specific incidence of active TB.
Although there aremany studies into TB epidemic, cause,
spread, and suggestive measures for therapy and control,
none of the aforementioned studies uses a mathematical
model to evaluate the actual epidemic of TB in Nigeria using
data obtained from the local TB control program in the
community. This paper proposes a mathematical model that
will be used to evaluate TB burden in this country. We aim to
point out effective strategies that could be used to effectively
reduce TB burden and death due to TB in Nigeria.
Specifically, we present a mathematical model that aims
to investigate if more TB active case finding is needed
in Nigeria, in order to help policymakers to make sound
decisions in implementing effective TB control measures in
the country. Section 2 shows the developedmethodology and
explains the proposed model. Sections 3 and 4 present and
discuss the results obtained as well as their limitations and
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other possibilities for further research. Finally, the last section
highlights the main conclusions drawn from this study.
2. Materials and Methods
Our goal is to develop a close-enough-to-reality mathemati-
cal model of the TB epidemic that can allow us to investigate
effects of demographics and notification of TB epidemics in a
population of Nigeria, as well as to estimate the actual burden
of the disease including death toll and case fertility ratio in
some of the regions in the country.
2.1. Model Description. Figure 1 represents the model dia-
gram, which we briefly outline. Birth occurs at a constant
rate Π into the susceptible class S with the assumption that
all newborns are susceptible toMtb.𝐸1, 𝐸2, . . . , 𝐸7, 𝐸>7 repre-
sent the noninfectious population infected with tuberculosis
without any clinical symptoms (LTBI) in their various years
of infection; i.e., an individual who was infected recently
(less than one year ago) will be assigned to 𝐸1, while an
individual whowas infected last yearwould be assigned to the𝐸2 population. The last LTBI compartment, 𝐸>7, consists of
the whole latently infected population with more than 7 years
of infection. 𝐼1 and 𝐼2 represent the population that is sick; i.e.,
they have an active disease with clinical symptoms and they
can infect the general population;𝑇 is the sick population that
was diagnosed and is receiving effective chemoprophylaxis,
thus unable to infect anyone. As shown in the diagram, only
people in the 𝐼2 compartment will be diagnosed and will
move towards the 𝑇 compartment, while the 𝐼1 compartment
accounts for the missed TB cases. Death rates in the model
depend on disease status; they are fixed into 𝜇𝑆 for susceptible
population, ]1 for exposed classes, and 𝜇𝐼1 , 𝜇𝐼2 , and 𝜇𝑇 for
sick individuals of 𝐼1, 𝐼2, and 𝑇, respectively. Based on the
disparate time scale of natural death versus death due to TB
disease, we assume that 𝜇𝑆 ≤ ]1 ≤ 𝜇𝑇 ≤ 𝜇𝐼2 ≤ 𝜇𝐼1 .
Transmission of Mtb TB occurs following adequate
contact between the sick infectious individuals (𝐼1 and 𝐼2)
and the susceptible population. We assume that the latently
infected (𝐸𝑖) are not infectious and thus not capable of
transmitting the bacteria. We use the incidence expression𝛼(𝜃𝐼1 + 𝐼2)/𝑁 to indicate successful transmission ofMtb due
to nonlinear contact dynamics in a large population [41]. 𝛼
is the transmission rate that represents possible interactions
that may occur among the susceptible population and the
sick infectious population, which is defined as the average
contact per unit time. Infectivity of 𝐼1 is assumed to be
lower (0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1), as the undiagnosed long-term sick
individuals probably reduce their activity due to their poor
health conditions.
Newly infected individuals progress directly to the
infected class𝐸1 and stay there for a period of one year, where
the probability of developing active disease is 𝑝1. If they do
not become sick, they progress to 𝐸2 (at a per capita rate𝑘1) the subsequent year, where the probability of developing
the active disease is 𝑝2. The progression through the latently
infected compartment will continue yearly at a constant per
capita rate 𝑘1. Finally, all latently infected patients with more
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Figure 1:Themodel: a compartment model for tuberculosis transmis-
sion in Nigeria. The model shows the dynamic flow of tuberculosis
(TB) including susceptible population 𝑆; the latently infected pop-
ulation are discerned based on the time since they were infected;
therefore 𝐸1 stands for people latently infected for a period of one
year, 𝐸2 stands for people infected for 2 years, etc.; 𝐸>7 stands for
people that have been infected for more than 7 years; two types of
the nondiagnosed sick population are considered, 𝐼1 and 𝐼2, and the
sick under treatment is shown as 𝑇. Birth occurs at constant rateΠ. Transmission of Mtb depends on 𝛼(𝜃𝐼1 + 𝐼2)/𝑁 and probability
leading to active TB is given as 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖2+𝑏𝑖+𝑐, where 𝑖 is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ year
of infection. 𝑘1 indicate succession from one infected compartment
to the next. A fraction of the sick, 𝛽, will be detected and notified;𝑘2 is related to diagnosis time delay before starting treatment and 𝛾
indicates a fraction of relapse for the sick under treatment. Recovery
rate is given as 𝑘3 while 𝑘4 represents the fraction of the infected
population that gets rid of the disease spontaneously. We account
for all courses of death, 𝜇𝑠, ]𝑖, 𝜇𝐼2 , and 𝜇𝑇, and death due to active
TB, 𝜇𝐼1 .
than seven years of infection will remain in the compartment𝐸>7 for a very long period of time, where the probability of
becoming sick (𝑝8) is very low and later would be integrated
back into the susceptible society at a constant per capita rate
of 𝑘4.
The probability of developing an active disease decreases
across the latently infected compartment, 𝑝𝑖, which is
assumed to be an autonomous decreasing quadratic function,
given as 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖2 + 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐, where 𝑖 is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ year of
infection. The sum (∑𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖) represents the 10–13% of the
latently infected population that will become sick in seven
years or more, and 𝑝1𝐸1 + 𝑝2𝐸2 is about 5-6% of the latently
infected population that will become sick in the first two years
of infection.
We define 𝑇 as the fraction of the sick infectious popula-
tion that were notified and are receiving effective chemopro-
phylaxis, 𝑘2 as the rate of effective per capita notification, and𝑘3 as the per capita rate of successful therapy completion. We
assume that starting a treatment removes an individual from
infectious class 𝐼2 and places them into 𝑇. We also assume
that individuals receiving chemoprophylaxis can abandon
therapy, thus showing a relapse at a per capita rate 𝛾.
4 Complexity
2.1.1. Model Formulation. We used a system of nonlinear
differential equations to model the dynamics of individuals
within the population settings. Setting 𝑁(𝑡) = 𝑆(𝑡) + 𝐸1(𝑡)
+ 𝐸2(𝑡) + 𝐸3(𝑡) + 𝐸4(𝑡) + 𝐸5(𝑡) + 𝐸6(𝑡) + 𝐸7(𝑡) + 𝐸>7(𝑡) +𝐼1(𝑡) + 𝐼2(𝑡) + 𝑇(𝑡) and suppressing time dependence, 𝑡, for
each variable,𝑁(𝑡) represent the total population size at time𝑡. The twelve model equations are
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡 = Π + 𝑘4𝐸>7 + 𝑘3𝑇 − (
𝛼 (𝜃𝐼1 + 𝐼2)𝑁 + 𝜇𝑠) 𝑆, (1)
𝑑𝐸1𝑑𝑡 = (
𝛼 (𝜃𝐼1 + 𝐼2)𝑁 )𝑆 − (]1 + 𝑘1) 𝐸1 + 𝑝1𝐸1, (2)
𝑑𝐸2𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘1𝐸1 − (]1 + 𝑘1) 𝐸2 + 𝑝2𝐸2, (3)
𝑑𝐸3𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘1𝐸2 − (]1 + 𝑘1) 𝐸3 + 𝑝3𝐸3, (4)
𝑑𝐸4𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘1𝐸3 − (]1 + 𝑘1) 𝐸4 + 𝑝4𝐸4, (5)
𝑑𝐸5𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘1𝐸4 − (]1 + 𝑘1) 𝐸5 + 𝑝5𝐸5, (6)
𝑑𝐸6𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘1𝐸5 − (]1 + 𝑘1) 𝐸6 + 𝑝6𝐸6, (7)
𝑑𝐸7𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘1𝐸6 − (]1 + 𝑘1) 𝐸7 + 𝑝7𝐸7, (8)
𝑑𝐸>7𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘1𝐸7 − (]1 + 𝑘1) 𝐸>7 + 𝑝8𝐸>7, (9)
𝑑𝐼1𝑑𝑡 = ∑(1 − 𝛽) (𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖) + (1 − 𝛽) 𝑝8𝐸>7 − 𝜇𝐼1𝐼1,
𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 . . . , 7.
(10)
𝑑𝐼2𝑑𝑡 = ∑𝛽 (𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖) + 𝛽𝑝8𝐸>7 + 𝛾𝑇 − (𝜇𝐼2 + 𝑘2) 𝐼2,
𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 . . . , 7.
(11)
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘2𝐼2 − (𝛾 + 𝑘3 + 𝜇𝑇) 𝑇. (12)
Equation (1) describes the rate of change of the susceptible
population 𝑆. There is a gain into this population through
constant birth rate Π. A loss in this population occurs as a
result of infection with Mtb with transmission rate 𝛼(𝜃𝐼1 +𝐼2)𝑆/𝑁 and constant death rate 𝜇s. Equations (2) through (9)
represent the rate of change of the latently infected population
over time. The rate of change of 𝐸1 increases as a result of
Mtb infection that results in latent infection at a rate 𝛼(𝜃𝐼1 +𝐼2)𝑆/𝑁 and decreases by developing active TB at a rate 𝑝1𝐸1,
natural death ]1, and movement to the second year of latent
infection class at a rate 𝑘1𝐸1. 𝐸2(𝑡), 𝐸3(𝑡), . . . , 𝐸>7(𝑡) increase
by successive movement of latently infected individuals from
one class to the next and decrease by progressive movement
to the next infected class, natural death ]1, and developing of
active TB at the rate 𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖 in each 𝑖𝑡ℎ latently infected class.
A fraction (1 − 𝛽) of the Mtb infection which progress to
active TB and were undetected decrease by death due to TB
and other causes at the rate 𝜇𝐼1, and the detected fraction are
increased by relapse at a rate 𝛾𝑇 and decrease by diagnosis
at a rate 𝑘2𝐼2 and by death at a rate 𝜇𝐼2. The rate of change
of sick individuals under treatment is increased at a rate 𝑘2𝐼2
and reduced at a rate 𝛾𝑇, recovery rate 𝑘3𝑇, and natural death
at the rate 𝜇𝑇.
2.1.2. Model Calibration and Validation. In order to deter-
mine the effects of various parameters on the dynamics of TB
inNigeria, (1) to (12) are integrated by a Runge–Kutta method
of order 4, using Matlab software (Ode45). We started by
fitting ourmodel to the 2000–2010 prevalence data onNigeria
from the official WHO reports and Nigerian epidemiological
fact sheets [42]. The reason why this period was chosen
is because of reliability of available data together with the
fact that all parameters can be approximately considered
constant for that period, which would not be applicable
if the period was longer. We used the least squares curve
fitting in Matlab, by specifying the lower and upper bounds
of specific parameters to be estimated. The recruitment
rate of the susceptible was chosen and calculated such that
the population of the country remains constant during the
simulation. The treatment efficacy (1 − 𝛾) is considered to be
80% with probability of relapse taken as 20%. The parameter
values that gave the best fit are given in Table 1 and were
obtained with 𝑅2 = 0.9992.
The initial conditions were chosen in accord with avail-
able data when possible (i.e., for the total population, esti-
mates of global LTBI population, the population in sick
compartments, and the ratio 𝐼1/𝐼2). The distribution of LTBI
among time-since-infection compartments was also fitted
in this process. We finally obtained these initial conditions
(considering a population of 100,000):
(𝑆 (0) , 𝐸1 (0) , 𝐸2 (0) , 𝐸3 (0) , 𝐸4 (0) , 𝐸5 (0) , 𝐸6 (0) , 𝐸7 (0) , 𝐸>7 (0) , 𝐼1 (0) , 𝐼2 (0) , 𝑇 (0))
= (58303, 6100, 5000, 4438, 4020, 3550, 3140, 2860, 12250, 284, 55, 0) . (13)
This corresponds to initial prevalence of 339 and a notifi-
cation rate of 16%. Figure 2 shows the epidemiological data
together with the best fit of the model.
As a validation of the previous calibration, we took data
from a wider period (1990–2015) and confronted it with the
model. Keeping all the parameters constant but with a small
change in the force of infection value, as well as in the initial
conditions, the new𝑅2 was 0.9706.Therefore, we assumed the
calibration for the 2000–2010 period to be the baseline for our
subsequent virtual experiments.
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Table 1: Summary description of parameters of the model fitted to Nigeria data (2000-2015).
Parameter Parameter description Values (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ−1) Source
Π Birth rate in S class Constant NA
𝜇𝑠 Death rate in S 0.012 calibrated𝜇𝑖1 Death rate in 𝐼1 0.146 calibrated𝜇𝑖2 Death rate in 𝐼2 0.146 calibrated𝜇𝑇 Death rate in 𝑇 0.01 calibrated
]1 Death rate in LTBI 0.0108 calibrated𝛼 Contact rate of sick population 3.54 calibrated
𝑘1 Movement rate in LTBI population 112 calibrated𝑝𝑖 Probability of developing active TB 𝑎𝑖2 + 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐 derived𝛽 Notification rate 0.16 [35]
𝜃 Reduced probability for sick individuals in 𝐼1 0.78 calibrated
𝑘3 Recovery rate 16 [35]
𝑘4 Inverse TB clearance rate 1120 calibrated𝛾 Relapse rate 0.20 [35]
]8 Death rate in 𝐸>7 0.008 calibrated
𝑘2 Inverse of diagnosis delay time 13 [11]𝑎 Probability component for active TB 0.001035 calibrated
𝑏 Probability component for active TB -0.0152 calibrated
𝑐 Probability component for active TB 0.06 calibrated
(1 − 𝛾) Effective TB treatment rate 0.80 [35]
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Figure 2:Model simulation calibrated against tuberculosis prevalence
data in Nigeria: The figure shows the tuberculosis prevalence curve
of the model, calibrated with 2000–2010 data, compared with the
data estimates from WHO in that period. The model prevalence
curve is obtained by solving (1) to (12), using the initial conditions
in (13) and parameter values in Table 1.The goodness-of-fit measure(𝑅2) for simulation trajectories was evaluated and found to be
0.9992.
2.2. Facts and Hypotheses. For the purpose of this paper, we
assume a constant birth rate Π. All newborns into the model
susceptible class are uninfected, and TB/HIV coinfection is
not explicitly modeled.These assumptions are simplifications
that are not relevant to the current purpose, which is the
identification of significant damage caused by poor case
detection in the TB control program. They will be modified
in a subsequent study in order to account for the effects
of changes in the birth rate over time and to evaluate the
significance of TB/HIV coinfection.
We propose to use the model in the exploration of dif-
ferent situations in Nigeria as a virtual experiments platform.
The situations evaluated have been selected to start working
on four wide hypotheses, although the final confirmation
of all of them would require further research including on-
field projects and incorporating experts from other involved
disciplines. The four starting hypotheses are the following:
(1) TB prevalence still remains a major health challenge
in Nigeria due to poor case detection
(2) Increase in effective treatment may not necessarily
cause a significant decrease in the prevalence of TB in
the country if active case finding is not implemented.
In other words, increasing the notification rate is
necessary for decreasing TB transmission in Nigeria
(3) The persistence and nondecreasing dynamics of TB in
Nigeria are also related to a large number of latently
infected individuals
(4) Poor notification rate has resulted in a large number
(hundreds of thousands) of deaths of TB patients
3. Results
Numerical simulations of the model allowed us to estimate
some important parameters associated with TB in Nigeria.
In addition, we were able to observe and quantify the effect
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of the infected population on the prevalence of TB in the
country. They also allowed us to make a distinct connection
between the notification parameter and the death toll on
the sick population (infectious) population, the relationship
between the death and the prevalence of the disease in the
country. To illustrate these effects, we divide this section
into 3 subsections. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were used to explain
the case detection and how effective treatment affects TB
dynamics in Nigeria; we made a prediction of new TB cases
and provide an alternative strategy for TB control.Hypothesis
3 was used to explain the relationship between LTBI and the
dynamics of TB prevalence. Finally, by means of Hypothesis
4 we quantified the death due to TB and estimate the death
toll due to TB for the next decade in Nigeria, and we also
estimate lives that could be saved with the alternative strategy
proposed.
3.1. Hypotheses 1 and 2: Case Detection and Effective Treat-
ment. The model was successfully fitted into WHO data
of TB prevalence in Nigeria. Then, we compared the fitted
tendency with predictions regarding an increase in notifica-
tion parameter. The parameter values obtained after fitting
the model into data of Nigeria are briefly summarized and
discussed in Table 1. As shown in Figure 2, the obtained
baseline simulation represents the epidemic TB situation
in Nigeria successfully. Values for many parameters were
determined from vital statistics: TB data from NTBLCP
in Gombe State, official TB data from the World Health
Organization (WHO), and other recent literaturesmentioned
in Table 1. When the values could not be estimated from data
or literature, as in the case of the parameters associated with
the contact rate, they were obtained with the model’s fitting
into epidemiological data (𝑅2 = 0.9992).
Recall,WHOestimates that about 30%of theworld popu-
lation is infectedwith LTBI [43].However, themodel revealed
that about 34–37%(depending on the choice of contact rate
for the sick population and some other parameters that where
calibrated) of Nigeria’s population is latently infected with
TB.This population is distributed across the various infected
classes ranging from 𝐸1 to 𝐸>7, and the time since infection
in this population was also fitted.
We then used our model to investigate how the noti-
fication of new TB cases affects the dynamics of TB in
Nigeria. We tested the hypothesis that the nonimprovement
in notification observed in the situation of Nigeria may
partially explain why the prevalence of TB in this country
is very persistent and not declining as compared to others,
showing an incidence rate between 400 and 500/100,000
(more than 130 times the incidence rate in the USA) [44–
46]. The notification rate of TB in Nigeria is about 16% [35].
Therefore, initial conditions for new TB cases were calculated
by assigning 16% of new cases to 𝐼2 (i.e., the compartment that
gathers the sick population that goes to hospital and receives
care at some point), and 84% were assigned to 𝐼1 (i.e., the
population that remain sick throughout their life cycle until
death).
Figure 3 shows the fitting of themodel into the prevalence
of TB in Nigeria, namely, baseline, together with some
Figure 3: Hypothesis 1: baseline simulation and effect of the notifica-
tion rate. Model fitted to the prevalence of tuberculosis in Nigeria.
The blue star represents the epidemiological data of tuberculosis
prevalencewhile the red line-circle represents themodel simulation.
The fitting was done with 16% of the sick population being notified.
The experiment was repeated with 20% (yellow curve), 25% (green
curve), 30% (black curve), 60% (magenta curve), and 85% (cyan
curve) notification, respectively.
simulations where an increase in the notification rate was
explored. The mean prevalence for the epidemiological data
is 330.64 with a standard deviation of 6.7, while the mean for
the model is 330.39with a standard deviation of 6.6 and an𝑅2
coefficient of 0.9992 (Table 2). The model is pretty consistent
with the epidemiological data.Themean resultant prevalence
for each simulated notification rate is recorded in Table 2 as
well. These results show a clear decrease in the prevalence of
TB when the notification of the new TB cases increases.
In the baseline simulation, the model predicted 62,000
deaths due to TB in the year 1990, 72,000 deaths in the year
1995, and 118,000 in the year 2014.These results are within the
range of annual TB deaths estimated by WHO [35]. Figure 4
shows the predicted decline in prevalence after 10 years for
each of the notification rates tested. In fact, a simply 10%
relative increase in case notification of people with active TB
reduces the TB prevalence by 15% when compared with the
current situation. Predicted TB deaths also would decline by
more than 15% when compared with the baseline simulation
that fitted the epidemiological data.
A new simulation series was designed in order to explore
the effect of an improvement of effective treatment, i.e., a
decrease in 𝛾. The results showed that a 10% improvement of
effective treatment among active TB individuals produces a
decline of only 5% in the prevalence of TB and related deaths
compared with the baseline fitting, as shown in Figure 5(a).
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Table 2: Summary of the mean prevalence of data and model simulations, as well as 𝑅2 of the fitting.
Case detection rate Mean prevalence Standard deviation References
Epidemiological data 330.64 6.7 [35]
Model 16%Notification 330.40 6.8, 𝑅2 = 0.9992 Model
Model 20%Notification 311 NA Model
Model 25%Notification 288 NA Model
Model 30%Notification 266 NA Model
Model 60%Notification 156 NA Model
Model 85%Notification 105 NA Model
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Figure 4: Hypothesis 1: evolution of tuberculosis prevalence in
Nigeria after 10 years of simulation with different notification rate.
Each point on the curve shows the prevalence of tuberculosis in
Nigeria when simulated with the corresponding notification value
on the x-axis for 10 years.
Given these results, the most effective intervention for reduc-
ing future TB cases and related deaths in Nigeria as predicted
by the model is active case finding.
A final virtual experiment was designed in order to ex-
plore the effect of an improvement of effective treatment in
a context with a high case detection rate. In this simulation
series, the detection rate was fixed at 80% and different
treatment success rates were explored. The results showed
that, in this case, the improvement in treatment effective-
ness would provide a significant decrease in TB prevalence
(Figure 5(b)). With a notification rate of 80%, the increase
in effective treatment by 10% will lead to a decline in
the prevalence of 23% and associated deaths by almost
30%. In the case of a poor case detection rate, increase
in 10% of effective treatment is associated with only 5%
decrease in prevalence and related deaths. Therefore, an
increase in the treatment effectiveness is only relevant if it
is combined with active case finding or in a scenario where
the notification rate is significantly high. Nevertheless, with
the growing problem multidrug-resistant TB, investment in
treatment becomes more relevant and needs to be main-
tained.
3.1.1. TB Prediction in Nigeria. Looking at the current TB
situation in Nigeria, one can wonder what the situation will
be if all parameters are left unchanged especially in terms of
passive case finding.We envisioned this scenario andwith the
help of the baseline simulation results, the following results
are presented. Figure 6(a) shows the predicted evolution
of TB when the notification rate is gradually increased,
while Figure 6(b) shows the effect of a sudden increase in
this parameter. The simulation starts with the baseline that
represents the current situation (16% notification, red-dashed
line). Keeping the notification at this ratewithout any changes
may keep the prevalence of TB in the country between 350
and 320/100,000 even after 40 years from the present day.
This is precisely the present situation of TB in Nigeria, where
there have not been any significant changes or decline in TB
prevalence for the past 25 years (323/100,000 in 1990 and
332/100,000 in 2015 [35]). Increasing the notification rate up
to 20% in 10 years could keep the prevalence between 300
and 290/100,000 people. If no more effort is made to increase
the notification further, the prevalence would remain in
this range even after a period of 50 years. Increasing the
notification further to 25% in another 10 years would reduce
the prevalence to between 290 and 260/100,000 people, and a
further increase in notification to 30% would bring down the
prevalence to between 220 and 240/100,000.We repeated the
experiment with a sudden increase in the notification from
16% to 30% as seen in Figure 6(b) when the prevalence would
remain in the range of 270/100,000 to 280/100,000.
For a successful and reasonable decline in TB cases in
Nigeria to be achieved, case finding needs to be active and
increased from period of time to time. Although a 30%
notification rate is viable, a real TB prevalence decrease
in Nigeria can only be achieved with a notification rate
around 80%. Both strategies presented in Figures 3 and 6
produce the same results in the long run in terms of TB
prevalence decline. However, in terms of public health, a
progressive decreasing strategy would be more feasible due
to the economic resources that need to be allocated by health
authorities. In contrast, increasing the notification rate by
a large percentage could be very ambitious and resource
demanding. At this junction, the most important point is to
be able to make interventions as soon as possible given the
long time required to actually see changes in TB prevalence.
3.2. Hypothesis 3: Latently Infected Population. Although it
is known that latently infected individuals are connected
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Figure 5: Hypothesis 2: effective treatment in the population with good surveillance and poor surveillance. (a) The figure depicts a relative
increase in effective treatment from 80%, 85%, and 90% to 95% in a population with poor case detection, where the notification rate is only
16%. (b) The figure shows a significant decrease in prevalence due to increase in effective treatment from 80%, 85%, and 90% to 95%, in a
population with very good case detection, where the notification rate is 80%.
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Figure 6:Hypothesis 1: effective strategies in a gradual increase in tuberculosis notification in the case of poor tuberculosis surveillance. (a) Result
of the prediction made by the model when the notification of new tuberculosis cases is gradually increased. The red curve shows the poor
notification rate situation, which represents the present situation of tuberculosis in Nigeria (the blue stars). The rest of the curves represent a
change in case detection and increasing in the notification of new cases by some percentages over a period of time. (b) Result of the prediction
made when the notification of new tuberculosis cases is suddenly increased.
with the incidence of TB, it is not completely clear how this
connection can influence the dynamics of the disease in
a population. Our first hypothesis implied that poor case
detection leads to a higher number of unnotified TB cases,
which leads to a high number of latently infected individuals
that are at risk of developing active TB, thus resulting in
persistent high TB prevalence. Our model was also used as
a virtual experimental device to test the effect of the latently
infected population in Nigeria, which can provide significant
information that can be very difficult or impossible to guess
otherwise. We are going to show why the prevalence of TB
in Nigeria is substantially high and nondecreasing for a very
long period of time.
We explored the effect of increasing the notification rate
or the treatment success on the LTBI population (Figure 7).
Figure 7(a) shows the result of various simulations of
the latently infected population carried out with different
notification parameters. The latently infected population
consistently declines with each increase in notification rate.
This result explains why a population with a poor case
detection program can fail to achieve significant progress
in reducing new TB cases, because the latently infected
population remains the same for a very long period of time
due to what is called the replacement principle, where each
sick TB patient produces at least one sick patient before death
or progress to receiving treatment (the number of new cases
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Figure 7: Hypothesis 3: changes in latent tuberculosis with respect to an increase in notification rate or in effective treatment. (a) Simulated
dynamics of the latently infected population (LTBI) with different notification levels, with all other parameters kept constant in the population
of Nigeria. The red curve shows the LTBI population that remained constant for more than 20 years, thereby producing new sick people
constantly. With an increase in notification up to 30%, the pool of the LTBI starts decreasing (blue curve), and a further increase in
notification shows a much higher decrease in the pool of LTBI (black curve, 85% notification rate). (b) Simulation of the LTBI population
with improvement in effective treatment, with all other parameters kept constant in the population of Nigeria. There is little or no change in
the number of LTBI cases before and after increasing the effective treatment.
that receive treatment is very low). This type of situation
guaranteed the consistent production of newer TB cases if
active case finding is not implemented.
The increase in notification rate affects not only the active
new TB cases but also the latently infected population. A 10%
increase in notification was associated with a 38% decline in
latent infectedTB (Figures 7(a) and 8), while a 10% increase in
effective treatment showed only a 2.9% decline in the latently
infected population (Figure 7(b)).
3.3. Hypothesis 4: Poor Notification and Mortality in Sick Pop-
ulation. Wefinally tested the hypothesis that low notification
rate has resulted in massive deaths in the sick population.
This phenomenon might be a mystery in Nigeria as not every
death is reported to the authorities. Only the deaths that
occur in a notified case of TB are recorded as a death due to
this disease. As the notification rate of TB in Nigeria is just
16%, one can wonder how many death cases due to TB went
unnoticed. As mentioned earlier, we used the notification of
16% to fit the data to the model.
Figure 9 shows the estimated TB-related mortality per a
hundred thousand individuals in the population of Nigeria
obtained from the model. The present-day mortality rate in
Nigeria is shown by the red curve, which shows that mortality
due to TB in Nigeria is between 70 and 65 individuals per
100,000 individuals. This result is very consistent with the
report from WHO [35]. The model shows that an increase
in the notification by 10% would lead to the decrease in
mortality by 20%. Actually, we see from Figure 9 that if
the notification is increased from 16% to 25%, the mortality
declines to less than 60/100,000 individuals, which implies
hundreds of thousands of lives that would be saved. In
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Figure 8: Hypothesis 3: latently infected population after 10 years
of simulation of the model with different notification levels. Each
point of the curve represents the corresponding population of the
latently infected compartments, when the model is simulated with
the corresponding notification rate on the x-axis.
order to better understand these dynamics, we estimated the
mortality rate in Nigeria after 10 years of simulation with
the model by using different notification parameters, starting
from the current situation in Nigeria (notification rate of
16%). The result of this experiment is shown in Figure 10.
The expected cumulative number of deaths due to TB
with the 16% notification after 10 years of simulation is
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Figure 9: Hypothesis 4: The figure shows the decrease in mortality
due to tuberculosis in the sick population for a period of 10 years
with different notification levels. The red curve represents the
current mortality due to tuberculosis in Nigeria (baseline), and the
rest of the curves show what the situation would look like if the
notification were to be different.
4,748,971. An increase in notification to a rate of 20% could
save up to 292,244 lives within this period. If the notification
rate was increased to 25%, up to 584,489 lives could be saved
within this period.
Although the estimated TB prevalence in Nigeria from
1990 to the year 2016 remains the same, the estimated number
of new cases increases annually. These are attributed to the
increase in the population of the country, but, at the same
time, it shows a massive increase in the number of deaths
due to TB in the population as estimated by the model. The
estimated new TB cases rise from 310,000 in 1990 to more
than 600,000 in 2015, and the estimated number of TB-related
deaths by the model rises from 62,000 in 1990 to more than
120,000 in 2015. If the population ofNigeria continues to grow
at the rate of 3.2% annually [47] and the case finding remains
passive at 16% notification, then TB-related deaths will reach
up to 3,456,640 in the year 2030; this is twice the current
number of deaths due to TB in the world reported by WHO
in 2017 [3]. Depending on availability of funds, political
willingness to implement active case finding in Nigeria, and
the strategy implemented, millions of lives could be saved
from 2018 to 2030. Globally, the model predicted a total
death number of 11,872,530 individuals from 2017 to 2030.
An increase in case detection by 15% within this period could
save up to 2,557,160 lives and would reduce the incidence by
more than 30%.
4. Discussion
Epidemiological data from Nigeria shows that the TB situa-
tion in this country is very persistent over time, in spite of
the efforts made by all the stakeholders battling the disease.
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Figure 10:Hypothesis 4: the result of 10-year simulation of themodel
using different notification rates. Each point on the curve represents
the mortality in the sick population after the model is simulated for
10 years with the corresponding notification rate on the x-axis.
While TB prevalence in Nigeria in 1990was 323/100,000 indi-
viduals, today it is around the same number (330/100,000)
according to WHO. The same situation is observed in the
number of deaths due to the disease (70/100,000 today
compared to 65/100,000 in 1990). The reason for this steady
state of the TB epidemic in the country is still unclear. Many
associate it with poverty and population growth. Nigeria
recently overtook India as the world’s poverty capital [48]
with about 87 million people in abject poverty [48]. Its
unprecedented demographic growth (from 95,62 million
people in 1990 to 206,20 in 2018) is mainly due to a very high
fertility rate (5.526 according to the World Bank in 2016).
Others presume that there is a need for a better strategy in
order to fight the disease towards a significant decline in the
near future [11].
Nigeria is a particular setting where several healthcare
options (medical pluralism) including orthodox medicine
(public, private, or drugstores), traditional medicine, and
spiritual healers operate freely [11].The public health facilities
where the TB control program operates are distanced from
the citizens. More often than not, these health facilities are
not the first choice during health seeking decisions. Unlike
the theory of Dim and Dim [11] and Zwerling et al. [49],
we believe that high TB prevalence in Nigeria has a lot
to do with policies of its TB control program, as stated in
other studies [18, 45, 50, 51]. Today, Nigeria is ranked as
number 3 in the world in terms of TB burden [52] just
behind China and India. The country has adopted passive
case finding as recommended by WHO [42], based on a
study conducted in India [53, 54]. Nevertheless, the Indian
context has completely different demographic, cultural, and
literacy settings fromNigeria.However, successful TB control
only happens when social and cultural factors are taken into
consideration [55]. It is therefore imperative to revise and
consider the means of extending the NTBLCP strategy.
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In this study, we applied epidemic models to real pop-
ulations to draw conclusions about one of the leading
health challenges in Nigeria. We numerically showed that
an increase in the diagnosis rate together with a treatment’s
success of TB patients is an essential step towards TB control
in Nigeria. In order to increase notification rate of TB in
Nigeria using the current passive case detection strategy, the
people at the community level should be empowered with
adequate knowledge of the growing burden of the disease
and accessible potentials for a cure. Alternatively, active
case finding strategies could be explored and implemented,
although the existence of many remote communities in some
Nigerian areas would dramatically make this task difficult. In
any case, the analysis reveals that, with current strategies, it
will be impossible to actualize the aims of the EndTB strategy,
with targets to reduce TB deaths by 95% and to cut new TB
cases by 90% between 2015 and 2035 [56].
Even with a high increase in the notification and with-
out considering HIV/TB coinfection and the problem of
multidrug-resistant (MDR) strains, mortality from TB in
Nigeria will still be dramatic for the next few decades to come.
Two main facts will contribute to this increase in mortality:
first, Nigeria’s population growth of more than 3.2% annually
[47, 57] and, second, the resulting deaths due to TB which
are expected to drastically increase by 2030 unless effective
TB control is implemented in the country. The results we
obtained in our study confirm this situation. This issue poses
a great threat not only to Nigeria but also to the entire world’s
TB program and to the ambitious End TB Partnership [56] by
2030.
The increase of TB diagnosis by applying active case find-
ing along with specific actions to guarantee TB treatment’s
adherence and success could be used to achieve the goals set
by WHO in Nigeria by reducing TB mortality significantly,
TB prevalence, and LTBI population. Perhaps the time has
come for a critical reexamination of the costs, risks, and
benefits of active case finding in this country. Indeed, the
strategies evaluated in this paper would require substantial
resources and extraordinary mobilization of international
attention, since the greater part of TB control program
funding comes from external sources [42]. We have not
attempted to estimate the cost difference of the control
strategies proposed. Initiating and sustaining such a large-
scale effort of active case finding would be very challenging.
However, the first step needs to include both a realistic
assessment of implementing these ambitious initiatives and
the identification of an optimal way to implement them. For
that, the socioeconomic context of the different Nigerian ter-
ritories and the social inequalities within and between them
should be taken into account, so that they can be transformed
into feasible policy recommendations. Furthermore, success
could not be guaranteed without both realistic evaluation of
the costs of pursuing active case finding and the treatment of
new diagnosed TB sick individuals.
Our results exploring different scenarios show the high
relevance of increasing the notification rate in contrast to the
modest effects of an improvement of treatment efficacy only.
Nevertheless, the treatment efficacy would probably turn out
to be crucial if we included the problem of MDR, which
would be addressed in further studies. Despite contemplating
the absence of MDR as a limitation of the model, our
conclusions cannot be questioned, since the main problem
is still the pool of nondiagnosed TB sick individuals. Future
studies could also include the study of the reinfection effect
in the model. This new setting would allow a detailed study
of the LTBI population and its distribution between old and
recent infections. Nonetheless, the reinfection effect would
not change the main dynamics given by the current model
and the recommendations that arose from it.
5. Conclusions
The model shows that WHO targets stated by the End
TB strategy [56] would not be achieved with the current
public management of TB in Nigeria. In fact, its forecasted
situation for 2030 suggests being far away from ending the
TB epidemics as aimed in the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals under Goal 3. The high percentage of
undiagnosed TB sick individuals in this country is a huge
obstacle for the target incidence’s disease. It is essential
to increase the number of the diagnosed and successfully
treated, thus requiring not only a significant economic effort
but also a boost in social work in the community. This result
is valid not only for Nigeria, but also for such countries where
nondiagnosis is a serious problem. In all cases, a signifi-
cant TB incidence’s decrease can only be achieved by both
increasing the notification rate to the 80%-90% range and
providing appropriate management of diagnosed patients.
With both measures, new infections can be prevented and
the treatment’s success can be guaranteed. This situation is
the bottleneck that needs to be overcome in addition to
the incorporation, improvement, and/or strengthening of
other essential TB control measures such as directly observed
treatment or contact tracing.
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National infrastructure systems spanning energy, transport, digital, waste, and water are well recognised as complex and
interdependent. While some policy makers have been keen to adopt the narrative of complexity, the application of complexity-
based methods in public policy decision-making has been restricted by the lack of innovation in associated methodologies and
tools. In this paper we firstly evaluate the application of complex adaptive systems theory to infrastructure systems, comparing
and contrasting this approach with traditional systems theory. We secondly identify five key theoretical properties of complex
adaptive systems including adaptive agents, diverse agents, dynamics, irreversibility, and emergence, which are exhibited across
three hierarchical levels ranging from agents, to networks, to systems. With these properties in mind, we then present a case study
on the development of a system-of-systems modelling approach based on complex adaptive systems theory capable of modelling
an emergent national infrastructure system, driven by agent-level decisions with explicitly modelled interdependencies between
energy, transport, digital, waste, andwater. Indeed, the novel contribution of the paper is the articulation of the case study describing
a decade of research which applies complex adaptive systems properties to the development of a national infrastructure system-of-
systems model. This approach has been used by the UK National Infrastructure Commission to produce a National Infrastructure
Assessment which is capable of coordinating infrastructure policy across a historically fragmented governance landscape spanning
eight government departments. The application will continue to be pertinent moving forward due to the continuing complexity of
interdependent infrastructure systems, particularly the challenges of increased electrification and the proliferation of the Internet
of Things.
1. Introduction
Infrastructure systems across the world are becoming
increasingly challenged as a result of growing demand and the
fact that many assets are coming to the end of their lifespan.
One technological solution to these problems is the use of
Information Communication Technology (ICT) to provide
smart management in both the supply of and demand for
infrastructure. However, the pervasive use of ICT means we
have transitioned to a position where infrastructure sectors
are becoming more and more interdependent [1–4]. Because
of this interconnectivity, individual infrastructure sectors can
no longer be assessed in isolation, motivating the increased
use of decision support methods which utilise systems-based
approaches.
When contrasted against the level of intellectual enquiry
focusing on complexity, there has hitherto been relatively
limited application of complexity-based methods to support
public policy decision-making. This is despite the dissatisfac-
tion shown regarding the rigid application of the assumptions
associated with general systems theory, neoclassical eco-
nomics, and rational decision-making, in favour ofmore evo-
lutionary, complexity-based approaches [5–10]. There needs
to be greater understanding of how national infrastructure
systems and their agents adapt and change across time
and space. One approach that may prove promising in this
endeavour is the application of complex adaptive system
(CAS) theory, as it can help to generate new knowledge
on how to model infrastructure systems. In this article we
investigate the application of CAS to infrastructure systems
by building on the work of others who have examined this
problem [1, 11–14].
We first consider the characteristics of a national infras-
tructure system and secondly outline the basis of an approach
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based on complex adaptive systems, including how it can
be distinguished conceptually from general systems theory.
We then examine how the properties of a CAS approach can
be used to understand more about national infrastructure,
before providing a case study of how this has been utilised
by the UK’s National Infrastructure Commission to model
national infrastructure strategies.
2. The Key Characteristics of a National
Infrastructure System
High-quality national infrastructure systems comprised of
the energy, transport, ICT, water, and waste are essential
for economic prosperity and a fully functioning society
[17]. However, defining infrastructure is difficult as the term
is used to refer to a variety of objects and technological
artefacts and the human systems that enable their effective
functioning. We synthesise a working definition within this
context, whereby infrastructure is an enabling system that
provides a range of different services to intermediate and end
users.
Increasingly, infrastructure assets require inputs from
other sectors to function, for example, as smart infrastructure
systems increasingly rely on digital connectivity to operate.
These assets are coordinated to undertake a variety of
processes which provide business-to-business or business-to-
consumer infrastructure services. Often this takes place in a
hierarchicalmanner, with networks operating acrossmultiple
spatial layers [18, 19], resulting in nested processes. Two of
the main processes which infrastructure assets can undertake
are the transformation or preservation of different material
and immaterial entities. These processes can be carried out
to a range of materials and objects or to intangible forms
of capital such as information. In addition, infrastructure
assets are also able to transmit and distribute these material or
intangible forms of capital across space. We therefore define
infrastructure as the coordinated operation and management
of a group of physical assets to perform a range of processes,
thereby providing infrastructure services to users [20].
Given that infrastructure services having low substi-
tutability [21], poor infrastructure decision-making can have
severe economic and societal effects, with infrastructure
assets being durable commodities which can last decades.
These systems are frequently very large in scale and con-
sequently, particularly with regard to the aforementioned
factors, can become susceptible to path dependent “lock-
in” effects [22]. Infrastructure investments, particularly once
reinforced by increasing returns, can lock infrastructure
systems on path dependent economic or environmental
trajectories which are incredibly hard to break away from
due to the substantial financial hurdles involved with path
divergence.
Infrastructure is deeply intertwined in all economic and
societal systems. It mediates the way we create new value,
how we move across space, and the way we interact and
communicate, as well as bringing a driver of technologi-
cal uncertainty [23]. Transport, energy, and ICT are good
examples as they can have the most dramatic economic
effects on productivity, location, and innovation, by enabling
agglomeration benefits including increasing trade speciali-
sation, labour market efficiency, and helping the spread of
new ideas. Recent analysis indicates that infrastructure stocks
canpositively affect long-run economic output by somewhere
between the range of 0.07 and 0.10 [24]. Although a variety
of papers use different infrastructure stock definitions and
econometric techniques, recent studies indicate that there
are generally positive economic effects from infrastructure
investment (although they can vary by infrastructure sector),
even if they are relatively humble [25–30].
National infrastructure systems often have mixed plan-
ning, delivery, operation, ownership, and regulatory frame-
works, where governance frequently extends across private
firms and individuals, public institutions, and third-sector
organisations [31]. This reflects the historical legacy of many
infrastructure systems, which were once publicly owned and
centralised systems. Past governance arrangements signifi-
cantly shape the current character, structure, and operation
of national infrastructure systems and continue to have
profound hysteretic impacts in the future. As an example,
Table 1 details the diverse attributes of the UK national
infrastructure system.
Like all national infrastructure systems, the actors
involved in Table 1 operate over a multitude of spatial scales
including the local, regional, national, and international
levels, with a wide range of motivations and constraints. This
makes it a very challenging task for those trying tomanoeuvre
each system to provide economically efficient, spatially equi-
table, and environmentally sustainable outcomes [32].
In the next section we consider the key properties of a
CAS and assess how it might assist in understanding national
infrastructure. In making this assessment we draw upon the
growing literature of CAS theory.
3. The Properties of a Complex
Adaptive System
A complex system has a multitude of individual compo-
nents and agents that are highly connected and interdepen-
dent, to the extent that “emergent” behavioural phenomena
occur which cannot be explained using other reductionist
approaches. Complexity theory is used as a form of guiding
metatheory to understand a range of evolving natural and
social systems, frequently applying computational simulation
methodologies as the method of enquiry [33–37].
Many authors make the distinction between systems that
are simple or complicated, but not complex [13, 38, 39]. This
is because many find it easier to begin by defining what
complexity is not, before attempting to define what it is.
Table 2 draws upon the work of Arthur [10], Delorme [16],
and Lei et al. [12] to compare the properties of general systems
theory and a CAS approach.
In a complex system functionality arises not only from
the multitude of (often nonlinear) interactions between the
physical components and incumbent agents of the system, but
also from interactions with the surrounding environment.
Complex systems are seen to undergo a variety of possible
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Table 1: Characteristics of the UK National Infrastructure System (adapted from Hall et al. [15]).
Energy Transport Water Waste DigitalCommunicationsWastewater Solid Waste
Scale NationalInternational
Regional
National
International
Regional Regional Regional NationalInternational
Ownership Private Mixed (by mode) Mixed (by region) Mixed (by region)
Mixed (public
responsibility with
private operation
Private
Governance
and
Regulation
Varies e.g.
electricity has
unregulated
market prices but
regulated network
charges
Varies e.g. rail has
regulated efficiency
targets; roads and
government
planned with some
private provision
For England andWales, price and
investment regulated by Ofwat,
drinking water quality regulation by
DWI, environmental regulation by EA.
Local Authority
run.
Environmental
regulation by
EA/DEFRA in
England and
Wales, SEPA in
Scotland
Competition
regulation by
Ofcom; universal
service obligations;
spectrum licences
and coverage
obligations
Issues Security of supply;GHG emissions
Congestion;
high speed rail;
airport capacity
Demand
management;
climate change;
environmental
regulation
Energy costs;
environmental
regulation
Waste
minimisation and
recycling targets;
resource
management
Technological
innovation; rural
coverage
Table 2: Properties of general systems and complex adaptive systems [10, 12, 16].
General Systemseory Complex Adaptive Systemseory
Key Properties Key Properties Property Category Hierarchical Level
Complicated Complex Emergent
behaviour and
self-organisation System level
Aggregable with functional
decomposition
Emergent with
limited functional
decomposition
Centralised control Distributed control
Determinate and Linear Non-determinateand Non-linear
Instability and
robustness
Static PerpetualDynamics
Dynamics and
evolution Network levelEquilibrium
A Far-from-
equilibrium
State
Closed Open
Reversible Irreversible
Rational, deductive behaviour
Adaptive,
evolutionary
behaviour
Adaptiveness
Agent level
Simpliﬁed assumptions and
homogenous agents
Diversity among
agents and more
realistic
assumptions
Agent diversity
states. They are in a state of flux which, often resulting from
self-organising tendencies, changes the configuration of the
system. It is important to make the distinction between a
complex system and the subsequent concept of a complex
adaptive system. The word adaptive comes from the Latin
“adaptation” which relates to the modification required to
suit new conditions. Thus, to adapt is to improve over time
in relation to one’s environment (whether natural, economic,
social, technical, institutional, or some other variant). But the
key to the definition is the verb to improve.
Winder et al. [40] state that not all complex systems
display evolutionary dynamics as some can exhibit mech-
anistic dynamics. The dynamic quantitative change which
results from a complex system responding to an external
stimulus may display only mechanistic, responsive change.
The evolutionary dynamics evident in complex adaptive
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systems only take place if the relationships between the parts
of the system components are modified, in order to gain
some form of advantageous position. Hence, the ability for
a group of entities to generate a variety of responses to a
changing selection environment is a defining feature of an
evolutionary system. The absence of this changing, evolving
behaviour may indicate that a system is only dynamically
mechanistic, rather than evolutionary. Consequently, a CAS
can be defined as containing a large number of agents which
interact, learn, and, most crucially, adapt to changes in
their selection environment in order to improve their future
survival chances [41].
The main properties of a CAS can be identified as evolu-
tion, aggregate behaviour, and anticipation (Holland, 1992).
Evolution is a key feature; while adaptation can be described
as the improvements made by entities in response to external
environmental stimuli, evolution is different as it is the algo-
rithmic process that produces these improvements [42]. Yet
the use of this metaphor as a transformational process is often
ill-defined [43]. For a process to be described as evolutionary
it must exhibit certain properties, specifically the generation
of novelty endogenously, fromwithin the system. A system is
not evolutionary if change is only incorporated as some form
of exogenous shock which momentarily changes the system’s
“equilibrium” position. Moreover, evolutionary systems are
also dynamic and undergoing perpetual change, with the
relationships between the key components in continual flux.
Indeed, the process of evolution is discontinuous and irre-
versible.
4. Applying the Key Concepts to an
Infrastructure System
Chaudet at al. [44] state that after considering key properties,
infrastructures “can be considered excellent metaphors of
complex systems”. But to gain a true understanding of a spe-
cific system one must undertake an in-depth investigation.
This section considers the extent to which the key features
of a CAS appear to characterise the workings of a national
infrastructure system. Following the structure presented in
Table 2, the analysis is undertaken at the agent, network, and
the system levels.
4.1. Agent-Level Properties
4.1.1. Adaptive, Evolutionary Behaviour. Although dynamic
behaviour is a feature of many types of general systems, this
property is especially prominent in complex adaptive systems
and linked to perpetual dynamics at the network level. For
example, individuals, households, and firms exhibit adaptive
behaviour change driven by changing supply and demand
conditions. This is particularly true for infrastructure service
providers operating in market contexts. These behavioural
changes can result fromnew technologies, new infrastructure
assets, and flows of financial investment on the supply side.
On the demand side, new technology drives change in how
infrastructure services are used and where they are required.
An example of this change is evident in the adoption of
smartphones, 4G LTE services, and the subsequent explosion
in data demand associated with video streaming. Changes
in user behaviour, coupled with the proliferation of new
technologies, dramatically changed the supply and demand
characteristics of mobile telecommunications infrastructure
systems from 2008 onwards, following the release of the
Apple iPhone and the proliferation of smartphones.
4.1.2. Diversity among Agents andMore Realistic Assumptions.
The heterogeneous attributes of individuals, households, and
firms, incumbent to the supply and demand of infrastructure
services are visibly evident. A general characteristic that
defines the demand side is the demographic group of partic-
ular consumers. For example, trends in broadband adoption
associated with Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) (e.g.,
Netflix) are correlated with particular demographic groups,
where older households generally have a lower propensity to
adopt these services.
4.2. Network-Level Properties
4.2.1. Perpetual Dynamics. We witness perpetual dynamic
change in the national infrastructure system in both the
supply and demand for infrastructure. For example, the
development of infrastructure is incremental, so the physical
network according to current and expected demand under-
goes a perpetual process of expansion, modification, and
contraction at different points in space. Moreover, the flows
across the physical network are also altered in accordance
with these processes. Innovation has a particular impact on
driving change in technological and institutional regimes
in infrastructure systems [45]. Disruptive technologies and
new forms of organisation combine with and result from the
adaptive, self-organising behaviour of the firms, households,
and individuals that produce and consume infrastructure
services on a daily basis. The economy and society are thus
seen to perpetually coevolve with changes in infrastructure
networks, advancements in infrastructure technology and
organisation, and the new trajectories of economic growth
and development.
4.2.2. A Far-from-Equilibrium State. The factors that influ-
ence the demand for and supply of infrastructure are subject
to continuous dynamic change and thus it would appear naive
to adopt a theoretical perspective that assumes it is at an
optimal equilibrium at some point in time. A CAS approach
would appear more appropriate, as it pays more attention to
the imperfections of the system.
4.2.3. Openness. National infrastructure systems are open
entities characterised by inward and outward flows of goods,
services, and capital. They have no precise, fixed boundary
between the system under investigation, other nested systems
in the hierarchy, and the wider environment. While we define
“the national infrastructure system” purely for practical
purposes in research, it is not an isolated, “closed” system.
Instead it undergoes constant interaction and exchange with
its economic, social, and natural environment. We have his-
torically been quite poor at integrating long-term behavioural
change into models of infrastructure systems.
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The system requires a wide range of inputs to flow into
different infrastructure sectors to enable functionality, such as
energy, raw and intermediate materials, labour, information,
and financial capital. This openness can result in the system
behaving differently to ostensibly similar shocks from its
environment, at different points in time. This is because
national infrastructure systems can change their network
structure over temporal periods, changing the system’s com-
plexity. Homogenous responses to perturbations are highly
unlikely.
4.2.4. Irreversibility. The notion of irreversibility in infras-
tructure systems refers to the fact that time-independent
decisions are rare. In fact, infrastructure providers are
almost certainly taking decisions within a set of constrained
capabilities, because they must work with durable, long-
lived infrastructure assets and networks operating in market
contexts. “Lock-in” effects with infrastructure assets often
prevent viable transitions to other forms of organisation and
operation. For example, in the energy sector many countries
have addressed emissions controls by introducing regula-
tory mechanisms combined with energy demand manage-
ment and renewable energy generation policies. These have
inevitably affected the cost of energy because they attempt
to move the system away from the existing “locked-in”
state.Moreover, there are alsomicroeconomic irreversibilities
resulting from the adaptive behaviours of firms, households,
individuals, regulators, and other institutions that inevitably
explore, learn, and retain information relating to their activi-
ties.
4.3. System-Level Properties
4.3.1. Complexity. The system is complex because it is
comprised of diverse adaptive agents, there is distributed
control throughout the system, and infrastructure networks
are joined by a range of different physical and cyber-
interdependencies. Moreover, the functionality of the system
arises not only from the multitude of (often nonlinear) inter-
actions between the physical components and incumbent
agents of the system, but also from how the system per se
interacts with its surrounding environment.
4.3.2. Emergence and Limited Functional Decomposition. The
highly dynamic structure of the national infrastructure sys-
tem results from the high level of interconnection between
incumbent networks. When the national infrastructure is
driven by a set of exogenous drivers (demographic change,
economic growth, climate scenarios, etc.), interdependen-
cies between different sectors lead to second-order, indirect
demands for infrastructure services. Hence, it is not straight-
forward to functionally decompose the national infrastructure
into individual stable parts.
Moreover, unlike in the natural sciences where individual
natural processes can often be isolated for experimentation,
the sociotechnical processes pertaining to the economic,
technological, spatial, demographic, institutional, and envi-
ronmental aspects of national infrastructure systems need to
be considered and examined in the widest sense, because they
are not readily decomposable [46].
4.3.3. Distributed Control. National infrastructure systems in
developed, freemarket economies do not have one individual
entity in control of the system. This can be problematic for
coordination. Often top-down management approaches can
yield undesirable outcomes as a result. This has increasingly
been the case over the past three decades where nationalised
industries have been opened to market-based competition
between different actors. Whereas the state previously had a
centralised command-and-control structure, now it only has
limited regulatory control. Complexity approaches naturally
lend themselves to being utilised to investigate the impli-
cations of different game-theoretic behaviours that play out
in a decentralised market context, although there has been
relatively limited application to infrastructure hitherto.
4.3.4. Indeterminateness and Nonlinearity. A consequence
of increasing interdependency in national infrastructure
means these systems become indeterminate and nonlinear.
Additionally, feedback mechanisms arise when externalities
in the system alter the costs and benefits which accrue
from an individual’s decisions, therefore causing behavioural
change. Positive feedback often has a destabilising effect on
a system, while negative feedback can create an effect which
is homeostatic. Nonlinear feedback mechanisms can cause
the system to undergo transitions to other organisational
states. Moreover, endogenously created technologies can be
responsible for this type of transition, inducing qualitative
change in the relationships of key system components. For
example, the evolution of energy and transportation systems
over the past century has instigated organisational and opera-
tional transitions in the national infrastructure, encouraging
coevolutionary change in tandem with the demand patterns.
The nonlinearities and the degree of technological inno-
vation inherent in the system make unpredictable outcomes
occur. These emergent outcomes might not have seemed
logical or possible from close examination of the actions
of individuals. Complex adaptive properties mean that the
system can shift to a very wide variety of possible future
states. Indeed, the path dependent properties of certain
components often play a part in this. There is thus a need
to move away from the past “predict and provide” planning
approaches used for large technical systems and recognise
the importance of greater understanding of the plethora of
interacting technical and social processes which can push
the system into states that arise unexpectedly. Rather than
focusing solely on technology and infrastructure, we should
shift our thinking to also include sociotechnical regimes,
including the users and their behaviours in infrastructure
analysis.
5. A System-of-Systems Approach to
Infrastructure: A Case Study of the UK
We now present a case study which uses CAS properties to
develop a system-of-systems (SoS) approach to infrastruc-
ture, as an example of a complexity-based method applied to
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support public policy decision-making. As already identified,
there has been growing recognition in recent decades of the
importance that national infrastructure systems are intercon-
nected. While infrastructure (especially energy) has under-
pinned many vital systems for over a century, the increasing
proliferation of ICT has been a key driver and will continue to
be, considering those technologies on the horizon such as the
Internet of Things or Connected and Autonomous Vehicles.
Past analytical approaches prevent thorough analysis of this
complexity by ignoring interdependencies; therefore we need
new tools and methodologies that position us to quantify
these systems.This has the potential to revolutionise both the
quality and quantity of infrastructure analytics available to
public policy decision-makers, leading to the development of
more effective infrastructure planning and resilience policies.
This case study begins by detailing the main decision-makers
and their goals and information requirements. Subsequently,
a novel approach to infrastructure assessment is detailed
before being critically reviewed.
5.1. Key Decision-Makers. An important issue with infras-
tructure policy is that responsibility has traditionally been
fragmented and spread out across the UK Government. For
example, energy, transport, ICT, water, and waste policy has
included up to eight government departments, namely, (i)
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, (ii) the Department
for Transport, (iii) the Department for Digital, Culture,
Media and Sport, (iv) the Department for the Environment,
Farming and Rural Affairs, (v) HMTreasury, (vi) the Cabinet
Office, (vii) theMinistry of Housing, Communities and Local
Government, and (viii) the Department for International
Trade.
Over the past decade the UK has attempted to take a far
more strategic approach to infrastructure, as promoted by
the release of the UK Council of Science and Technology
(2009) report entitled Infrastructure for the 21st Century.
Subsequently, under the labour government a white paper
was published titled Building Britain’s Future, promoting the
infrastructure agenda as a way of dealing with the damage
caused by the Global Financial Crisis. This led to a new
body being created called Infrastructure UK (known as
“IUK”), within HM Treasury, with the key responsibility of
developing a National Infrastructure Plan.
In light of this fragmented governance landscape, the
creation of a strategic high-level planning body within HM
Treasury called the National Infrastructure Commission
(NIC) was tasked with coordinating infrastructure policy
across government. This body is like those that have been
established in Australia (Infrastructure Australia) and New
Zealand (National Infrastructure Advisory Board). The NIC
operates via a set of infrastructure commissioners who
have responsibility to develop a long-term strategy for the
delivery of national infrastructure. There is a requirement to
undertake a National Infrastructure Assessment at least once
every parliament (5 years) as well as responding to emerging
issues at the direction of the Chancellor, which have recently
included smart power systems, 5G communications, the East-
West transport corridor, and coordinating the development
of a digital twin of the UK’s national infrastructure system.
The NIC is the key decision-making body focused on within
this analysis, given its need to coordinate across all areas of
infrastructure policy.
The overall goal of the UK’s infrastructure policy is to
deliver efficient and effective infrastructure systems which
are sustainable, enhance productivity, and provide economic
opportunity for everyone in society. However, long-term
infrastructure planning is a classic decision-making under
uncertainty problem which needs to navigate changes in
demography, economy, society, and environment. Infrastruc-
ture policy can also be highly political and subject to radical
technological change.
5.2. Information Used for Decision-Making. Each infrastruc-
ture sector may have its own specific set of metrics required
to assess the state of the current and future system. However,
a general approach is to consider (i) system capacity, (ii)
service coverage, (iii) investment costs, and (iv) potential
emissions. The traditional approach to infrastructure analyt-
ics for public policy decision-making constitutes fragmented
sector modelling, often taking place in individual govern-
ment departmentswhoderive information froma niche set of
models pertinent to each infrastructure sector, including the
UK TIMES energy model, DECC energy demand model, the
National Transport Model, and the LTIS flood model. This
is problematic because transport modellers may use com-
pletely different epistemological approaches, assumptions,
and forward-looking scenarios when compared to energy,
digital, water, or waste management. This firstly introduces
additional uncertainty when comparing the potential results
between these models and, secondly, completely ignores the
feedback between infrastructure sectors. Hence, this leads to
the treatment of infrastructure existing in a closed system,
with centralised command and control which is considerably
detached from reality and may lead to unintended outcomes.
For example, new electrification strategies in one sector may
work from the assumption that enough electricity is available
to support this approach, which may not be true. Hence, by
capturing the key characteristics of national infrastructure,
by representing the interdependencies between the systems,
more accurate information can be provided to decision-
makers. This accuracy is achieved by reducing the level of
uncertainty inherent in the data, models, and results.
5.3. The Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium
(ITRC) Approach. One example of where this methodology
has been applied is by the ITRC (see Hall et al. [47]). Taking
inspiration from the Council of Science and Technology
(2009) report, the ITRC project was formed based on the
proposition that modelling and simulation techniques can
be highly important to understand and effectively manip-
ulate complex systems. Moreover, the design and planning
of infrastructure can be improved using powerful systems
models as these techniques can help to optimise across a
wide range of policy constraints. The ITRC subsequently
collaborated with the newly created IUK to analyse the
National Infrastructure Pipeline and undertake a “hotspots”
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analysis of critical risks to infrastructure across the UK (see
Thacker et al. [18, 19]). Following this the ITRC undertook the
analysis for the UK’s first National Needs Assessment (NNA)
led by Sir John Armitt, the then President of the Institution
of Civil Engineers. Consequently, the modelling capability
was utilised to inform the UK’s first National Infrastructure
Assessment published in 2018. Had the modelling approach
not been available to undertake a holistic evaluation, these
activities either would not have taken place or would have
relied on fragmented modelling approaches for each individ-
ual sector used in the past, ignoring the interconnected and
interdependent nature of national infrastructure. This would
likely have led to an underestimation in total demand for
future infrastructure services.
The framework developed by ITRC for conducting a
National Infrastructure Assessment is based on an initial step
which defines a set of “what if” questions pertinent to the
current needs of policy makers. Four stages follow: firstly,
collecting scenarios that represent future uncertainties such
as demography, economic growth, and climate; secondly,
developing both plausible and experimental infrastructure
strategies for testing [48]; thirdly, applying a national infras-
tructure system-of-systems model to simulate the perfor-
mance of infrastructure under various exogenous scenarios;
finally, evaluating the performance of different strategies and
identifying robust options.
ITRC and NIC have been working together to produce
an original evidence base that underpins the NIC’s strategic
work. This evidence base has been augmented by utilising a
national infrastructure system-of-systems model (NISMOD)
consisting of a family of models. TheNISMOD suite includes
a model for long-term planning (-LP) and for the analysis
of risk and vulnerability (-RV) of critical national infrastruc-
ture. NISMOD-LP implements the National Infrastructure
Assessment approach developed by ITRC (see Hall et al.
[47] for a more complete description). NISMOD-LP is an
infrastructure system-of-systems model that enables users to
explore strategic planning of multiple infrastructure sectors,
while simulating the operation of the individual sectors
and their key interdependencies under a range of unified
scenarios of future developments spanning natural sciences,
demography, and economics. Demands for infrastructure
services are derived from these scenarios of key demand
drivers [49]. For example, demand for transport services,
such as car passenger travel, is derived from future scenarios
of population, GVA, and endogenously computed travel
time and cost (an example of adaptive dynamic behaviour).
Long-term dynamics are explored through narratives of
technological change and consumer acceptance that affect
the attributes of infrastructure assets and demand for infras-
tructure services. The infrastructure sectors are represented
by detailed engineering simulation models that are linked
with one another, and while a comprehensive description
of each model is beyond the theoretical focus of this paper,
they are available for energy [50], transport [51], digital
communications [52, 53], solid waste [54, 55], and water
[56, 57]. The linkages between these models represent the
critical dependencies between sectors (see Figure 1) including
flows ranging from resources to information.
For example, the energy supply model simulates the
operation of the UK’s portfolio of current and potential
future electric power stations, the electricity transmission and
distribution networks, gas pipeline, pumps, and storage facil-
ities. Electricity and gas are thus supplied to meet demand
for energy-related infrastructure services. The simulation
models enable analysts to test the implications of strategies
within the infrastructure system. Crucially, the simulation
models produce quantitative performance metrics which
allow analysts to evaluate the performance of the infras-
tructure system under different conditions. By comparing
the performance metrics of multiple model runs across
a wide range of scenarios and combinations of planning
strategies, analysts can explore robust policy options across
the infrastructure system-of-systems.
5.4. Critically Reviewing a System-of-Systems Approach to
Infrastructure Public Policy Decision-Making. In this section
we evaluate the added-value provided by utilising a system-
of-systems approach for infrastructure decision-making. We
discuss the existing limitations, as seen from the perspec-
tive of complex adaptive systems theory, and whether new
insights can be provided into the properties of the national
infrastructure system.
We illustrate a mapping in Figure 2, from the dis-
tinct properties of infrastructure as a complex adaptive
system to the implemented methodology, with infrastructure
being modelled as a system-of-systems using NISMOD.
This firstly includes adaptive agents, whereby operators of
critical national infrastructure deploy different long-term
planning strategies to meet future demand under a range
of exogenous scenarios and conditions. Secondly, diverse
agents are represented by different infrastructure decision-
makers across the various sectors in the system-of-systems
simulation framework. Diverse agents are also represented on
the demand side, where demands for infrastructure services
are segmented by socioeconomic attributes using a set of
spatially disaggregated household demographic profiles and
commercial and industrial productivity statistics. Thirdly,
the modelling approach captures short-term dynamics of
interdependencies between systems; as decisions are made
by each individual sector, this changes the system-level
conditions, with ramifications for investment and operational
decisions elsewhere in national infrastructure. By simulating
the operation of the system, we capture the supply dynamics
to meet the diverse demands for infrastructure services.
Fourthly, as in reality, the decision to invest in a sequence
of irreversible interventions locks the system structure into
a long-term trajectory. Finally, because of these properties,
a spatially explicit national infrastructure system structure
emerges, which is assessed using a set of performance criteria
metrics, such as capacity, coverage, cost, and emissions.
However, while developing and applying new theories
can be a useful intellectual academic exercise, there is
still the question as to whether this improves the existing
understanding of infrastructure. This case study demon-
strates that complex adaptive systems theory and system-of-
systems methodologies can be combined predicated on the
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Figure 1: A dependency shown between just two infrastructure sectors contained in the ITRC’s National Infrastructure System Model. The
cylinders labelled 𝑇
𝑡𝑟
and 𝑇
𝑒𝑠
represent the stock of available technologies for the transport and energy sectors. Narratives hold the collection
of assumptions exogenous to the modelled system about long-term technological changes andmodify the attributes of available technologies.
Scenarios capture changes in socioeconomic drivers of infrastructure service demands. The network structure that underpins the hourly
operation of the sector is altered over annual planning timescales as technology changes, and long-term planning investments result in the
turnover of the infrastructure stock. Performance metrics produced from the operation of the system simulation feed back into the planning
strategies governing future investments and provide the results of a model run.
properties outlined inTable 2, enabling developments beyond
traditional systems-based analysis. Given there is growing
dissatisfaction assuming that reality can bemodelled as static,
deterministic, and containing homogenous, rational agents,
this is to be welcomed.
While there have been relatively few examples of
complexity-based approaches supporting public policy, in
this application to long-term infrastructure decision-making
we have detailed a methodology addressing five properties
of complex adaptive systems (adaptive agents, diverse agents,
dynamics, irreversibility, and emergence), across three hier-
archical levels ranging from agents, to networks, to systems.
The main contribution of this application of the national
infrastructure systemmodel is that we capture the emergence
of a whole national infrastructure system, driven by agent-
level decisions and explicitly modelled interdependencies
across the sectors of energy, transport, digital, water, and
waste. The breaching of individual infrastructure sector
system boundaries creates new opportunities for under-
standing trade-offs and synergies across sectors, not only
within individual systems, with cumulative potential to make
more effective policy decisions, while reducing the likelihood
of unintended consequences. Adopting these methods will
require a change in mindset by both model developers
and policy decision-makers, as it requires increased use of
system-of-systems-based thinking and associated modelling
methodologies. In doing so, this could further unshackle
approaches that view reality as something that is predictable
and linear, towards increased recognition that the world is
highly dynamic, diverse, and evolving: in essence, complex.
6. Conclusion
In this article we have sought to build on the core properties
identified by Arthur [10], Delorme [16], and Lei et al. [12], to
assess whether a CAS approachmight help to provide a better
understanding of the forces underpinning change in national
infrastructure systems. We find that properties of a complex
adaptive system characterise the workings of infrastructure
systems well and subsequently articulate a system-of-systems
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Figure 2: Mapping the properties of a complex adaptive system to a system-of-systems approach.
method grounded in this theory. The novel contribution of
the paper is the articulation of the case study describing a
decade of research which applies complex adaptive systems
properties to the development of a national infrastructure
system-of-systems model. This enables decision-makers to
explore the trade-offs and properties of an emergent national
infrastructure system, driven by agent-level decisions and
explicitly modelled interdependencies between energy, trans-
port, digital communications, waste, andwater. Subsequently,
the approach has been used by the UK National Infras-
tructure Commission to produce a National Infrastructure
Assessment which is capable of coordinating infrastructure
policy across a historically fragmented governance landscape
spanning eight government departments. The application
will continue to be pertinent moving forward due to the
continuing complexity of interdependent infrastructure sys-
tems, particularly from increased electrification and the
proliferation of the Internet of Things.
Data Availability
In this article we theoretically review the use of complexity
methods and provide a case study based on a particular
application. We reference the models developed and used for
this process but do not report results from them. Data used
by these models can be traced via the references provided in
the paper.
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Bipartite matching problem is to study two disjoint groups of agents who need to be matched pairwise. It can be applied to many
real-world scenarios and explain many social phenomena. In this article, we study the effect of competition on bipartite matching
problem by introducing conformity into the preference structure. The results show that a certain amount of competition can
improve the overall utility of society and also eliminate the giant shift of social utility when matching unequal numbers of men
and women.
1. Introduction
Bipartite matching problem is to study how the two disjoint
groups of agents can be matched pairwise for their personal
preferences, such as the matching between men and women,
students and colleges, workers and jobs, consumers and prod-
ucts [1–3], and many other scenarios [4–7]. For convenience
we use the paradigm of marriage problem, where N men
and N women need to be matched. In this problem, each
participant is selfish, everyone tries to optimize their own
choices, and the competition is inevitable. A key question is
how to find a stable solution in which there is no such a pair
of man and woman who prefer themselves more than the
assigned partner [8]. The number of stable solutions is very
large [9]; themost famous one among them is obtained by the
Gale-Shapley algorithm, which was awarded the Nobel Prize
in Economics in 2012.
In 1962, Gale and Shapley proved that for the same
number of men and women, a stable solution can always
be obtained through Gale-Shapley algorithm [1]. In this
algorithm, every agent has a preference list, which is a ranking
list of all members from the opposite sex. Men act as suitors
and send proposals to women according to their preference
lists. When a woman has multiple candidate partners, she
always retains her favorite one. The algorithm will continue
until all agents find their spouses. This matching result can
easily prove to be stable, because the only way for men to
improve their current situation is to send proposals towomen
who have already rejected them, but the spouse of these
women must be in front of this man in the women’s lists.
Besides, it also proved to be the men-optimal solution among
all stable solutions.
Statistical physicists also find areas of interest in the
bipartite matching problem because the model is very similar
to a system in which two different particles interact [10, 11].
We assume that the utility of an agent is corresponding to
the ranking of her/his spouse in her/his preference list [12].
It can be generally regarded as a cost function, or ‘energy’ in
physics terminology. In the following text, the term ‘energy’
of an agent is used to express the utility of an agent. If a
person just happens to match the person at the top of her/his
preference list as a spouse, then she/he will be the happiest
and have an ‘energy’ of 1. In the worst case, one had to choose
the person at the bottom of the list and the ‘energy’ would be
𝑁. Inmost of the previous researches [9, 12, 13], for simplicity,
the preference lists are always established randomly and
independently.
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Physicists are constantly interested in finding a solution
with the lowest ‘energy’, which is called the ground state [13–
16]. This is equivalent to the commonly used term ‘minimal
cost solution’. The replica method in spin glass is used to
compute the minimal cost solution in the bipartite matching
problem [14], and the result gives that the average ‘energy’ of
each individual in the minimal cost solution is 0.808√𝑁 [12].
However, 24.2% of men can find one or more women [13], so
that both of them prefer each other to their current spouses.
Therefore, this minimal cost solution is a very unstable
matching. Moreover, the Mean Field Theory is utilized to
calculate the average ‘energy’ of the stable solution obtained
by Gale-Shapley algorithm [12]. In this case, the average
‘energy’ of men is log(𝑁), and the average ‘energy’ of women
is𝑁/ log(𝑁). Further, with the aid of the ‘energy’ distribution
function, it is proved that for all stable solutions, there exists
a relationship 𝜖𝑚 ∗ 𝜖𝑤 = 𝑁. The average ‘energy’ is 𝜖𝑔 = (𝜖𝑚 +
𝜖𝑤)/2 = 0.5(𝜖𝑚+𝑁/𝜖𝑚). It is easy to see that the global optimal
stable solution corresponds to the same ‘energy’√𝑁 for both
men and women, which is a little worse than the global
optimal solution. In addition, it is worthwhile to mention
that the men-optimal solution has the highest total ‘energy’
among all stable solutions. After that, various issues were
investigated, such as the matching problem under partial
choice [17, 18], which means the lists of men only contain a
fraction of all women, or people have a spatial distribution
and tend to match people who are geometrically closer [19],
etc.
One of the interesting questions is, if people’s preference
lists are not strictly random, i.e., if we induce a conformity
term into the preference structure, i.e., the agents have similar
preferences, which makes some of the agents become more
popular than others for all agents, how will the popularity
of agents affect the matching results? Later we will show
that the weight of popularity in the preference structure
is directly related to the competition intensity. In previous
studies [19], numerical simulation showed that the exerting
of competition will lead to higher ‘energy’ and lower util-
ity. Here we thoroughly study the impact of competition
on bipartite matching, and instead of intuitive result that
competition may reduce the utility of the society, our result
shows that a certain amount of competition can increase
the social utility. On the other hand, a recent research [20]
shows that random bipartite matching is very sensitive to the
symmetry of the sizes of the two sides; even reducing the
number of women by only one will lead to a dramatic change
of the ‘energy’ in the matching result. However, this dramatic
change in social utility is rarely observed in real life, even
though the numbers of matching parties in reality are often
different. Our research shows that introducing competition
into the preference list can effectively decrease the symmetry
sensitivity of the matching result and explain the absence of
the dramatic change in daily observation.
2. Method
The Gale-Shapley algorithm [1] is described below: suppose
we have two disjoint sets of N men and N women who
need to be matched pairwise. Each person has her/his
preference list which stores the ranking of all members from
the opposite sex. At the beginning, everyone is unengaged.
In each step, each unengaged man issues a proposal to his
favorite woman among those he has not proposed to. The
courted woman will choose her favorite from all the suitors
and her provisional partner.The process iteratively runs until
everyone is matched and it is easy to realize that a final
matching will be achieved eventually.
3. Results and Discussions
3.1. Matching between 𝑁 Men and 𝑁 Women. Let us firstly
consider the matching problem when the two groups have
equal size. For simplicity, it is usually assumed that everyone’s
preference list is completely random. Considering the process
of Gale-Shapley algorithm, men make proposals to women.
If the courted woman is unengaged, then the total number of
matched pairs will increase by one. If this woman is engaged,
no matter the suitor or her current partner is retained, the
number of partners will not change.
It is proved that on average [12], a total number of
𝑁(log(𝑁)+0.522) proposals need to be sent tomake everyone
engaged. Every proposal leads to a man’s ‘energy’ increasing
by one; the average ‘energy’ of men is the same as the
average number of proposals that he needs to make; i.e.,
the average ‘energy’ of men is log(𝑁) + 0.522. On the other
hand, for women, each of them receives on average log(𝑁) +
0.522 proposals. Each time they receive a proposal, they
can make a choice and decide the man whom they prefer.
Obviously, themore proposals they receive, the lower ‘energy’
women have. Since each suitor is randomly distributed in
the preference list, the optimal one among many choices
is equivalent to the first order statistic of multiple random
sampling from uniform distribution. It is easy to obtain the
woman’s average ‘energy’ as 𝑁/(log(𝑁) + 0.522 + 1). When
𝑁 is large, the average male ‘energy’ is approximately equal
to log(𝑁), and the average female ‘energy’ is approximately
equal to 𝑁/ log(𝑁). This conclusion is consistent with the
results of the ‘energy’ distribution function method used in
previous study [12].
However, in reality the preference lists are seldom purely
random. Some intrinsic properties, such as beauty, intel-
ligence, and wealth, will affect the ranking order of the
preference lists and then a certain level of conformity can be
observed in the structure of their preference lists. People with
those widely accepted attributes are easier to rank in front of
the preference lists of all agents. Let us consider the extreme
case, when the preferences of all agents are strictly based
on popularity term; then everyone should have an identical
preference list. At the first step, all men will make proposals
to the woman they all prefer. The man ranked at the top of
women’s preference list will be accepted and the other men
are refused. After that, the remaining men make proposals
to the woman who is their second favorite, the man ranked
second in the women’s preference lists will be accepted and
the others will be rejected. The process continues, it is easy to
know that the men’s ‘energy’ from low to high are 1, 2, 3 . . . 𝑁
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Figure 1: The number of initial competitors versus the weight of popularity,𝑁 = 1000; the result is averaged over 100 realizations.
and the average ‘energy’ (𝑁 + 1)/2. The average ‘energy’ of
women is the same.
We define the men who have been rejected after the first
round of proposing as the initial competitors. Thus, the total
number of initial competitors can be regarded as ameasure of
the competition intensity of thematching. In the extreme case
above (preference lists are completely the same), following
the Gale-Shapley algorithm, all men will propose to the same
woman so that the number of initial competitors is 𝑁 − 1.
Now consider the other extreme case when the preference
lists are purely random; theoretically the probability that a
woman does not receive any proposal is (1 − 1/𝑁)𝑁; when
𝑁 is large, this probability is close to 1/𝑒. Since the number of
menwho have been rejected is equal to the number of women
who have not received any proposals, the number of initial
competitors is𝑁/𝑒 ≃ 0.368𝑁.
In general, we propose a model to characterize the
realistic situation that some of the agents are ranked high in
the preference lists of all the opposite sex agents. In thismodel
the scores of each agent rating the agents of the opposite
sex consist of two parts: the popularity term that reveals the
conformity of the preference lists and a random term that
brings diversification of the personal preferences.
We assume that woman 𝑖 rates man 𝛼 with a score 𝑆𝛼,𝑖.
𝑆𝛼,𝑖 = 𝜔 × 𝐹𝛼 + (1 − 𝜔) × 𝑁𝛼,𝑖 (1)
Here 𝐹𝛼 is popularity of man 𝛼 and 𝑁𝛼,𝑖 is a random
term. For simplicity, we assume that 𝐹 and 𝑁 are uniformly
distributed on [0,1] and that weight of popularity 𝜔 is
universal for all men and women. One can choose other
distributions for the popularity, but it does not change
the main conclusion. For any intermediate situations the
number of initial competitors lies in [0.368N, N] because
of the monotonous relationship of 𝑆𝛼,𝑖 and the weight 𝜔 by
definition.
Belowwe present a numerical simulation result (Figure 1)
which shows how the number of initial competitors changes
with the weight of popularity in our model. The simulation
is done on a system containing N=1000 agents on each side,
and the result is averaged over 100 realizations. As shown in
Figure 1, the number of initial competitors gets increasingly
higher as the weight of conformity grows.
The preference list of woman 𝑖 is generated according to
the order of her ratings of all men. Similarly, we can obtain
the preference list of everyone. With these preference lists,
implementing Gale-Shapley algorithm, we will obtain the
final stable matching.
Now we start to analyze this matching result. As shown
in Figure 2(a), the average ‘energy’ of men increases mono-
tonically with the weight of popularity, 𝜔. This is because
when the weight of popularity increases, more proposals
are required for everyone to be engaged. However, a slight
competition will significantly reduce the women’s ‘energy’.
This increase of women’s average ‘energy’ grows with 𝑁
(Figure 2(b)), and the competition intensity required for the
women to reach optimal ‘energy’ decreases as the population
grows (Figure 2(c)). As competition further intensifies, the
women’s ‘energy’ will also increase. On the one hand, due
to the increase of the number of proposals, the number
of choices of woman increases. It can be known from the
nature of the order statistics that the minimum number
of multiple random sampling decreases as the number of
sampling increases. The increase in competition between
men is beneficial to the women. On the other hand, the
increase in the weight of popularity also leads women to tend
to favor the men with high popularity and thus increases the
intensity of competition among women. Many women have
to bematched with the men positioned further down on their
preference lists. This will lead to an increase in the average
‘energy’ of women and all people.
Due to the increase of 𝜔 in the beginning, the reduction
of women’s ‘energy’ is more significant than the increase of
men’s ‘energy’. As shown in Figure 3(a), there exists a 𝜔∗𝑔 that
can make average ‘energy’ of all people reaches the optimal
value. In other words, it is a certain degree of social popularity
that increases the total social utility.
In order to study the relationship between a person’s
intrinsic popularity and her/his level of utility, we cluster
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Figure 3: The numerical simulation of average ‘energy’ of all agents,𝑁 = 1000; the result is averaged over 100 realizations. (a) The average
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Figure 4: The average ‘energy’ of different popularity groups; the horizontal axis shows the different values of popularity. 𝑁 = 1000; the
result is averaged over 100 realizations. (a) The average ‘energy’ of men at 𝜔 = 0 and 𝜔 = 𝜔∗𝑤; (b) the average ‘energy’ of women at 𝜔 = 0 and
𝜔 = 𝜔∗𝑤; (c) the average ‘energy’ of three representative popularity groups of men, bottom(0,0.1), middle(0.45,0.55), and top(0.9,1), versus 𝜔;
(d) the average ‘energy’ of three representative popularity groups of women, bottom(0,0.1), middle(0.45,0.55), and top(0.9,1), versus 𝜔. Note
that when 𝜔 = 0 (triangles) the average ‘energy’ of men or women stays the same as the value shown in Figure 2(a); the small deviations are
the random fluctuations which are irrelevant to the popularity.
the ‘energy’ of men and women to 10 groups according to
the range of popularity [0, 0.1), [0.1, 0.2), . . . , [0.9, 1] (data
binning) and compare their utility in two cases: 𝜔 = 0
and 𝜔 = 𝜔∗𝑤 (women’s optimal). As shown by Figure 4(a),
the competition causes ‘energy’ of men to rise in all pop-
ularity groups. As shown in Figure 4(b), at the women’s
optimal weight of popularity, the ‘energy’ of women in lowest
20% conformity groups increases, and the ‘energy’ of the
remaining 80% women decreases. In general, women will
have lower ‘energy’ with a certain level of competition, as we
have known above.
In addition, we take three representative agent groups
and label them as bottom (popularity ranges [0,0.1]), middle
(conformity ranges [0.45,0.55]), and top (popularity ranges
[0.9,1]), respectively. With the increase of competition, i.e.,
the increase of 𝜔, the ‘energy’ of the three groups of men
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Figure 5: The matching between 1000 men and 999 women, as a function of 𝜔. The result is averaged over 100 realizations. (a) The average
‘energy’ of men and women; (b) Δ𝜖𝑚 versus 𝜔; (c) Δ𝜖𝑤 versus 𝜔.
will increase, while the top women will have lower ‘energy’
and the bottom women will have higher ‘energy’ (as shown
in Figures 4(c) and 4(d)). This change is very sensitive to 𝜔;
even if 𝜔 is very small (0.01), the ‘energy’ difference between
the top group and bottom group has an obvious gap. For
the middle group women, a slight competition improves
their utility, but as the competition intensifies, their ‘energy’
becomes even higher.
3.2. Matching between 𝑁 Men and 𝑁 − 1 Women. For
a long time, the G-S algorithm has been considered to
produce a men-optimal stable matching. In particular, for
a completely random preference list, that is, when 𝜔 =
0, the average ‘energy’ of men is log(𝑁) + 0.522, which
is far less than the average ‘energy’ of women, which is
𝑁/[log(𝑁) + 0.522], so the active side takes a huge advantage
in the matching. However, a recent research [20] shows that
in a random bipartite matching, if one woman is removed
from the matching, the average ‘energy’ of men will become
𝑁/ log(𝑁), and the average ‘energy’ of women will become
log(𝑁). The ’energies’ of the positive and passive sides are
completely reversed.
In our daily life, the sizes of matching parties are rarely
equal. Imagine removing one agent of passive party in the
bipartite matching, for example, reducing a woman in the
marriage problem, downsizing one job position in the labor
market, or cutting one offer in the college admission; under
the assumption of random bipartite matching, the pairing
result will change drastically with the smallest change of the
size of passive side. In particular in the marriage problem,
due to the natural inequality of birth rates of different sex as
well as some other cultural or political impact, the sex ratio
(boys versus girls) is larger than 1. It makes the matching
of unequal numbers of men and women have even more
practical meaning. However, in reality, one of the possible
reasons for the phenomenon that such a large difference in
social utility is rarely seen, is that the low-popularity agents
will be quickly eliminated and other people’s pairing results
are almost unaffected.
We analyze the matching results in the case of 1000 men
and 999 women with different 𝜔. As shown in Figure 5(a),
the curves are extremely similar to that of Figure 2(a), despite
the fact that the gender has reversed.The women become the
dominant side of the matching. We compare this asymmetric
case with the symmetric case above and examine the changes
of the average ‘energy’ ofmen and women,Δ𝜖𝑚 = 𝜖
󸀠
𝑚−𝜖𝑚 and
Δ𝜖𝑤 = 𝜖
󸀠
𝑚−𝜖𝑤.The results are shown in Figures 5(b) and 5(c),
respectively. It is found that this difference sharply decreases
with the increase of 𝜔, which explains why the slight change
in the number of people in reality does not obviously affect
overall utility society.
4. Conclusion
In this article we introduce competition in bipartite matching
problem by bringing the conformity in the preference lists
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of agents. While in the traditional Gale-Shapley model, the
preference lists of agents are randomly generated, the active
agents can easily acquire the results they want and stop
sending proposals so that the agents from the passive side are
left with little freedom of choice. We show that if a certain
amount of competition is introduced, the active agents have
to make more efforts and send more proposals, which will
slightly decrease their utility. However, at the same time, the
utility of the passive side will be obviously increased, and
society as a whole will have a higher total utility than the
original matching result. To summarize, a certain amount
of competition increases the total utility of the society. This
not only is true for the bipartite matching problem, but
also enlightens our understanding of many other social
phenomena. Besides, when matching two parties of different
sizes, the utility of the two parties can be dramatically
changed compared to the symmetric case. The introduction
of conformity in the preference lists can also eliminate this
potential significant utility change, which provides a possible
explanation why this significant utility change is rarely seen
in human society.
Data Availability
No data were used to support this study.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Prof. Yi-Cheng Zhang and Wen-Yao
Zhang for helpful discussions. This research is supported in
part by the Chinese National Natural Science Foundation
under grant No. 61602202 and Natural Science Foundation of
Jiangsu Province under grants No. BK20160428, BK20161302.
Gui-Yuan Shia and Yi-Xiu Kong acknowledge the support
from China Scholarship Council (CSC).
References
[1] D. Gale and L. S. Shapley, “College admissions and the stability
of marriage,” 	e American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 69, no.
1, pp. 9–15, 1962.
[2] A. E. Roth, “The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical
Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory,” Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 92, no. 6, pp. 991–1016, 1984.
[3] A. E. Roth and M. A. Sotomayor, Two-sided matching, vol. 18 of
Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1990.
[4] B. M. Maggs and R. K. Sitaraman, “Algorithmic nuggets in
content delivery,”Computer Communication Review, vol. 45, no.
3, pp. 52–66, 2015.
[5] D. Lebedev, F. Mathieu, and L. Viennot, “On using matching
theory to understand P2P network design,” in In INOC 2007,
International Network Optimization Conference, 2007.
[6] M. Hasan and E. Hossain, “Distributed resource allocation in
5G cellular networks,” inTowards 5G: Applications, requirements
and candidate technologies, pp. 245–269, Wiley, 2015.
[7] G. J. Hitsch, A. Hortac¸su, and D. Ariely, “Matching and sorting
in online dating,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 1, pp.
130–163, 2010.
[8] A. E. Roth, “The economics of matching: stability and incen-
tives,”Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 617–
628, 1982.
[9] M. Dzierzawa and M.-J. Ome´ro, “Statistics of stable marriages,”
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 287, no.
1-2, pp. 321–333, 2000.
[10] Y. Zhang, “The Information Economy,” in Non-Equilibrium
Social Science and Policy, Understanding Complex Systems, pp.
149–158, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2017.
[11] A. Chakraborti, D. Challet, A. Chatterjee, M. Marsili, Y.-C.
Zhang, and B. . Chakrabarti, “Statistical mechanics of com-
petitive resource allocation using agent-based models,” Physics
Reports, vol. 552, pp. 1–25, 2015.
[12] M.-J. Ome´ro, M. Dzierzawa, M. Marsili, and Y.-C. Zhang,
“Scaling behavior in the stable marriage problem,” Journal de
Physique II, vol. 7, no. 12, pp. 1723–1732, 1997.
[13] G.-Y. Shi, Y.-X. Kong, H. Liao, and Y.-C. Zhang, “Analysis
of ground state in random bipartite matching,” Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 444, pp. 397–402,
2016.
[14] M. Me´zard and G. Parisi, “Replicas and optimization,” Journal
de Physique Lettres, vol. 46, no. 17, pp. 771–778, 1985.
[15] M. Me´zard and G. Parisi, “The Euclidean matching problem,”
Le Journal de Physique, vol. 49, no. 12, pp. 2019–2025, 1988.
[16] V. S. Dotsenko, “Exact solution of the random bipartite match-
ingmodel,” Journal of Physics A:Mathematical and General, vol.
33, no. 10, pp. 2015–2030, 2000.
[17] Y.-C. Zhang, “Happier world with more information,” Physica
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 299, no. 1-2, pp.
104–120, 2001.
[18] P. Laureti and Y.-C. Zhang, “Matching games with partial infor-
mation,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,
vol. 324, no. 1-2, pp. 49–65, 2003.
[19] G. Caldarelli and A. Capocci, “Beauty and distance in the
stable marriage problem,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and
its Applications, vol. 300, no. 1-2, pp. 325–331, 2001.
[20] G. Shi, Y. Kong, B. Chen, G. Yuan, and R. Wu, “Instability in
Stable Marriage Problem: MatchingUnequally NumberedMen
andWomen,” Complexity, vol. 2018, 5 pages, 2018.
Research Article
Congenital and Blood Transfusion Transmission of Chagas
Disease: A Framework Using Mathematical Modeling
Edneide Ramalho ,1 Jones Albuquerque,1,2 Cláudio Cristino,1 Virginia Lorena,3
Jordi Gómez i Prat,4 Clara Prats ,5 and Daniel López 5
1Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco, Departamento de Estat´ıstica e Informa´tica, Recife, PE, Brazil
2LIKA –Laborato´rio de Imunopatologia Keizo Assami, UFPE, Recife, PE, Brazil
3FIOCRUZ – Fundac¸a˜o Oswaldo Cruz - Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil
4Unitat de Salut Internacional, PROSICS, Programa Especial de Malalties Infeccioses Vall d’Hebron-Drassanes, Barcelona, Spain
5Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya BarcelonaTech, Departament de Fı´sica, Escola Superior d’Agricultura de Barcelona,
Castelldefels, Spain
Correspondence should be addressed to Clara Prats; clara.prats@upc.edu
Received 21 May 2018; Accepted 4 October 2018; Published 1 November 2018
Guest Editor: Miguel Fuentes
Copyright © 2018 Edneide Ramalho et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
Chagas disease or American trypanosomiasis is an important health problem in Latin America. Due to the mobility of Latin
American population around the world, countries without vector presence started to report disease cases. We developed a
deterministic compartmental model in order to gain insights into the disease dynamics in a scenario without vector presence,
considering congenital transmission and transmission by blood transfusion. The model was used to evaluate the epidemiological
effect of control measures. It was applied to demographic data from Spain and sensitivity analysis was performed on model
parameters associated with control strategies.
1. Introduction
Chagas disease or American trypanosomiasis is caused by the
protozoan parasite Trypanosoma cruzi, and it is an important
health problem in Latin America. The most effective trans-
mission route is through contact with triatomines bug (the
disease vector) feces. Other transmission routes can occur
by blood transfusion, organ transplantation, and congenital
transmission [1]. Some cases of oral transmission have been
reported in Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Argentina,
and Bolivia [2].
The disease presents an initial acute phase, generally
asymptomatic, and a subsequent chronic phase, which can
present clinical manifestations (cardiac, digestive, and/or
neurological) [1]. Since the 1960s the only drugs used in
Chagas disease treatment are benznidazole and nifurtimox,
which have a great efficiency if the treatment starts early and
can control disease progression in chronic cases [1, 3].
Although some Latin American countries, as Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Peru, have
received from the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO) the International Certification of Disease Elimina-
tion by the main vector Triatoma infestans, the disease is still
a challenge [4]. According to theWorld Health Organization,
around 8 million people are infected worldwide and 10,000
people die every year due to disease clinical manifestation
[1]. Moreover, it estimates that 25 million people are at risk
of acquiring the disease. Around 30-40% of infected people
develop cardiomyopathy, digestive megasyndromes, or both
[5].
Since 2000, cases of the disease started to be reported in
nonendemic countries such as European countries, Canada,
USA, Japan, and Australia, due to the large flow of Latin
American immigrants [6]. In 2010, the World Health Assem-
bly approved a resolution, WHA 63.20 [7], recognizing the
increase in the number of cases and established a way to track
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all of the transmission routes.The global cost of the disease is
similar to rotavirus or cervical cancer [8].
By 2009, 4,290 cases had been diagnosed in Europe,
compared with an estimated incidence ranging from 68,000
to 122,000 cases, hence 95% of cases are nondiagnosed,
reflecting the difficulty in tracking infected people [9, 10].
Due to uncertainty about the real number of cases in each
country, estimates are based on PAHO [11] and Schmunis et
al. 2014 [12].
Spain is the European country with most Latin American
immigrants, ranking the second on the world list, after
the United States of America [13]. In 2008, there were
approximately 4 million immigrants in Spain. 1.5 million of
themwere born in a country endemic for Chagas disease and,
therefore, they are potential carriers of the disease [14]. The
first case of the disease by blood transfusion in Spain was
detected in 1984, with two more cases in 1995 and 2004 [15].
Cases of congenital transmission were also reported [16, 17].
Due to its silent evolution after infection and the resulting
underdiagnoses, there is no complete and reliable data about
the disease. Therefore, mathematical models can be a partic-
ularly useful tool on the study of disease spread and control.
Several mathematical modeling studies have been done
in order to assess different aspects of Chagas disease and
control strategies. For instance, Velasco-Hernandez et al. [18]
considered a compartmental model with humans, vectors,
and transmission by blood transfusion. Inaba and Sekine
[19] also considered humans, vectors, and blood transfusion
but with infection age dependent infectivity. Congenital
transmission was considered by Massad [4], Raimundo et al.
[20], and Coffield et al. [21]. Fabrizio et al. [22] explored an
interhuman model, considering congenital transmission and
blood transfusion transmission.
In this work, we present a novel deterministic compart-
mental model considering congenital and blood transfusion
as the main mode of transmission using demographic data
from Spain. The aim is to gain insight into the dynamics of
the disease in a scenario without the vector and to evaluate
the epidemiological impact through the implementation of
control strategies like an improvement on surveillance in
blood transfusion and treatment of infected newborns. We
also introduced a cure rate for infected individuals to verify
how it affects disease dynamics.This cure ratemeans decrease
in the number of parasites inside host, and consequently
decreasing the risk of developing clinical manifestation.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Model Description. We introduce a deterministic com-
partmentalmodel forChagas transmissionwithout the vector
presence. The model distinguishes Latin American people
from countries with active vector transmission and natives
and immigrants from countries without vector transmission.
It also splits men and women in different compartments in
order to take vertical transmission into account. Therefore,
the population is classified into eight compartments:
(1) 𝑀Vℎ: healthy men from country with active vector
transmission;
(2)𝑀V𝑖: infected men from country with active vector
transmission;
(3)𝑀ℎ: healthy men from country without vector trans-
mission;
(4) 𝑀𝑖: infected men from country without vector trans-
mission;
(5) WVℎ: healthy women from country with active vector
transmission;
(6) 𝑊V𝑖: infected women from country with active vector
transmission;
(7) 𝑊ℎ: healthy women from country without vector
transmission;
(8) 𝑊𝑖: infected women from country without vector
transmission.
In the model simulations we analyze the number of
individuals over time in each of the compartments. The pro-
cesses considered for driving their dynamics are the simplest
as possible, keeping in mind the essence of the system’s
structure, the objectives of the model and the questions to
be answered. The reasons for looking for such simplicity are
various. From a theoretical perspective, a strictly gradual
increase in complexity is essential in any model development
in order to elucidate the different drivers of the overall
dynamics. From a social perspective, this simplicity facilitates
the necessary interaction with nonmodelers like community
health workers, social scientists, and patients’ associations in
order to seek real and feasible applications.
The processes considered by the current model are birth,
mortality, and flows among compartments. Infections flows
are associated with two possible causes: blood transfusion
and congenital transmission. Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the
model.The assumptions for the dynamics of transmission are
the following:
(i) It is assumed that vertical transmission is propor-
tional to the number of infected women. People who
are born in Spain will be considered in the without
vector compartment, that is, 𝑊𝑖 or 𝑀𝑖, even though
their family origin is Latin American.
(ii) We considered that the birth rate 𝛼 is the same for
women from countries with and without the vector
presence. We also assumed that 50% of the descen-
dants are women and 50% are men, for simplicity.
(iii) If a woman is infected, she has a probability 𝛽 to infect
her son or daughter.
(iv) The parameter 𝛾 stands for mortality rate for healthy
people. For infected individuals we assumed a mor-
tality rate induced by the disease 𝛿, where 𝛿 > 𝛾.
(v) Flow among health and infected classes due to blood
transfusion is considered as the result of interaction
between susceptible and infected people. We con-
sidered that there is no difference in the blood and
organ donation rate for populations from countries
without the vector and for countries with the vector.
The parameter 𝜏 stands for the yearly blood donation
rate.
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Figure 1: Flow chart for the dynamics of proposed model. Letters inside box indicate the number of individuals in each compartment:
infected women from country with vector (𝑊V𝑖), healthy women from country with active vector transmission (𝑊Vℎ), infected men from
countrywith active vector transmission (𝑀V𝑖), healthymen fromcountrywith active vector transmission (𝑀Vℎ), infectedwomen fromcountry
without vector transmission (𝑊
𝑖
), healthy women from country without vector transmission (𝑊
ℎ
), infectedmen from country without vector
transmission(𝑀
𝑖
), and healthy men from country without vector transmission (𝑀
ℎ
). 𝛾 is the death rate for healthy people and 𝛿 is the death
rate for infected people. 𝜏
𝑏
is the rate of infection due to blood transfusion. Dashed lines indicate the births. Newborns from𝑊V𝑖 can be an
infected female (1), healthy female (2), healthy male (3), or infected male (4). The same occur for newborns from𝑊
𝑖
that can be infected
female (5), healthy female (6), infected male (7), or healthy male (8). Healthy women𝑊Vℎ and𝑊ℎ only gave birth to healthy newborns (flows
not shown).
(vi) We also considered that a proportion 𝑝𝑖 of donated
blood is potentially contaminated with T. cruzi. Once
donation has been made, health services carry out
controls screening. We considered 𝜉 as the probability
of an effective surveillance in screening donated
blood samples, thus 1 − 𝜉 is the probability that an
infected sample will not be detected, reach a receptor,
and infect him or her. In this way, the rate at which
a healthy person becomes infected with a parasite
from an infected person will be proportional to the
product 𝜏𝑏 = 𝜏𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝜉). We also considered that
all transfusions are made with the same rate for all
individuals.
(vii) We supposed that infected individuals can be cured
with a rate 𝐶 due to treatment. This cure rate
means a reduction in the number of parasites inside
host, reducing the chances of clinical manifestation.
We consider that a yearly percentage 𝑑 of infected
individuals will be diagnosed and receive treatment.
Considering 𝑒 as the treatment effectiveness, we can
write 𝐶 = 𝑒 ⋅ 𝑑. The detected patients that do
not receive any treatment due to different reasons
(e.g., reported difficulties in accessing it [29]) are not
distinguished from nondiagnosed individuals by the
model.
(viii) Nomigration flows (neither immigration nor emigra-
tion) were considered by themodel, since they are not
relevant for its current purpose.
According to the assumptions above, the model is rep-
resented by the following system of ordinary differential
equations (1)-(8):
𝑑𝑀ℎ
𝑑𝑡 = 0.5𝛼 (𝑊ℎ +𝑊Vℎ)
+ 0.5𝛼 (1 − 𝛽 + 𝜌) (𝑊𝑖 +𝑊V𝑖) + 𝐶𝑀𝑖
− 𝛾𝑀ℎ − 𝜏𝑏 (1 − 𝜉)𝑀ℎ ( 𝐼𝑁)
(1)
𝑑𝑊ℎ
𝑑𝑡 = 0.5𝛼 (𝑊ℎ +𝑊Vℎ)
+ 0.5𝛼 (1 − 𝛽 + 𝜌) (𝑊𝑖 +𝑊V𝑖) + 𝐶𝑊𝑖
− 𝛾𝑊ℎ − 𝜏𝑏 (1 − 𝜉)𝑊ℎ ( 𝐼𝑁)
(2)
𝑑𝑀Vℎ
𝑑𝑡 = 𝐶𝑀V𝑖 − 𝛾𝑀Vℎ − 𝜏𝑏 (1 − 𝜉)𝑀Vℎ (
𝐼
𝑁) (3)
𝑑𝑊Vℎ
𝑑𝑡 = 𝐶𝑊V𝑖 − 𝛾𝑊Vℎ − 𝜏𝑏 (1 − 𝜉)𝑊Vℎ (
𝐼
𝑁) (4)
𝑑𝑀𝑖
𝑑𝑡 = 0.5𝛼𝛽 (𝑊𝑖 +𝑊V𝑖) (1 − 𝜌) − (𝛿 + 𝐶)𝑀𝑖
+ 𝜏𝑏 (1 − 𝜉)𝑀ℎ ( 𝐼𝑁)
(5)
𝑑𝑊𝑖
𝑑𝑡 = 0.5𝛼𝛽 (𝑊𝑖 +𝑊V𝑖) (1 − 𝜌) − (𝛿 + 𝐶)𝑊𝑖
+ 𝜏𝑏 (1 − 𝜉)𝑊ℎ ( 𝐼𝑁)
(6)
𝑑𝑀V𝑖
𝑑𝑡 = 𝜏𝑏 (1 − 𝜉)𝑀Vℎ (
𝐼
𝑁) − (𝛿 + 𝐶)𝑀V𝑖 (7)
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𝑑𝑊V𝑖
𝑑𝑡 = 𝜏𝑏 (1 − 𝜉)𝑊Vℎ (
𝐼
𝑁) − (𝛿 + 𝐶)𝑊V𝑖 (8)
where 𝐼 = 𝑊𝑖+𝑀𝑖+𝑊V𝑖+𝑀V𝑖 is the number of all infected
individuals and𝑁 is the total population.
Formulating and evaluating the model behavior will help
us to find out what information is known and what is
unknown, to analyze the relative importance of each one of
the parameters, and to understand the system’s dynamics,
observing the long-term dynamics based on the control
actions that are carried out.
3. Results
3.1. Parameter Estimation. In order to evaluate the trends and
the important factors on the dynamic system, it is necessary
to attribute parameters values used by the model. Thus, the
modelwas fed with available data from Spain.The diversity of
model parameters to be fixed required the use of different data
sources. After exploring data availability, we chose 2007 as
the starting point of the simulation because it guaranteed the
access to all necessary information. The sources and obtained
values are described below.
3.1.1. Birth Rate and Vertical Transmission. By 2007 birth
rate in Spain was 10.9 per 1,000 inhabitants [23]. In a study
performed in two maternity clinics in Barcelona, Mun˜oz et
al. [24] reported a prevalence of 3.4% among pregnant Latin
American and 7.3% of newborns were infected. Then, we set
the birth rate as 𝛼 = 0.0109 year−1 and the probability of
vertical transmission as 𝛽 = 0.073.
3.1.2. Mortality Rates. By 2007 mortality rate in Spain was
8.5 per 1,000 inhabitants [25]. Cunuba´ et al. [26] published
a systematic review about mortality attributed to Chagas
disease.The authors found that the annuallymortality rate for
Chagas patients was twice higher than non-Chagas patients
in a moderate clinical group (0.16 (Chagas) vs. 0.08 (non-
Chagas) with RR = 2.10, 95% CI: 1.52-2.91).Therefore, we set
𝛾 = 0.0085 per year and 𝛿 = 2𝛾 = 0.017.
3.1.3. Transmission by Blood Transfusion. We defined the rate
of transmission by blood transfusion as 𝜏𝑏 = 𝜏𝑝𝑖, where𝜏 is the donation rate per year and 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion
of potentially infected blood samples. The proportion of
potentially infected blood samples was reported as 0.67 per
1,000 [27]. The rate of blood donation in Spain in 2007 was
33.4 per 1,000 inhabitants [28]. Then, the rate of infection by
blood transfusion 𝜏𝑏 was calculated as 0.00022378 per year.
3.1.4. Control Strategies. Actions to control the increase
in new cases of Chagas disease are incorporated into the
model ((1)-(8)) by assuming some control parameters. We
considered two kinds of control strategies:
(i) Increasing the proportion of infected newborn
treated, by means of increasing the parameter 𝜌 on
the model simulation.
(ii) Increasing surveillance in blood transfusion, by
means of increasing the parameter 𝜉 in the model
simulation.
Moreover, we also assumed a cure rate by diagnosing and
treating infected individuals. In the model simulation, it was
done by increasing the parameter 𝑑.
A summary of parameters used in the simulations is listed
in Table 1.
3.2. Numerical Simulations. Population in Spain in 2007 was
45,226,803 [30] of which 1,638,694 were immigrants from
countries with the vector presence and potential Chagas dis-
ease carriers. The estimated number of infected individuals
was 53,134. Besides, taking into account the demographic
characteristics of the population, the estimated number of
infected women in the childbearing age in Spain was 24,000
[24, 27].
Based on that, the initial conditions were set as𝑀ℎ(0) =21, 791, 055,𝑀𝑖(0) = 0,𝑀Vℎ(0) = 792, 780,𝑀V𝑖(0) = 29, 134,𝑊ℎ(0) = 21, 792, 055,𝑊𝑖(0) = 0,𝑊Vℎ(0) = 792, 780,𝑊V𝑖(0) =24, 000.
By use of model (1)-(8), we simulated the cumulative
number of infected people over time. Numerical simulations
were performed using the software R 3.5.0, integrating the
system ((1)-(8)) by Runge–Kutta fourth-order method, using
the parameters shown in Table 1 and the initial conditions
set above. Time step used was one year and time range for
simulation was 40 years.
3.3. Total Infected Population. The dynamics of the total
number of infected individuals (𝐼 = 𝑀𝑖 + 𝑊𝑖 + 𝑀V𝑖 +𝑊V𝑖) was simulated for 40 years in order to observe the
epidemiological behavior given by the model. We observe a
decreasing behavior on the total number of infected people
along time as shown in Figure 2. This result is due to the
higher death rate attributed to infected people and to the fact
that migration flows are not considered, thus resulting in a
decreasing rate of change in the total number of the infected.
At the end of 40 years simulation, there was a 48% reduction
in the number of the total infected when compared with the
initial value.
3.4. Comparing the Effect of Transmission Routes. Beyond
the number of infected people immigrating to the country
without vector presence, another quantity of interest is the
number of new cases of the disease, i. e., the cumulative
number of new infected arising due blood transfusion and
congenital transmission, represented by the sum of individu-
als in the compartments𝑊𝑖 and𝑀𝑖.
We can compare the difference in the disease dynamics
when only one route of infection is considered, as displayed
in Figure 3.The results show that congenital transmission has
a higher impact than the transmission by blood transfusion,
causing 38% more new infections.
3.5. Control Strategies. Two control strategies were consid-
ered, as above mentioned, treatment of infected newborns
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Table 1: Parameters used in numerical simulation of proposed model (1)-(8).
Parameter Meaning Value Source
𝛼 Birth rate (year−1) 0.0109 [23]
𝛽 Probability of vertical transmission 0.073 [24]
𝛾 Mortality rate (year−1) 0.0085 [25]
𝛿 Mortality rate due disease (year−1) 0.0017 [26]
𝜏
𝑏
Rate of infection by infected blood (year−1) 0.00022378 [27, 28]
𝐶 Cure rate (year−1) Various
𝜌 Proportion of new born treated Various
𝜉 Probability of a efficient surveillance Various
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Figure 2: Dynamics on the number of total infected people along
40 years simulation considering death rate due to disease as twice
the natural death rate and no migration flows.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the number of cumulative new infections
along time when a single transmission route is considered.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis on the cumulative number of newly
infected individuals by varying 𝜌, i.e., the proportion of treatment
of infected newborn.
(𝜌) and surveillance in blood transfusion (𝜉).These strategies
were simulated, isolated, and combined.
3.5.1. Considering Only Treatment of Infected Newborns. In
this simulation, we evaluated the effect of performing a
control strategy only on newborns. The parameter associ-
ated with this control strategy is 𝜌, which represents the
proportion of successfully treated infected newborns. This
parameter was varied by 20%. The other parameters of the
model remained constant as in Table 1, while the parameter
𝜉 representing the control in blood transmission was set to
zero. Figure 4 displays the result of this sensitivity analysis in
the cumulative number of newly infected individuals.
When comparing these tendencies with the scenario
without control (Figure 2), the obtained percentage reduc-
tions on the cumulative number of new infected after 40 years
are shown in Table 2. Treating 100% of infected newborn
means that the cumulative number of newly infected individ-
uals will arise only due to transmission by blood transfusion.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis on the cumulative number of newly
infected individuals by varying 𝜉, i.e., the probability of effective
surveillance in blood transfusions.
Table 2: Percentage reductions due to variation only in parameter
𝜌 – the proportion of treatment in infected newborn.
𝜌 values Reduction (%)
20% 12.5
40% 24.9
60% 37.29
80% 49.64
100% 61.95
Table 3: Percentage reductions in the number of new cases due to
variation in parameter 𝜉 – the probability of an effective surveillance
in blood transfusion.
𝜉 values Reduction (%)
20% 7.75
40% 15.49
60% 23.22
80% 30.93
100% 38.63
3.5.2. Control Only in Blood Transfusion. In this simulation,
we evaluated the effect of performing a control strategy only
onblood transfusion. Figure 5 displays the result of sensitivity
analysis on the cumulative number of newly infected indi-
viduals by varying the probability of an effective surveillance
𝜉 on blood transfusions, while the other parameters remain
constant and the parameter associated with the control of
infected newborn 𝜌 is set to zero.
The obtained percentage reductions in the cumulative
number of the newly infected after a 40 years simulation,
when compared with the without control scenario (Figure 2),
are shown in Table 3. When a probability of an effective
Table 4: Percentage reductions in the number of new cases due
to variation in both parameters associated with control strategies
– 𝜌 (percent of infected newborn treated) and 𝜉 (probability of an
effective surveillance in blood transfusion).
Parameters values Reduction (%)
𝜌 = 20%, 𝜉 = 20% 20.2
𝜌 = 40%, 𝜉 = 20% 32.6
𝜌 = 60%, 𝜉 = 40% 52.6
𝜌 = 80%, 𝜉 = 60% 72.6
𝜌 = 100%, 𝜉 = 80% 92.4.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis on the cumulative number of newly
infected by applying combined control: increasing proportion of
treatment in infected newborns (parameter 𝜌) and on the surveil-
lance in blood transfusion transmission (parameter 𝜉).
surveillance reaches 100%, new cases are only due to congen-
ital transmission.
3.5.3. Combined Control. Sensitivity analysis can also be
performed by varying the two parameters associated to
control strategies at the same time. Figure 6 shows the results
of combined control, by varying 𝜌 and 𝜉 simultaneously.
Resulting percentage reductions on the cumulative number
of newly infected when compared with a without control
scenario at the end of 40 years simulation are shown in
Table 4.
We also explored the effect of a certain cure rate on the
dynamics of infected individuals. The effectiveness due to
treatment with nifurtimox and/or benznidazole in patients in
the chronic indeterminate phase of Chagas disease is about 7-
8% [3].
According to [10], the index of underdiagnosis in Spain is
in the range 92.0-95.6%. It justifies the low values considered
for the percent of detected individuals in model simulation,
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Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis considering detection and treatment
of infected individuals 𝑑, treatment of infected newborns 𝜌, and
surveillance in blood transfusion transmission 𝜉.
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Figure 8:The result of simulation of interrupted control. Parameters
associated with control strategies were 𝑑 = 25% (detection of
infected people), 𝜌 = 80% (treatment of infected newborn), and
𝜉 = 80% (effectiveness on surveillance in blood transfusion). The
control strategies were applied after 10 years of simulation. After 15
years of application, the control strategies were stopped.
included in the parameter 𝑑. Based on that, we set the
treatment effectiveness as 𝑒 = 7.5% and varied the detection
and treatment of infected individuals 𝑑. The cure rate is
assessed as 𝐶 = 7.5% ⋅ 𝑑.
The detection and treatment of infected patients are
difficult, mainly due to the asymptomatic characteristics of
the disease [10] but also because of other barriers such as
health care access limitations or the ownmisperception of the
Table 5: Percentage reductions on the total number of infected
individuals by varying the proportion of detection and treatment of
infected individuals 𝑑.
𝑑 values Reduction (%)
𝑑 = 5% 13.93
𝑑 = 15% 36.23
𝑑 = 20% 45.11
𝑑 = 25% 52.76
Table 6: Percentage reductions for each parameter variation.
Parameters Reduction (%)
d = 5%, 𝜉= 10%, 𝜌= 10% 22.63
d = 15%, 𝜉= 20%, 𝜌= 20% 48.78
d = 20%, 𝜉= 30%, 𝜌= 30% 60.51
d = 25%, 𝜉= 40%, 𝜌= 40% 69.75
disease [29]. Therefore, we varied the parameter 𝑑 between 0
and 25%.
Percentage reductions in the total number of infected
individuals from the initial year simulation to 40 years are
shown in Table 5.
The cumulative number of new infected is strongly
affected by the introduction of the cure rate. Figure 7 displays
the sensitivity analysis by varying the parameters 𝜌, 𝜉, and
𝑑. The corresponding percentage reductions when compared
with the scenario without control at the end of 40 years
simulation for each parameter combination are displayed in
Table 6.
3.5.4. Interrupted Control. Another interesting scenario
explored by our model was the simulation of interrupted
control. We simulated the cumulative number of new cases
by applying control strategies after ten years without control,
followed by a control period of 15 years, and interrupted
again after this period. We used a detection proportion of
25%, a treatment success of 80% of infected newborns, and
surveillance in blood transfusion 80% effective. Figure 8
displays the result. In the first ten years, the number of
new cases increases because there are more infected people
in the population. When control strategies are performed,
the number of new cases decreases because infected people
are treated avoiding transmission by congenital and blood
transfusion routes. When the control strategies are stopped,
the number of new cases start increasing again, since there
will be more infected newborns and people infected by blood
transfusions over time.
4. Discussion
In this work, we used a compartmental mathematical model
to evaluate the dynamics of Chagas disease in a scenario
with vector absence, where the transmission can only occur
through congenital or blood transfusion routes.
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Our results show that, although the total number of
infected individuals presents a decreasing behavior (Fig-
ure 2), in 40 years its reduction reaches less than half of its
initial value, even assuming a death rate for infected individ-
uals as twice the rate for healthy people and no immigration.
It means that if the disease is not taken seriously, it can be
present in the population for a long period of time [31], even
with the vector absence, generating a burden to the public
health system which should be prepared to provide patient
care and conduct an adequate treatment in order to prevent
the long-term disease manifestations.
According to the model, transmission exclusively due to
blood transfusion has a smaller impact on the number of new
cases when compared with the transmission exclusively due
to congenital route (Figure 3). Low prevalence in blood banks
in countries with vector absence, oftentimes by self-exclusion
of Latin American immigrants in transfusion services, can
explain this fact [9]. Nevertheless, blood screening should
be sustained and it is vital to prevent infection through
transfusion and organ transplantation also in nonendemic
countries. Optimizing blood transfusion safety and screening
is one of the resolutions of the World Health Assembly for
the control and elimination of Chagas disease (WHA 63.20)
[7]. In Spain, the control strategy is based on selective donor
screening from a questionnaire and it has been implemented
since 2005. Donations from at-risk individuals are accepted
and the blood is tested [15]. It can prevent a transfusion by
a contaminated blood sample beyond identifying infected
people. Simulation results plotted in Figures 4 and 5 display
the application of isolated control strategies. They show that,
even if all infected newborns are treated or if a totally effective
surveillance in blood banks is reached, the reduction on the
number of new cases when compared with a scenario without
control is not 100% achieved.
Themodel simulation also shows that application of com-
bined control strategies (i.e., treatment of infected newborns
and effective surveillance in blood transfusion) can lead to a
more significant reduction in the number of new cases when
compared with a scenario without control (Figure 6). For
instance, treating 80% of infected newborns and having 60%
of effectiveness on surveillance in blood banks entails 72.6%
less new infections when compared with a scenario without
control. It is important to highlight that, although there are
standard protocols to deal with the disease control, the quality
of the service is very important and sometimes difficult to be
measured. In this sense, the study of patients’ perceptions and
experiences should be included in such protocols in order to
increase the quality assessment of services. This fact justifies
the values used on our parameters associated with control
strategies, varying from 20% to 100% on the effectiveness.
Regarding congenital transmission, an important fact to
mention is that the majority of Latin American immigrants
in Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand are
women in childbearing age, highlighting the importance of
programs to screen pregnant women. These programs lead
to an early detection of congenital transmission, as stated
in World Health Assembly [7]. By 2014 only the Tuscany
region in Italy had legislation to screen pregnant women
from areas considered endemic [8]. In Spain, only Catalonia,
Valencia, and Galicia regions had protocols in screening
pregnant women from Latin America up to 2014 [8]. The
other countries do not have national programs for disease
prevention [32, 33]. The adoption of screening protocols is
extremely important since the identification and treatment of
infected newborns have good therapeutic results [24].
Although the detection of infected people is difficult due
to the asymptomatic characteristic of the disease leading to
an underestimation on the number of current cases [10], our
model tested the effect of a cure rate due to treatment. This
cure rate can be understood as a reduction in the number
of parasites inside the host body. Treatment in chronic
cases can reduce long-term complications caused by the
disease [3, 34]. Nevertheless, treatment accessibility should
be guaranteed for all of the diagnosed patients by eliminating
existing barriers [29]. Regarding women in childbearing age,
detection and treatment also prevent congenital transmission
[35, 36].
Our model results are in accordance with this fact since
the detection and treatment of infected people have an impact
on the cumulative number of new infections (Figure 7).
One important strategy to track infected people is by active
surveillance in primary care and community action in order
to identify pregnant women and follow up their children
[37]. Even with a great effort to conduct this kind of strategy,
in some cases, infected people can be lost. The simulations
results show that there is a reduction in the number of
total infected people by 52.76% if 25% of infected people
are detected and treated when compared with a scenario
without control. The detection and treatment also reduce
the number of new cases when combined with treatment of
infected newborns and surveillance on blood transfusions.
For example, detecting 25% of infected individuals, treating
40% of infected newborns, and having a surveillance in blood
banks 40% efficient, the number of new cases is almost 70%
smaller when compared with a scenario without control. It is
important that the control strategies are sustained; otherwise,
the disease elimination will take even longer to be achieved.
Figure 8 displays a result of a simulation where the control
is applied for a limited period and it is then interrupted.
During the period where control applications are performed,
the number of new cases decreases, but it starts increasing
again when control stops.
The model was applied to Spain, a country without the
vector presence, but it could be similarly applied to other
countrieswith vector absence in order to carry out a diagnosis
of the current epidemiological situation and determine the
order of magnitude of such control strategies’ effects.
It should be recalled that a model is a simplified descrip-
tion of reality. Consequently, it entails necessary simplifica-
tions in order to focus on the stated aims. The proposed
model was sufficient to show the importance of sustaining
the control strategies considered in order to advance steadily
towards the disease elimination. Otherwise, it will be present
in a population for a long time causing long-term clinical
manifestation and a burden on the public health system.
Other aspects can be also explored in future works as, for
example, the introduction of migrations rates. Nevertheless,
although migration flows have a straightforward effect on
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are usually unpredictable and difficult to control. Therefore,
in silico experiments could be used for exploring different
scenarios and proposing possible actions to revert those
negative epidemiological effects. Another control strategy
that could be incorporated into the model for its testing is
the screening of specific collectives in order to detect (and
treat, if necessary) new asymptomatic cases among at-risk
populations [38]. In the case of women in childbearing age,
treating infected women before a future pregnancy would
prevent congenital transmission [36].
Finally, it is also important to point out that the inter- and
transdisciplinary work amongmodelers, health practitioners,
community health workers, patients’ associations, and other
context-specific actors is essential for generating and imple-
menting effective tools for decision making and public health
control policies. In that sense, the development of simple
models and user-friendly simulation platforms will guarantee
that this necessary collaboration between modeling experts
and nonexperts is feasible.
5. Conclusions
Mathematicalmodels can be used as a valuable tool to explore
different scenarios related to disease spread, as well as to
estimate the epidemiological impact when control strategies
are implemented. Interdisciplinary collaboration is extremely
important in this context since it can improve decision
making for the implementation of public policies in order to
reduce the disease burden in public health.
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Policymakings and regulations of financialmarkets rely on a good understanding of the complexity of financialmarkets.There have
been recent advances in applying data-driven science and network theory into the studies of social and financial systems. Financial
assets and institutions are strongly connected and influence each other. It is essential to study how the topological structures of
financial networks could potentially influencemarket behaviors. Network analysis is an innovativemethod to enhance data mining
and knowledge discovery in financial data. With the help of complex network theory, the topological network structures of a
market can be extracted to reveal hidden information and relationships among stocks. In this study, two major markets of the most
influential economies, China and the United States, are systematically studied from the perspective of financial network analysis.
Results suggest that the network properties and hierarchical structures are fundamentally different for the two stock markets.
The patterns embedded in the price movements are revealed and shed light on the market dynamics. Financial policymakers and
regulators can gain inspiration from these findings for applications in policy making, regulations design, portfolio management,
risk management, and trading.
1. Introduction
Thevisualization of networks and research of hierarchy struc-
tures are essential to study complex systems like financial
markets. Thanks to the significant development of complex
network science [1], quantitative methods and models have
been applied in the studies of financial markets network
structure. In financial network analysis, entities like assets,
stocks, markets, companies, and institutions are modeled as
vertices while their mutual relationships are abstracted as
edges. This approach empowers industrial professionals and
researchers to reveal hidden information embedded in the
topological structures of financial networks, such as the mar-
ket dynamics, trading activities, and investment sentiment.
This information is essential to evaluate and monitor the
financial market risks, contagions, distress propagation, as
well as market mode shifts. Financial network analysis has
been utilized in applications like portfoliomanagement, trad-
ing, market regulation, stress testing, and risk management.
The USA and China are the top two dominating
economies with influences over the global economies. The
two economies are similar in market size. However, the
US economy is well established and developed while the
Chinese economy is emerging and still undertaking fast
development. As the leading economic powerhouses, the
health and stabilities of these two economies are vital for the
prosperities of the world economy. During the past few years,
both countries suffered a series of stockmarket disasters, such
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as the 2008US subprime crisis and the 2007 and 2015Chinese
stock market bubble bursts. These dramatic market crashes
brought widespread and long-lasting negative impacts on
economies and markets. The stock markets of both countries
are also different regarding history, regulations, maturities,
and scales. Thus, it is essential to understand the properties
of these two markets by utilizing the data-driven science
approach. Recently, various major markets in the world
have been investigated using the financial network analysis
approach. However, there is still a lack of systematical studies
dedicating to compare the network structures and properties
of the US and Chinese stock markets using the financial
network analysis approach.
To understand how the two markets differ in the struc-
tures and topological properties, as well as the dynamics mar-
ket properties, this research investigates the markets using a
dataset spanning over nine years. In this research, the stock
markets are modeled as multiple networks including hier-
archical trees, minimum spanning trees, planar maximally
filtered graphs, and assets graphs. Meanwhile, their detailed
topological properties are analyzed and systematically com-
pared. Through quantitative analysis and network visualiza-
tion, results show the twomarkets are different inmany ways.
This provides insights for regulators on the structures and
dynamics of stock markets from the perspective of network
science.
This paper is organized as follows. First, Section 2 gives
a background on the theory of complex networks, financial
network analysis, and relevant complex network parameters
are introduced. Then, in Section 3, the data and method used
to construct networks are described. Section 4 presents the
network properties. In Section 5, the detailed hierarchical
structures of both stock networks are carefully investigated
and compared. Finally, conclusions and discussions are pre-
sented in Section 6.
2. Literature Review of
Financial Network Analysis
Network science has become an innovative tool widely used
in studies of complex systems in a variety of engineering and
scientific domains [2–4]. The network modeling methodolo-
gies and theoretical frameworks have revealed informative
and useful empirical discoveries [5]. Studying the statistical
properties such as degree distribution, average length, and
clustering coefficient can help describe the networks topolo-
gies and the dynamics of network evolution. Furthermore,
it is possible to study the information spreading, network
stability, and phase changes and hopefully to predict and
control the network dynamics [6].
Time series data can be modeled as networks [7, 8]. For
price time series [9], calculation of correlation matrices for a
group of assets is possible [10–12]. From the correlationmatri-
ces, financial network analysis could be applied to construct
networks for further analysis and data mining [13–17]. In
most existing literature, assets are treated as vertices, while
the interconnectivity relationships are modeled as pairwise
edges among assets. The correlation matrices are not only
important for network analysis and topological visualization
but also serve as a bridge between financial network analysis
and traditional finance theories. This is similar to modern
portfolio theory (MPT) [18, 19], which is based on the cor-
relation relationships among assets. Network-based portfolio
selection has been proposed for optimization and empirically
proofed workable [20].
Since the minimum spanning tree approach is first used
in the study of stock market structure [21], financial network
analysis has grown into an essential tool of financial big
data. However, this fast-growing field is still at an early stage
[22]. Financial network analysis provides an unprecedented
perspective shedding new insights on evaluating the market
stability, market risk, shock propagation, and contagion [23–
25]. The connectedness among assets plays the critical role
of market contagion phase transition [26] which is similar to
other tolerance properties of other nonfinancial complex
networks [27]. Further research reveals that intermediate
level of risk diversification can enhance themarket robustness
[28]. The importance and risk contribution of companies
can be identified through the network analysis [29, 30]. The
systemic risks and stability can also be evaluated according
to the topological properties of the financial network, and
providing implications for market regulations [22, 31, 32].
Through investigating the clustering of assets, portfolio opti-
mization can be achieved with better predicted over realized
risks [33]. Overlapping of portfolios is revealed by network
analysis as one primary factor for market contagion [34]. In
another approach, risk spillover networks are constructed to
study the behaviors of financial institutions [35]. Instead of
a single layer approach, by building multiple-layer network,
the banking system risk is analyzed and quantified [36].
Regression models can also take network structure into
consideration as factors for resilience and robustness of the
markets [37]. This financial network approach opens more
interesting newpossibilities and dramatically enriches regres-
sion models in finance studies. Recently, there has been a
thread of studies on major players in financial networks, such
as ‘too interconnected to fail’ institutions [38], ‘too central to
fail’ [39], and ‘too big to fail’ [40].The research demonstrated
that financial network analysis brings new insights to finance
studies and benefits to finance practices.
In the rise of quantitative trading, the causality and
lead/lag relationships revealed by financial network analysis
can be particularly interesting for trading strategy design [41,
42]. Many researches have revealed stylized evidence that the
network structure has a profound influence on the asset
returns [43]. Taking risks into consideration, it has been
found that investing in peripheries of financial networks
might generate better returns over risks [44]. Furthermore,
industry professionalswould be inspired by financial network
analysis to seek price movement signals for potential predic-
tions [45].
While most existing financial network analysis literatures
focus on the stock markets or specific economy sectors [46–
48], a variety of financial systems have been studied as fi-
nancial network such as global financial institutions [39, 40],
world trade web [49, 50], interbank markets [51–54], exchan-
ges [55], monetary market [56], corporate networks [57, 58],
global banking [59], CDSmarket [60], and credit market [61].
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Many major individual financial markets around the
world have also been studied in network approach, such asUS
[62, 63], China [64–66], Germany [67, 68], EU [69–71], Brazil
[33, 72], Italian [53, 56], Korea [73], Russia [74], and Mexico
[36, 75]. Furthermore, there is literature focusing on the
cross-board global markets [76, 77]. Using the partial data,
networks of global markets are reconstructed, and methods
are compared [56]. Bayesian graphical models are applied
to identify groups of counties which are major contributors
to systemic risks according to banking behaviors in the
global banks [78]. For the European markets, the risk and
contagion channels are studied, and results show the EU
markets are vulnerable to risks [71]. Global stock exchange
network is investigated to evaluate the attractions for IPOs
[79]. A recent study has demonstrated the approach which
uses transfer entropy to study a selection of major individual
stocks around the world and reveals that stocks are clustered
according to their countries and industries [80]. By looking
into the network structures of the global financial network,
it is possible to give new insights into the international
business cycle [81]. The diversification and participation are
investigated for various economies [82].
Considering a large number of assets in financial markets,
the initial networks havemassive edges. By filtering the noises
of the networks, the financial networks can be significantly
simplified to enable advanced analysis such as principal
component analysis (PCA) [76] and random matrix theory
(RMT) [83, 84] to further extract hidden patterns. Hierarchi-
cal tree (HT) [21, 68], minimum spanning tree (MST) [85],
planar maximally filtered graphs (PMFG) [86], asset graph
(AG) [87, 88], and partial correlation network [15, 89, 90]
are major approaches applied in filtering financial networks.
Mantegna [21] first introduces the minimum spanning tree
method into the study of hierarchical structures in financial
markets. With the network, we can study the topological
structure of a market or a portfolio. In this research, we
adopt the frameworks to study the correlations and the
corresponding networks of stock markets both in China and
theUnited States to systematically study how the twomarkets
behave differently.
3. Data and Research Methods
3.1. Indices of CSI300 and S&P500. We study the stock
markets of China and United States: the former is a typical
representative of emerging countries with fast-growing GDP
rate and influence on global economies, while the latter is
the most established and developed economy in the world.
To study the major stocks of each market, we focus on the
component stocks of the major indices of the two stock
markets, i.e., China Securities Index 300 (CSI300) for the
Chinese stock market and Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P500)
for the US market. In our study, we cover a period of nine
years starting from 04/01/2007 and ending on 06/11/2015
with 2149 trading days for CSI300 and 2228 trading days
for S&P500. The reason why the two markets have different
numbers of trading dates is that the two markets have
different trading calendars. Index and all component stocks
daily price data of CSI300 are retrieved from the CSMAR
Solution Database of Shenzhen GTA Education Tech. Ltd.
We download the S&P500 index and component stocks daily
prices data throughYahoo finance service. Since not all stocks
are traded on each trading date, so we only select those
CSI300 stocks with at least 2000 trading dates, and without
continuous 100 nontrading dates, this selection results in a
final set of 163 stocks. For S&P500, we select those stocks with
at least 2100 trading dates, and in results, we get 468 stocks.
After stocks selection, we take the prices on the available
closest trading date to fill the nontrading dates. In Figures 1(a)
and 1(b) we plot the daily close prices and the daily log returns
for the index of CSI300 in the study period of 04/01/2007 and
06/11/2015 with 2149 trading days. In Figures 1(c) and 1(d),
we plot the daily close prices and the daily log returns for the
index of S&P500 in the same study period from 04/01/2007
to 06/11/2015 with 2228 trading days. From the figures, we see
that the two markets show large fluctuations in the last nine
years. CSI300 experienced huge market crashes in 2008 and
2015, while S&P500 kept climbing almost continuously after
the 2008 financial crisis.
3.1.1. CSI300. China has two independent stock market
exchanges, i.e., the Shanghai stock exchange and the Shen-
zhen stock exchange. Opened at the beginning of 1990s with
only 25 years of trading history, the two markets have grown
into important financial markets playing vital roles in China’s
financial markets and economy. Among the many stock
market indices, the China Securities Index 300, or CSI300,
was introduced by the China Securities Index Company,
Ltd. in 2005 to a base of 1000 on 31/12/2004. In CSI300,
a set of 300 stocks are included as the index components;
all of them have the largest market values and are actively
traded in Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. CSI300 has
become a widely accepted benchmark to evaluate the whole
stock markets behaviors in China as well as a good basis
for other derivative products. Starting from 1000 points in
the early of 2004, now CSI300 has reached 3793 points as
of 06/11/2015 [91]. To give an image of the Chinese stock
market, we plot the 2149 CSI300 index daily close prices and
daily log returns in the study period between 04/01/2007
and 06/11/2015 in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). In the past nine
years, CSI300 experienced twomajor market crashes in 2007-
2008 and 2015, respectively, during which themarket suffered
huge losses and fluctuations. There are 163 stocks of CSI300
component stocks included in our dataset, as shown in
Table 1, in which we summarize the numbers of these 163
stocks for all 20 industry sectors. As shown, all industry
sectors from Agriculture to Comprehensive are represented.
For convenience, we will refer to these 163 stocks as CSI163 in
the following parts.
3.1.2. S&P500. Compiled by Standard & Poor’s in 1957, the
S&P500 is an established American stock market index
with more components, more risk diversification, and better
reflection of the overall stock market performance than
both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq.
All components are large stocks in capitalization with good
liquidities and diversifications in different industry sectors.
The S&P500 represents major parts of the market and is
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Figure 1: CSI300 index daily close prices (a) and log returns (b) in the study period between 04/01/2007 and 06/11/2015 with 2149 trading
days. S&P500 index daily close prices (c) and log returns (d) in the study period between 04/01/2007 and 06/11/2015 with 2228 trading days.
considered as one of the best benchmarks for the US financial
markets and economy. Starting from less than 100, after more
than 50 years of development, the S&P500 reached 2099
on 06/11/2015 [92]. We plot 2228 daily close prices and log
returns of the index of the S&P500 in our study period
between 04/01/2007 and 06/11/2015 in Figures 1(c) and 1(d).
We can observe that the S&P500 index suffered a major
crash between 2008 and 2009 then recovered almost steadily
with minor fluctuations. After the selection, there are 468
stocks of the S&P500 component stocks included in our
dataset, as shown in Table 2. We summarize the numbers
of these 468 stocks for all ten industry sectors. As shown,
all industry sectors from Energy to Utilities are represented.
For convenience, from now we will refer to these 468 stocks
as S&P468 in the following parts. Table 3 gives a summary
of the two datasets of both CSI163 and S&P468; CSI163 has
a larger standard deviation 𝜎𝑟 of the log returns, indicating
larger fluctuations than S&P468. We use ⟨𝑥⟩ to denote the
average of variable 𝑥 in this paper.
3.2. Construction of Stock Networks
3.2.1. Price Returns and Correlations. From the time-stamped
price time series of a blanket of stocks, it is possible to
calculate the correlations for any pair of stocks once a time
window is given. 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) is the price at time 𝑡 of stock 𝑠𝑖. It could
be one of the daily prices of open, close, high, or low. Per
most literature suggests, we choose the most used daily close
price. To smooth the fluctuationwithout loss of generality, the
logarithmic return for 𝑠𝑖 in the period of [𝑡 − Δ𝑡, 𝑡] is defined
as
𝑌𝑖 (𝑡) = ln𝑃𝑖 (𝑡) − ln𝑃𝑖 (𝑡 − Δ𝑡) , (1)
and usually used instead of 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) itself. In most cases, daily
log returns are used where Δ𝑡 = 1. For stock pair of 𝑠𝑖 and𝑠𝑗, we can extract the two price time series in a time window
with a length or size of 𝐿, i.e., with 𝐿 price values included
in the window. The selection of 𝐿 is expected to meet the
requirement of 𝐿/𝑁 > 1. In a sliding window approach, we
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Table 1: 163 component stocks of CSI300 are included in our dataset. In this table, we list the China Securities RegulatoryCommission (CSRC)
industry code, sector name, and numbers of stocks for each industry sector of these 163 stocks. All 20 industry sectors are represented.
Industry code Industry Sector Number of Stocks
A Agriculture 1
B Mining 6
C0 Food & Beverage 4
C1 Textiles & Apparel 4
C3 Paper & Printing 2
C4 Petrochemicals 9
C5 Electronics 7
C6 Metals & Non-metals 20
C7 Machinery 27
C8 Pharmaceuticals 15
D Utilities 6
E Construction 5
F Transportation 10
G IT 8
H Wholesale & retail trade 10
I Finance and insurance 10
J Real estate 11
K Social Services 3
L Communication & Cultural Industry 2
M Comprehensive 3
Table 2: 468 component stocks of S&P500 are included in the
dataset. In this table, we list the Global Industry Classification
Standard (GICS) code, sector name, and number of stocks for each
industry sector in S&P500. All ten industry sectors are represented.
Industry code Industry Sector Number of Stocks
10 Energy 36
15 Materials 26
20 Industrials 63
25 Consumer Discretionary 78
30 Consumer Staples 33
35 Health Care 50
40 Financials 87
45 Information Technology 61
50 Telecommunication Services 5
55 Utilities 29
Table 3: Basic information ofCSI163 and S&P468 datasets including
the number of stocks, the number of trading days, the average log
returns ⟨𝑟⟩, and the standard deviation 𝜎𝑟 of the log returns is
presented. Compared to the US market, the Chinese market has
higher fluctuations in our study period between 04/01/2007 and
06/11/2015.
Dataset Stocks Days ⟨𝑟⟩ 𝜎𝑟 ⟨𝑟min⟩ ⟨𝑟max⟩
CSI163 163 2149 1.4795e-04 0.0340 -0.4832 0.1002
S&P468 468 2228 1.4691e-04 0.0252 -0.3413 0.2168
can extract subsets of prices in a serial of sliding windows:
[1, 𝐿], [2, 𝐿 + 1], ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . For a given window, with the two time
series of prices, it is possible to generate two log return time
series using equation (1) for both stocks 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗. Thus, the
correlation coefficient between two stocks can be calculated
by using the Pearson correlation coefficient [21]
𝜌𝑖𝑗 = ⟨𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗⟩ − ⟨𝑌𝑖⟩ ⟨𝑌𝑗⟩√(⟨𝑌2𝑖 ⟩ − ⟨𝑌𝑖⟩2) (⟨𝑌2𝑗 ⟩ − ⟨𝑌𝑗⟩2)
, (2)
where ⟨⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⟩ stands for the average. The value of 𝜌𝑖𝑗 ranges
between -1 and 1, where a negative value of 𝜌𝑖𝑗 < 0 indicates
the two stocks fluctuate in a noncorrelated manner, i.e., one
falls downwhile another one climbs up. For a positive value of𝜌𝑖𝑗 > 0, the two stocks fluctuate in a positively correlated way.
In this case, they move in the same direction. If 𝜌𝑖𝑗 ≈ 0, then
they are not correlated. If |𝜌𝑖𝑗| ≈ 1, then the two stocks are
perfectly correlated or noncorrelated. In a stock market, the
stocks from the same industry aremore likely to be correlated.
For a portfolio of𝑁 stocks 𝑠1, 𝑠2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑠𝑁, we can calculate
all 𝑁 × 𝑁 pairs of correlation coefficients 𝜌𝑖𝑗 for any 𝑠𝑖 and
𝑠𝑗. These𝑁2 pairs of values can be expressed as a correlation
coefficient matrix 𝐶 with a size of𝑁 ×𝑁.
Based on the correlation matrix 𝐶, we can define the
distance 𝑑𝑖𝑗 between stock pair of 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 as
𝑑𝑖𝑗 = √2 (1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑗). (3)
The values of 𝑑𝑖𝑗 form an adjacent symmetric matrix 𝐷, in
which there are 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2 different elements. It is verified
that this definition satisfies the three rules of Euclidean
distance: (1) 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 0 if and only if 𝑖 = 𝑗; (2) 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 𝑑𝑗𝑖;
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(3) 𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑘+𝑑𝑘𝑗 [21]. Since −1 ≤ 𝜌𝑖𝑗 ≤ 1, we have 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 2.
With this definition, the distance for two stocks has a value
of 2 when they are completely anticorrelated (𝜌𝑖𝑗 = −1),
and a small distance close to 0 when they are positively and
completely correlated (𝜌𝑖𝑗 󳨀→ 1). This makes it possible to
compare the distances for any two pairs of stocks.
3.2.2. Network 𝑁(𝑉,𝐸). With the adjacency matrix 𝐷, we
can further construct the network 𝑁(𝑉,𝐸) for the stocks,
where stock 𝑠𝑖 is represented as vertex V𝑖 ∈ 𝑉, and 𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑉
represents the edge between V𝑖 and V𝑗 with a distance of 𝑑𝑖𝑗.
The network 𝑁(𝑉, 𝐸) is undirected in which only one edge
exists between a pair of vertices. The size of the network is the
number of stocks𝑁.The possible maximumnumber of edges
is𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2 for an undirected complete network in which
all vertex pairs are connected. For a portfolio with a large
number of stocks𝑁, the number of edges is a huge number.
Thus it is necessary to simplify the network by filtering
less important edges. In a simple threshold approach, by
introducing a threshold value 𝜃, we can reduce the network by
chopping those edges whose distance are greater than 𝜃 and
keeping the remaining edges. In other words, we only retain
the connections which are strong enough, i.e., those with
small distances, and all other weak edgeswith distances larger
than the threshold 𝜃 are filtered as the following equation:
𝑒𝑖𝑗 = {{{
1 if 𝑑𝑖𝑗 < 𝜃,
0 otherwise. (4)
Or in an edge ranking approach, we only keep a certain
number of top edgeswith the strongest relationships, say𝑁−1
edges. With this approach, the remaining edges are more
likely to form loops in strongly connected vertices and are
referred to as an asset graph [93].
3.2.3. Network Filtering. By filtering edges in a threshold
approach, we may get isolated vertices or loops in the filtered
network. To avoid this, tree approaches including minimum
spanning tree (MST) can be used to chop edges but still
keep all vertices connected as a tree. MST is introduced to
investigate the hierarchical structure of stock networks first
by Mantegna [21]. Many studies also use this approach, such
as Jang et al., to investigate the foreign exchange market
using in the periods of currency crises finding that the
values of correlation coefficients decrease but the normalized
tree length increase in crises [94]. Matteo et al. find that
the dynamical planar maximally filtered graphs (PMFGs)
can preserve same hierarchical structure as the dynamical
MST, and the financial sector dominates the central role in
the network [47]. As an application of network analysis in
portfolio management, Onnela et al. suggest the assets of the
classic Markowitz portfolio are always located on the outer
leaves of the tree [88], and Pozzi et al. further suggest that
even it is better to invest in the peripheries of the MST of
a market [44]. In [85], MST networks extracted from real
correlation data are compared with those generated from
artificial random models. Results reveal that the properties
of MST from real data cannot be reproduced, showing the
uniqueness of real stock networks.
Based on the network 𝑁(𝑉,𝐸), we can extract a tree
connecting all vertices with𝑁−1 edges with aminimum total
distance also known asminimum spanning tree (MST) of the
stocks. By only using the 𝑁 − 1 edges out of the maximum
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2 edges, the network is dramatically simplified or
filtered while keeping the most important shortest edges. To
extract the MST, Kruskal’s Algorithm was applied in three
steps: (1) we rank all edges according to the distances from
the shortest to the longest; (2) in each round, we choose
the shortest edge into the MST while avoiding loops; (3) we
repeat round #2 until all vertices and all𝑁− 1 shortest edges
are added [95]. Bonanno et al. review the MST approach in
revealing information of markets [96].
Using the MST, we can construct the hierarchical tree
(HT) in which the subdominant ultrametric distance 𝑑<𝑖𝑗 is
defined as the maximum distance of an edge along the path
between V𝑖 and V𝑗. The HT satisfies the first two rules with a
stronger third one:
𝑑<𝑖𝑗 ≤ max (𝑑<𝑖𝑘, 𝑑<𝑘𝑗) , (5)
With this ultrametric inequality, we can construct a hierar-
chical tree based on a MST and present a unique topological
structure of the stocks [21, 97].
By loosening the requirements of MST up to 4 vertices,
but forbid crossings, as many as 3(𝑁 − 2) edges containing
the MST as the subgraph including all the top𝑁− 1 shortest
edges can be gathered. This new network can be drawn
on a planar surface without link crossings is called planar
maximally filtered graphs (PMFG) [47, 86, 98–101]. This
makes PMFG different from MST, which also shows richer
structures of the network. In a similar construction to MST,
to construct PMFG, we firstly rank the edges in ascending
orders according to the distances of edge pairs. Then we add
the shortest edges into the PMFG but keeping the genus 𝑔 =
𝑘, where the 𝑔 is the largest number of simple closed curves
one can draw on a planar surface without separating it. For
the case of 𝑔 = 0, when all edges are considered, PMFG can
be gathered [86]. It has also been proved that an MST is a
subgraph of a PMFG and the number of 3- and 4-cliques in a
PMFG is 3𝑛 − 8 and 3𝑛 − 4, respectively [102].
Since PMFG contains more edges and allows loops and
cliques, there is more information embedded in PMFG than
in MST. After the introducing of PMFG into the study of
network structures of stocks, PMFG has been used in studies
ofmany stockmarkets, andmore recently, PMFG is applied in
investment strategy design [44]. Based on PMFG, a clustering
approach called Directed bubble hierarchical tree (DBHT) is
proposed and show good performance compared with other
algorithms and also been applied to study financial data [103].
It has been reported that, in a running window approach, the
PMFG shows stronger stability in a long run compared with
MST [104].
4. Stock Network Topological Properties
A network 𝑁 = (𝑉, 𝐸) is a graph composed of a set of
vertices 𝑉 and a set of edges 𝐸. In a network model,
the participants are represented as the vertices 𝑉, and the
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Table 4: For the CSI163 network, the maximum possible number of edges of |𝑒|max for 𝑁 = 163 vertices, the existing edge number |𝑒|, the
edge density |𝑒|𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦, the average degree ⟨𝑑⟩, the average distance ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩, the minimum distance 𝑑min𝑖𝑗 , and the maximum distance 𝑑max𝑖𝑗 are
presented for different 𝜃 from 0 to 1.5 in a step of 0.1.
𝜃 |𝑒|max |𝑒| |𝑒|𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ⟨𝑑⟩ ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ 𝑑min𝑖𝑗 𝑑max𝑖𝑗
0.1 13203 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.2 13203 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.3 13203 2 0.0002 0.0245 0.0000 0.0049 0.0089
0.4 13203 30 0.0023 0.3681 0.0000 0.0010 0.0593
0.5 13203 91 0.0069 1.1166 0.0003 0.0003 0.2200
0.6 13203 276 0.0209 3.3865 0.0010 0.0003 0.3689
0.7 13203 1594 0.1207 19.5583 0.0038 0.0003 0.4291
0.8 13203 5620 0.4257 68.9571 0.0177 0.0004 0.5353
0.9 13203 10555 0.7994 129.5092 0.0666 0.0004 0.7098
1 13203 12816 0.9707 157.2515 0.1866 0.0005 0.7996
1.1 13203 13194 0.9993 161.8896 0.4052 0.0006 0.9443
1.2 13203 13203 1.0000 162.0000 0.6957 0.0902 1.0887
1.3 13203 13203 1.0000 162.0000 0.9637 0.3719 1.1910
1.4 13203 13203 1.0000 162.0000 1.0966 0.5515 1.2878
1.5 13203 13203 1.0000 162.0000 1.1141 0.5515 1.3230
relationship between any pair of two participants 𝑖 and 𝑗 is
represented as the edge 𝑒𝑖𝑗 connecting the two vertices V𝑖
and V𝑗. In this study, the following properties of financial
markets are researched: (1) Degree and Degree Distribution
which describes the connectivities of vertices; (2) Clustering
Coefficient which is the indication of the transitivity and
density of a network; (3) Average Path Length, which is
a global property indicating how the network spans; (4)
Betweenness Centrality which describe the global importance
or centrality of vertices or edges; (5) Components which
describe the grouping phenomena of substructures of the
networks.
Based on how the correlations are calculated, there are
two approaches, static or dynamic. In a static approach,
the correlations are calculated over the whole period using
all available prices. Thus we get a single static correlation
matrix to describe the market regardless of the different
market periods.When sliding windows are used in a dynamic
approach,we get a sequence of correlationmatrices.The static
approach, which is the most used in literature, gives a static
description of the structure of the market with details of
different market periods like bear markets or bull markets.
However, the dynamic approach can reveal the evolution of
market structures and behaviors, which are especially useful
for the comparisons of calm periods and crashes.
In this part, we present the topological properties of
stock networks of the two markets, CSI163 and S&P468, in
a dynamic approach. Considered to meet the requirement
of 𝐿/𝑁 > 1, we set the sliding window size 𝐿𝐶𝑆𝐼163 =170 for CSI163 and 𝐿𝑆&𝑃468 = 500 for S&P468. In total,
there are 2149 windows for CSI163 and 2228 windows for
S&P468. After calculating the log returns for both CSI163 and
S&P468 by using equation (1), we calculate the correlation
coefficient matrices over the period between 12/09/2007 and
06/11/2015 for CSI163, 26/12/2008 and 06/11/2015 for S&P468
using equation (2). Based on the correlation matrices, it is
straight to get stock networks. For CSI163, we have a network
of 163 vertices, and for the S&P468, we have a network of
468 vertices. The edge connecting two stocks indicates how
the two stocks behave correlatively or anticorrelatively. For a
positive correlation coefficient value, the two prices move in
the same direction, while for a negative value, the two prices
move in opposite directions, so to normalize all correlation
coefficients to positive values as edge distances, we adopt the
definition of distance based on equation (3). Through this
definition, all negative values are transformed into positive
distance values, and the order of values is preserved. All
vertices in the networks for both markets are fixed. However,
the edges vary in each sliding window as the correlation
coefficients change. In the following parts, the statistical
properties of both networks evolved in our study period are
investigated.
4.1. Degree and Degree Distribution. For a network of 𝑁
stocks, there are 𝑁 × 𝑁 edges, which is a huge number
for a large 𝑁. So we normally filter the weakest edges to
simplify the network. In the threshold approach, a threshold
𝜃 can be used to chop the edges, if 𝑑𝑖𝑗 > 𝜃. For a given
network, different 𝜃 can lead to different structures with
same vertices but different sets of remaining edges. Based
on the correlation matrices, we first investigate the stock
networks with different 𝜃 for both CSI163 and S&P468. In the
sliding window approach, using daily log return time series,
we first calculate the correlation matrices of 163 × 163 for
CSI163 and 468 × 468 for S&P468; then we average all the
correlation matrices over the study periods. After that, we get
the averaged correlation matrices, with which we can apply
the edge filtering process for different 𝜃 based on the equation
(4). Based on the result, small 𝜃 closes to 0 will filter most
edgeswhile larger 𝜃 close to themaximumvalue twowill keep
most edges. We use an 𝜃 interval of [0.1 − 1.5] with a step
of 0.1. We present the basic network properties in Table 4 for
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Table 5: For the S&P468 network, the max possible edges |𝑒|max for𝑁 = 468 vertices, the existing edge number |𝑒|, the edge density |𝑒|𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦,
the average degree ⟨𝑑⟩, the average distance ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩, the minimum distance 𝑑min𝑖𝑗 , and the maximum distance 𝑑max𝑖𝑗 are presented for different 𝜃
from 0 to 1.5 in a step of 0.1.
𝜃 |𝑒|max |𝑒| |𝑒|𝑑𝑒𝑛s𝑖𝑡𝑦 ⟨𝑑⟩ ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ 𝑑min𝑖𝑗 𝑑max𝑖𝑗
0.1 109278 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.2 109278 2 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0935 0.1094
0.3 109278 2 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.1959 0.2033
0.4 109278 18 0.0002 0.0769 0.0000 0.0005 0.2033
0.5 109278 137 0.0013 0.5855 0.0001 0.0003 0.3265
0.6 109278 729 0.0067 3.1154 0.0007 0.0003 0.4980
0.7 109278 3571 0.0327 15.2607 0.0038 0.0004 0.6125
0.8 109278 16433 0.1504 70.2265 0.0213 0.0004 0.7255
0.9 109278 50364 0.4609 215.2308 0.0952 0.0005 0.8122
1 109278 88680 0.8115 378.9744 0.2739 0.0005 0.9264
1.1 109278 106179 0.9716 453.7564 0.5356 0.0006 1.0334
1.2 109278 108956 0.9971 465.6239 0.7994 0.0007 1.1486
1.3 109278 109277 1.0000 466.9957 0.9906 0.0044 1.2480
1.4 109278 109278 1.0000 467.0000 1.0711 0.1959 1.3465
1.5 109278 109278 1.0000 467.0000 1.0711 0.1959 1.3465
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Figure 2: Edge densities of CSI163 and S&P468 for different
thresholds 𝜃 from 0.1 to 1.5. It shows that the densities increase
sharply from 0 to 1 in the 𝜃 interval of 0.6 and 1.
the CSI163 network and Table 5 with different 𝜃 between 0.1
and 1.5. The maximum possible edges are 13203 for CSI163
and 109278 for S&P468, respectively. For different distance
thresholds 𝜃, any edges whose distances are greater than the
threshold are filtered. So with smaller 𝜃, only a few edges
remain in the network and this results a smaller edge density
|𝑒|𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦, smaller average degree ⟨𝑑⟩, average distance ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩,
minimumdistance 𝑑min𝑖𝑗 , andmaximumdistance 𝑑max𝑖𝑗 aswell.
In Figure 2, we plot the edge densities of CSI163 and
S&P468 for different thresholds 𝜃 from 0.1 to 1.5. In the
interval of 0.1 to 0.6, the densities for both networks are close
to 0, meaning all edges are filtered. While in the interval of 1
to 1.5, the densities are close to 1, meaning that all edges are
preserved. Between these two intervals, we see that the two
curves have a similar shape with a slope when 𝜃 lies between
0.6 and 1. This indicates that most edges are within this
interval. A similar edge density distribution is also reported
in [65].The study shows that stock networks also demonstrate
a similar transforming interval.
We investigate the degree distributions of both networks
with different 𝜃. No matter if 𝜃 is too small or too large,
the degree distributions are noisy, while in a narrow interval
around 0.7, the distributions follow the power law. The
regressionfitting curve is a straight line in the plots of log 𝑃(𝑘)
against log(𝑘), where the log𝑃(𝑘) is the log10 probability for
a vertex with 𝑘 degrees and the log(𝑘) is the log10 degree.
After running on the data, we plot the typical power law
distributions in Figure 3(a) for CSI163 and Figure 3(b) for
S&P468 respectively. For both distributions, we fit the log10-
log10 distribution and get the power law exponents 𝛾 =−0.9935 for CSI163 and 𝛾 = −1.2323 for S&P468. In the
plots, we use the same 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 20 to calculate the probabilities
for different degrees. As shown in Figure 3, we see that a
large number of vertices have small degrees. Only a few
vertices have large degrees. As the vertices are stocks, and
the degrees are rooted in the correlations between stocks,
for both CSI163 and S&P468 networks, only a few stocks
are the highly correlated with the most parts of rest stocks.
These stocks have a wider and larger influence over the
whole networks, while other stocks with relatively smaller
degrees are less correlated with other stocks. This presents
limited influence over the network. The negative fitting slope
value 𝛾 also indicates that both the CSI163 and S&P468
networks are scale-free networks in which a small portion
of vertices have larger degrees while a large portion of
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Figure 3: Log-Log degree distributions of CSI163 and S&P468 networks. By using different 𝜃, we can filter out edges with larger distances.
We find that not all the filtered networks can demonstrate the power law degree distributions. Only when 𝜃 falls within a narrow interval
around 0.7, the filtered networks follow the power law degree distribution. In Figure 3(a), for the CSI163 network, we use 𝜃 = 0.68 and we get
a fitting line with a slope of 𝛾 = −0.9935. In Figure 3(b), for the S&P468 network, we use 𝜃 = 0.75 and we get a fitting line with a slope of
𝛾 = −1.2323. This indicates that the degree distributions of both stock markets follow the power law in the form of 𝑃(𝑘) ∼ 𝑘−𝛾, which also
means the networks are scale free in which a small portion of vertices have larger degrees, while a large portion of vertices have small degrees.
vertices have smaller degrees this agree with previous studies
[105].
4.2. Average Clustering Coefficient. Average clustering coef-
ficient ⟨𝐶⟩ is an average of all clustering coefficients ⟨𝐶𝑖⟩
of all vertices. The clustering coefficient ⟨𝐶𝑖⟩ indicates the
transitivity for an individual vertex V𝑖, while the overall
averaged clustering coefficient ⟨𝐶⟩ is an indication of the
transitivity and density of the whole network. In Figure 4, we
present the average clustering coefficient ⟨𝐶⟩ for both CSI163
and S&P468 networks comparing with random networks.
The ⟨𝐶⟩ gets larger with the 𝜃 when larger 𝜃 will preserve
more edges, while it remains almost unchanged with a
slight increase in both random networks. Comparing with
random networks of same sizes of 163 × 163 for CSI163 and468 × 268 for S&P468, ⟨𝐶⟩ of both two stock networks are
significantly larger than that of the corresponding random
networks. For CSI163, ⟨𝐶⟩ is 4.9574 times larger than that
of the random networks on average with a maximum of
11.8903 times. For S&P468 the average multiple is 5.2305
times, andmaximummultiple is 10.4180 times comparedwith
the random networks. This shows that both stock networks
are well connected with better transitivity. This result agrees
with many other previous studies.
4.3. Average Path Length. Unlike clustering coefficient which
is a local property, for any two vertices V𝑖 and V𝑗 in a network,
the number of edges covering the shortest route linking the
two vertices is defined as the characteristic path length, 𝑙𝑖𝑗,
in [2] which is a typical global property. By averaging the
lengths of all possible pairs, we can calculate the average path
length ⟨𝐿⟩. As an indication of how the network is connected,
many real networks have small ⟨𝐿⟩ compared with random
networks. In Figure 5, we plot the average path length ⟨𝐿⟩
of both CSI163 and S&P468 networks with comparisons of
random networks in same sizes. The two stock networks
are significantly different from the corresponding random
networks with the same sizes of 163 × 163 and 468 ×
468. While the flat curves of ⟨𝐿⟩ of random networks stay
almost unchanged with 𝜃, this is a result of the universal
homogeneous edge distribution on the whole network. There
are peaks for the stock networks. On the left hand of the peak,
there is a decline of ⟨𝐿⟩ with the decrease of 𝜃, since when 𝜃
gets too small, most edges are filtered, and the giant networks
break into small parts and ⟨𝐿⟩ in small parts are decreasing
significantly. However, for the right hand of the peak, ⟨𝐿⟩
gets smaller with the increase of 𝜃 due to the increasing
connectivity when more and more edges are preserved. This
shows the stock networks of both CSI163 and S&P468 are
different from random networks.
4.4. Betweenness Centrality. The betweenness 𝑏V𝑖 of vertex V𝑖
is defined as the number of shortest paths passing V𝑖, which is
an indication of the importance of an individual vertex in the
contribution to the global connectivity. By averaging over the
betweenness of all vertices, we can compare the betweenness
for any two vertices. Larger betweenness means great global
influence of the stock networks. This is the same to the edges.
The betweenness 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the number of shortest paths passing
the edge 𝑒𝑖𝑗 indicating the importance of this edge for its
contribution to the global connectivity. In this study, we focus
on the vertex betweenness. In the calculation of the shortest
paths, we can use the original distance 𝑑𝑖𝑗 defined in equation
(3) or simplify the network as a binary network according to
𝑒𝑖𝑗 = {{{
1 𝑑𝑖𝑗 > 0,
0 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 0.
(6)
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Figure 4: Average clustering coefficient ⟨𝐶⟩ of CSI163 and S&P468 for different thresholds 𝜃. It shows that ⟨𝐶⟩ gets larger with 𝜃. To compare
with random networks, we plot the corresponding average clustering coefficients under the same interval of 𝜃. As is shown, for both CSI163
and S&P468 networks, ⟨𝐶⟩ values are significantly larger than the random networks of the same size. This indicates the stockmarkets are far
from random and the stocks are comparatively clustered.
In the former, edges with different distances have different
contributions to the paths, while, for the latter, all edges of
nonzero distance are normalized as 1 and treated equally with
great scarifying of original distance information. As shown
in Figure 6, we plot the average betweenness ⟨𝐵⟩ of CSI163
and S&P468 for both binary case and weighted case under
different 𝜃 in Figures 6(a) and 6(b) respectively. For binary
network case, all edges with positive distances are normalized
as unit 1, while, in weighted networks, the original distances
are directly used in the calculation of shortest paths. The
shapes for binary and weighted networks are different. There
are peaks for both stock networks in binary networks, while
⟨𝐵⟩ gets larger with 𝜃 from almost zero to large numbers in
weighted networks.
We visualize the stock networks of CSI163 and S&P468
with different 𝜃 of 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 in Figures 7(a)–7(d) and
8(a)–8(d), respectively. It shows that the networks can be
dramatically simplified using small values of 𝜃 and the edges
are preserved in larger values of 𝜃. As listed in Table 4, the
edge density of CSI163 grows dramatically from 0.0209 (𝜃 =
0.6) to 0.7994 (𝜃 = 0.9), while, for S&P468 as shown in
Table 5, the edge density of S&P468 grows also dramatically
from 0.0067 (𝜃 = 0.6) to 0.4609 (𝜃 = 0.9). All networks
in this paper are generated using the Pajek complex network
software [106].
4.5. Components. A component 𝐶𝑜𝑚 is a subnetwork of the
whole network with connected vertices. For a given network
with a set of 𝑁 vertices, the possible size of 𝐶𝑜𝑚 can range
from 1 for an isolated vertex to N for all connected vertices.
When an individual vertex V𝑖 is disconnected from any other
vertices, V𝑖 itself forms the smallest component with a single
vertex. When all the vertices are connected without any
isolated vertices, the network is a single giant component.
For a stock network, the stocks are correlated with each
other, while stocks belonging to different components are not
correlated. The component structures of stock networks have
great implications for risk management of a portfolio. Since
the stocks fall in the same component are correlated, so it is a
bad idea to invest in most stocks from the same components.
We should invest stocks fromdifferent components to diverse
the risk of the whole portfolio. When 𝜃 is small, most edges
are filtered leaving many vertices isolated. As a result, we
see the emerging of a large number of small components.
However, with the growth of 𝜃, more and more edges are
preserved. This allows the connectivity increase resulting
in the appearing of larger components. In Figure 9, the
properties of components of CSI163 and S&P468 networks
with different 𝜃 is presented. For the two networks, the
number of components𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (red), themax component
size 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 (green), and the average component size ⟨𝑆⟩ (blue)
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Figure 5: Average path lengths ⟨𝐿⟩ for CSI163 and S&P468 under different 𝜃 compared with values for random networks in same sizes of
163 × 163 and 468 × 468. It shows that for the two networks, there are peaks of ⟨𝐿⟩ above the curve of the corresponding random networks.
At first, 𝜃 is small, most edges are filtered, and the whole networks are broken into parts; thus the disconnected vertices and edges are also
filtered. So on the left hand, starting from the peak, with the decrease of 𝜃, we see that ⟨𝐿⟩ decreases too, while starting from the peak, with
the increase of 𝜃, we see a constant decline of ⟨𝐿⟩, for more edges remained resulting in decreasing of ⟨𝐿⟩. For the random networks, ⟨𝐿⟩ stay
almost unchanged because of the homogeneous edge distributions across the whole networks.
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Figure 6: Average betweenness ⟨𝐵⟩ of CSI163 and S&P468 is calculated for both the original weighted approach and binary simplification
approach under different 𝜃. The average betweenness for binary networks is different from the weighted network. For binary networks, the
curves for CSI163 and S&P468 share a similar shape.On the left hand of the peak, the ⟨𝐵⟩ gets larger with the increase of 𝜃, for more edges and
more vertices are preserved, and this leads to a growing number of paths, while on the right hand of the peak, large connected network emerges
leading to a small value of averaged ⟨𝐵⟩. In other words, the importance of a single individual vertex or edge is weakened in well-connected
networks (large 𝜃).
12 Complexity
(a) CSI163 network 𝜃 = 0.6 (b) CSI163 network 𝜃 = 0.7
(c) CSI163 network 𝜃 = 0.8 (d) CSI163 network 𝜃 = 0.9
Figure 7: CSI163 networks with different 𝜃 of 0.6 (a), 0.7 (b), 0.8 (c), 0.9 (d). It shows that the network is relatively sparser with small 𝜃 while
denser with large 𝜃, for small 𝜃 greatly simplifies the network by filtering most edges with larger distance. As a result, the edge density when
𝜃 = 0.9 is about 38.25 times to that when 𝜃 = 0.6. Different vertex colors indicate different industry sectors.
shows similar pattern and changes with the values of 𝜃.
Critical changes are obvious for both networks in the 𝜃
interval about [0.3 − 0.8] for CSI163 and in [0.5 − 1.1] for
S&P468, respectively. Before the transition interval, most
vertices are isolated when the whole network breaks into
small components, and both of the maximum and average
component sizes are small. In the transition interval, the
number of components decreases with both maximum and
average component sizes. After the transition interval, the
three properties stay unchanged when the giant connected
component appear with maximum and average size equal
to the number of total vertices. The similar component
properties transition under different of 𝜃 phenomena is also
observed in the study of a set of Chinese stocks [65] with a
reported transition critical value about 𝜃 = 0.17.
To investigate how industry sectors are connected in the
stock network, we summarize the properties of both CSI163
and S&P468 networks with 𝜃 = 1.0 listed in Tables 6 and 7,
respectively. As it shows, in the CSI163 network, the industry
sectors are all most the same in average degree ⟨𝑑⟩ and
average clustering coefficient ⟨𝐶⟩, while with significantly
different values of average betweenness coefficient ⟨𝐵⟩. The
difference of average degree ⟨𝑑⟩ and average clustering coeffi-
cient ⟨𝐶⟩ are not significant among the industry sectors.This
indicates that all sectors have similar degrees and clustering
coefficients. The difference between the average betweenness
coefficient ⟨𝐵⟩ shows that the sectors contribute to the
global connectivity differently. It is worthmentioning that the
finance and insurance sector has the largest average clustering
coefficient ⟨𝐶⟩ of 0.9829 but with a relatively small value of
average betweenness coefficient ⟨𝐵⟩ which is only 118.4000.
For the S&P468 network, as shown in Table 7, we observe
that Financials sector has the largest value of ⟨𝑑⟩ of 421.7471
and the 3rd largest value of ⟨𝐵⟩ of 1297.8161, with a smaller
value of the average clustering coefficient ⟨𝐶⟩of 0.8975, which
are very different from the CSI163 network. Furthermore,
the Energy and Industrials have the largest values of ⟨𝑑⟩
and ⟨𝐵⟩, while Consumer Staples and Telecommunication
Services have the smallest ⟨𝑑⟩ and ⟨𝐵⟩. From this, we also
observe that, for the S&P468 network, the sectors with larger
⟨𝐵⟩ are likely to have smaller values of ⟨𝐶⟩ and vise verse.
The findings indicate that the US market is dominated by
Financials while the finance and insurance in Chinese stock
markets play relatively less influential roles.
Complexity 13
(a) S&P468 network 𝜃 = 0.6 (b) S&P468 network 𝜃 = 0.7
(c) S&P468 network 𝜃 = 0.8 (d) S&P468 network 𝜃 = 0.9
Figure 8: S&P468 networks with different 𝜃 of 0.6 (a), 0.7 (b), 0.8 (c), and 0.9 (d). It also shows that the edge densities with different 𝜃 change
dramatically.We find that the edge density when 𝜃 = 0.9 is 68.79 times to that when 𝜃 = 0.6. Different vertex colors indicate different industry
sectors.
By focusing on the top stocks, it is possible to look
into the details of the networks. In Table 8, for the CSI163
network with 𝜃 = 0.8, we present the top 10 stocks with
the largest values of degree 𝑑𝑖 and betweenness 𝑏𝑖 ranked
in descending order in the upper part and the lower part,
respectively. The stock code, company name, industry name,
and values of 𝑑𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, and 𝑏𝑖 are listed. Younger Group, which
is a leading fashion brand in China, has the largest degree
of 𝑑𝑖 = 133, and HuDong Heavy Machinery, which is a
major machinery manufacturer in China, has the largest
betweenness coefficient of 𝑏𝑖 = 5444. While, in the S&P468
network, as shown in Table 9, T. Rowe Price Group has
the largest degree of 266, and Loews Corp. has the largest
betweenness coefficient value of 13202, both stocks are in
the Financials sector. For both stock networks, the two lists
based on 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 are similar. In other words, top stocks
with largest degree values also appear as top stocks with
largest betweenness coefficients 𝑏𝑖. It is worth noting that
the list based on the ranking of clustering coefficients 𝑐𝑖 are
dramatically different those based on degrees or betweenness
coefficients.This indicates that degree 𝑑𝑖 and the betweenness𝑏𝑖 are consistent in describing the importance of an individual
vertex, since the higher degree a vertex has, the more likely
it is on the shortest paths. As indicated in the two tables,
the stocks with codes labeled in bold appear on both top 10
lists, and in fact, the rest of the stocks on one list also can
be found appearing in a similar ranking position on another
list. We can also observe that stocks belong to Industries
of Metals & Nonmetals, Machinery, and Pharmaceuticals
are dominant the two top 10 lists in the CSI163 network.
However, for S&P468 network, Financials, Industrials, and
Materials are major stocks in the two lists. As an emerging
market, Industrials sector has great influence in Chinese
stockmarket, while the Financials sector has greater influence
inUS stockmarketwhich agreeswith [10].The significant dif-
ference between the two stockmarkets confirms the previous
studies with similar results indicating that Industrials is the
most influential sector among all industry sectors, while the
financial sector has weaker influence [107]. This is consistent
with our previous results revealed Tables 6 and 7.
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Figure 9: The component properties of the components number 𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (red), the max component size 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 (green), and the average
component size ⟨𝑆⟩ (blue) are plotted for CSI163 and S&P468 with different thresholds 𝜃 in (a) and (b), respectively. Both networks show
similar transitions when the networks transform from a large number of small isolated components into a connected giant network. Before
the transition interval, edges are filtered leaving isolated vertices are not correlated. After the transition interval, edges are preserved making
most vertices connected to form a single giant network in which all vertices are correlated.
Table 6: In this table, we list the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry code, the sector name and the numbers of stocks,
the average degree ⟨𝑑⟩, the average clustering coefficient ⟨𝐶⟩, and the average betweenness coefficient ⟨𝐵⟩ for each industry sector of these
163 stocks. The values are calculated from the CSI163 network with 𝜃 = 1.0.
Code Industry Sector Number ⟨𝑑⟩ ⟨𝐶⟩ ⟨𝐵⟩
A Agriculture 1 162.0000 0.9703 754.0000
B Mining 6 154.3333 0.9803 974.6667
C0 Food & Beverage 4 160.2500 0.9738 770.0000
C1 Textiles & Apparel 4 159.2500 0.9764 437.5000
C3 Paper & Printing 2 159.0000 0.9757 343.0000
C4 Petrochemicals 9 157.4444 0.9776 417.5556
C5 Electronics 7 157.1429 0.9783 176.8571
C6 Metals & Non-metals 20 159.9500 0.9756 808.0000
C7 Machinery 27 157.5926 0.9772 664.7407
C8 Pharmaceuticals 15 151.6000 0.9764 324.2667
D Utilities 6 159.6667 0.9770 199.6667
E Construction 5 160.2000 0.9768 945.2000
F Transportation 10 157.9000 0.9792 426.2000
G IT 8 156.3750 0.9775 444.0000
H Wholesale & retail trade 10 158.8000 0.9775 341.2000
I Finance and insurance 10 155.8000 0.9829 118.4000
J Real estate 11 153.2727 0.9791 302.3636
K Social Services 3 161.0000 0.9726 109.3333
L Communication 2 160.0000 0.9775 821.0000
M Comprehensive 3 159.6667 0.9777 582.6667
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Table 7: In this table, we list the industry code, the sector name, the numbers of stocks, the average degree ⟨𝑑⟩, the average clustering
coefficient ⟨𝐶⟩, and the average betweenness coefficient ⟨𝐵⟩ for each industry sector of S&P468 stocks. The values are calculated for the
S&P468 network with 𝜃 = 1.0.
Code Industry Sector Number ⟨𝑑⟩ ⟨𝐶⟩ ⟨𝐵⟩
10 Energy 36 419.6944 0.8948 1264.6111
15 Materials 26 404.2692 0.8948 1717.8462
20 Industrials 63 415.8571 0.8894 1937.0476
25 Consumer Discretionary 78 376.0256 0.9194 786.8205
30 Consumer Staples 33 269.0303 0.9194 37.8182
35 Health Care 50 309.6000 0.9135 213.8000
40 Financials 87 421.7471 0.8975 1297.8161
45 Information Technology 61 373.9344 0.9245 363.6721
50 Telecommunication 5 293.2000 0.9456 124.8000
55 Utilities 29 375.3448 0.9142 579.2414
Table 8: Top stocks with highest values of degree 𝑑𝑖, and betweenness 𝑏𝑖 ranked in descending order of 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 when the 𝜃 = 0.8 for CSI163
network. Stock codes in bold indicate the stocks appear at both top 10 stocks.
Code Name Industry 𝑑𝑖 ↓ 𝑐𝑖 𝑏𝑖
600177 Youngor Group Textiles & Apparel 133 0.5416 2154
600642 Shanghai Wanye Enterprises Real estate 131 0.5732 2362
39 China International Marine Containers (Group) Metals & Non-metals 127 0.5929 2276
600010 Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Union Metals & Non-metals 125 0.5738 1112
600166 Beiqi FotonMotor Machinery 123 0.6047 72
825 Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel Metals & Non-metals 122 0.6005 2644
623 Jilin Aodong Medicine Industry (Groups) Pharmaceuticals 121 0.6058 60
600362 Beijinghualian Hypermarket Wholesale and retail trade 121 0.6127 1552
600717 Qinhuangdao Yaohua Glass Real estate 119 0.6095 1354
600005 Wuhan Iron And Steel Metals & Non-metals 118 0.6009 532
Code Name Industry 𝑑𝑖 𝑐𝑖 𝑏𝑖 ↓
600150 HuDong Heavy Machinery Machinery 110 0.6155 5444
898 Angang Steel Metals & Non-metals 114 0.6367 4560
600398 Anyuan Industrial Mining 95 0.6710 4140
2051 China CAMC Engineering Construction 114 0.6226 4136
601607 Aluminum Corporation of China Limited Metals & Non-metals 116 0.6304 2766
825 Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel Metals & Non-metals 122 0.6005 2644
600031 Sany Heavy Industry Machinery 85 0.7300 2584
600642 Shanghai Wanye Enterprises Real estate 131 0.5732 2362
39 China International Marine Containers (Group) Metals & Non-metals 127 0.5929 2276
600177 Youngor Group Textiles & Apparel 133 0.5416 2154
5. Hierarchical Structures of Stock Networks
Mantegna introduced the minimum spanning tree and
hierarchical clustering methods into the study of financial
networks [21], in which a distance matrix 𝐷 is built from the
correlationmatrix for all stocks. Based on the distancematrix,
the minimum spanning tree is extracted. Since the minimum
spanning tree contains the information of edges connecting
all vertices in a single spanning tree with the shortest total
length, it is also possible to extract the hierarchical clustering
tree from the minimum spanning tree, where the distance
for vertex V𝑖 and V𝑗 is subdominant ultrametric distance𝑑<(𝑖, 𝑗) as the maximum value of distance along the shortest
path between the two vertices V𝑖 and V𝑗 [108]. However, the
subdominant ultrametric distance approach will lose much
edge distance information, for two separated vertices which
are indirectly connected on the minimum spanning tree
with a specific larger subdominant ultrametric distancemight
be directly linked in the original distance matrix. Vertices
which should be clustered together might be separated in a
hierarchical clustering tree based on ultrametric distance. To
preserve the hierarchical structure of the minimum spanning
tree as well as more information allowing loops and cliques,
Planar Maximally Filtered Graph (PMFG) is proposed in
[86]. Based on PMFG, the influence of different sectors
of CSI300 is studied revealing that the industrial sector is
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Table 9: Top stocks with highest values of degree 𝑑𝑖, and betweenness 𝑏𝑖 ranked in descending order of 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 when the 𝜃 = 0.8 for S&P468
network. Stock codes in bold indicate the stocks appear at both top 10 stocks.
Code Name Industry 𝑑𝑖 ↓ 𝑐𝑖 𝑏𝑖
TROW T. Rowe Price Group Financials 266 0.3882 4536
L Loews Corp. Financials 263 0.4069 13202
SNA Snap-On Inc. Consumer Discretionary 263 0.3894 8350
IVZ Invesco Ltd. Financials 261 0.4016 2868
BEN Franklin Resources Financials 259 0.4074 7836
HON Honeywell Int’l Inc. Industrials 256 0.4151 1790
AMG Affiliated Managers Group Inc Financials 255 0.4128 2042
DD Du Pont (E.I.) Materials 255 0.4163 4966
SIAL Sigma-Aldrich Materials 254 0.4186 7020
ROP Roper Industries Industrials 247 0.4326 8626
Code Name Industry 𝑑𝑖 𝑐𝑖 𝑏𝑖 ↓
L Loews Corp. Financials 263 0.4069 13202
HST Host Hotels & Resorts Financials 223 0.4938 12510
OKE ONEOK Energy 174 0.5329 9978
ROP Roper Industries Industrials 247 0.4326 8626
SNA Snap-On Inc. Consumer Discretionary 263 0.3894 8350
BEN Franklin Resources Financials 259 0.4074 7836
FLS Flowserve Corporation Industrials 202 0.5271 7726
JPM JPMorgan Chase & Co. Financials 124 0.7409 7614
UTX United Technologies Industrials 217 0.4746 7590
SIAL Sigma-Aldrich Materials 254 0.4186 7020
the dominant part of the whole market [107]. In [109], the
hierarchical tree structure of multiple industry indices in
China are investigated before and after a crisis showing the
structure changes around the crisis period. A similar study
of global financial crisis impact on stock market shows that
the Turkish market is less influenced [110]. Authors propose
to use Kullback-Leibler distance for the filtering procedures
in [11]. International real estate market networks in different
countries are studied in [99] revealing that markets are
clustered according to geographical locations. Instead of
using the methods of [21], a typical approach is applied to
extract the hierarchical structure of the German stockmarket
in [68]. Using the industry classification information as the
benchmark, authors compared the methods used to extract
the clusters in financial networks [103]. In [111], Neighbor-
Net approach is applied in which more distance information
is used in the construction of the tree compared to the
hierarchical clustering.
Since a sliding window approach with a window size of
𝐿 is utilized, in a study period of total 𝑃 trading days, we
can get a sequence of 𝑃 − 𝐿 + 1 trading windows. We have𝑃𝑐𝑠𝑖163 = 2149 for CSI163 and 𝑃𝑠&𝑝468 = 2228 for S&P468
trading dates in our study period between 04/01/2007 to
06/11/2015, respectively. As we adapted in previous parts, we
set the sliding window size as 𝐿𝑐𝑠𝑖163 = 170 for CSI163 and𝐿𝑆&𝑃468 = 500 for S&P468. We have𝑊𝑐𝑠𝑖163 = 1980 windows
for CSI163 and 𝑊𝑆&𝑃468 = 1729 for S&P468 respectively.
For each sliding window at time 𝑡, we can get the distance
matrices 𝐷𝑐𝑠𝑖163(𝑡) and 𝐷𝑆&𝑃468(𝑡) where 𝑡 = 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,𝑊. To
investigate the structures of the twomarkets taking the whole
study period as a whole, we calculate the averaged distance
matrix by averaging all elements overall sliding windows as
⟨𝐷⟩ = 1𝑊 ∑𝑡 𝐷𝑡. (7)
With this averaged distance matrix, we construct the hierar-
chical trees, minimum spanning trees, and asset graphs and
study the evolvement of the properties ofminimum spanning
trees and asset graphs for both CSI163 and S&P468.
5.1. Hierarchical Tree. In the study of the stock market or
a portfolio, a set of individual stocks belonging to different
economic sectors behavior correlated together. Based on the
prices information, the correlation matrix can be formed.
Based on that, a distance matrix can be derived. Using the
distance matrix, clustering algorithms can be further applied
to extract the clustering structures of the stocks. For the
stocks falling in the same cluster, they behave similar sharing
correlated price fluctuations, while, for the stocks coming
from different clusters, they are less similar than the ones of
the same clusters.Themain objective of clustering algorithms
is to minimize the dissimilarity for stocks in the same cluster
and maximize the dissimilarity for stocks in different clusters
meanwhile. Since the dissimilarity is naturally measured by
the distance, the selection of definition of distance between
clusters is important for clustering algorithms. Four distance
definitions as shown in equations (8)-(11) are used in extract-
ing of hierarchical clustering trees. The distance between two
clusters, 𝑐𝑚 and 𝑐𝑛, is defined as the minimum distance for
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Figure 10: CSI163 dendrogram hierarchical cluster trees extracted with different distance definitions in (a) smallest distance for stock pairs,
equation (8); (b) largest distance for stockpairs, equation (9); (c) average distance for stockpairs, equation (10); (d) distance between centroids
for clusters, equation (11).The color threshold is 0.7. All stockswhose linkage values are less than this thresholdwould be coloredwith a unique
color. As shown in the figures, different distance definitions extract different dendrogram hierarchical cluster trees whereas the same color
threshold generates different results. We see that the largest distance definition reveals more details of network.
all pairs as in equation (8), the maximum distance for all
pairs as in equation (9), the average distance for all pairs as
in equation (10), and the distance between average centroids
of the two clusters as in equation (11), respectively.
𝑑𝑚,𝑛 = min (𝑑𝑜𝑖𝑚,𝑜𝑗𝑛) (8)
𝑑𝑚,𝑛 = max (𝑑𝑜𝑖𝑚,𝑜𝑗𝑛) (9)
𝑑𝑚,𝑛 = 1𝑁𝑚𝑁𝑛 ∑𝑖 ∑𝑗 𝑑𝑜𝑖𝑚,𝑜𝑗𝑛 (10)
𝑑𝑚,𝑛 = 𝑑 (𝑜𝑚, 𝑜𝑛) (11)
In our study, we use all these four definitions of cluster
distance. For CSI163 network, we present the dendrogram
hierarchical cluster trees in Figures 10(a)–10(d). For S&P468
network, we present the trees in Figures 11(a)–11(d). In these
trees, the leaf nodes are individual stocks, and the height of
two merged branches indicates the distance or dissimilarity
between two clusters or stocks. The higher they merge, the
larger the distance is. For similar clusters or stocks, they
merge in a lower value of height. To color the similar stocks,
a color threshold of 0.7 × max(𝑑
𝑜𝑖𝑚,𝑜
𝑗
𝑛
) is used. Thus all
similar clusters or stocks are colored with the same colors.
By adjusting this color threshold, we can get the clusters
from the dendrogram hierarchical cluster trees. As shown in
the figures, using different definitions, we can get different
hierarchical cluster trees and it is obvious that Figures 10(b)
and 10(c) reveal more details of the structures, in which
the distance between clusters is the largest of all pairs and
the average distance of all pairs, respectively. The similar
effect is also observed in Figures 11(b) and 11(c) for S&P468
networks. These clustering results are found to agree with
the classifications of stocks very well. The colored clusters are
composed of stocks mostly from the same economy sectors.
Though there are exceptions that some stocks from different
sectors are clustered together, or stocks from the same sector
are clustered in different clusters. It is still astonishing to see
that stocks can be clustered which agree with the economy
sectors classification only from the prices information. These
results indicate that hierarchical cluster trees constructed
fromprice correlation matrix can reveal economy sectors and
this has potential applications in portfolio selection and risk
management.
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Figure 11: S&P468 dendrogram hierarchical cluster trees extracted with different distance definitions in (a) smallest distance for stock pairs,
equation (8); (b) largest distance for stockpairs, equation (9); (c) average distance for stockpairs, equation (10); (d) distance between centroids
for clusters, equation (11).The color threshold is 0.7. All stockswhose linkage values are less than this thresholdwould be coloredwith a unique
color. As shown in the figures, different distance definitions extract different dendrogram hierarchical cluster trees whereas the same color
threshold generates different results. Again, the largest distance definition reveals more details of network.
5.2. Minimum Spanning Tree. For a given undirected
weighted network with 𝑁 vertices, we can simplify the
network by extracting the backbone of the network
connecting all vertices, but with a minimum total length
of edges, this backbone is called minimum spanning tree,
or MST for short. Since loops or circles are not allowed to
connect vertices, a MST has a topological structure of tree
with 𝑁 − 1 edges which is dramatically simplified from
the original network which might have a maximum of
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2 edges. This brings huge advantages to the study
of networks of stocks by reducing noises and simplifying the
computation as well.
To construct a minimum spanning tree from a given
network, it is easy to be achieved by using Kruskal’s Algorithm
[95], in which all edges are ranked in ascending order. Start-
ing from the shortest edge on the edges ranking list, we add
edges to the tree by keeping the tree in spanning formwithout
introducing circles. When all edges are considered, we get a
final minimum spanning tree comprising all connected 𝑁
vertices with a minimum total length of 𝑁 − 1 edges. For
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Figure 12: The extraction of a minimum spanning tree from a six
vertices network using Kruskal’s MST Algorithm. We rank all edges
in descending order according to the edge lengths. Starting from the
shortest edge and add the edges into the tree but avoiding loops or
circles, after considering all edges, we get a final tree connecting all
vertices with the minimum total edge lengths. In our example, after
adding 𝑒1,3, 𝑒1,6, 𝑒2,4, 𝑒2,5, and 𝑒6,4, we finally extract a tree of 𝑇3,1,6,4,2,5
with a total length of 1.1.
a network in which all edges are with distinct lengths, the
extracted MST is unique. In Figure 12, we demonstrate the
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Agriculture Mining
Food & Beverage Textiles & Apparel Paper & Printing Petrochemicals
Electronics Metals & Non-metals Machinery Pharmaceuticals
Utilities Construction Transportation IT
Wholesale & retail Finance & insurance Real estate Social Services
Communication Comprehensive
Figure 13: Minimum spanning tree of CSI163. Vertices are colored to indicate different industry sectors.
Table 10: In this table, we present the top 10 stocks with the largest degrees in the MST of CSI163. As is shown, the top 10 stocks are diverse
in industry sectors which represents 1 Wholesale & retail stock, 1 Metals & Non-metals stock, 2 Pharmaceuticals stocks, 2 Real estate stocks,
1 Finance & insurance stock, 2 Utilities stocks, and 1 Textiles & Apparel stock.
Degree Code Name Industry
11 600362 Beijinghualian Hypermarket Wholesale & retail
9 898 Angang Steel Metals & Non-metals
8 600085 Beijing Tongrentang Pharmaceuticals
7 2 China Vanke Real estate
7 600036 China Merchants Bank Finance & insurance
6 600008 Beijing Capital Utilities
6 600027 Huadian Power Utilities
6 600177 Youngor Group Textiles & Apparel
6 600642 Shanghai Wanye Enterprises Real estate
5 623 Jilin Aodong Medicine Industry Pharmaceuticals
process of extracting the minimum spanning tree from a six
vertices network following Kruskal’s MST Algorithm. The
edges are ranked in descending order, and we start from the
shortest ones and add them into the tree but omit the edges
which might introduce loops; after considering all edges, we
get a minimum spanning tree with a minimum total length.
In this example, edge (3,6) and (6,4) are omitted because that
𝑒3,6might bring a loop of (3,6,1) and 𝑒6,4might bring a loop of
(6,4,2,5). Another widely used algorithm is Prim’s Algorithm
[112] which begins with a starting vertex and adds the shortest
one to the existing tree from all edges connected to the
tree. By repeating this greedily, we can extract the minimum
spanning tree of the given network. In this research, we apply
Kruskal’s Algorithm to analyze the network structures of
CSI163 and S&P468.
To extract the minimum spanning trees of the stock
networks of CSI163 and S&P468, we average all correlation
matrices over the investigated time windows, presented in
Figures 13 and 14 for CSI163 and S&P468, respectively. We
see that the stocks of the same industry sectors are clustered
in the MSTs for both CSI163 and S&P468, and this clustering
effect is much more obvious for S&P468 in which stocks are
well clustered according to the industry sectors of S&P500.
We further look into the connectivities of MSTs for both
CSI163 and S&P468; we find that after the edge filtering
process, some stocks are still well connected with other
stocks. These stocks are the key stocks in the contribution
of connectivities of the MSTs, while most stocks are poorly
connected with the degree of only one or two. In Tables 10
and 11, we present the top 10 stocks according to their degrees
in MST of CSI163 and S&P468, respectively. We find that the
most connected stocks of CSI163 are diverse, while, for the
MST of S&P468, 3 Financials stocks appear in the top 10.This
agrees with other analysis that the Chinese stock market is
muchmore diverse and Financials stocks play important roles
in the US market.
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Figure 14: Minimum spanning tree of S&P468. Vertices are colored to indicate different industry sectors.
Table 11: In this table, we present the top 10 stocks with the largest degrees in the MST of S&P468. As is shown, Honeywell Intl. is the most
connected stock in the MST with a degree of 38. The top 10 stocks are composed of 2 Industrials stocks, 3 Financials stocks, 2 Utilities stocks,
1 Health Care stock, and 1 Consumer Discretionary stock.
Degree Tick Stock Name Industry
38 HON Honeywell Intl. Industrials
18 TROW T. Rowe Price Group Financials
11 SCG SCANA Corp Utilities
10 ITW Illinois Tool Works Industrials
9 ADP Automatic Data Processing IT
9 XEL Xcel Energy Inc Utilities
8 JNJ Johnson & Johnson Health Care
8 SPG Simon Property Financials
8 SNA Snap-On Inc. Consumer Discretionary
7 AMG Affiliated Managers Financials
5.3. Planar Maximally Filtered Graph. Like the minimum
spanning tree (MST) approach, planar maximally filtered
graphs, PMFG, is also an edge filtering method but the
allowance of cliques up to 4 vertices shows much richer
structure information of a network rather than a single tree.
Based on the correlation matrix, the PMFG spans on a planar
surface without crossing of edges but with loops and holes.
It is believed that a PMFG might reveal more details of the
networks. After the introduction of PMFG by Tumminello
et al. in the study of 100 stocks of NYSE [86], PMFG has
been applied in many studies of financial networks. In [67],
the authors study the PMFG networks of DAX 30 stocks.
Instead of using the correlation matrix, a 𝑝-values matrix of
EngleGranger cointegration test is used to extract the PMFG
for Chinese stocks in [98]. The stability and robustness of
PMFG for 300 NYSE stocks are compared with MST in a
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Figure 15: PMFG of CSI163.
Figure 16: PMFG of S&P468.
running window approach, and the results reveal that PMFG
is stabler than MST [104]. In [47], the same authors of
[104] confirm that PMFG provides stronger robustness and
stability in revealing network structures of stock markets. It
has also been proven that the PMFG always contains an MST
for the same distance matrix [86].
The PMFGs of CSI163 and S&P468 networks are plotted
in Figures 15 and 16, respectively. We see that PMFGs have
muchmore edges compared toMSTs. Further, we use another
layout to plot the two PMFGs in Figures 17 and 18, from
which, we find that PMFGs also produce good clusters for
stocks of different industry sectors.
5.4. Asset Graph. In the minimum spanning tree (MST),
a connected tree structure connecting all vertices with a
minimum total length of edges is extracted. The selection
process of adding edges in generating an MST out of a
distance matrix is presented in Figure 12; an MST is always
a connected single tree without disconnected parts. By
connecting the𝑁 vertices, a total of𝑁 − 1 edges are needed,
where 𝑁 is the number of vertices in the original network.
It is obvious that an MST does not guarantee to be with
the possible minimum total lengths of the 𝑁 − 1 edges.
By changing the strategy of how edges are selected and
allowing disconnected parts, the asset graph (AG) approach
is proposed in [87, 88]. Similar to MST, to generate an
AG, we start the distance matrix containing all pairwise
distances information of the network; we first rank all edges
in ascending order from the shortest to the longest. Without
considering the requirement of keeping a tree connected, we
choose the top 𝑁 − 1 edges to form an AG. It has been
found that AG extracts similar structures asMST can do with
smaller normalized length and with better stable structure
over time. In this section, we show the AG networks for both
markets. In Figures 19 and 20, we present AG structures for
CSI163 and S&P468 networks, respectively. Compared with
Figures 13 and 14 of the minimum spanning trees of CSI163
and S&P468 networks, we see that AG structures are more
complex than MST and there are many isolated vertices in
AG. The connected cliques in AG are the most correlated
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Figure 17: CSI163 PMFG. We label the vertices with stock codes in (a) and industry codes in (b).
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Figure 18: S&P468 PMFG. We label the vertices with stock codes in (a) and industry codes in (b).
stocks connected by the shortest possible edges; in other
words, by connecting the most correlated stocks, AG omits
the less correlated stocks. We also observe that many cliques
emerge in AG and this reveals more information about the
structures than inMSTwhere no loops or cliques are allowed.
We see thatAG is a simple but effective network simplification
approach in extracting the most correlated stocks. However,
the sacrifice is also obvious, as shown in Figures 19 and 20,
the clustering is poor in AG compared with MST for both
markets.
We have shown that AG allows isolated vertices and not
all vertices are connected in one giant tree. To generate anAG,
we can use different numbers of edges; with the increase in
edge number, we can see that the portion of isolated vertices
declines. It is interesting to investigate how the vertices are
related to the edge numbers. In the original distance matrix,
the maximum possible number of edges is 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2. The
percentage of the fraction of AG is the top edges added to AG
networks to the total possible edges. When we increase this
edge percentage, more and more vertices are connected. We
calculate the percentage of connected vertices as the number
of connected to the total vertices number of𝑁. We plot these
results in Figures 21(a) and 21(b) for CSI163 and S&p468
networks, respectively. As the figures show, with a small
fraction of edges being included, more and more vertices
are connected; it requires only 0.0123 and 0.0043 of the total
edges for all vertices to be connected in CSI163 and S&P468,
respectively.This indicates that the top edges are very effective
in connecting vertices for S&P468 than CSI163.
In the previous section, all structures are extracted from
the average distance matrices over the whole study periods
which is defined in equation (7) as ⟨𝐷⟩ = (1/𝑊)∑𝑡𝐷𝑡,
where𝑊 is the number of sliding windows. In this part, we
investigate the dynamic structures of the filtered networks
with a focus on the AG and MST. For each sliding window,
at time 𝑡, we get a series of distance matrices 𝐷𝑡 based on the
returns data on the interval of [𝑡, 𝑡 − 1, . . . , 𝑡 − 𝐿 + 1] where𝐿 is the length of a sliding window. For each sliding window,
using the distance matrix𝐷𝑡, we construct the corresponding
original network 𝑁𝑡, the asset graph 𝐴𝐺𝑡, and the minimum
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Figure 19: Asset graph of CSI163 with𝑁 − 1 shortest edges.
spanning tree𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡. Using our dataset, we get𝑊𝑐𝑠𝑖163 = 1980
windows for CSI163 and𝑊𝑆&𝑃468 = 1729 for S&P468 in the
study period between 04/01/2007 and 06/11/2015.
In Figure 22, we present the distance distributions of
original distance matrices 𝑁𝑡, asset graphs 𝐴𝐺𝑡, and mini-
mum spanning trees 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 for both of CSI163 and S&P468
in the study period between 04/01/2007 and 06/11/2015. In
the original network 𝑁𝑡, a number of 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2 edges
are considered, while, for 𝐴𝐺𝑡 and 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡, 𝑁 − 1 edges are
considered. Since the sliding window sizes are 𝐿𝑐𝑠𝑖163 = 170
and 𝐿𝑆&𝑃468 = 500, we should keep in mind that a slice of
distribution is a result of the past 𝐿 dates, i.e., about half of a
year for CSI163 and two years for S&P468.The shapes of these
distributions are influenced by the lengths of 𝐿. We choose
the same set of lengths by considering the requirements of
randommatrix theory approach which we shall discuss later.
The similar plots are reported in [87] in the study of 477 stocks
from NYSE which is in a similar size of our S&P468 dataset
in which 468 stocks are included. We add more evidence by
comparing two markets of CSI163 and S&P468. In Figures
22(a) and 22(b), we observe obvious shifts of the distribution
centers for both markets. In these shifts, positive shifts to
the mean value of ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ = √2 roughly correspond to the
normal market periods, while negative shifts to the mean
value correspond to the bear or collapsing market periods.
This indicates that the stocks behave synchronized in bad
periods and this agrees with many previous studies. This also
provides a potential market measurement for investors and
regulators to watch how market shift behaviors. In Figures
22(c) and 22(d), the distributions of distances of AG for
CSI163 and S&P468 are plotted. Since AG is a subgraph of the
original network and is composed of the top 𝑁 − 1 shortest
edges, we expect the distributions show a left shift to themean
center of ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ = √2 compared to the original networks, and
this is well shown in the plots for both CSI163 and S&P468,
more precisely, the distributions of AG are zoom-in of the
left tails of original networks. The MST, as shown in Figures
22(e) and 22(f), has a relatively wider distribution which is
positively shifted compared to AG but negatively shifted to
the original network. Also, we find that, in AG and MST
networks, the most parts of the distributions stay on the left
hand of the center √2 which means the network is correlated
on average; in other words, for periods when the mean center
stays on the left hand, the network backbones of AG and
MST are on average correlated, and rarely anticorrelated.
A potential implication is that, for the whole market, the
network provides a diversified portfolio when the market is
normal or in a bull state, but for the top edges in AG andMST,
the networkmoves together with less diversificationwhen the
market falls into bear markets or crisis periods.
The distance 𝑑𝑖𝑗 indicates how the two stocks correlate
with each other. Larger 𝑑𝑖𝑗means smaller correlation and vice
versa. For an original network 𝑁 at time 𝑡, the total distance
can be introduced as
𝑑𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∑
𝑖,𝑗
𝑑𝑖𝑗, (12)
and the average distance for the original network can be
defined as
⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ = 1𝑁 (𝑁 − 1) /2∑𝑖,𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗. (13)
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Figure 20: Asset graph of S&P468 with𝑁 − 1 shortest edges.
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Figure 21: Percentages of connected vertices of AG against edge densities for CSI163 and S&P468 networks.
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Figure 22: Probability distributions of all distances 𝑑𝑖𝑗 of 𝑁𝑡, 𝐴𝐺𝑡, and 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 of CSI163 and S&P468 over the years in our study period
between 04/01/2007 and 06/11/2015. The total number of edges is 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2 for 𝑁𝑡, and 𝑁 − 1 for 𝐴𝐺𝑡 and𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡, respectively. Since the
sliding window size 𝐿𝐶𝑆𝐼163 = 170 and 𝐿𝑆&𝑃468 = 500, so the data only starts after a period of 𝐿.
In the same way, we can calculate the total distances for
𝐴𝐺𝑡 and𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 using equation (12), but considering the edge
number for𝐴𝐺𝑡 and𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 is𝑁−1, we normalize the average
distance for them as
⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ = 1𝑁 − 1∑𝑖,𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗. (14)
To investigate the tightness of the network, the total
distance 𝑑𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 and average distance ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ for the original
network 𝑁𝑡, 𝐴𝐺𝑡, and 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 in our study periods for both
networks are investigated. We plot the results in Figure 23
for 𝑑𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 and Figure 24 for ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩, respectively. For each stock
market, total distance 𝑑𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 and average distance ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ show
similar shapes. For both stock markets, the values are in this
order:𝑁𝑡 > 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 > 𝐴𝐺𝑡; i.e., the original networks have the
largest values of 𝑑𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 and ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ compared to𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 and 𝐴𝐺𝑡,
while 𝐴𝐺𝑡 has the smallest values.
By comparing the total distance 𝑑𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 plotted in
Figure 23(a) and the average distance ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ plotted in
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Figure 23: The evolving of total distances 𝑑𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 of original network𝑁𝑡, asset graph 𝐴𝐺𝑡, and minimum spanning tree𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 for CSI163 and
S&P468 over time in the study period.
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Figure 24: The evolving of average distances ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ of original network 𝑁𝑡, asset graph 𝐴𝐺𝑡, and minimum spanning tree𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 for CSI163
and S&P468 over time in the study period.
Figure 24(a) for CSI163 over the study period, we find the
six plots share similar shapes. The same similarities are
also observed in Figures 23(b) and 24(b) for the S&P468
network. This indicates that the AG and MST are both good
backbones of the whole original market networks, and this
tracking stays robust over time. For both networks, we also
find that the curve of 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡 is above 𝐴𝐺𝑡 which means the
total and average distances are slightly larger in MST than
in AG. Our findings agree with the results reported in [87].
Since the two stock markets datasets have different stock
numbers, we compare the average distance between the two
markets, and as shown in Figure 24, we see that the CSI163
is slightly sparser than S&P468, which indicates that the
CSI163 which is a developing market is more diversified than
S&P468 which is a developed market; this also agrees with
many previous research.
In Table 12, we summary the average (𝑑𝑖𝑗), minimum⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩min, maximum ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩max, and standard deviation ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩𝜎
of CSI163 and S&P468 networks for three kinds networks:
original, AG, and MST. We can see that the values are in
the order of 𝑁 > 𝑀𝑆𝑇 > 𝐴𝐺 for average, minimum, and
maximum. Also the three networks have similar standard
deviations. We find that the values of (𝑑𝑖𝑗) and minimum⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩min for CSI163 are slightly larger than S&P468 which
indicates stocks in CSI163 are less likely to correlated than in
S&P468. To visualize the distributions of these three kinds of
networks, we plot the probability density function (PDF) for
the original network, AG, and MST for CSI163 and S&P468
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Table 12: Average(𝑑𝑖𝑗), minimum ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩min, maximum ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩max, and standard deviation ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩𝜎 of CSI163 and S&P468 networks. The values
of first row belong to the original network𝑁, those of the second row belong to the AG, and those of the third row belong to MST.
CSI163 S&P468
(𝑑𝑖𝑗) ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩min ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩max ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩𝜎 (𝑑𝑖𝑗) ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩min ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩max ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩𝜎
1.1145 1.2445 0.9619 0.0650 1.0754 1.1968 0.9816 0.0731
0.7049 0.8708 0.5868 0.0578 0.6377 0.7607 0.5579 0.0623
0.8251 0.9565 0.7017 0.0540 0.7971 0.9092 0.7113 0.0615
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Figure 25: Probability density function (PDF) of average distance ⟨𝑑𝑖𝑗⟩ of original network𝑁, asset graph 𝐴𝐺, and minimum spanning tree𝑀𝑆𝑇 for CSI163 and S&P468.
in Figures 25(a) and 25(b), respectively. We see that the
distributions of all three networks share similar shapes but
with different mean centers; as shown in the figures, the AG
locates on the left, MST locates in the center, and original
locates on the right.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
In this research, we investigated the properties and models
of the complex network theory and its applications from
data science perspective. Using the daily close prices of two
sets of stocks from CSI300 and S&P500, we constructed the
correlation matrices for both the whole study periods and
all sliding windows. Based on these correlation matrices, we
build the networks with stocks as the vertices and correlation
relationships as the edges. We systematically applied network
filtering methods like hierarchical tree, minimum spanning
tree, planar maximally filtered graph, and asset graph to
simplify the networks. For each filtered network, the network
properties are discussed. Financial markets are complex
systems, and it is important to extract useful information
from the noise background by applyingmethods like complex
networks. We find that, for the stock markets, CSI300
and S&P500, the former is an emerging market while the
latter is a mature well-developed market. They share similar
properties in many ways and also vary in many aspects. The
revealed properties and robustness might provide sights of
the structures and dynamics of the two stock markets for
practitioners and regulators. Furthermore, it is interesting
to develop trading strategies with the information revealed
from the topological networks of stocks or indices. For
instance, the pair trading [113–116] is a basic and market
neutral strategy considering the movement of a correlated
stock pair, in which if the spread widens, then traders can
short one and long another one to gain the spread. Onemight
use the information of the networks to identify the pairs
and evaluate the reliabilities. Also, considering pairs between
groups of stocks rather than only two stocks, wemight use the
component or cluster information revealed in the networks
to build the trading groups. Furthermore, the directed net-
works built with Granger causalities or lagged correlations
might give more lead/lag details of stock pairs on the time
factors asynchronously. Second, with the help of network
edge filtering, we can significantly simplify the networks,
but most studies focus on the topological simplification
without concerns of the original portfolio returns. What if
28 Complexity
we consider the returns with the topology of the networks
to optimize the portfolio selection? The topological structure
can give us information on how diverse the portfolio is but
this is not enough to design the portfolio without return
information. Apossibleway is to adjust the portfolio selection
by considering measurements like the ratio of returns over
total distances of a portfolio or other approaches combining
both topological and return information. Also, the techniques
of network modeling and analysis can enhance the ability in
policymodeling and decisionmaking. We hope this work can
inspire policymakers and researchers in applying network
theories in wider applications.
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This paper presents Android-based SOS platform named SOSerbia for sending emergency messages by citizens in Serbia. The heart
of the platform is SOS client Android application which is an easy and simple solution for sending SOS messages with unique
combination of volume buttons. The proposed platform solves a lot of safety, security, and emergency problems for people who
can be in dangerous situations. After a person presses a correct combination of buttons, a message with his or her location is
sent to the operating center of the Serbian Police. The platform merges several appropriately combined advanced Android
technologies into one complete solution. The proposed solution also uses the Google location API for getting user’s location and
Media Player broadcast receiver for reading pressed buttons for volume. This logic can be also customized for any other mobile
operating system. In other words, the proposed architecture can be also implemented in iOS or Windows OS. It should be noted
that the proposed architecture is optimized for diﬀerent mobile devices. It is also implemented with simple widget and
background process based on location. The proposed platform is experimentally demonstrated as a part of emergency response
center at the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia. This platform overcomes real-life problems that other state-of-the-
art solutions introduce and can be applied and integrated easily in any national police and e-government systems.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, IT technologies grow rapidly and constantly.
Our daily life cannot be imagined without using these
technologies. An accelerated development of the mobile OS,
such as Android and iOS, has changed the main point of
using mobile phones. A mobile phone is not used only for
telephoning and sending messages but also is used for many
new and smart features. Some of these features allow location
sharing and tracking, which denotes a powerful and eﬃcient
tool that should be used carefully because of the private infor-
mation, such as location [1]. On the other hand, in recent
years, people live faster. In general, people could experience
a lot of unexpected situations like accidents, hijacking, and
criminal rate on a daily basis. Fortunately, people have their
mobile phones next to them at any moment, so they can feel
more protected. Thus, they can act in emergency situations
quickly and save their lives. Due to the fact that Android is
the most commonly used OS for mobile [2–5], there are
many applications developed and specialized for its easy
use (please see [1] and references therein). In other words,
nowadays, the problem of emergency, dangerous situations
can be potentially solved to the certain extent. According to
statistics of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia,
in the Republic of Serbia, in the last 10 years, there were 139
kidnapping, 791 rapes, 257 rape attempts, 43,482 cases of
home violence, 1446 thieveries, 32,584 robberies, 426 traf-
ﬁcking, 4 terrorism actions, 791 cases of school violence,
439,368 car accidents, and 216,041 ﬁre accidents. This paper
suggests an approach to the security problem in Serbia
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through the implementation of modern mobile architec-
ture, to address the mentioned issues of emergency and
dangerous situations for people who are in trouble. The
main aim is to enable people to send in an easy and unno-
ticeable way a SMS message containing their location to the
Police Operating Center. To the best knowledge of the
authors, this appropriate combination of advanced Android
technologies proposed in this paper for the ﬁrst time con-
structs unique, complete, and operatively usable software
platform for sending emergency messages. The source code
of Android application can be pulled from https://bitbucket.
org/bicba90/sos_android/. The proposed platform clearly
overcomes the problems introduced in previously proposed
solutions described in literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Related
Work, the related works and applications are presented. In
The Architecture of the Proposed Platform, the architecture
and operation of the proposed solution are presented. A
description of implementation of the proposed platform is
presented in Implementation. The next section, Experimen-
tal Usage and Evaluation, is provided and discussed. Finally,
the Conclusion is given in last section.
2. Related Work
Mobile applications and mobile services are becoming one of
the technology mainstreams in recent years. Android-based
applications are becoming a proper tool in order to solve dif-
ferent everyday life problems [1, 6, 7]. Recently, many
researchers have tried to ﬁnd a proper solution to address
the security issue in the case of emergency [8–13], but there
has been no proper solution.
In [8], an Android application that oﬀers SOS message
sending using the GPS location via a WhatsApp messenger
to predeﬁne recipient was proposed. To activate an SOS mes-
sage sending, user has to shake his Android phone while the
application is running. The main idea the author had was to
enable sending of user’s location via some of the modern ser-
vices such as WhatsApp. However, if the application is not
running, and the user is in a situation where he cannot pull
out his or her phone from a pocket or a bag, this application
is of no use.
Similar application intended for the cases where there is
no operation of mobile communication systems was pre-
sented in [9]. The proposed application is used in a way that
a group of phones, which have this application installed, cre-
ate an ad hoc, a peer-to-peer-like, wireless network. On the
one hand, this application is very good because in many
cases, such as earthquake and other natural disaster cases,
due to the damages, there is no proper operation of standard
communication systems. On the other hand, this is not a
good solution because it relies on a fact that each user
has an installed proposed application, which could not be
the case and which surely decreases the eﬀectiveness of
the proposed application. This application is also conve-
nient for the places when there is no mobile communica-
tion signal, such as rural places. However, in this modern
society, there is almost no place where there is no mobile
communication signal. Due to the all abovementioned
options, it can be concluded that the proposed application
is good to be used in some situations but it cannot address
the problem that we try to solve here. If other Android
phones near us do not use this application, then this is use-
less, and the messages go as far as the network of phones
goes, and apart from all that, in most cases when there is
an emergency, the mobile network is available, so there is
no need for this application.
The application that addresses the problem of the loca-
tion on the roads is presented in [10]. Namely, it was con-
cluded that road accidents are the factors that increase the
mortality level. So the basic idea of the application is to warn
a driver that he is approaching dangerous corner and help
him slow down and prepare for the corner. The application
is notifying a driver about the dangerous corner within 700
meters before the sharp corner. The warning is realized by
playing “buzz” sound as the alert, to tell the driver that there
are dangerous corners ahead. Besides, this system will give
suggestions to the closest emergency places by only refresh-
ing the list of the places and pin point the emergency places
on map. The localization technique used in this application
is very similar to those we use in our application. Both the
application presented in [10] and our application use the
GPS service to obtain accurate user position. However, the
application [10] is customized for road transport and cannot
solve several diﬀerent kinds of dangerous situations.
Furthermore, there is a similar application is bSafe
Android application [11]. This application provides more
than one option to the user; namely, four services are pro-
vided: bSafe Alarm, Follow me, Timer Alarm, and Fake call.
The ﬁrst one is intended for sending an SMS with the user
location, but besides the location, both audio and video data
can be sent together with the information about the location.
When this option is activated, an automatic recording is trig-
gered and the recorded data is sent to the desired number or
numbers. In this application, user can deﬁne a friend cycle
containing as mush numbers as the user wants, and these
numbers can be edited unlimited number of times. The sec-
ond option allows tracking of the user’s location on the
map in real time. The third option allows user to set the time
he thinks he will reach some location, and if he does not
reach the location in deﬁned period, SMS message with his
current location will be sent. The last, but not the least,
option provides a face call. When user activates this option,
the face call is performed, which can be beneﬁcial in the case
when user wants to divert attacker’s attention by letting him
know that there is someone who could hear if attack happens,
which could be used as a kind of evidence. However, this app
is not integrated with any centralized system and is not useful
in several dangerous situations where there is no time for
active usage of mobile phone.
The application GoSuraksheit [12] is also one of the sim-
ilar applications. This application is also intended for sending
of the SMS with the user’s location. The operation principle is
the similar to the presented applications [10, 11]. The user’s
location is obtained by using the GPS and then forwarded
to the desired numbers (up to ﬁve numbers). The main
advantage of this application is that it provides a possibility
to share the location on a popular social network, Facebook.
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The main disadvantages of the service presented in paper
[12] are as follows:
(i) The service does not include any centralized logic
and integration into government system
(ii) The client mobile app is not applicable in many dan-
gerous situations
The application presented in [13] allows mobile phone
user in an emergency to send the SMS to the police or rescue
center. With each request, user’s location coordinates are
sent to the police center number. This application can oper-
ate in two modes, network mode and GPS mode. All the
details of a user, such as description, priority, and current
location report, are sent to the server. In other words, this
app solves the problem of integration with the centralized
system in order to help the citizens, but it is also inapplicable
in several dangerous situations when the victim cannot
actively use mobile phone.
To summarize, in order to trigger previously listed appli-
cations, it is necessary to open the application on a mobile
phone which is sometimes impossible to do. The shortcom-
ings of these applications is that there is no emergency button
or trigger for fast and silent alert, even if the application has
some sort of silent switch, such as phone shaking or detection
of user running, which is not good because the application
can be triggered accidently. In addition, some of the pre-
sented applications do not have the widget. Moreover, there
is no any information about experimental usage of the pro-
posed app [8–13] and its reaction time measurements in
real-life situation. These services also cannot give any useful
analytics after long-time operative usage of client app.
On the other hand, the application we propose here eﬀec-
tively works in the situations when the victim cannot easily
and actively use mobile phone. It can even work if the screen
is broken and the device is locked, and it sends messages
directly to the Police Data Center. This center is integrated
with Serbian e-Government BigData Center and it will be
possible to apply advanced analytics solutions after the pro-
posed service generates a suﬃciently large amount of data.
3. The Architecture of the Proposed Platform
The architecture of the proposed application and its opera-
tion is presented in Figure 1. As it can be seen, the ﬁrst step
is sending of the SOS message when the user is in danger.
The second one is processing of sent data at the police
computer center that has a DB connected to Serbian e-
Government BigData Center. This DB has a list of users
and exact real-time locations of police patrols, so it can be
easily calculated the nearest patrol distance. After this step,
patrol is informed by the dispatch center about location
where they should go. The main purpose of this process is
to minimize the time from sending the SMS to getting a help
from the police. By using the proposed application, in only
few steps, of which the ﬁrst one is triggering SMS with but-
tons, the second one is related to the DB with users where
we already know who is sending the SMS, and the third is a
determination the closest police patrol according to the
obtained information on user’s location (each patrol is
Whole process takes a few seconds,
from receiving SOS SMS,
to sending the nearest police patrol
Person in danger
SOS application
Serbian e-Government 
BigData Center
DB
Serbian police data center
Police patrol
Emergency 
call service
Computer which is connected
to DB and showing 
real-time patrol locations
Sending SOS SMS with 
exact user location
Figure 1: The architecture of the proposed platform.
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equipped with a GPS transmitter). The patrol should be
informed where to go by the operator from Police Data
Center, and that is the only part that is not automated.
The proposed architecture of the client Android applica-
tion is shown in Figure 2. Three components properly com-
bined are necessary to provide a good operation ﬂow of
suggested solution: activity, service, and broadcast receiver
[14]. An activity interacts with user so it creates a window
to place UI (user interface) elements. An Android applica-
tion can contain several activities, which means that many
diﬀerent screens can interact with each other [15]. In pro-
posed approach, user via view in activity sends a request
for starting service that is responsible for getting current
location. To explain, service is a component which runs in
the background without direct interaction with the user
and it is used for repetitive and potentially long running
operations. As the service has no user interface, it is not
bound to the lifecycle of an activity [14]. In the proposed cli-
ent app, broadcast receiver is responsible for registering sys-
tem events and allows reading pressed buttons for default
combination as an Android component which allows you
to register for system or application events. All registered
receivers for an event are notiﬁed by the Android runtime
once this event happens.
To sum up, implemented client solution is consisted of
these three components. For release stage, SOS application
also uses Google API Client library for locations (“com.goo-
gle.android.gms:play-services-location:10.2.6”) for getting
user’s location. Google Location Services API is the most
popular service for adding location awareness with auto-
mated location tracking, geofencing, and activity recognition.
The proposed architecture of the client Android applica-
tion also allows implementation of multiple options, such as
(i) emergency trigger—for emergency SMS sending to
the emergency services
(ii) widget trigger—same as previous, but only for
sending when phone is unlocked
(iii) pattern/pin—for opening and activating application
(iv) time locker—for setting application’s active hours
(v) SMS remote control—if application receives a
message from predeﬁned number with certain code
(#123backup), for example, it will trigger data
backup (SMS, images, videos, and documents), user
will be able to select what he wants to save or
upload to cloud
(vi) restore/factory reset—in case the device is stolen
or lost
(vii) app icon hidden in whole user system—in case the
phone is stolen
(viii) camera remote control—again trigger feature
remotely, this time turn camera on, take a picture
with front and rear camera, and send it to prede-
ﬁned number
For the ﬁrst release of the service, we have selected ﬁrst
two options to implement, emergency trigger and widget
trigger. In other words, our SOS application is developed
for working in two ways. First, service is implemented to have
listener for buttons that user needs to press (default combina-
tion for sending SOS message). Second, service is imple-
mented when widget has occurred. When user presses
widget, it automatically sends message with its own location
and any other information if the service is customized for dif-
ferent users.
4. Implementation
4.1. Release Stage. SOS application for sending emergency
messages uses Android platform. This is an oﬄine app,
which means that it can work without access to the Internet.
What this essentially means is that it gives a better experience
to the users, and it can even be a key factor for them in order
to retain or uninstall application. Further, the main reasons
for using Android as a client platform are as follows:
(i) Open source (can be leveraged without having to
worry about the licensing costs)
(ii) Dissociation of the user’s interface from the business
logic
(iii) Asynchronous calls (easy to code client-side
multithreading)
(iv) Customizable user interface (create custom inter-
faces for diﬀerent business)
(v) Reusable and responsive components (support for
Android material)
(vi) Portability (can easily be ported to other mobile
operating systems)
The list of features and advantages embedded in Android
OS is quite long. The core release-stage functionality is to
send message, prompted by the users, based on existing
Activity
Service
ANDROID
SYSTEM
BROADCAST
RECEIVER
Start service
Send broadcast
On receive
Figure 2: The architecture of the client Android application.
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services implemented for listening and getting location. This
client-side module provides integration of Google Service API
Location and JSON for parsing model.
On the one hand, with the listener services used on the
UI side, SOS client communicates with this service that
has been started in background and performs location task
and starts broadcast receiver for media. On the other
hand, there is a widget, which user presses and triggers
service during this process.
4.2. User Interface. In one word, user interface is everything
that the user can see and interact with. User interface of the
proposed client Android application is shown in Figure 3.
Android provides a variety of prebuilt UI components, such
as structured layout objects and UI controls that allow to
build the graphical user interface (see Figure 4). UI in SOS
application is implemented in XML, using primarily Linear-
Layout [15]. LinearLayout is a view group that aligns all chil-
dren in a single direction, vertically or horizontally and also
supports assigning a weight to individual child with the
android: layout_weight attribute. This attribute assigns an
“importance” value to a view in terms of how much space it
should occupy on the screen.
4.3. Widget. App Widgets are miniature application views
that can be embedded in other applications (such as the
home screen) and receive periodic updates [15]. These
views are referred to as widgets in the user interface, and it
can be published one with an App Widget provider. An
application component that is able to hold other App
Widgets is called an App Widget host. Figure 5 shows imple-
mented SOS App Widget.
As mentioned, SOS application uses App Widget
declared in manifest ﬁle (see Figure 6) implemented in class
CustomAppWidgetProvider which extends class AppWid-
getProvider. The AppWidgetProvider class extends Broad-
castReceiver as a convenience class to handle the App
Widget broadcasts. The AppWidgetProvider receives only
the event broadcasts that are relevant to the App Widget,
such as when the App Widget is updated, deleted, enabled,
and disabled. When these broadcast events occur, the App-
WidgetProvider receives method calls such as OnUpdate()
and OnReceive() method.
The proposed client application calls OnUpdate()
method when the user adds the AppWidget, so it should per-
form the essential setup, such as to deﬁne event handlers for
views and to start a temporary service, if necessary. However,
if you have declared a conﬁguration activity, this method is
not called when the user adds the App Widget, but is called
for the subsequent updates. It is the responsibility of the con-
ﬁguration activity to perform the ﬁrst update when conﬁgu-
ration is done (see Figure 7).
The proposed client application calls OnReceive()
method for every broadcast and before each of the rest call-
back methods. This method checks if location is turned on.
If yes, service is starting. If not, it shows toast message for
warning to turn the location on in settings (see Figure 8).
4.4. Service. A service is an application component represent-
ing either an application’s desire to perform a longer-running
operation while not interacting with the user or to supply
functionality for other applications to use [14]. Each service
class must have a corresponding <service> declaration in
its package’s AndroidManifest.xml. Services can be started
with Context.startService() and Context.bindService(). Ser-
vices run in the main thread of their hosting process. In this
work, two services are implemented: volume service and
widget service.
4.5. Volume Service. A volume service is one of two applica-
tions services, as we can see in Figure 9. Service can be started
and stopped by the user, by pushing one of those two buttons
Pokreni servis (eng. Start service) and Zaustavi servis (eng.
Stop service). It is called volume service mainly because this
service is working in background and waiting to capture right
the combination of volume buttons sequentially pressed (at
this particular implementation case that combination is set
to up-down-up-down). This combination of volume buttons
pressed triggers the SMS sending (see Figure 10). After
service is started, location services must be enabled so that
volume service can send user’s location in message. Basic
principle is that after user triggers the right combination,
service starts with gathering information about user’s loca-
tion which usually takes between 1 and 5 seconds (mainly
depends on connection quality at the moment of sending
SOS SMS message) and immediately after that it sends mes-
sage with map link. After sending the message, volume ser-
vice remains active if there is need for a new send.
Figure 3: Main screen implementation.
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4.6. Widget Service. A widget service implementation shown
in Figure 11 has almost the same logic as volume service;
the diﬀerence between them is that the widget service is
triggered by widget button, after which is not listening for
volume button-pressed combination, but instead it starts
location services and sends message after ﬁnding the right
location. Also, widget service is destroyed after sending
message, because its only purpose is to send message in
the shortest way. So, the implemented principle is that the
service sends a message on location change, as we can
see in Figure 12. When service ﬁnds a location, it sends
a message, stops the location updates, and destroys the
widget service.
4.7. Presentation of Solution. Final result generated by pro-
posed client is shown in Figure 13. We can see a message
which contains link to the Google maps with user’s coordi-
nates shown as a pin. Message contains text in this for-
m—“SOS my location is Google maps link.” With this
location, user who sends an SOS message can be rescued in
the short period of time. The form of SOS message can be
easily customized to diﬀerent kinds of app users.
5. Experimental Usage and Evaluation
For evaluation purposes, the platform has been tested
multiple times in diﬀerent real-life situations. Application is
working as intended and sends a message every time after a
given command.
During the period of experimental usage, the shortest
reaction time was less than a minute that includes period
from sending SOS SMS until the arrival of police patrol,
and the longest period was 3 minutes, and that was the situ-
ation where police patrol was on the other side of their
patrolling area; in other words, they were at furthest possible
location from the accident (approximately 4 km). These spe-
ciﬁc numbers are roughly measured using few simulation
attempts as well as some real-life situations and statistical
data from the Ministry of Interior, Republic of Serbia, and
they highly depend on internal police organization.
Drawbacks of the app are the locations, which are not
correct in closed spaces or not even shown at all, and it is
because of device’s inability to ﬁnd GPS satellites. Also, other
issue is the high buildings with lots of ﬂoors, where the coor-
dinates are the same for the whole building and there are lots
of apartments in it, but that can be almost ﬁxed by sending
the elevation of device. However, we will still have a problem
with multiple apartments, for example. So those are the few
things that we have to look back at, during further develop-
ment of the proposed platform.
Figure 4: Main screen implemented in XML.
Figure 5: SOS widget.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, an Android-based SOS software platform has
been presented. The client SOS application is designed in a
way to enable user to send his location in a simple and unno-
ticeable way. The performance of the proposed application
has been veriﬁed experimentally. The application is shown
to be very useful in a large number of life-threatening situa-
tions. Moreover, this kind of applications is very suitable
for children monitoring during many of their activities, such
as going to the school, for a run, or during travelling, and in
the situation where children ﬁnd themselves in an unknown
place or dangerous situation.
One of the main advantages of the proposed application
is that it is directly connected to the police system and its
Figure 6: CustomAppWidgetProvider declared in manifest ﬁle.
Figure 7: OnUpdate method in CustomAppWidgetProvider class.
Figure 8: OnReceive() method in CustomAppWidgetProvider class.
Figure 9: Main screen with start and stop buttons for service and
settings button for the app.
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Figure 10: Implemented volume service logic.
Figure 11: Implemented widget service logic.
Figure 12: Implemented location update logic.
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database, which means that a needed and necessary help can
be obtained as soon as possible. Besides, the police have the
information on all mobile phone users and real-time loca-
tions of all police patrols and there are a large number of
highly experienced people who can help a victim. The other
advantage is that almost the entire process is automated;
the only thing that should be done manually by an operator
at the Police Operation Data Centre is to determine which
of the police patrols is the closest to the victim and to direct
them to go the sent location to help a victim. This way, the
time needed to react is decreased signiﬁcantly, which can
save many lives.
Data Availability
The source code of the proposed application used to sup-
port the ﬁndings of this study is included within the arti-
cle. Executable installation ﬁle with installation instruction
can be found (https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1WI-
4KDNrd9cX49Cf3BS6qJC2f9xMr30Y). This ﬁle can be eas-
ily generated from the source code included in the article.
This app can be easily integrated and tested in any police
or similar system.
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Prediction is one of the major challenges in complex systems. The prediction methods have shown to be effective predictors of the
evolution of networks. These methods can help policy makers to solve practical problems successfully and make better strategy for
the future. In thiswork, we focus on exporting countries’ data of the International TradeNetwork. A recommendation system is then
used to identify the products that correspond to the production capacity of each individual country but are somehow overlooked
by the country. Then, we simulate the evolution of the country’s fitness if it would have followed the recommendations. The result
of this work is the combination of these twomethods to provide insights to countries on how to enhance the diversification of their
exported products in a scientific way and improve national competitiveness significantly, especially for developing countries.
1. Introduction
International trade plays a considerable role in the exchange
channels between countries [1, 2]. It is also becoming more
important as time goes on. In 1960, international trade
accounted for roughly 25% of a country’s total Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP). Nowadays it accounts for nearly 60%
of countries GDP [3]. Historically, various classic economic
models were developed to evaluate the dissimilarity of wealth
resulting from the exportation of diverse goods [4]. Models
based on the gravity equation were also developed and
showed to be adequate to explain many of the features of
the international trade [5]. Another approach, the Product
Space, attempted to illustrate how the nations will develop
in the future by projecting the exports data onto a two-
dimensional map and observing the diffusion of the export
process [6]. Economic models mainly consist of commodity
profits, geographical relations, comprehensive productivity,
economic structure [7], and a series of macroeconomic
elements. In practice, numerous complex external factors,
e.g., national policies, religious beliefs, and the country’s
current production capacity, are key components in the
international trade. Here, we also recognize that plenty of
sociologists have constructed grand theories on the empirical
study of global economic development [8–10].Thesemethods
and theories were developed by David Snyder and Edward
L. Kick [11]; it was the first study of international trade and
world economic growth using a network framework in the
American Journal of Sociology, 1979. In [12], the authors
emphasized the importance of the global trade, and the
structure of the modern world system was addressed by
multiple-network analysis. The complex network approach
was also used in [13], and it was shown that the Interna-
tional Trade Network and the World Wide Web both have
collaborative characteristics [14]. Indeed, the International
Trade Network is a complex network in terms of structure.
With this is in mind, we apply recommendation algorithms
that are usually applied on e-commerce systems in order
to predict the evolution of the International Trade Network
[15–17].
Twomethods were proposed to assign scores to countries
and products using the complex network approach.The basis
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of these methods is to analyze the relation between countries
and their exports and then to rank the countries according
to their economic competitiveness and the exported good
with the economic advantage they bring to the exporting
countries. The first method, the Method of Reflection (MR),
proposed the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) to account
for the production characteristics of countries. The countries
are ranked according to their exporting capacity. The authors
pointed out that the method is able to predict the future
economic expansion of countries and that the scores obtained
with MR indicate which products should be exported in
order to maximize the countries’ performance [18]. In [19],
a method based on the Markov chain was proposed. The
method showed the need to take into account the nonlinear
interactions between exported commodities and national
diversity. This led to the development of the Fitness and
Complexity metric [20]. It is an iterative method based on
the nonlinearity of the system. This method was shown to
be conceptually more grounded than the previous ones and
a better predictor of the economic evolution [21, 22]. This
method was applied to forecast the GDP growth in a recent
work. The authors reported that their estimates were on
average 25 percent more accurate than were those made by
the International Monetary Fund [23].
In this paper, we startwith a detailed definition of the used
algorithms, namely, the Probabilistic Spreading algorithm
[24], the Heat Spreading algorithm [25], the Degree Increase
algorithm [26], and the Time-Aware Probabilistic Spreading
algorithms [27]. We then apply these four algorithms to the
International Trade Network and compare their performance
on two different aspects. The first one is the evaluation of the
accuracy of the recommendation, which is a standard evalu-
ation of the recommendation algorithms. The second aspect
is the evaluation of the algorithms on their ability to rec-
ommend products that would improve the countries’ fitness.
This is obtained by the combination of the recommendation
results with the Fitness and Complexity scores to simulate
the changes in rankings and fitness values of countries after
exporting recommended products. The experimental results
confirm the validity of the recommendation algorithm on
this task and show the validity of our approach to tackle this
problem.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. International Trade Network
2001 to 2015. This dataset was cleaned using harmoniza-
tion techniques in [28] and the similar categories were
merged together. Additionally, the countries that had no
entries recorded for exportation between 2001 and 2015
were removed. After cleaning procedure, the International
Trade Network was comprised of 192 countries and 786
commodities. We use the bipartite network approach to rep-
resent the data. In this approach, one set of nodes represents
the countries, and the second set of nodes represents the
commodities. If a country is considered as an exporter of
a commodity, a link connects the country’s node and the
commodity node.
RCA. The data of the International Trade Network includes
country nodes and commodity nodes. These two types of
nodes form a bipartite network. One important aspect of our
network representation is that it is binary. Either two nodes
are connected, or they are not. We then need a criterion to
define if a country can be considered as an exporter of a
commodity or not. Indeed, even if countries cannot produce
a specific commodity, they might export a very small amount
of it. Therefore it should not be considered as an exporter
of the commodity. In order to quantify the advantage of a
country on a commodity, we use the “Revealed Comparative
Advantage” (RCA) as a clear constraint to determine whether
a country can be considered as an exporter of certain
commodities [29].
𝑅𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝛼 = 𝑒𝑖𝛼/∑𝑗 𝑒𝑗𝛼∑𝛽 𝑒𝑖𝛽/∑𝑗𝛽 𝑒𝑗𝛽 , (1)
where 𝑒𝑖𝛼 is the total amount of export 𝛼 for country 𝑖. If
the country 𝑖 is regarded as an exporter of the commodity𝛼, the export amount of the commodity 𝛼 should occupy a
larger proportion in the total amount of the export goods of
the country 𝑖. We set the RCA value to 1 and the country-
commodity will have links when this pair of nodes satisfies
the condition of 𝑅𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝛼 ≥ 1. These nodes and links together
constitute the bipartite network of the international trade
activities.
2.2. Methods
2.2.1. Recommendation System. Recommendation systems
aim at recommending the most adequate items for users.
In comparison with traditional link prediction, the focus is
put on individual nodes rather than individual links. In our
case, the main focus of the recommendation process is the
countries nodes. For each country node in the system, the
algorithms compute a score for every product in the network.
If the country is already considered as an exporter of an item,
the score corresponding to the product is set to 0 (i.e., a
product that is already exported is not recommended). The
recommendation list for each country is composed by the top𝐿 products with the highest score for the particular country.
We now describe the algorithms used in this work. Note that𝐿 is set to 20 in this work and it has been shown to have no
impact on the significance of the accuracy [17].
In order to compare the performance of the five recom-
mender algorithms, we choose a year 𝑇 and predict which
additional product the countries export at year 𝑇 + 5 (the
testing set) based solely on the data up to year 𝑇 (the training
set).
Probabilistic Spreading (ProbS). For target user 𝑖, the initial
resources are first distributed evenly on the item side and then
propagated to the user side through a random walk process
[24]. In the same way, the resources are then returned to the
item side. Both steps are used to allocate resources among
neighbors and then spread to the other side. Finally, the score
of each item for country 𝑖 is obtained. The initial resource
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vector is represented as 𝑓(𝑖) and its elements are represented
as 𝑓(𝑖)𝛼 = 𝑎𝑖𝛼. The final resource values 𝑠(𝑖)𝛼 can be written as
𝑠(𝑖)𝛼 =
𝐼∑
𝛽=1
𝑊𝛼𝛽𝑓(𝑖)𝛽 . (2)
The elements of the redistribution matrix𝑊 are derived from
Probabilistic Spreading process.
𝑊𝛼𝛽 = 1𝑘𝛽
𝑈∑
𝑗=1
𝑎𝑗𝛼𝑎𝑗𝛽
𝑘𝑗 , (3)
where 𝐼 denotes the number of products and 𝑈 the number
of countries. 𝑎𝑗𝛼𝑎𝑗𝛽 represents path from item 𝛽 to item𝛼 through country 𝑗 in two random walks. The ProbS
algorithm employs a column-normalized transition matrix.
The partition of 𝑘𝛽 and 𝑘𝑗 corresponds to the uniform
partition of resources between all links from nodes 𝛽 and 𝑗
[30].
Heat Spreading (HeatS). The HeatS spreading algorithm
evolved from the Probabilistic Spreading algorithm. These
two methods are similar in structure and both use random
walk processes to the redistribute initial resources. Compared
with the ProbS algorithm, resources spread more evenly
in the HeatS spreading method and items with only few
connections usually benefit from a higher score than with the
ProbS algorithm [25].
The initial resource vector is set to 𝑓(𝑖) according to user’s
item collection; the elements 𝑓(𝑖)𝛼 = 𝑎𝑖𝛼 can be regarded as the
temperature value of the item. Unlike the ProbS algorithm,
which uses column normalization transformation matrix,
the HeatS algorithm uses row normalization. The spreading
process is represented by a matrix as follows, where 𝑊󸀠 =
𝑊𝑇:
𝑊󸀠𝛼𝛽 = 1𝑘𝛼
𝑈∑
𝑗=1
𝑎𝑗𝛼𝑎𝑗𝛽
𝑘𝑗 . (4)
Resource received by the user 𝑖 is equal to the average
resource owned by the user’s collected item. Similarly, item
side receives resources transmitted from the user through the
averaging process. The item’s score is calculated as
ℎ(𝑖)𝛼 =
𝐼∑
𝛽=1
𝑊󸀠𝛼𝛽𝑓(𝑖)𝛽 . (5)
Degree Increase (DI). The time information is often over-
looked in the evolution of complex networks. In fact, time
plays a crucial role in the evolution of information networks
[31–33]. The combination of recommendation systems with
time dynamics improves the recommendation and allows
performing better predictions. It has been proven that the
Degree Increase (DI) method can accurately predict the
prevalence of items in the future. The increase in popularity
of item 𝛼 within time window 𝜏 is
Δ𝑘𝛼 (𝑡, 𝜏) = 𝑘𝛼 (𝑡) − 𝑘𝛼 (𝑡 − 𝜏) , (6)
where item degree 𝑘𝛼(𝑡) = ∑𝑖 𝐴 𝑖𝛼(𝑡) corresponds to the
number of users who have collected item 𝛼. The final item
score is expressed as
Δ𝑘󸀠𝛼 (𝑡, 𝜏) = Δ𝑘𝛼 (𝑡, 𝜏) + 𝜀𝑘𝛼 (𝑡) . (7)
In practice, the value of 𝜀must be small enough to ensure that
the ranking of commodity popularity growth Δ𝑘𝛼(𝑡, 𝜏) does
not change.
Time-Aware Probabilistic Spreading (TProbS). The ProbS
method is characterized by the fact that spread of resources
is cumulative; that is, the more popular items are more likely
to get high scores and get recommended to users. The Time-
Aware Probabilistic Spreading method integrates the ProbS
method with the DI method. It is written mathematically as
𝑢(𝑖)𝛼 = 𝑠(𝑖)𝛼 (Δ𝑘
󸀠
𝛼 (𝑡, 𝜏)𝑘𝛼 (𝑡) )
𝜃
, (8)
where the parameter 𝜃 is an additional parameter to define
the length of past time window.
2.2.2. Fitness and Complexity Metrics. The Fitness and Com-
plexity metrics are used to measure the competitiveness of
countries and the quality of exported products.The algorithm
consists of two nonlinear coupling equations [20, 34], which
eventually reach a fixed value through iterative methods and
the equations are defined as
𝐹𝑛𝑖 =
𝐼∑
𝛼=1
𝑎𝑖𝛼𝑄𝑛−1𝛼 (9)
𝑄𝑛𝛼 = 1∑𝑈𝑖=1 𝑎𝑖𝛼1/𝐹𝑛−1𝑖 , (10)
where 𝐹𝑛𝑖 indicates the fitness of country 𝑖 after 𝑛 iterations.
In [35], the convergence of the algorithm and its stopping
condition were demonstrated. The higher the fitness value,
the more advantageous the variety and complexity of the
goods exported by the country. The study [36] shows that the
weak economies can analyze how to get out of the poverty
trap and increase the diversification of their exports via fitness
metrics. Complexity 𝑄𝑛𝛼 cannot simply be calculated from
the average of countries’ fitness. Successful countries export
almost all products and it is unable to infer the complexity
of each product from their export data (for example, our
data shows that a total of 786 products were included in
the International Trade Network from 2001 to 2015, and the
United States exported a total of 775 kinds of products).
Therefore, the complexity of product should be measured in
a nonlinear way; namely, it is essential to reduce contribution
of successful countries. Assuming that product 𝛼 possesses
two exporters 𝑖 and 𝑗 with fitness values of 0.2 and 15,
respectively, the complexity of the product would be 0.197.
If the two exporters 𝑖 and 𝑗 have fitness values of 10 and 15,
the complexity would be 6. These two examples verify the
fact that the value of complexity dependsmainly on the worst
exporter.
4 Complexity
2.2.3. Precision and Recall Metrics. In general, recommen-
dation algorithms are compared in their ability to predict
the future. In order to evaluate their accuracy, we use two
metrics, namely, the Precision and the Recall metrics. We are
not interested in the accuracy of the algorithms per se, but
the accuracy of the recommendation results is an important
evaluation indicator. A higher accuracy indicates that the
exporting countries possess the capacity to produce the
recommended commodities. Indeed, the countries should
be able to produce the recommended commodities in the
near future; otherwise the recommendation process would be
meaningless.
Precision. For each country, the individual Precision is mea-
sured as the fraction of recommended products that are
eventually exported. If 𝑛𝑖 is the number of products that
are eventually exported by country 𝑖 and that are actually
recommended, then the Precision for country 𝑖 is 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖/𝐿.
The Precision 𝑃 is the average of 𝑃𝑖 over every country. Recall.
Recall is similar to Precision, but we use the number of newly
exported goods instead of the fixed recommendation list 𝐿.
If country 𝑖 exports 𝐸𝑖 additional items in the testing set, the
individual Recall reads 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖/𝐸𝑖. The Recall is the average
of 𝑅𝑖 over every country.
2.3. Addition of Products to Countries’ Export Basket. After
having obtained the recommendation list from the previously
described recommendation methods, we add the goods that
are at the top of the recommendation lists to the respective
countries’ exports baskets. Then, the fitness value of each
country is reevaluated and its change is recorded. However,
the calculations of fitness are an iterative nonlinear process,
which is coupledwith the complexity of the products.Thus, in
order to evaluate the changes brought by adding the products
to the country’s export basket, only one country is modified
at a time. In other words, for a given country 𝑖, only its
recommendation list is added to its exports basket and the
rest of the network is left untouched. For instance, if we
have a high complexity product to the export basket of a
low fitness country, the complexity of the product might be
greatly reduced, which will have a strong impact on the rest
of the Fitness and Complexity values. The simulation process
is described as below. For each country, we add the𝐿 products
in its recommendation list to its export basket. For each
product 𝛼 in the top 𝐿 part of the recommendation list of
country 𝑖, we add a link between the country 𝑖 and the product𝛼 in the data. The export volume of product 𝛼 from country 𝑖
must satisfy the condition of 𝑅𝐶𝐴 ≥ 1.
3. Results
3.1. Accuracy of the Recommendation Algorithms. The first
step in the comparison of the algorithms is to compare
their accuracies. We perform the predictions from years
2001 to 2010. The results are shown in Figure 1. First, we
see that the top performing method is the TProbS method.
This is not surprising as this is the one including both
the strength of ProbS and time information. The parameter𝜃 = 0.2 is constantly the one giving the highest Recall in
our simulation and thus is fixed to this value. Obviously,
this lessens the impact of degree increase on the network,
which is compatible with the expected behavior of countries
development.They should not all focus on the same products,
but they still follow the ongoing trends. As noted in [17],
the HeatS method performs surprisingly well. This method
usually performs poorly in online e-commerce networks
[25] but has the advantage of recommending products with
lower degree. DI and Degree both perform poorly, which is
expected as they do not take into account the production
capabilities of countries.
3.2. Tier Division. An interesting study is to investigate the
impact of the methods on countries with different fitness
rank. It is not certain that a country that belongs to the
top of the fitness list will behave the same to a country
that belongs at the bottom of the list. In order to study this
effect, we divide the countries into three different categories
according to their fitness rank. The three categories hold the
same number of countries and thus are denoted as top tier,
middle tier, and low tier. For each category, we compute
the average increased ranking and increased fitness after the
addition of the recommended exports. The results are shown
in Figure 2. The countries that benefit the most from these
recommendations are middle and low tier countries. In panel
(a), the most interesting result is in HeatS. The increased
rankings by following its recommendation are much higher
than those of TProbS. This is especially true with top tier
countries, as following the recommendation of TProbSwould
even lower a country’s fitness. This comes from the fact that
top tier countries need to innovate and produce goods for
which there are only a few competitors, while, for middle and
low tier countries, it is sufficient to produce additional items.
Note that we try adding time to HeatS: the Recall improved
to the level of TProbS, but the improvement of fitness was
lower than that of HeatS. So we decided to keep only HeatS
and TProbS for simplicity.
From panel (b), we see that the fitness of top tier
countries is the one improving themost, which shows that the
recommendation algorithm indeed recommends different
complex products in line with the ability of the country.
For top tier countries, the difference of fitness between two
countries is large, while, for lower tier countries, the fitness
difference between two countries is much smaller. This fact
explains the result that top tier countries’ fitness improvement
is significant but their ranking is only slightly improved, while
the low tier countries can increase the ranking a lot in the
case of less improvement in fitness. To illustrate better our
recommendation results, we select three countries in each
tier. Due to the limit of the page size, we only choose the
five products with the highest score according to TProbS
and HeatS for each country. The products recommended by
TProbS and HeatS are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Both tables show the products with different complexity for
various tier countries.
3.3. Evolution of Countries’ Fitness. In order to directly study
the effect of each algorithm on the country’s fitness value, we
randomly select 30 countries in the middle tier and compare
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Table 1: The top five recommended products by TProbS algorithms for three randomly selected countries in different tiers.
Tier Country Recommended products (top 5)
Low tier
Vanuatu
Cigarettes
Fruit, fresh or dried
Plants and parts of trees used in perfumery; in pharmacy; etc.
Sawlogs and veneer logs, of non-coniferous species
Non-alcoholic beverages
Tonga
Spices, except pepper and pimento
Sugar confectionery and preparations, non-chocolate
Fish, dried, salted or in brine; smoked fish
Cement
Wood, simply shaped
Dominica
Meal and flour of wheat and flour of meslin
Cask, drums, etc., of iron, steel, aluminium, for packing goods
Packing containers, box files, etc., of paper, used in offices
Beer made from malt
Plastic packing containers, lids, stoppers and other closures
Middle tier
Norway
Animals, live (including zoo animals, pets, insects, etc.)
Fuel wood and wood charcoal
Bovine and equine hides, raw, whether or not split
Bones, ivory, horns, coral, shells and similar products
Soaps, organic products and preparations for use as soap
Mauritius
Skirts
Vegetable products roots and tubers, fresh, dried
Leather of other hides or skins
Footwear
Other outer garments
Kyrgyzstan
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits
Fish, fresh or chilled, excluding fillet
Eggs, birds, and egg yolks, fresh, dried or preserved, in shell
Fruit or vegetable juices
Jams, jellies, marmalades, etc., as cooked preparations
Top tier
Germany
Iron, steel, aluminium reservoirs, tanks, etc., capacity 300 lt plus
Non-domestic refrigerators and refrigerating equipment, parts
Insulated electric wire, cable, bars, etc.
Bottles etc. of glass
Railway or tramway sleepers
Italy
Refined sugar etc.
Fuel wood and wood charcoal
Sugar confectionery and preparations
Manufactures of mineral materials (other than ceramic)
cotton, not elastic nor rubberized
Switzerland
Structures and parts of, of iron, steel; plates, rods, and the like
Manufactures of mineral materials (other than ceramic)
Other furniture and parts thereof
Organic surface-active agents
Miscellaneous articles of base metal
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Table 2: The top five recommended products by HeatS algorithms for three randomly selected countries in different tiers.
Tier Country Recommended products (top 5)
Low tier
Vanuatu
Sugars, beet and cane, raw, solid
Natural rubber latex; natural rubber and gums
Jute, other textile bast fibers, raw, processed but not spun
Ores and concentrates of uranium and thorium
Nuts edible, fresh or dried
Tonga
Manila hemp, raw or processed but not spun
Coconut (copra) oil
Cocoa beans, raw, roasted
Waxes of animal or vegetable origin
Palm nuts and kernels
Dominica
Potassium salts, natural, crude
Distilled alcoholic beverages
Surveying, navigational, compasses, etc., instruments, nonelectrical
Figs, fresh or dried
Beer made from malt
Middle tier
Norway
Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted
Asbestos
Radio-active chemical elements, isotopes etc.
Ships, boats and other vessels
Iron ore agglomerates
Mauritius
Fabrics, woven
Fish, dried, salted or in brine; smoked fish
Articles of apparel, clothing accessories of plastic or rubber
Household appliances, decorative article, etc., of base metal
Headgear and fitting thereof
Kyrgyzstan
Meat of sheep and goats, fresh, chilled or frozen
Iron ore and concentrates, not agglomerated
Coffee green, roasted; coffee substitutes containing coffee
Cut flowers and foliage
Railway or tramway sleepers (ties) of wood
Top tier
Germany
Photographic and cinematographic apparatus and equipment
Organo-sulfur compounds
Parts of the pumps and compressor
Orthopedic appliances, hearing aids, artificial parts of the body
Phenols and phenol-alcohols, and their derivatives
Italy
Digital central storage units, separately consigned
Children’s toys, indoor games, etc.
Optical instruments and apparatus
Fabrics of glass fiber (including narrow, pile fabrics, lace, etc.)
Printing presses
Switzerland
Electro-medical equipment
Chemical products and preparations
Parts of steam power units
Spectacles and spectacle frames
Other chemical derivatives of cellulose; vulcanized fiber
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Figure 1: A comparison of Recall and Precision for the five algorithms. The recommendation is performed at year 𝑇 for year 𝑇 + 5, with𝑇 ranging from year 2001 to 2010. The results shown are averaged over this time period. For TProbS, we set a value of 𝜃 = 0.2. The Degree
method simply ranks the products according to their degree. All subsequent experiments were based on this recommendation.
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Figure 2: Panel (a) is the average increase of fitness ranking for the three different tiers of countries for the time period 2008–2015. The
number of goods added for each country is set to 𝐿 = 20. Panel (b) is the average increased fitness value of those three tiers.
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Figure 3: Panel (a) shows fitness values as a function of the length of the recommendation list 𝐿. The results are average over 30 randomly
selected countries and over the 15 years spanned by the data. Time evolution of fitness for the thirty selected middle tier countries that are
shown in panel (b). The length of the recommendation list is set to 𝐿 = 20.
the evolution in the average fitness of these countries for
the different methods. We compare the normal evolution of
countries and the one recommended by these algorithms.The
results are shown in Figure 3 (panel (a)). For any length of
the recommendation list 𝐿, HeatS is the top performing by a
great margin compared to other methods. For all methods,
ranking is consistent for every choice of 𝐿, and so the choice
of the value is not meaningful, as long as it is reasonably
small compared to the total number of items. By looking
at the evolution with the length of the recommendation
list 𝐿, we find that the results are consistent and if the
country should follow the recommendation, even if it can
add only few products to its export basket. Following the
recommendation made by HeatS seems to be adequate in
terms of technological requirements (i.e., the countries have
the required technology) as well as the best path to increase
the country’s fitness. In Figure 3 (panel (b)), the results are
shown for different years and for fixed 𝐿. Though some
methods are better in a specific year than others, it is clear
that HeatS is always the top performing method, followed by
Degree andDI and thenTProbS.This is good news as it shows
the robustness of our method, both in the isolated case and in
the real evolution of countries’ exports.
We are also interested in the individual behavior of the
fitness evolution. We randomly select four countries and
study the effect of the method on the evolution of the fitness
values. The comparison of the five methods as a function
of L and the original fitness is shown in Figure 4. Again,
HeatS is the top performing method, except for Kazakhstan.
For this country, DI and Degree are the top performing
methods due to the low fitness of this country. The original
fitness values corresponding to the four countries Croatia,
Kazakhstan, Poland, andColombia are 2.0563, 0.7234, 3.7678,
and 1.0714, respectively. While we saw in Figure 3 that HeatS
is always best on average, it is different when considering
individual countries with especially low production. The
impact of the recommendation on the increased ranking of
the four countries is shown in Figure 5. We see in Figure 5
(panel (b)) that even if HeatS is not the best method, the
difference in ranking is quite small, while in other panels it
clearly outperforms other methods.
3.4. Real Production Ability. In the previous results, we fixed
a parameter𝐿 and assigned the same number of newproducts
to every country. However, in reality some countries produce
many new products in a specific year, while some others
struggle more. To reflect this, we use a dynamic length
of the recommendation 𝐿 𝑖, where 𝐿 𝑖 is the length of the
recommendation list for country 𝑖, equal to its number of
new products between times 𝑇 + 5 and 𝑇. We build a
“virtual network” corresponding exactly to the real one at𝑇 + 5, except for one country 𝑖, for which we replace the
links that appear between 𝑇 and 𝑇 + 5 by those of the
recommendation list. This ensures that the network is of
constant size.The results for HeatS are shown in Figure 6.We
see that HeatS improves greatly the fitness of most countries
that follow its recommendation. Only a few countries see
their fitness decreasing compared to their original evolution.
As a comparison, we see in Figure 7 that TProbS is of no use
for top tier countries, but for middle and especially low tier
countries they might benefit from it. While lower than for
HeatS, the recommendations of TProbS are made of more
widespread technologies and so might be easier to follow for
the low fitness countries.
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Figure 4: Detailed view of the fitness as a function of the length of the recommendation list 𝐿 for four randomly selected countries. The
original fitness values of four countries Croatia, Kazakhstan, Poland, and Colombia are 2.0563, 0.7234, 3.7678, and 1.0714, respectively.
4. Conclusion
In this study, we extended the traditional recommendations,
which are usually applied on social networks, to the inter-
national trade. Thanks to recent advances in measuring the
potential countries’ evolution based solely on the network
structure, we designed amethodwhich aims to help countries
to find a suitable evolution path among all the possible ones.
The study suffers two main limitations. The first one is that
the exports categories are roughly defined. Only about 786
categories are present in the dataset. This leads to some
categories containing very varied products, such as iron based
goods.The second one is that there are important restrictions,
or conversely support, to the trade between countries. For
instance, USA, Canada, and Mexico recently signed an
agreement to open the market of dairy and car parts. On the
opposite side, countries might limit their sensitive exports,
such as military goods, to specific countries. While the first
limitation is difficult to address due to the data limitations,
the second one can be added by weighting differently the
relationships between countries on specific products.
At the same time, the recommendation proved to grasp
the countries technological evolution by being able to cor-
rectly predict the future, and the method of Fitness and
Complexity has been shown in [37–39] to uncover hidden
features of the countries’ evolution. It is important to note
that the recommendation method should agree with the
similar capabilities of a country [40]. Those two ingredients
together mixed with our results show remarkable evidence
that our methods as supplementary message could help to
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Figure 5: Comparison of the increased rankings of the four selected countries. The increased ranking of each method is averaged over
different lengths of the recommendation list 𝐿.
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Figure 6: Difference of fitness resulting from following recommendation of HeatS and real evolution. The countries are sorted according to
their fitness value, country 0 being the one with the highest average fitness. Each bar represents a country.The recommendation is performed
at year 𝑇 for year 𝑇+ 5, with 𝑇 ranging from year 2001 to 2010. 143 countries of the 181 countries would see their fitness improve by following
the recommendation of HeatS.
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Figure 7: Difference of fitness resulting from following recom-
mendation of TProbS and real evolution. The countries are sorted
according to their fitness value, country 0 being the one with
the highest average fitness. Each bar represents a country. The
recommendation is performed at year 𝑇 for year 𝑇 + 5, with 𝑇
ranging from year 2001 to 2010. 120 countries of the 181 countries
would see their fitness improve by following the recommendation
of TProbS.
design objective metrics in order to facilitate the work of
policy makers and encourage the development of technology
towards the better economic goal.
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Fund investment is a hot issue in today’s society. How to choose a project for investment is aﬀected by many factors. In view of this
problem, this paper starts from the granular computing point of view and combines the multigranulation rough set decision-
making method to construct a fund investment decision information system; then, the fund investment decision information
system is reduced under diﬀerent thresholds, and the decision rules are extracted through reduction. And from the aspects of
decision accuracy and rule accuracy, the rules are analyzed. Finally, decision rules are used to give the decision of the fund
investment project. This study provides a new approach to fund management.
1. Introduction
Fund investment management [1] is a hot issue in today’s
society. How to choose a better one from some of the possible
fund projects or to ﬁnd some direction from the existing
successful fund project before investment is a problem that
every decision maker needs to think about. At present, many
scholars have studied how to carry out project selection and
malpractice from the pension fund industry and social
insurance industry [2–6].
In order to enable investors to better invest in projects,
many scholars have carried out many researches on invest-
ment methods in recent years. Lu [7] uses mathematical
methods to analyze the major Reynolds index, SHARP index,
Jansen index, and M2 index, which are mainly used in the
performance evaluation of the fund, and deduces the
relationship between each other by mathematical methods.
It also expounds the conditions for the use of indicators in
the performance evaluation of funds. Peng [8] systematically
introduced the theories and methods of performance
evaluation of open-end funds and summarized the research
results of fund performance evaluation both at home and
abroad. Then, according to the scientiﬁc, systematic, and
feasible principles, we select 9 indicators that can reﬂect the
performance level of the open-end fund and use the analytic
hierarchy process to construct the system of the performance
evaluation of the open-end fund in China. Then, we evalu-
ated the index factors of sample funds in the sample period,
respectively. Finally, combined with fuzzy comprehensive
evaluation method and grey comprehensive evaluation
method, we get the overall evaluation results of an open-
end fund performance. From the quantitative and qualitative
point of view, Xu [9] selected the VaR method combining the
GARCH model and the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation
method using the analytic hierarchy process to further
construct the risk assessment system of China’s open fund.
Rough set theory [10, 11] is a mathematical method
proposed by Professor Pawlak in 1982 to eﬀectively analyze
and deal with inaccurate, inconsistent, and incomplete
information. After nearly thirty years of development, rough
set theory has been widely used in the ﬁelds of pattern
recognition, machine learning, decision analysis, knowledge
acquisition, and data mining. The classical rough set is an
equivalent class derived from a single undiscernible two-
element relation on a domain. The following and upper
approximation sets are used to rough the unknown concept.
Granular computing is a new discipline with rapid develop-
ment. It integrates many theoretical research achievements
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such as rough set, fuzzy set, and artiﬁcial intelligence. At
present, rough set theory has become an important tool for
granular computing. Literatures [12–14] from the angle of
granular computing (parallel multiple grain structures), the
knowledge particles (equivalent classes) derived from a single
indiscernible two-element relation, are analyzed to approxi-
mate the inadequacies of the rough sets of the unknown
concepts. Furthermore, the concept of multigranulation
rough sets is proposed. An optimistic multigranulation rough
set and a pessimistic multigranulation rough set model are
given. The Pawlak rough set is extended from a single grain
structure to a number of granular structures, and it is proved
that the classic rough set model of Pawlak is a special case of
the multigranularity rough set. In addition, many researchers
have extended the multigranularity rough set. Xu et al. have
done a lot of work on multigranulation rough sets [15–20].
Yang and others studied the multigranularity rough set
[21–25] based on incomplete information system, test cost
sensitivity, and hierarchical structure.
In order to solve the problem of project investment fund,
this paper constructs the fund investment decision informa-
tion system from the perspective of granular computing and
combined with multigranular rough set decision method.
Then reduce the information table, extract the rules from
the simpliﬁed information table, and perform the rule
analysis. Finally, the decision conclusions of the fund invest-
ment are given. The main contributions of this article are
as follows:
(1) This paper proposes a method for constructing a
project fund investment decision information sys-
tem, which is the premise that we use rough sets to
solve project investment problems
(2) In this paper, the generalized multigranularity rough
set model is used to reduce the fund project informa-
tion system, and then the rules are extracted on
the simpliﬁed information system. Finally, the fund
investment decision is given from these rules
The remaining structure of this paper is shown as follows:
in the second part, the related knowledge of multigranularity
rough sets is introduced. In the third part, the cleaning infor-
mation system of the fund investment project is constructed.
In the fourth part, the fund investment decision based on the
multigranularity rough set is studied. Finally, the conclusion
is given in the ﬁfth part.
2. Preliminaries
The section recalls necessary concepts and preliminaries
required in the sequel of our work. Detailed description of
the theory can be found in [12, 13, 26–29].
An information system with decisions is an ordered
quadruple ℐ = U , A ∪D, F,G , where
(i) U = x1, x2,⋯, xn is a nonempty ﬁnite set of
objects
(ii) A ∪D is a nonempty ﬁnite attribute set
(iii) A = a1, a2,⋯, ap denotes the set of condition
attributes
(iv) D = d1, d2,⋯, dq denotes the set of decision
attributes and A ∩D =∅
(v) F = f k ∣U⟶Vk, k ≤ p , f k x is the value of ak on
x ∈U , Vk, the domain of ak, ak ∈ A
(vi) G = gk′ ∣U⟶Vk′, k′ ≤ q , gk′ x is the value of dk′
on x ∈U , Vk′, the domain of dk′, dk′ ∈D
In an information system, the equivalence class of an
object with respect to an attribute subset of A is a granu-
larity from the viewpoint of granular computing. A parti-
tion of the universe is a granular structure. Rough set
proposed by Pawlak is a single granularity rough set
model, and the granular structure in this model is induced
by the indiscernibility relation of the attribute set. In gen-
eral, the above cases cannot always be satisﬁed or required
in practical problems. In the three cases referred in [12],
there are limitations in single granularity rough set for
addressing practical problems with multiple partitions,
and multigranulation rough set can now be used to eﬀectively
solve these problems. Under those circumstances, we must
describe a target concept through multiple binary relations
on the universe according to user’s requirements or targets
of problem solving. In the literatures [12, 13, 26, 27], to apply
rough set theory to practical problems widely, multigranula-
tion rough set model has been studied based on multiple
equivalence relations.
Let ℐ = U , A ∪D, F,G be an information system, X ⊆
U and P = P1, P2,⋯, Pt Pi ⊆ A i = 1, 2,⋯, l . Then Pi or
U/Pi is referred to as a granularity. The equivalence class of
an object x with respect to Pi is deﬁned as
x Pi = y ∈U f x, a = f y, a ,  a ∈ Pi 1
The lower and upper approximation sets of X with
respect to single Pi are deﬁned as follows:
Pi X = x ∈U ∣ x Pi ⊆ X ,
Pi X = x ∈U ∣ x Pi ⋂ X ≠∅
2
Considering further studies on multigranulation rough
set, we now review the two basic forms of multigranulation
rough set model.
Deﬁnition 1 (see [12]). Letℐ = U , A ∪D, F,G be an infor-
mation system, X ⊆U and P = P1, P2,⋯, Pt , Pi ⊆ A i = 1,
2,⋯, l . The optimistic multigranulation lower and upper
approximation sets of X with respect to single P are deﬁned
as follows:
P X OM = x ∈U ∣ ∨ x Pi ⊆ X , i ≤ l ,
P X OM = x ∈U ∣ ∧ x Pi ⋂ X ≠∅ , i ≤ l
3
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where “∨” means the logical operator “or,” which represents
that the alternative conditions are satisﬁed, and “∧” means
the logical operator “and,” which represents that all of the
conditions are satisﬁed.
The set X is deﬁnable if and only if P X OM = P X OM .
Otherwise, X is rough. P X OM and P X OM are referred to
as optimistic lower and upper approximation sets,
respectively.
From the above deﬁnition, the operators “∨” and “∧”
can be exchanged between the optimistic lower approxi-
mation set and the optimistic upper approximation set.
Corresponding to optimistic multigranulation rough set,
pessimistic multigranulation rough set model can be deﬁned
in the following.
Deﬁnition 2 (see [12]). Let ℐ = U , A ∪D, F,G be an
information system, X ⊆U and P = P1, P2,⋯, Pt , Pi ⊆ A
i = 1, 2,⋯, l . The optimistic multigranulation lower and
upper approximation sets of X with respect to single P are
deﬁned as follows:
P X PM = x ∈U ∣ ∧ x Pi ⊆ X , i ≤ l ,
P X PM = x ∈U ∣ ∨ x Pi ⋂ X ≠∅ , i ≤ l
4
The set X is deﬁnable when and only when P X PM =
P X PM. Otherwise, X is rough. P X PM and P X PM are
referred to as pessimistic lower and upper approximation
sets, respectively.
The uncertainty of a concept in a multigranulation
rough set model is also due to the existence of a boundary
region. The greater the boundary of a concept is, the lower
its accuracy is, and the coarser the concept is. Similar to
the measures in the Pawlak rough set model, the accuracy
and roughness measures in optimistic multigranulation
rough set and pessimistic multigranulation rough set were
deﬁned in the same way [12]. As generalizations of the
Pawlak rough set model, we only show the relations
among optimistic multigranulation rough set, pessimistic
multigranulation rough set, and single granularity rough
set in the following.
Proposition 1 (see [12]). Let ℐ = U , A ∪D, F,G be an
information system, X ⊆U and P = P1, P2,⋯, Pt , Pi ⊆ A
i = 1, 2,⋯, l . The following properties hold:
(1) P X OM =⋃
l
i=1
Pi X
(2) P X OM =⋂
l
i=1
Pi X
(3) P X PM =⋂
l
i=1
Pi X
(4) P X PM =⋃
l
i=1
Pi X
(5) P X PM ⊆ P X OM
(6) P X OM ⊆ P X PM
In addition, there are many related properties as well as
proof, please refer to [12, 28].
In order to express generalized multigranulation rough
sets, we ﬁrst introduce a characteristic function, which is called
support feature function.
Deﬁnition 3 (see [30]). Let ℐ = U , A ∪D, F,G be an
information system, X ⊆U and P = P1, P2,⋯, Pt , Pi ⊆ A
i = 1, 2,⋯, l , suppose
SPiX x =
1, x Pi ⊆ X
0, else
  i ≤ l 5
SPiX x is called x’s support feature function for X, which is
used to describe the inclusion relation between equivalence
class x Pi and concept X, which indicates whether object x
accurately supports X by Pi.
The optimistic multigranular rough set and the pes-
simistic multigranular rough set are generalizations of
two multigranular rough set models. We will propose
a new multigranular rough set model with the parameter
β ∈ 0 5, 1 . We have introduced this parameter to imple-
ment the conceptual description of objects that support the
concept at the most granular levels. Objects that may portray
the concept are ignored below the corresponding level. The
new model is expressed as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 (see [30]). Letℐ = U , A ∪D, F,G be an infor-
mation system, X ⊆U and P = P1, P2,⋯, Pt , Pi ⊆ A i = 1,
2,⋯, l , SPiX x is called x’s support feature function for X.
For any β ∈ 0 5, 1 , the lower approximation and upper
approximation of X for P are deﬁned as follows:
P X β = x ∈U ∣
∑li=1S
Pi
X x
l
≥ β ,
P X β = x ∈U ∣
∑li=1 1 − S
Pi
~X x
l
> 1 − β
6
The set X is deﬁnable if P X β = P X β; otherwise, X is a
rough set. We denote this generalized multigranulation
rough set model as GMGRS, and β as the information level
for P.
The multigranulation rough set is a generalization of the
classical rough set. Since several attributes in the information
system can have diﬀerent eﬀects on the decision-making
3Complexity
eﬀect, when these eﬀects cannot be performed simulta-
neously, but separately and independently, we cannot use
classical rough set theory to treat these attributes as a whole
through an indistinguishable relationship for system reduc-
tion and rule extraction. Therefore, according to the general
process of rough set decision, we can get the speciﬁc steps
of multigranular rough set decision and provide a theoretical
model for decision analysis of fund project investment in
multigranular environment.
3. Construction of Decision Information
System for Fund Investments
Fund has become an increasingly important source of
ﬁnancing for people. For a decision maker, one may need
to adopt a better one from some possible fund projects or
ﬁnd some directions from existing successful fund projects
before investing. How to do it? We will propose a novel
decision-making fund investments based on multigranula-
tion rough set. This section mainly focuses to build fund
investment decision information system.
The ﬂow chart of our multigranulation decision-making
model for fund investment is shown in Figure 1.
As can be seen from the ﬂow chart, the investment
decision system model based on the multigranulation rough
set fund is constructed according to the following steps.
Step 1. Select condition attributes of the decision system.
Before investing in the fund project, we ﬁrst carry out the
essential project evaluation for each project. In this paper,
we through the project interviews, questionnaires, and other
methods to determine project evaluation factors, which are
Market environment, Science and technology level, Education
level, Management level, and Cultural level, respectively.
There are ﬁve aspects to measure every fund project. These
evaluation factors consists of a conditional attribute set
of the fun investment decision-making system based on
multigranulation rough sets.
Step 2. Determine the value of the every condition attribute.
According to the performance of market environment level,
science and technology level, education level, management
level, and culture level, a comprehensive overall evaluation
of the items was conducted to be evaluated. In order to study
conveniently, we only have a small research. So, we can
simplify attribute values, which is divided into A, B, C, D,
and E ﬁve grades for each factor. Moreover, ﬁve grades A,
B, C, D, and E present mainly outstanding, good, general,
poor, and very poor, respectively.
Step 3. Determine the decision attribute of the decision system.
According to the above analysis, the decision attribute is
divided into good and common decision results. Of course,
depending on the situation, the decision attribute can also
be set to three or more attribute values.
Step 4. Knowledge representation of the decision system based
on multigranulation rough set. According to the knowledge
of multigranulation rough sets and the above analysis, we
regard these ﬁve conditional attributes as ﬁve granularities,
i.e., P1 = a1 , P2 = a2 , P3 = a3 , P4 = a4 , P5 = a5 .
At the same time, we randomly selected six experts. These
experts are familiar with every project comparison by a long
period of research and questionnaire. Thus, the evaluation
result can be thought to constitute a small expert system.
Through this evaluation form, we obtained 6 valid data
and formed 6 objects into the decision-making information
system in Table 1.
Remark.Wemainly check the reduction and decision rule by
designing multiple granularity rough set decision steps, and
we can get more granular rough set decision-making applica-
tion. In the paper, we do not set on a large scale data in detail
and do not set testing for the rules, which will be our future
research work.
4. Decision Making for Fund Investments
Based on Multigranulation Rough Set
In this section, based on the previous theories, the fund
investment decisions are made with multigranulation rough
sets. Firstly, generalized multigranulation rough set model
Begin
End
Knowledge representation of the decision system
Determine the decision attribute of the decision system
Determine the value of the every condition attribute
Select condition attributes of the decision system
Figure 1: The ﬂow chart of multigranulation decision-making
model for fund investment.
Table 1: A fund investment information decision system.
U P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 d
x1 A A C B C G
x2 B A C C D Co
x3 C D E B D Co
x4 B B A B A G
x5 A B D A B G
x6 C C C D E Co
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is used to fund investment decision-making information sys-
tem, and then some important rules are extracted based
on the reduction of the information system. Finally,
results of fund investment decision can be given from
the obtained conclusion.
Starting from the data of the fund investment decision-
making information system in Table 1, funds are classiﬁed
according to diﬀerent granularities. The classiﬁcation results
are as follows:
U
P1
= x1, x5 , x2, x4 , x3, x6 ,
U
P2
= x1, x2 , x3 , x4, x5 , x6 ,
U
P3
= x1, x2, x6 , x3 , x4 , x5 ,
U
P4
= x1, x3, x4 , x2 , x5 , x6 ,
U
P5
= x1 , x2, x3 , x4 , x5 , x6 ,
U
d
= x1, x4, x5 , x2, x3, x6
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If we take information level β = 0 7 (0 6 < β ≤ 1) and
β = 0 6 (0 5 < β ≤ 0 6), then we can obtain the support
feature matrix tables of lower approximation and upper
approximation for every decision class in Tables 2–5.
So, we can calculate the lower approximation and upper
approximation of D1 and D2.
P D1 0 7 = x5 ,
P D1 0 7 = x1, x2, x4, x5 ,
P D2 0 7 = x3, x6 ,
P D1 0 7 = x1, x2, x3, x4, x6 ,
P D1 0 6 = x4, x5 ,
P D1 0 6 = x1, x2, x4, x5 ,
P D2 0 6 = x3, x6 ,
P D2 0 6 = x1, x2, x3, x6
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In keeping the classiﬁcation unchanged, all the
reductions of the decision-making information system are
obtained by MATLAB calculation as follows.
If we take information level β = 0 7 (0 6 < β ≤ 1), then
the reduction is a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 . Moreover, if we take
information level β = 0 6 (0 5 < β ≤ 0 6), then the reduction
is a1, a2, a3, a5 and a2, a3, a4, a5 .
In the next, we extract the rules from two cases
according to the reduction obtained above and give the
quantitative results for the decision precision and rule
precision of the rules.
Case 1. The information level is β = 0 7 (0 6 < β ≤ 1), and the
reduction is a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 .
In this case, rule can be carried out in accordance
with the system. In fact, each object is a decision rule,
Table 2: The support feature matrix table of lower approximation
(β = 0 7).
D1 D2
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
1 0
0 1
Table 3: The support feature matrix table of upper approximation
(β = 0 7).
D1 D2
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 1
1 0
0 1
Table 4: The support feature matrix table of upper approximation
(β = 0 6).
D1 D2
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
0 1
Table 5: The support feature matrix table of lower approximation
(β = 0 6).
D1 D2
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 0
0 1
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and the information cannot be simpliﬁed attributes in the
system. So, we extract the rules directly, and the rules are in
the following.
r1 P1, A ∧ P2, A ∧ P3, C ∧ P4, B ∧ P5, C ⟶ d,G, 0 6, 1 ,
r2 P1, B ∧ P2, A ∧ P3, C ∧ P4, C ∧ P5,D ⟶ d, Co, 0 6, 1 ,
r3 P1, C ∧ P2,D ∧ P3, E ∧ P4, B ∧ P5,D ⟶ d, Co, 0 6, 1 ,
r4 P1, B ∧ P2, B ∧ P3, A ∧ P4, B ∧ P5, A ⟶ d,G, 0 6, 1 ,
r5 P1, A ∧ P2, B ∧ P3,D ∧ P4, A ∧ P5, B ⟶ d,G, 0 6, 1 ,
r6 P1, C ∧ P2, C ∧ P3, C ∧ P4,D ∧ P5, E ⟶ d, Co, 0 6, 1
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These rules are always valid and unique in decision
information system of Table 1. Moreover, we can ﬁnd that
the decision accuracy of each rule is all 1/3 and the rule
accuracy is 1. In this case, the evaluation requires all the
information of a fund project, which is not very useful for
us to simplify the decision-making process and deal with
unknown information.
Case 2. The information level is β = 0 6 (0 5 < β ≤ 0 6), and
the reduction is a1, a2, a3, a5 and a2, a3, a4, a5 .
In the case, from the reductions, we can ﬁnd that
the decision system can be presented by partial not
all attributes.
Thus, the decision system can be simpliﬁed in the
following two decision tables which are Tables 6 and 7.
From Table 6, we can have some rules as follows:
r1 P1, A ∧ P2, A ∧ P3, C ∧ P5, C ⟶ d,G, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r2 P1, B ∧ P2, A ∧ P3, C ∧ P5,D ⟶ d, Co, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r3 P1, C ∧ P2,D ∧ P3, E ∧ P5,D ⟶ d, Co, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r4 P1, B ∧ P2, B ∧ P3, A ∧ P5, A ⟶ d,G, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r5 P1, A ∧ P2, B ∧ P3,D ∧ P5, B ⟶ d,G, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r6 P1, C ∧ P2, C ∧ P3, C ∧ P5, E ⟶ d, Co, 0 5, 0 6
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From Table 7, we can have some rules as follows:
r7 P2, A ∧ P3, C ∧ P4, B ∧ P5, C ⟶ d,G, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r8 P2,A ∧ P3, C ∧ P4, C ∧ P5,D ⟶ d, Co, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r9 P2,D ∧ P3, E ∧ P4, B ∧ P5,D ⟶ d, Co, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r10 P2, B ∧ P3, A ∧ P4, B ∧ P5, A ⟶ d,G, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r11 P2, B ∧ P3,D ∧ P4, A ∧ P5, B ⟶ d,G, 0 5, 0 6 ,
r12 P2, C ∧ P3, C ∧ P4,D ∧ P5, E ⟶ d, Co, 0 5, 0 6
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As a result of our data on a smaller scale, the
reduction of information system data has no duplication,
so that we get 12 decision rules. When the data size is
larger, reduction can make a lot of duplicate data merging,
eﬀectively reduce the number of decision rules, and improve
the decision accuracy and precision of rules.
According to the calculation, the accuracy of the above
12 decision rules is 1/6 and the accuracy of the rules is 1.
Although the decision-making accuracy is reduced, the
rule accuracy does not decrease. So, we can have that
reduction that simpliﬁes the test of the data validation
rules; decision conclusion can be obtained without a large
scale of data validation.
From the rules obtained above, the conclusion of
the decision making for fund investments can be got
about the decision information system in Table 1.
According to the representation form of decision rules,
each decision result is shown in Table 8. The symbol
means that the corresponding value is arbitrary, that
is, any value taken under the speciﬁed conditions in
the table has no inﬂuence on the decision result indicated
in the table.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, a multigranulation rough set decision method
is used to construct the fund investment decision informa-
tion system; then, the fund investment decision information
system is reduced at diﬀerent thresholds, the decision rules
are extracted by reduction and the rules are analyzed, and
ﬁnally the decision rules are given using fund investment
Table 6: Fund investment decision system after the reduction (I).
U P1 P2 P3 P5 d
x1 A A C C G
x2 B A C D Co
x3 C D E D Co
x4 B B A A G
x5 A B D B G
x6 C C C E Co
Table 7: Fund investment decision system after the reduction (II).
U P2 P3 P4 P5 d
x1 A C B C G
x2 A C C D Co
x3 D E B D Co
x4 B A B A G
x5 B D A B G
x6 C C D E Co
6 Complexity
decision making. This study provides a new approach to fund
management, enriching the application of multigranulation
rough sets.
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This paper studies the resilience of public policies that governments design for catalyzing economic development. This property
depends on the extent to which behavioral heuristics and spillover eﬀects allow policymakers to attain their original goals when
a particular policy cannot be funded as originally planned. This scenario takes place, for example, when unanticipated events
such as natural disasters or political turmoil obstruct the use of resources to advance certain policy issues, e.g., infrastructure or
labor reforms. Here, we analyze how the adaptive capacity of the policy-making process generates resilience in the face of
disruptions. In order to estimate the allocation of resources across policies, we employ a computational model that accounts for
diverse social mechanisms, for example, coevolutionary learning and network interdependencies. In our simulations, we use a
data set of 117 countries on 79 development indicators over an 11-year period. Then, we calculate a resilience score
corresponding to each development indicator via counter-factual analysis of policy disruptions. Next, we assess whether some
development strategies produce resilient/fragile policy proﬁles. Finally, by studying the relationship between policy resilience
and policy priority, we determine which issues are bottlenecks to economic development.
1. Introduction
Most economists are largely concerned with designing eﬃ-
cient policies for ﬁrms and the public sector but much less
preoccupied of why certain strategies fail when facing adverse
situations. Their focus on the optimal allocation of resources
has, on one hand, an ontological explanation since—in the
neoclassical view—governments and ﬁrms are assumed to
have the capacity to control the performance of a system or
organization [1]. On the other hand, there is an epistemolog-
ical explanation since economic theories are deductive con-
structions built on agents maximizing objective functions
that are speciﬁed in well-deﬁned problems. These features
become evident in the most well-known textbook deﬁnition
of economics, e.g., “the study of rational behaviors dealing
with multiple objectives and limited resources that can be used
for alternative purposes” [rephrasing [2]].
Unfortunately, the rational conception of economics—
where consumers, ﬁrms, and governments are centrally coor-
dinated through equilibria—does not allow for a clear under-
standing of why ﬁrms, policies, and economies fail. That is,
the study of resilience in human-made systems is not possible
without a decentralized systemic view. The concept of resil-
ience has diﬀerent connotations depending on the ﬁeld of
inquiry (e.g., physics, ecology, economics, sociology, or psy-
chology). In this paper, we use a deﬁnition that is compatible
with the problem of policy-making and development: “Resil-
ience is the [adaptive] capacity of a system, enterprise, or a
person to maintain its core purpose and integrity in the face
of dramatically changed circumstances” ([3], p. 7).
Under the lens of complexity science, explanations for
the failure of economies and their resilience come to light.
This is so because complexity builds on the idea that agents
within a system and systems themselves are interconnected;
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hence, they are not fully decomposable [4, 5]. Thus, it is
possible for a moderate perturbation on a subpopulation to
permeate throughout the system and inﬂuence its overall
performance with—sometimes—catastrophic consequences.
Complexity, however, is not only about connectivity but also
about diversity and adaptation. These properties stem from
the evolutionary nature of economic systems. With these
properties, economies are equipped to respond to adverse
events or failures of their components. On one hand, diver-
sity allows a system to generate alternative solutions to the
ones impaired by a failure. On the other, adaptation allows
agents to react by updating their objectives and strategies
when the environment changes.
In this paper, we study the resilience of transformative
public policies. A policy is transformative when it is designed
to generate a change in a speciﬁc issue in order to reach a
goal. For example, if the goal is to decrease infant mortality
by 50%, a transformative public policy is the construction
of hospitals in marginalized communities, while a nontrans-
formative one is the expenditure to maintain the current
health infrastructure. When countries attempt to reach a
large set of goals simultaneously, resilience arises from the
evolutionary nature of the process where policies are
designed and implemented. The work of [6] (hereon refer
to as CCG) provides a framework to model such process as
a behavioral game between a central authority (government)
and public functionaries (bureaucrats) on a network of policy
spillovers. For a country, the estimated “allocation proﬁ-
le”—i.e., the evolved distribution of resources across policy
issues—can be thought of as a consistent (or relatively eﬃ-
cient) package. In this political economy game, the govern-
ment tries to make the best use of its budget, while
bureaucrats may divert some of the allocated funds for a per-
sonal gain (i.e., corruption). Hence, rather than modelling
agents designing an optimal budgetary allocation, we esti-
mate the emergent allocation proﬁle.
In order to study resilience, we estimate the alternative
allocation proﬁles that emerge in the pretense of adverse
events. The intuition is that it is not always feasible to imple-
ment the allocation proﬁle estimated for an economic setting
that is free of unexpected adversities. These adversities occur
when resources initially intended for a transformative policy
have to be reassigned to a diﬀerent purpose. For instance,
improving health facilities is put on hold because ﬁghting
an epidemic outbreak consumes a large share of resources
from the ministry of health; a labor reform has to be post-
poned when the aﬀected unions sabotage its implementation;
an expansion of the highway system is cancelled because
recovering from a natural disaster requires substantial
resources for repairing damaged infrastructure.
An estimated allocation proﬁle depends on the goals of
the government. Consistent with the literature of economic
development, we assume that those targets are drawn from
exemplary countries. That is, a government determines its
goals by imitating the development indicators of a more
advanced nation. We term these adopted targets a develop-
ment mode. Resilience is measured by estimating the alloca-
tion proﬁle of a development mode when one of its public
policies is exogenously suspended, which we call a disruption.
Therefore, resilience is the capacity of the system to maintain
the evolution of socioeconomic indicators in line with a pre-
speciﬁed development mode. For a single country, the alloca-
tion proﬁles corresponding to each development mode allow
estimating the expected time of convergence to targets. Sig-
niﬁcant deviations from the expectation indicate whether a
policy is resilient or fragile. In this sense, resilience is not
the property of being able to recover the initial condition of
a system but rather its capability of continuing to fulﬁll its
goals when facing adverse circumstances.
Resilience analysis allows us to compare not only policy
issues but also allocation proﬁles. For example, a country like
Mexico may have diﬀerent options of development modes
(Canada, Singapore, France, etc.); however, some allocation
proﬁles may be more resilient than others. Therefore, asses-
sing the feasibility of a development mode is not only an
exercise about costs and beneﬁts but also of endurance to
adverse events. This analysis is signiﬁcantly enriched when
considering the priority that governments assign to speciﬁc
policy issues (i.e., the amount of resources allocated). For
instance, a policy issue that is not resilientmay hinder the pos-
sibility of reaching the targets set by the government. If such a
policy receives a low priority from the government, the out-
comes in terms of economic development may be worse than
expected. In other words, policies with poor resilience and low
priority act as bottlenecks to economic development. Identify-
ing these bottlenecks is paramount to development studies.
Ironically, due to the rational-equilibrium epistemology of
neoclassical economics, there are no adequate quantitative
tools for this purpose. Our work ﬁlls this gap and provides
a well-suited analytic tool.
The rest of the paper is structured with ﬁve more sec-
tions. In the second section, we frame our approach in the lit-
erature of policy resilience. In the third section, we present
the data used to calibrate our model. In the fourth section,
we provide an overview of the CCG model for analyzing
the policy-making process and explain how allocation pro-
ﬁles and their resilience are estimated. In the ﬁfth section,
we show the results of our estimations for three country cases
and a more detailed description of aggregate outcomes for
the entire database. Finally, in the sixth section, we discuss
the beneﬁts of complexity tools for studying resilience and
summarize our main ﬁndings.
2. On the Nature of Resilience and
Policy-Making
This paper studies the resilience of public policies that are
formulated through a process of adaptation and learning.
(It is neither about a system’s architecture nor of policy tools
that can improve the resilience of a particular system (e.g.,
ecological, environmental, transportation, regional, social,
ﬁnancial, urban, organizational, productive, and business).)
It explores the likelihood of failure in the pursuit of speciﬁc
development modes, independently of how this mode was
originally established (e.g., internal political agreements, imi-
tating successful countries, through international consensus,
or from pressures of the civil society). This is a relevant and
intriguing question since the evaluation of society’s (or
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government’s) aspirations requires to estimate the reach-
ability of alternative standards. In the related literature, this
approach falls under the umbrella of policy resilience at the
process level. This literature refers to the institutional and
procedural features of policy-making that are in place
when an unanticipated shock disrupts a socioeconomic sys-
tem [7]. In this respect, resilience should be of great con-
cern in setting a societal agenda (development modes)
and in formulating an allocation proﬁle that is coherent
with such agenda.
The policy process relates to three mechanisms. First, it
has to do with the governance of decision-making (e.g., stake-
holder participation, institutional accountability, and multi-
level and polycentric architectures). Second, it relates to the
functionaries’ capability of harnessing information for pro-
ducing workable policies (e.g., involvement of nonstate actors
with specialized expertise, a culture of evidence-based deci-
sion-making). Third, it deals with the administrative capacity
of public oﬃcials at the local (or agency) level so that policies
can be implemented rapidly and with certain degree of ﬂexi-
bility (e.g., well-designed protocols, use of transparent rules,
mechanisms for conﬂict resolution among agencies, and a
well-functioning system for the monitoring and sanctioning
of corruption).
The political economy game developed by CCG incor-
porates important aspects of this policy-making process,
emphasizing the distinction between design and implemen-
tation. For example, it speciﬁes the mechanisms for the
misuse of budgetary allocations by bureaucrats. Accord-
ingly, we employ this model to study how the disruption
of a public policy modiﬁes the distribution of resources
allocated to the remaining policies, while maintaining the
original set of goals. This is a resilience problem because the
policy-making process is able to readjust the allocation proﬁle
without losing its ability to fulﬁll the government’s agenda
(i.e., it is a dynamic property of the system). A related but dif-
ferent concept is robustness. In the literature of complexity,
robustness refers to the ability of a system to keep working
when some components fail (e.g., an edge in a network).
Sometimes, robustness occurs due to the redundancy of com-
ponents, paths, and functions [8]. Clearly, robustness is a
static property of the system since it is not intended to cap-
ture the adaptive nature of an economy (it only considers
connectivity and diversity).
In recent years, we have witnessed an explosion of quan-
titative methodologies for analyzing the resilience and
robustness of socioeconomic systems [9, 10]. However, the
literature of policy analysis at the process level is mainly qual-
itative [11–13]. Consequently, the tools and recommenda-
tions in this line of research are based solely on case studies
and on an informal treatment of complexity. In order to
develop a quantitative framework at the process level, it is
convenient to construct a calibrated model on how policies
are endogenously designed and implemented. This is pre-
cisely our approach. First, we build a computational political
economy game. Then, we perform Monte Carlo simulations
to estimate allocation proﬁles and resilience scores. Finally,
we analyze the outcomes in terms of countries, socioeco-
nomic indicators, development modes, and bottlenecks.
3. Data
The data consist of annual observations of 79 policy indica-
tors for 117 countries, covering the 2006–2016 period. Three
secondary sources are used to build this database: the Global
Competitiveness Report produced by the World Economic
Forum, the World Development Indicators, and the World
Governance Indicators, being the latter two assembled by
the World Bank. Following CCG, we normalize these indica-
tors so that the worst possible outcome takes a value of 0,
while the best value is 1 across countries and years.
We synthesize this information by grouping the 79 devel-
opment indicators in 13 commonly used pillars. To illustrate
the data structure, we pool countries into four clusters by
similarity in their development indicators (with cluster 1
being the most advanced and cluster 4 the least). We identify
the clusters of countries by applying Ward’s method with the
L2 (Euclidean) norm as the distance metric across the 79
indicators. Figure 1 shows that, in general, more advanced
nations have higher levels of development indicators. The
large gap between the clusters 1 and 2 denotes the middle-
income development trap.
3.1. Spillover Network. An important component of the CCG
model is a network of spillovers between public policies that
accounts for well-known interdependencies between policy
issues [14–16]. Empirically, this network is estimated from
partial correlations between development indicators at the
level of each country. Therefore, we estimate one network
for each country. Arguably, a network topology reﬂects the
socioeconomic conditions in a speciﬁc nation. We employ a
two-step empirical strategy developed in the estimation of
neural networks from functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing data [17, 18]. First, we apply the method of triangulated
maximally ﬁltered graphs (TMFG) [19] to estimate which
pairs of indicators have signiﬁcant relationships. Then, we
determine the edges’ directions (inferred causality) through
the likelihood-ratios method developed by [20]. The ﬁeld of
network estimation has various diﬀerent methods, without
a broad consensus on a gold standard. Each method assumes
a speciﬁc underlying model and is designed for data with cer-
tain properties. Our methodological choice is based on the
applicability of this strategy to high-dimensional time series
of short length. However, as new and better methods emerge,
we expect further improvements to our estimations.
4. Methods
We use the CCG model in order to simulate the policy-
making process through a behavioral game with two types
of agents: a central authority (government) and public ser-
vants (functionaries or bureaucrats). Firstly, the government
allocates resources to diﬀerent public policies, with the aim of
improving the indicators associated to their respective policy
issues. Secondly, functionaries in charge of implementing
these policies have incentives to divert public funds for per-
sonal gain. This game takes place on a spillover network.
These spillovers encourage free-riding and reinforce a mis-
alignment between the government’s and functionaries’
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incentives. (See [6] for a detailed interpretation of the
model’s equations and diﬀerent validation tests).
4.1. Evolution of Development Indicators. There are N policy
issues in the economy, each one with an indicator that mea-
sures its level of development. As a government invests Pi
∈ 0, 1 resources in a policy issue, its indicator grows, i.e.,
the investment accumulates. This means that, when the gov-
ernment sets a target Ti for policy issue i, indicator Ii will
reach Ti after a number of periods. Hence, the dynamics
describing the evolution of Ii are given by
Ii,t = Ii,t−1 + γ Ti − Ii,t−1 Ci,t +〠
j
Cj,tAj,i , 1
where γ captures the eﬀectiveness of policy-making in a spe-
ciﬁc country; Ci,t ∈ 0, Pi is the contribution of bureaucrat i
(see explanation in next section), and A is the adjacency
matrix of the spillovers network (a weighted directed graph).
4.2. The Learning Process of Public Servants. In a given period
t, a public servant i receives Pi,t resources from the central
authority and uses Ci,t eﬀectively in the implementation of
the public policy. Hence, Pi,t − Ci,t is the level of corruption
of i, while the level of i’s indicator gives him (or her) political
status. Then, in order to determine the impact of this contri-
bution, the bureaucrat evaluates the change in beneﬁts Fi
expressed through
Fi,t = Ii,t + Pi,t − Ci,t 1 − θi,t f R,t , 2
where θi,t is an indicator function derived from the supervi-
sion of the central authority, and f R,t is a map from the indi-
cator of rule of law to a probability. In the CCG model, a
period should not be interpreted as time, since the method
does not aim at reproducing time series. Instead, it should
be interpreted as the realization of events such as budgetary
readjustments. Hence, if it takes more periods to reach one
set of goals than another, we say that the former are more dif-
ﬁcult to attain than the latter.
We assume that the government cannot observe the
functionaries’ contributions directly, although larger diver-
sions of funds are more diﬃcult to hide. Hence, we model
government supervision as a random variable θi,t . The out-
come θi,t is 1 if the public servant in policy issue i is caught
diverting public funds and zero otherwise. Then, the proba-
bility mass function of θi at time t is
θi,t =
1 with probability f C,t
Pi,t − Ci,t
∑Nj=1 Pj,t − Cj,t
,
0 with probability 1 − f C,t
Pi,t − Ci,t
∑Nj=1 Pj,t − Cj,t
,
3
where f C,t is a function mapping the indicator of control of
corruption to a probability.
Note that f C,t captures the eﬀorts from the central
authority to detect corrupt oﬃcials. Meanwhile, f R,t reﬂects
the capability of the state to punish oﬃcials involved in these
activities. These two mechanisms describe diﬀerent con-
straints that governments face when ﬁghting corruption. To
be more speciﬁc, f R,t and f C,t take the form
f X,t =
IX,t
e1−IX,t
, 4
where X = R for the rule of law, or X = C for control of
corruption.
The contribution of functionary i is determined by
Ci,t =min Pi,t , max 0, Ci,t−1 + di,t ΔFi,t
Ci,t−1 + Ci,t−2
2 ,
5
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where ΔFi,t is the most recent change in beneﬁts, and di,t is
the sign function
di,t = sgn ΔFi,t ⋅ ΔCi,t , 6
such that
ΔFi,t = Fi,t−1 − Fi,t−2,
ΔCi,t = Ci,t−1 − Ci,t−2
7
That is, functionaries’ contributions increase when
higher (or lower) past beneﬁts coincide with higher (or
lower) past contributions. Therefore, as time goes by,
bureaucrats learn the level of corruption that gives them
certain conﬁdence of keeping the beneﬁts derived from
their public post.
4.3. The Adaptive Behavior of the Central Authority. The gov-
ernment’s problem consists in deciding how to allocate its
limited resources to a large set of policies. Its objective is to
reduce the gap between the current indicators (Ii) and their
targets (Ti), where the latter come from a previously selected
development mode. Formally, the government’s multidi-
mensional problem is
min  〠
N
i=1
Ii,t − Ti
2 8
Resource allocations P1,t ,… , PN ,t are the control vari-
ables of the central authority. We call a speciﬁc conﬁguration
of these variables an allocation proﬁle. These packages of pol-
icies are the key endogenous variables to be simulated by the
model. The amount of resources that the government can
invest per period in a proﬁle is restricted by
〠
N
i
Pi,t ≤ B∀t, 9
where B denotes noncommitted resources of the central
authority. It is important to clarify that the resources
involved in this problem are those destined to transformative
policies, not public expenditure committed to previously
established purposes (e.g., highway maintenance, agricultural
subventions, and payment of public debt).
Each time step, the central authority determines an allo-
cation proﬁle and evaluates the gap between targets and
observed indicators. The amount of resources allocated to
policy issue i is determined by
pi,t =
qi,t
∑Nj qi,t
, 10
where qi,t is the propensity of assigning resources to policy i,
deﬁned as
qi,t = Ti − Ii,t Ki + 1 1 − θi,t f R,t , 11
where Ki is the number of outgoing connections of node i,
also known as its out-degree. Here, the out-degree captures
the centrality or importance of a policy issue for the
country. Hence, the government does not know the struc-
ture of the network but has a proxy of the relevance of
each policy issue.
Finally, the amount of resources allocated to policy i is
Pi,t = pi,tB 12
This component of the policy-making process indicates
that the government’s behavior is adaptive. That is, resources
are redistributed when undesired events such as the detection
of corruption materialize.
4.4. Algorithm. Once the political economy game is formu-
lated mathematically, an agent-based model is programmed
with Algorithm 1. Note that, for each simulation, four endog-
enous variables are obtained: public servants’ contributions
and beneﬁts, government’s allocations, and society’s develop-
ment indicators. A simulation halts when a convergence cri-
terion is met for all indicators. The combination of a
coevolutionary learning process, the diversity of conditions
that bureaucrats face, and the network of policy spillovers
requires computational simulation.
4.5. Estimation of Allocation Proﬁles. Each country in the
data set can adopt development modes of nations with (1)
a higher GDP per capita (adjusted for purchasing power
parity) and (2) a higher average level of development indica-
tors. This means that, for the sample of 117 countries, there
are more than 6000 combinations of country-mode pairs
(e.g., RUS-CAN stands for Russia adopting the Canada
development mode). We estimate the allocation proﬁles of
each of these pairs, assuming no policy disruptions. For a
given pair, a single allocation proﬁle consists of the inter-
temporal averages P = 1/ℓ∑ℓt=0Pi,t
N
i=1, where ℓ is the num-
ber of periods before converging to the targets. For the
same pair, we performmMonte Carlo simulations and com-
pute the average allocation proﬁle P = 1/M∑Mm=1Pmi
N
i=1.
Each simulation is calibrated by imputing the empirical
values of the country’s development indicators in 2016
(the initial conditions), the estimated network of spill-
overs, the values of the adopted mode’s development indi-
cators in 2016 (the targets), and the budget constrain B
obtained from an indicator on public expenditure as a
fraction of GDP.
In order to provide inference on aggregate metrics, we
calibrate parameter γ to ﬁt our endogenous variable of
corruption (Pi − Ci) to the observed levels of an empirical
indicator on the diversion of public funds. This is done
through a clustering algorithm that classiﬁes all countries
into diﬀerent categories of γ (see details in [6]). Once
the model has been calibrated, we obtain the average allo-
cation proﬁle for a set of Monte Carlo simulations. The
purpose of estimating these proﬁles is to obtain the relative
priorities that governments give to diﬀerent policies under
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each development mode, which we use in this paper to
identify bottlenecks.
For illustration purposes, Figure 2 presents the estimated
policy proﬁles for three diﬀerent country-mode pairs. From
this example, we infer that policy priorities depend on the
speciﬁc pair, which highlights the relevance of context in
the design and implementation of policies. Likewise, we can
conclude that the coherence of the allocation proﬁle, and
not the strength of isolated policies, is what really matters
to achieve development goals.
4.6. Estimation of Resilience. The strategy to assess the resil-
ience of an individual policy is to measure the eﬀect of dis-
rupting its budgetary allocation. This exercise describes a
scenario where the central authority of a country is forced
to put oﬀ the implementation of a transformative policy
due to an unexpected event. In the context of our behavioral
game, the disruption of a transformative policy in issue i pre-
cludes it from receiving sustained allocations. Aware of this
disruption, the government adapts and modiﬁes its policy
priorities in an attempt to reach the targets speciﬁed by the
chosen development mode. In other words, this “change of
plans” alters the coevolutionary learning process between
central authority and functionaries, and, hence, the dynamics
through which the indicators reach all their targets. More for-
mally, assume that policy i has been disrupted (Pi,t = 0 for all
t). Let T ij denote the time it takes for indicator j to converge
to its target while i has been disrupted. Then, the adjusted
convergence time induced by a disruption of i is
T i = Ti − Ii,0
N − 1 〠
N−1
j≠i
T ij, 13
where Ti − Ii,0 takes into account the fact that, by disrupting
an indicator with a large initial gap, the average convergence
time becomes shorter. The fact that a policy issue is not
receiving direct investments does not inhibit the possibility
that the level of its associated indicator can increase. On the
contrary, this is likely to happen because there are spillover
eﬀects among policies.
As we previously discussed, resilience is a dynamic prop-
erty of a system. This means that the eﬀect of disrupting a
particular public policy needs to be measured beyond the
budgetary consequences of setting Pi,t = 0. In other words, a
policy is said to be resilient if the corresponding adjusted
convergence time is lower than the expectation from remov-
ing direct investments from i. In contrast, the policy is said to
be fragile if its adjusted convergence time is higher. (A direct
comparison of convergence times between the complete and
the disrupted models is not informative. This is so because it
is not possible to isolate the eﬀect of the disrupted policy due
to the adaptive nature of the model. That is, the complete
model has N objectives and the disrupted has N-1, rendering
any comparison useless without a normalization that
accounts for the eﬀect of the disrupted policy.)
Our proxy to measure the direct budgetary eﬀects on
convergence time is Pi, the average allocation to policy issue
i obtained from the model without disruptions. Note that, by
(11), Pi and Ti − Ii,0 are positively correlated. Therefore, if the
model was purely driven by budgetary eﬀects, a relationship
between Pi and T
i would be almost perfect (although not
necessarily linear). Deviations from the expectation of such
relationship denote evidence of resilience and fragility. Allow
us to illustrate this with a hypothetical example. Figure 3
shows artiﬁcial data about the positive relationship between
T i and Pi. The solid line represents the estimated relation-
ship, i.e., the expected budgetary eﬀect on the adjusted con-
vergence time. The dots above the conﬁdence interval
denote fragile policy issues because their disruption increase
convergence time more than expected. The dots under the
interval correspond to resilient policies. Finally, the policy
issues inside the interval are undeﬁned because they are
explained by the budgetary eﬀect.
Figure 3 exempliﬁes the importance of a systemic
approach to public policy. The points away from the expecta-
tion capture the eﬀects derived from the coevolutionary
dynamics of the model and the network. Given that each
country can choose between multiple development modes
and that it has a unique combination of network topology,
initial conditions, and institutional factors, the relationship
to be estimated for each country is
T̂
i = aPbi + εi, 14
where a and b are the parameters to be estimated via nonlin-
ear least squares. Then, we construct our resilience score of
policy i as follows
ℛi =
T̂
i
l −T
i if T i < T̂ il ,
T̂
i
u −T
i if T i < T̂ iu,
0 otherwise,
15
where T̂
i
l and T̂
i
u denote the lower and upper bounds of the
estimated conﬁdence interval. For clarity in the exposition of
our results, the positive value of this score indicates that the
corresponding policy is resilient (below the curve), while
the negative value denotes that the policy is fragile (above
the curve).
Input: A, T , B, γ
1 for each time t do
2 for each public servant i do
3 update contribution Ci,t ;
4 update beneﬁts Fi,t ;
5 for each node i do
6 update indicator Ii,t ;
7 for each node i do
8 central authority updates Pi,t ;
9 if ∣Ii,t − Ii,t−1∣ < ϵ for every i then
10 halt;
Algorithm 1: Computation implementation.
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5. Results
We estimate the 79 disrupted allocation proﬁles of each
country-mode pair (for each of the 79 cases of disruption in
a country-mode pair, we performed 30 Monte Carlo simula-
tions). For an individual country x, we pool all the outputs
from simulating the adoption of all the development modes
that x can follow. Then, we ﬁt the curve in (14) to these out-
puts. Although we do not display conﬁdence intervals in our
plots (due to their narrowness), all our results were calculated
considering an interval of 95% conﬁdence. This curve pro-
vides the expected adjusted convergence time when x cuts
its budget allocation to a disrupted policy with certain level
of priority. When the convergence time from disrupting a
policy deviates signiﬁcantly from this expectation, it suggests
resilience or fragility.
First, we provide an aggregate example in Figure 4 by ﬁt-
ting (14) to the pooled outputs of all the country-mode pairs.
(The time variable in the vertical axis is normalized by the
sum of adjusted convergence times of all perturbations in
the proﬁle, while the priorities in the horizontal axis are nor-
malized by the country’s budget B.) This aggregate exercise is
useful to show the general structure of convergence times and
relative priorities. Note that the simulated points produce a
nonlinear ﬁt, so resilient policies are those below the curve,
while fragile ones lie above it. Many policies exhibit low rela-
tive priorities and short convergence times when disrupted.
On the other hand, fewer have large budgetary allocations
while, at the same time, produce long convergence times.
The inset panel shows the distribution of deviations from
the curve. This shows that most of the points are well
explained by budgetary eﬀects.
5.1. The Importance of Spillovers. Our next aggregate result
highlights the importance of spillover eﬀects on the simula-
tion outcomes. Network eﬀects on node-level dynamic were
already identiﬁed by [6], who showed that more incoming
spillovers induce lower contributions. Then, in the context
of resilience, a straightforward demonstration of these eﬀects
is through the adjusted convergence time when the allocation
on issue i is disrupted. Figure 5 shows this metric aggregated
by countries (Figure 5(a)) and by indicators (Figure 5(b)).
That is, the dots represent average values across simulation
runs and development modes for all indicators and for all
countries, respectively. In each panel, the estimates have been
obtained from the full model, incorporating spillover eﬀects,
and from an incomplete version where we deactivate all
interactions among policy issues.
Figure 5(a) shows that the simulations generate signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent convergence times for most countries when
we remove spillovers. Notice that, in most cases, the adjusted
convergence time is lower when countries have spillover
eﬀects. This indicates that network eﬀects tend to be
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beneﬁcial for reaching development goals, independently of
disrupted public policies. In some cases, however, this does
not occur due to diﬀerent mechanisms. In our view, an intu-
itive explanation for an increase in convergence time due to
spillover eﬀects has to do with the reallocation of resources.
For example, it is possible that—for some countries and
development modes—redistributing resources from a dis-
rupted issue to other policies generates biases in favor of
nodes with relatively fewer outgoing spillovers. Under these
circumstances, it may seem as if the presence of spillovers is
detrimental for reaching the targets. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
that these cases tend to be advanced nations, suggesting that
spillover eﬀects are more beneﬁcial (at least in a more direct
way) in developing countries. Of course, second order
eﬀects might also contribute to this phenomenon.
In Figure 5(b), we can see that, by removing the spill-
overs, the adjusted convergence time varies modestly
between indicators. This is expected since, in the absence
of a network, indicators evolve only through the contribu-
tions of their bureaucrats. In this case, most of the empiri-
cal variation comes from the diﬀerent budget constraints
across countries. Since indicator-level aggregations include
all countries, this variation is not observed across indica-
tors. Therefore, spillovers provide an important source of
heterogeneity to study resilience at the aggregate level of
each indicator.
5.2. Simulation Results for Three Countries. Out of the 117
countries in the data set, we select three to estimate (14).
These countries are in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent stages of devel-
opment, for example, Mexico is considered a high-middle
income country (cluster 2), Albania is lower-middle (cluster
3), and Nigeria is low (cluster 4).
Figure 6 shows the pooled outputs of all the country-
mode pairs for each of the three cases. To be more precise,
each dot in Figure 6(a) corresponds to T i and Pi when i is
disrupted in a speciﬁc development mode that Mexico can
adopt. That is, there are 79 dots for each development mode.
Here, we highlight the dots corresponding to the most
resilient development mode (in blue) and to the least one
(in orange). The resilience of a country-mode pair is mea-
sured through the average resilience score from its 79 dis-
rupted policies. High resilience at the level of an allocation
proﬁle does not imply that all policies are resilient. It means
that a country adopting a particular development mode has
better chances at reaching its targets below the expected time.
Figure 7 shows the outcome of a similar exercise, this
time, highlighting the indicators with the highest and the
lowest average resilience scores across development modes.
The blue (orange) dots highlight the most (least) resilient
indicator across diﬀerent development modes. In the Mexi-
can case, the most fragile issue falls into the pillar of public
governance, while the most resilient belongs to the pillar of
cost of doing business. For Albania, the most resilient indica-
tor corresponds to the R&D innovation pillar and the most
fragile to the ﬁnancial market development pillar. In the case
of Nigeria, the most fragile issue relates to the pillar of infra-
structure while the most resilient is part of the health pillar.
These ﬁndings illustrate two important facts: (i) a disaggre-
gated analysis is very important because some policy issues
within a development mode can be very resilient while others
can be extremely fragile, and (ii) a particular policy issue can
be highly resilient (or fragile) for a country, no matter which
development mode is adopted.
Finally, Figure 8(a)–8(c) show which ones are the most
and the least resilient development pillars. The resilience of
a pillar measures the average score of its corresponding indi-
cators (or policy issues) across all development modes adopt-
able by a country. For the Mexican case, public governance is
the most fragile pillar while infrastructure is the most resil-
ient. Interestingly, the most resilient (fragile) pillar contains
indicators that are rather fragile (resilient), highlighting
the importance of disaggregation. This also occurs in the
other two cases but with diﬀerent pillars. For Albania, the
most fragile pillar is health, and the most resilient is R&D
innovation. This picture is completely reversed for Nigeria.
This is an interesting result since, intuitively, one would
expect health to be fragile. The Nigerian case is special
because the eﬀect on convergence time is largely dominated
by the gap between initial conditions and targets. In fact,
Nigeria exhibits a disproportionate indicator-target gap of
its health-related indicators, which makes it a high-priority
pillar (due to (11)), as shown in Figure 2. In contrast, for
example, Mexico’s top pillar—public governance—is the
most fragile. This highlights the importance of context spec-
iﬁcity and the interactions between initial conditions, tar-
gets, and spillovers.
5.3. A Global View of Resilience. In this section, we provide a
global perspective of resilience by computing average scores
at the level of development pillars and indicators. The pur-
pose of this section is to understand how, across all the coun-
tries in the sample, certain policy issues tend to be fragile or
resilient. These global averages are obtained from all the
country-mode estimations. In other words, these results
should be interpreted as the level of resilience that we should
expect if we were to study a policy issue in a hypothetical
country with the average characteristics of the population.
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Figure 9 shows the average resilience scores at the level
of development pillars. The top three most resilient pillars
are governance of ﬁrms, technological readiness, and cost of
doing business. In contrast, the three most fragile pillars
(negative resilience scores) are infrastructure, macroeco-
nomic environment, and business sophistication. Note that,
due to the dominance of laggard economies in the country
population, these estimates are biased towards developing
countries. Nevertheless, if we pick a country at random,
these are the expected levels of resilience to be found in each
development pillar.
Figure 10 presents the average resilience scores at the
level of each development indicator. Once more, the bar dia-
gram highlights the importance of a disaggregated analysis.
For instance, Figure 9 indicates that themacroeconomic envi-
ronment pillar is rather fragile, yet in Figure 10, we can see
that the inﬂation indicator is resilient. This is particularly
interesting given the generalized notion that controlling
inﬂation is central for economic development. This result,
in contrast, suggests that this policy issue is not critical to
attain the rest of the development goals. This is coherent with
the idea of incorporating more diverse development goals in
the international agenda. For example, one of the drivers
behind the Sustainable Development Goals has been a critical
position towards the narrow scope of the Millennium Devel-
opment Project, which focused almost exclusively in eco-
nomic outcomes. In fact, most development pillars have at
least one indicator with the opposite classiﬁcation (resilient/
fragile). The top ﬁve most resilient indicators are time to
resolve insolvency, time required to enforce a contract, gov-
ernment procurement of advanced tech. products, survival
to age 65 (male), and adolescent fertility rate, with two of
them belonging to the pillar of cost of doing business and
two more to health. The top ﬁve most fragile indicators are
business cost of crime and violence, infant mortality rate,
tuberculosis cases, quality of port infrastructure, and quality
of roads, with two of them belonging to the health pillar
and two more to infrastructure.
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Figure 6: The most (blue) and the least (orange) resilient development modes for three countries. The majority of orange dots are not visible
because they are covered by the blue ones. Gray dots refer to other development modes.
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5.4. Bottlenecks and Sturdy Policy Issues. One of the key chal-
lenges in development is the identiﬁcation of policy issues
that act as binding constraints to development [21–23]. In
other words, there exist certain policy issues that act as
bottlenecks, so their identiﬁcation can make policy design
substantially more eﬀective. In our context, bottlenecks are
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Figure 10: Average resilience by development indicator.
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fragile policy issues that receive a low relative priority by the
central authority. Put it diﬀerently, these are policies where
the central authority does not invest large sums, and, ironi-
cally, their disruption lowers the chances of attaining the
goals of a chosen development mode.
Another important concept is sturdiness. We say that a
policy issue is sturdy when it is a prime objective of the
central authority, and, nonetheless, it is very resilient to dis-
ruptions. This paradoxical scenario is explained by two
important features of the policy-making process. On the
one hand, the adaptability of the agents involved in the
design and implementation of policies (governments and
public functionaries) allows a proper reallocation of
resources from the original priorities to alternative policies
which, in turn, mitigate negative impacts. On the other hand,
the network of interdependent policies helps to improve the
performance of an indicator even if it does not receive direct
contributions from the general budget.
In order to identify bottlenecks and sturdy policies, we
isolate those points that fall in the 5th and 95th percentiles
of relative priorities. Bottlenecks are fragile policies in the
5th percentile, while sturdy ones are resilient issues in the
95th. Once isolated, we calculate the overall score of the bot-
tlenecks (which is negative) and sturdy policies (positive) at
the levels of pillars and development indicators. The overall
score consists of summing the indicator-level scores. The rea-
son for a sum, and not an average, is that the sum takes into
account the frequency with which a policy appears in bottle-
neck or sturdy issues across all country-mode pairs. Figure 11
shows the overall scores of bottlenecks and sturdy policies in
each development pillar.
The ﬁrst thing to notice in Figure 11 is the large diﬀerence
in the number of cases between bottlenecks and sturdy poli-
cies, being the latter much more frequent. This pattern
emerges from the learning and adaptive behavior of the
agents. It means that the adaptive nature of the policy-
making process reduces the number of scenarios where
adverse events hinder economic development. The second
feature is that the sturdiest indicators belong to the pillars
of business sophistication, ﬁnancial market development,
and governance of ﬁrms. On the other hand, the most critical
bottlenecks belong to the pillars of business sophistication,
public governance, health, and infrastructure.
Figure 12 presents a similar visualization, disaggregated
by development indicators. Here, the sturdiest policy issues
are control of international distribution, venture capital avail-
ability, ﬁnancing through local equity market, buyer sophisti-
cation, and ethical behavior of ﬁrms. In contrast, the most
critical bottlenecks are production process sophistication,
value chain breadth, extent of staﬀ training, university-indus-
try collaboration, and business impact of HIV/AIDS. The rea-
son why an indicator can be sturdy and a bottleneck at the
same time is that resilience scores may be diﬀer signiﬁcantly
between country-mode pairs. Figure 13 in the appendix pre-
sents another visualization at the level of the development
pillars but disaggregated into countries.
6. Conclusions
The quantitative study of prioritization and resilience of
public policies demands a systemic approach in order to
provide rigorous guidelines for policy advice. Traditional
methods such as regression analyses, growth diagnostics,
and benchmarking are severely limited for this purpose
because they neglect the fundamental systemic qualities
of any economy. These include the interdependencies
between policies, the importance of societal context (i.e.,
initial conditions, structure, and development modes to
pursue), the multiobjective goal-seeking behavior of gov-
ernments, and political economy considerations that pro-
duce misaligned incentives. In this paper, we develop a
complexity approach that overcomes these limitations
and use it to understand the phenomenon of resilience in
public policy.
Our framework allows identifying the allocation proﬁles
that an adaptive government selects—through a behavioral
game—in an attempt to reach the multiple targets of a pre-
speciﬁed development mode. These proﬁles are established
in an environment where public functionaries in charge of
implementing policies learn how to divert public funds.
Thus, by modelling the policy-making process, our method-
ology is capable of analyzing the adaptive nature of resilience
in policy issues when facing adverse events.
By disturbing the resource allocation to speciﬁc policy
issues, we obtain multiple results that help us to understand
policy resilience. First, some policy issues are resilient (i.e.,
the development goals are reached earlier than expected)
while others are fragile. Second, context matters because the
level of resilience or fragility depends on the country’s initial
conditions and the adopted development mode. Third, for
speciﬁc countries, some policy issues prove to be resilient
across development modes. Fourth, although some develop-
ment pillars tend to be resilient for speciﬁc countries, it is
common to ﬁnd that at least one of its indicators is fragile.
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Figure 11: Bottlenecks and sturdy policy overall scores by
development pillars. Bottlenecks: fragile policies in the 5th
percentile of relative priorities. Sturdy: resilient policies in the 95th
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Fifth, there is a set of sturdy policy issues that combine high
levels of resilience with large budget allocations. In contrast,
fragile policies with low budgetary priority are identiﬁed as
the bottlenecks to development.Overall, there aremore sturdy
policies than bottlenecks. However, the latter should raise
some ﬂags in the development strategies of governments,
since they represent major impairments to the economic
development of their nations.
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Figure 13: Sturdy policies and bottlenecks by development indicators by country (sorted by purchasing power parity income per capita).
Bottlenecks: fragile policies in the 5th percentile of relative priorities. Sturdy: resilient policies in the 95th percentile of relative priorities.
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The goal of the stable marriage problem is to match by pair two sets composed by the same number of elements. Due to its
widespread applications in the real world, especially the unique importance to the centralized matchmaker, a very large number
of questions have been extensively studied in this ﬁeld. This article considers a generalized form of the stable marriage problem,
where diﬀerent numbers of men and women need to be matched pairwise and the emergence of single men or women is
inevitable. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulations conﬁrm that even a small deviation on the number of men and
women from the equality condition can have a large impact on the matching solution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. These
results provide insights to many of the real-world applications when matching two sides with an unequal number.
1. Introduction
The stable marriage problem (SMP) consists in matching
men and women by pairs. By extension, this problem can
consist in the matching of two groups composed of diﬀerent
elements. For instance, there are extensive applications in
college admissions [1], labor markets [2], and many other
social systems [3]. The recent advances in Internet technol-
ogy have introduced the SMP into new applications: assign-
ing a large number of users to internet server [4], matching
peers in a P2P network according to preference [5], the
resource allocation in 5G networks [6], or the matching
mechanism of real-world dating website [7].
Many researchers studied the algorithms and proper-
ties on this fascinating and practical problem. The study
of the SMP started in 1962 with the Gale-Shapley (G-S) algo-
rithm [1]. This algorithm matches men and women with the
guarantee that there is always a stable match for an equal
number of men and women [8]. In 2012, the Nobel Prize in
Economics was awarded to Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E.
Roth for “the theory of stable allocations and the practice of
market design.” In this algorithm, each man ranks women
separately, from his favorite to his least favorite. Then, each
man who is still single issues a proposal to the highest woman
in his list who has not rejected him yet. The woman then
decides to accept or reject him, by retaining only the man
who is the most desirable to her. This solution is proved to
be one of the stable men-optimal solutions.
Besides mathematicians and computer scientists, statisti-
cal physicists are also interested in this issue [9, 10]. Indeed,
statistical physics is used to treat the problem with a large
number of particles, which is also well-suited to treat the
SMP. The mean ﬁeld theory was applied to calculate satisfac-
tion of both men and women in the stable marriage problem,
and it was found that men, who are the active side, were far
happier than women [11]. This method can also be used to
estimate the number of stable solutions [12, 13]. The replica
method used in spin glass was applied to study the global
optimal solution in bipartite matching, although this is not
a stable solution [14–17]. In addition, some interesting varied
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variations have been studied, such as the impact of matching
on the matching of partial information [18, 19], spatial distri-
bution, intrinsic ﬁtness [20], and acceptance threshold [13].
So far, mainstream research has been focusing on the
matching of the equal number of the two sides. In fact,
however, real-world matching problems are seldom a
match of a precisely equal size of two sides. We have seen
many examples in daily life, the student admission, job
market, the recent “one to one poverty alleviation program”
policy promoted by the Chinese government, or even the real
application of SMP: the marriage matching on dating website
[7]. These problems are mostly matching between diﬀerent
numbers of elements on both sides. We are curious to know
whether the original stable solution of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm can be applied to these unequal size-matching
problems and, if not, how would the stable solution of match-
ing be changed? What is the overall happiness of all agents in
the stable solution? Here, in this paper, we extend the stable
marriage problem to a generalized stable marriage problem
(GSMP), which represents a matching between any given
sizes of the two sides. Dzierzawa and Oméro [13] imple-
mented the numerical simulation to test the matching result
of N + 1men and N women, and their simulation shows that
in this case, women are far happier thanmen according to the
Gale-Shapley algorithm. This is hugely diﬀerent from what
the original SMP stable solution suggests. This is crucial
because it reveals that the Gale-Shapley solution is very sen-
sitive to even the smallest variation in the number of people
and actually cannot be directly used to analyze many unequal
size-matching problems. We further thoroughly study the
stable solution in GSMP, a matching between any number
of men and women. We carry out a theoretical analysis of
the stable solution for GSMP and obtain the average happi-
ness for men and women for any given population, and the
result is in perfect match with the numerical simulations.
2. Methods
We start with the classical scenario with N male and M
females to match pairwise. Here, we assume that everyone
knows all people from the opposite gender and that there is
a wish list for each person which represents the ranking of
all persons from the other gender to her/his preference. Fol-
lowing previous research models [11, 13, 17], a reasonable
and simple assumption is that all wish lists are randomly
established and irrelevant. We deﬁne an energy function for
each person, which is equal to the ranking of their eventual
partner in their wish list. The lower energy one has, the hap-
pier the person is. When N =M, it is the conventional SMP.
Here, we extend the SMP to groups with diﬀerent sizes.
When N ≠M, obviously, there will be some people who will
remain single. For these persons, their energy is deﬁned as
one worse than the bottom of the wish list; that is to say,
the energy is M + 1 for single men and N + 1 for women.
Since the number of single persons is obvious, the result of
the calculation can be simply converted for other deﬁnitions.
Here, we use Greek letters to represent men and Latin letters
to represent women. Their energy is denoted as em and ew for
men and women, respectively.
The G-S algorithm runs as follows: unengaged men will
continue to send proposals to women, and women keep the
one she prefers between the suitor and her provisional part-
ner. The process stops when no man issues proposal again,
either all men are engaged or the unengaged men are rejected
by everyone. ForN ≤M, this means that all men are engaged.
For the case ofN >M,Mmen are engaged and the remaining
N −M men are still single.
3. Result and Discussion
The stable marriage problem of the equal size of the two sides
has been thoroughly studied by many previous researches.
For M =N , several studies have proved that in the stable
solution of G-S the algorithm, the average energy of men is
ϵm = log N , and the average energy of women is ϵw =N/
log N .
3.1. Matching for M >N
3.1.1. The Average Energy of Men. First, let us consider the
situation that the number of women M is larger than the
number of men N . During the process of men proposing to
women, we notice the following: (1) the total energy of men
is equal to the number of proposals men have already sent.
(2) Once a woman is engaged, she will remain engaged (per-
haps with diﬀerent men) forever; that is to say, the number of
partners will never decrease.
Now, we focus on the number of matched pairs in the
proposing process; when it reaches to N , every man has
already been assigned to a partner and the proposal pro-
cess stops. When the number of matched pairs is K , there
are M − K women who remain unengaged. If one proposal
is sent to an engaged woman, no matter the suitor or the
woman’s current provisional partner wins, the number of
matched pairs will not change. If a proposal is sent to
an unengaged woman, which has a probability of M − K /
M, the number of matched pairs will increase to K + 1. It is
easy to deduce that on average M/ M − K , proposals have
to be sent to match one more pair.
Thus, in order to increase the number of matched pairs
from 0 to N , the expected total number of proposals men
have to send is
LN ,M = 〠
N−1
K=0
M
M − K
=M 〠
M
i=1
1
i
− 〠
M−N
j=1
1
j
1
Hence, the average energy of men when M >N is
ϵm =
LN ,M
N
= M
N
ln M
M −N
2
3.1.2. The Average Energy of Women. To obtain the average
energy of women ϵw, let us consider the ﬁnal stable solution,
in which everyone’s partner has been determined. Let us
assume a chosen woman who was ﬁnally paired with the
man ranked β in her list, so men who ranked higher than β
in her list did not issue a proposal to her. According to the
ranking of the men in the women’s list, let us denote the
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men’s energy as follows: ϵm α , α ∈ 1, 2,⋯,N . The men
who ranked in the top β − 1 in the woman’s list must have
a better partner than the woman, which means the energy
of the woman is higher than that of the assigned partners of
these men. This is because if the rank of the lady in a certain
men’s list is less than the energy value of the man, then he
must have already issued a proposal to the woman according
to the G-S Algorithm, thus causing a conﬂict. We can com-
pute the probability of a woman matched with the man
ranked β in her list:
Pβ = ∐
β−1
α=1
1 − ϵm α
M
∗
ϵm β
M
3
The energy of the single women is equal to N + 1. They
did not receive any proposal; the probability is:
PN+1 =
N
α=1
1 − ϵm α
M
4
Similarly, we use ϵm to replace ϵm α ; then we have
Pβ = 1 −
ϵm
M
β−1
∗
ϵm
M
,
PN+1 = 1 −
ϵm
M
N
5
Consider ϵw =∑β ∗ pβ; we can estimate the average
energy of women:
ϵw =
ϵm
M
〠
N
i=1
i ∗ 1 − ϵm
M
i−1
+ N + 1 ∗ 1 − ϵm
M
N
6
The summation of the series gives
ϵw =
ϵm
M
1 − 1 − ϵm /M N
ϵm/M 2
+ 1 − ϵm
M
N
7
Since we have ϵm = M/N ln M/ M −N ,
1 − ϵm/M N approximately is equal to M −N /M.
ϵw =
N
ϵm
+ M −N
M
, 8
and also we can see
ϵw ∗ ϵm ≃N 9
3.2. Matching for M <N
3.2.1. The Average Energy of Women. While M <N , let us
denote the energy of each woman as ϵi, and the average of
ϵi is denoted by ϵw.
In the ﬁnal matching state, all the women are matched
butN −Mmen are left single. The probability of a man being
single is Mi=1 1 − ϵi/N ; i.e., he is ranked lower than any of
the current partner in women’s lists. In total, we have N −M
men who are single, which means the probability of being
single is N −M /N , so we have
M
i=1
1 − ϵi
N
= N −M
N
10
Approximately, we use ϵw to replace ϵi,
1 − ϵw
N
M
= N −M
N
, 11
by taking the logarithm of both sides; we have
ϵw =
N
M
ln N
N −M
12
3.2.2. The Average Energy of Men. Let us consider the ﬁnal
stable state of matching which we know the exact matching
result of everyone. For any chosen man, we denote the energy
of women in his list as ϵw j , j ∈ 1, 2,… ,M . Then we have
the probability that he was accepted by the woman ranked ith
in his list:
Qi =
i−1
j=1
1 − ϵw j
N
ϵw i
N
13
And the probability that he was rejected by all women is
(we assume the energy of each single men is M + 1)
QM+1 =
M
j=1
1 − ϵw j
N
14
We can approximate ϵw j with the mean value ϵw, when
N is large. By averaging over i, we obtain:
ϵm = 〠
M
i=1
i 1 − ϵw
N
i−1 ϵw
N
+ M + 1 1 − ϵw
N
M
,
ϵm =
ϵw
N
1 − 1 − ϵw/N M
ϵw/N 2
+ 1 − ϵw
N
M
,
15
since 1 − ϵw/N M = N −M /N ; we have
ϵw ϵm −
N −M
M
=M 16
3.3. Numerical Simulations. The simulation result is shown
in Figure 1. Without the loss of generality, we ﬁx the
number of men equal to 1000 and vary the number of
women M from 1 to 2000. Under our deﬁnition of single’s
energy, as our theoretical result predicted, the average
energy of men increases in the beginning and almost
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saturate when M reaches around 700. The energy plateau
is mainly caused by the fact that we set the energy of sin-
gle men at M + 1. Although other deﬁnitions may apply,
we choose this deﬁnition out of many reasonable ones to
make the theoretical analysis easier. It is notable that the
average energy is low when M is close to 1. It is instruc-
tive to many social phenomena. When there are too few
women (M close to 1), most men end up single in the
matching. But the feeling of happiness, as written by soci-
ologist Ruut Veenhoven [21], “results from comparison”
may come from the relative comparison among surround-
ings, so that the overall happiness which is low may not
be a surprising outcome.
The energies of both men and women have dramatic
changes when M approaches 1000. The energy of men
has a sharp drop in this region while the energy of women
experiences a big rise. The energies of the active side and
passive side exchange their positions. As M increases, the
energy of men continues to decrease; at the meantime,
the energy of women keeps growing which is natural for
the situation that more women compete for a certain
number of men. In total, our simulation result veriﬁed
our previous theoretical analysis.
For many of the actual matching problems, the change in
the number of people’s happiness is not as sensitive to the
theoretical predictions. This may be due to some intrinsic
factors: appearance, test scores, university rankings, work
ability, salary level, and so on, which will cause the wish list
to become relevant. One of our studies recently [22] reveals
that the correlation of the people’s wish lists can signiﬁcantly
reduce the inherent instability of the G-S algorithm in the
generalized group size case.
4. Conclusion
In summary, we extend the study of the conventional stable
marriage problem to groups with diﬀerent numbers of
persons. This study has a realistic impact because the num-
bers of matching parties are often diﬀerent in many scenarios
in the real world and the losers of the competition are
widespread. For the traditional N men-M women matching
problem, it is widely accepted that the Gale-Shapley algo-
rithm leads to a matching result in which the active side
occupies a huge advantage. However, we ﬁnd that even by
reducing only one woman, the men of the active side become
obviously disadvantageous, which means that original stable
matching solution is super sensitive to changes in the
number of matching members.
In this paper, we thoroughly study the matching solution
of unequally sized stable marriage problem and provide both
a theoretical solution and numerical simulations. These ﬁnd-
ings help to further understand the structure and properties
of the SMP solution; it also sheds a light on the matching pro-
cess of matchmakers or resource allocators who deal with
many of the real bipartite matching problems with scarcity
of one side.
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